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Abstract
My dissertation deals with eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy and
political economy, particularly their discussion of sociability. My dissertation draws
attention to what I call the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy in Scottish
social thought, and presents an aspect of the Scottish Enlightenment thought as a
critical response to Bernard Mandeville's paradoxical thesis, 'private vices, public
benefits'.
My dissertation first traces how Mandeville tried to show that the wealth of a
modern commercial society was generated only from such vices as pride, vanity and
ambition and that wealth and virtue were therefore contradictory each other. I
present how Mandeville made his arguments concerning government and economic
policies, such as a highly mercantilist policy of aiming at a favourable trade balance,
based on his paradoxical thesis, 'private vices, public benefits'.
My dissertation next tries to present Francis Hutcheson's moral and political
theories as his criticism of Mandeville. I emphasise that Hutcheson's moral theory
argued that human nature was not vicious as Mandeville had argued, but was capable
of approving moral virtue in benevolence and guaranteeing the moral neutrality of
generating wealth. I then focus on Hutcheson's political theory of duty, and present
it as seeking the way of achieving both wealth and virtue by fulfilling the two sets of
duties: the moral duty of being virtuous and the economic duty of being prosperous.
My dissertation then traces how David Hume shifted the controversy from the
issues concerning the moral legitimacy of human nature and commercial opulence
towards disputes of words. I examine how Hume's moral theory argued that
whatever is useful to public benefits could not be called 'vices' but good and that
human nature was capable of forming such true moral ideas as justice, public
interests, political authority and industry in view of their utility as the standard of
morals. I present Hume's political and economic theory as aiming at the refinement
of taste and seeking to purge party rages from commerce so as to let the industry of
private interests form the moderate ideas of public interests and political authority
and pursue maximum utility.
My dissertation finally examines how Adam Smith resolved the controversy
by showing that human nature could approve moral virtue in propriety, not in utility
as Hume had argued. I present Smith's general theory of morals as attempting to
show that wealth could be generated in a morally neutral manner because human
nature was self-judgmental enough to understand the propriety, not merely the utility,
of such human passions as ambition. I then emphasise that Smith's economic theory
was his alternative policy proposal to Mandeville's favourable trade balance policy,
based on his distinctive theory of taste, advocating a free trade policy and stressing
the roles of legislators as enabling private interests to contribute to public benefits.
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The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
Introduction
1. John Pocock's problematique
My dissertation deals with eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy, particularly
its discussion of sociability. The question of sociability is of central importance to
the social thought of the Scottish Enlightenment. In this dissertation, my arguments
are presented as an attempt to answer some of the questions John Pocock (1983) set
out in his paper 'Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers: a study of the
relations between the civic humanist and the civil jurisprudential interpretation of
eighteenth-century social thought'. His paper concerns the interpretation of the
Scottish Enlightenment, and its social thought in particular, in relation to his idea of
civic humanism. Pocock's problematique is still useful for any attempt to interpret
the Scottish Enlightenment's theory of sociability, in addition to the fact that
answers, or even an overall attempt to answer his problematique, are now overdue.
The civic humanist framework in the interpretation of early modern political
and social thought, and of Scottish historical and economic theory in the eighteenth
century in particular, had been applied by particularising the ways in which it was
used as a mode of criticism against the Whig oligarchy.1 This Whig regime, whose
pillars were credit, patronage and office, is perceived as having facilitated commerce
by ruling through the creation of a system of aristocratic dependencies, though
modern and commercial in their character rather than feudal or medieval. The
expansion of trade was therefore associated with the growth of oligarchy, or the
growth of dependency-turned-corruption. It is argued that the critics of the emerging
Whig regime spoke in terms of an opposition between virtue and commerce and
assailed the regime's dependencies in the name of independence. The ideal of the
1 Pocock (1983), p. 236.
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ancient Greco-Roman classical citizen was asserted as being the head of his
household, proprietor of his arms and direct participant in his own government. It
was also to be the master of property in its natural form as land for cultivation,
discharging its classical function of endowing him with the independence necessary
for citizenship, self-mastery and virtue, depicted in Harringtonian or neo-
Harringtonian terms. His morality was to be neo-Stoic and his politics, in principle,
republican as independent individuals desiring to affirm their virtue against
corruption. The Whig regime, with its patronage, credit and commerce in the service
of parliamentary monarchy, was represented as corrupt in its modern commercial
shape.2
The problem Pocock has described concerns the alternatives to the civic
humanist framework offered by Scottish thought in the eighteenth century. They are
posed particularly by two distinctive theses: the first presents Scottish political
economy as an effective alternative to the nostalgia of agrarian republicanism; the
second is a counter-thesis which argues that Scottish thought evolved mainly outside
the doctrines and language of the civic humanist tradition.
The first thesis treats Scottish thought as responding to the civic humanist
challenge by the massive and rapid adoption of an Addisonian Whig social culture,
decisively shifting the locus of virtue from the civic to the commercial, from the
political and military to the economic, cultural and social.3 This thesis presents the
Scottish Enlightenment as directed mainly against the ancients, replacing the polis by
politeness, the oikos by the 'oeconomy', the classical political citizen of austere
virtue by the social and transactional image of man as the diversification and
refinement of the passions.4
The second thesis, on the other hand, presents Scottish social thought in the
eighteenth century as evolving within the tradition of natural jurisprudence which
Scotland shared more with adjacent Europe than with England. It argues that
Scotsmen encountered natural law, the law of nations and the civil law, not merely as
2 Pocock (1983), pp. 236-7. Harrington however seems not to fit well in Pocock's framework of
English republican thinking: see Jonathan Scott, pp. 139-63.
3 Pocock (1983), p. 240.
4 Pocock (1983), pp. 242-3.
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a part of professional training but as the principle of organising moral, social and
political philosophy. According to this approach, the Scots based their understanding
of the principles of sociability on a study of the principles of human nature and on
polite letters. Seen from this perspective, the study of law was more closely
associated with moral and epistemological philosophy than with the study of civic
virtue. It incorporated the Stoic, Shaftesburian, or Humean theories of perception,
ideas, sympathies, passions and even the newly important discourse of taste and
politeness and turned these into a science of man and society founded on the
universality of human nature in its geographical and historical diversity.5 Pocock
argued that the strength of this natural jurisprudential interpretation lies in showing
that Scottish thought and culture were not reducible merely to a debate between
Court and Country, or between Whig commercialism and Tory or Old Whig neo-
classicism. They must be seen as operating within its own conditioning structures
including provincialism within the Union. Even among civic humanists, their
understandings of an active social morality might have been comfortably integrated
with the moralist and jurisprudential traditions of Scotland.6
With the theoretical differentiation above, Pocock summed up his
problematique as follows: if the vocabulary and language of civic humanism,
together with others derived from it, were to exist side-by-side with the language of
natural jurisprudence, the relationship between them needed to be determined.7
Pocock has suggested that, since the civic humanist scheme presents the ideal
of republican virtue as a weapon that could be used to attack the Whig regime, it
presents Scottish social theory as the latter's philosophical defence. He concluded
that their delineation of commercial society was therefore not a criticism of
aristocracy but a vindication of it in its Whig shape.8 This interpretation presumes
that Scottish social theory was identical to the ideological basis of Whig policies.
My dissertation tries to disprove the case, by showing that Scottish social theory was
primarily and fundamentally formulated against modern Court Whiggism. I seek to
5 Pocock (1983), pp. 246-7.
6 Pocock (1983), p. 247.
7 Pocock (1983), pp. 249-50.
8 Pocock (1983), p. 243.
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show that Polite Whiggism, from which Scottish social theory seems to have
evolved, should be distinguished from modern Court Whiggism.
Pocock's interpretation has led him to a further question: whether it is
possible to regard commercial ideology as having at any period triumphed over the
ideology of civic patriotism and virtue, or as having driven it from the field. His
proposition has been that the civic and commercial ideologies were struggling with
one another at least down to the era of Smith and Millar, and that it is doubtful
whether there had been a moment at which the former may be said to have
disappeared entirely.9 My dissertation suggests that the question itself does not
necessarily lead to a crucial interpretation of Scottish social theory. I argue that
Scottish social theory seems to have evolved from Polite Whig ideology which
already contained some elements from Country Whiggism. I also argue that the
Scots version of polite ideology also made use of Country elements whenever it was
necessary and useful for their refutation ofCourt Whig ideology and policy.
Pocock has also suggested some possible strategies to use in confronting the
problem: the first is to assume that the civic humanist and jurisprudential languages
entailed distinct and opposing sets of ideological values, and that the relation
between them therefore existed in a state of ideological tension.10 My dissertation
indicates that this seems not to be the case: Polite Whiggism and Scottish social
theory were constructed primarily against Court Whiggism, by extracting ideas
useful and effective for their purpose from both civic humanist or Country Whiggism
and the natural law tradition.
Pocock's other proposal is based on Quentin Skinner's argument of
Ciceronian and Senecan modes of humanism of the sixteenth century. Skinner
argues that the tension between virtue and commerce had already been a great deal
reduced by then. Pocock assumes that it is highly possible that these or their
successors figured in eighteenth-century ideologies of sociability, sensibility and
politeness, serving to reduce the stark opposition between citizenship and culture." I
argue that the non-existence of an antithesis between civic humanism and natural
9 Pocock (1983), p. 244.
10 Pocock (1983), p. 250.
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jurisprudence however does not necessarily guarantee the putative existence of a
synthesis of them: there would be the possibility of a mere juxtaposition of them in a
vast area in-between those two extreme cases. I seek to show that Scottish social
theorists made use of both civic and jurisprudential idioms primarily for their
criticism and refutation of Court Whig ideology and policy, most notably expressed
in Mandeville, who had been neither Stoic nor Ciceronian unlike those Polite or
Scots Whigs. I criticise Pocock's conception of a new 'Adam Smith problem': that
is, 'How did the complex synthesis of "moral sentiment" with "the wealth of
nations" evolve or degenerate into the science of classical economics'?12 In view of
this new 'Adam Smith problem', Pocock has suggested that 'A common strategy is
to invoke Mandeville and suppose that this vindication of egotism and greed
somehow unmasks commercial society and prefigures its reductionism. Yet this
hardly seems convincing in the light of Hume's, Smith's and Robertson's labours to
demonstrate the proliferation and diversification of personality under the conditions
of commercial growth, an enterprise in which they incorporated all that Mandeville
had had to say'.13 My dissertation stresses that Smith's theory of 'moral sentiments'
was his assault on Mandeville's ethical theory, and 'the wealth of nations'
(Mandeville's term) was his consequent alternative policy proposal and conclusion in
place of Mandeville's, following his own refutation of the ethical foundation of
Mandeville's system.
2. The Scottish Enlightenment as a criticism of Bernard
Mandeville
To tackle these questions and assumptions, I turn, first of all, to a general assumption
made by the authors of both frameworks discussed above. They argue that the
Scottish theory of sociability was rooted in Bernard Mandeville's theory of passions,
of the sentiments which the passions give rise to, and of the relationship between
11 Quentin Skinner, Vol. I, Chapters 8 and 9; Pocock (1983), pp. 250-1.
12 Pocock (1983), p. 251.
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'private' and 'public' in his The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick
Benefits (London, 1714). My dissertation first offers a critique of this view, and
seeks to show that eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy was partly a critical
response to Mandeville's theory of passions, sentiments and sociability in what I call
the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy. The controversy was launched by
Mandeville with his graphic paradox that such 'private vices' as pride, vanity and
ambition alone could contribute to 'public benefits'. The debate revolved around the
question of how to direct the acquisitive passions driving men into commercial
relations into supplying their needs so as to establish sustainable sociability in the
newly-emerging commercial society in eighteenth-century Britain.
My dissertation traces how Mandeville, seeking to show that private vice is a
necessary evil for prosperity, emphasised the passion of pride as the most beneficial
quality to sociability and the most necessary for producing wealth. We then look at
Mandeville's argument that the task of government in establishing sociability in a
commercial society is to turn private vices into public benefits and happiness. I
emphasise Mandeville's economic policy that statecraft should aim at this by keeping
a favourable trade balance in foreign trade. We also consider how Mandeville
attempted to show that curing such vices would lead us out of prosperity into poverty
and that it was impossible to attempt for both riches and moral virtues at the same
time.
My dissertation stresses that, in Scottish moral philosophy, as ethics were
discussed in respect to the question of 'vices', so was political economy in respect to
that of 'benefits', and hence the question of sociability was by virtue of that argued
in both ethics and political economy. My dissertation, above all, seeks to show that
the Scottish theory of beauty and taste played a much more crucial role than has been
assumed in shaping the theory of sociability as a critical response to Mandeville's
arguments. An examination of the Scottish theory of beauty and taste offers us a
new picture of the theory of sociability in the Scottish Enlightenment which will be
rather different from Pocock's picture. I examine how and for what purposes the
13 Pocock (1983), p. 252.
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Scottish language of sociability employs such technical terms as 'beauty', 'virtue'
and 'wealth' as well as 'private', 'public', 'vice' and 'benefit'.
The theory of beauty and taste in Scottish moral philosophy has been lost
sight of by historians.14 It was with the theory of beauty and taste taken from
Shaftesbury that Francis Hutcheson initiated his scholarly publications with An
Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue (1725). In due course,
the theory of beauty and taste was by and large adopted by and in many ways
stimulated such Scots writers as Lord Karnes,'3 Alexander Gerard,16 James Beattie,17
Hugh Blair,18 Thomas Reid,19 Archibald Alison,20 and more notably, as we shall see,
David Hume and Adam Smith.21 It was the theory of beauty and taste that shaped,
though by no means exclusively, Smith's theory of sociability as his criticism of
Mandeville.
My dissertation therefore traces how Hutcheson criticised Mandeville and
developed what can be called a language of beauty, which was derived from
Shaftesbury, who had been the target of Mandeville. In this, Hutcheson showed that
sentiments and even the love of wealth are shaped by the 'sense of beauty' and
'taste' as well as the 'moral sense' or 'moral taste'. In Hutcheson's language,
therefore, sentiments are neither virtuous nor vicious in themselves, but are a means
of creating resources with which men can contribute to public benefits and virtuous
purposes. We look at how Hutcheson argued that the idea of beauty could be formed
14 As for the nature of aesthetics in the Enlightenment, R. G. Saisselin (1992) is particularly useful.
Charles L. Griswold (1999) surveys the importance of Smith's concept of beauty in his writings. See
Griswold, pp. 311-54, especially, pp. 330-5. As I argue below, 'taste' was a far more crucial concept
in Smith than that of 'beauty'.
15 Lord Karnes (1762).
16 Alexander Gerard (1759).
17 James Beattie (1776).
18 Hugh Blair (1783).
19 Thomas Reid (1785).
20 Archibald Alison (1790).
21 In his Outlines ofMoral Philosophy, Dugald Stewart reflected that taste had been treated as one of
the most important intellectual powers and 'an ultimate fact in the constitution of the human mind'.
At the end of the Scottish Enlightenment, Dugald Stewart still thought that 'the extensive influence it
[taste] possesses in such a state of society as ours, not only over the pursuits of those who devote
themselves to the study of Literature and of the Fine Arts, but over the enjoyments of every individual
who partakes of the general refinement of manners, might justify the allotment of a separate article to
an illustration of the intellectual process by which it is formed' (Outline, 86). See Dugald Stewart
(1854), p. 32.
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indifferently to self-interest, rather than relatively to self-interest or vicious motives
as Mandeville had argued, due to our sense of beauty. I emphasise that Hutcheson's
objective in his moral theory was to prove that morals were not solely motivated by
self-interest or vicious motives, but inferred from benevolence, due to our moral
sense. I also stress that Hutcheson's ideas of the sense of beauty and the moral sense
were presented for the sake of guaranteeing the moral neutrality of generating wealth
against Mandeville's arguments.
My dissertation then presents Hutcheson's A System of Moral Philosophy
(1755) as classifying duties into two categories: a duty of being virtuous; and a duty
of being prosperous. We see that Hutcheson argued that both kinds of duty would
enable us to be virtuous as well as wealthy at the same time through the moral sense.
I emphasise that this compatibility of virtuous and wealthy was the hinge in the
System of his criticism of Mandeville, who had argued that these two were
contradictory each other.
Having examined Hutcheson, my dissertation then traces the theories of
David Hume. Hume is generally assumed to be a friendly but sceptical critic of
Hutcheson. My dissertation will emphasise that Hume owed to Hutcheson more than
is realised, in terms of the theory of beauty and taste which was important in shaping
the moral sentiments and sociability. My dissertation, however, seeks to show that
Hume developed his criticism of Mandeville in a different way from Hutcheson. I
discuss Hume's differences from Hutcheson in the context of Hume's theories of
property, justice and the pursuit of wealth, and I emphasise that Hume was able to
demonstrate on different grounds to Hutcheson that the pursuit of wealth shaped by
the sense of beauty and utility can generate virtue. My dissertation stresses that a
theory of taste also played a crucial role in Hume's system of moral philosophy. We
look at how Hume was to follow Hutcheson's criticism of Mandevillian terminology
and tried to organise the controversy as disputes of words. I present how Hume's
moral theory argued that whatever was useful to public benefits could not be called
'vices' but good. I also trace how Hume endeavoured to show that human nature
was capable of forming such true moral ideas as justice, public interests, political
authority and industry in view of their utility as the standard of morals, against
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Mandeville's rhetoric for destroying the distinction between morals and vices. I
stress that Hume's concept of sympathy, in place of Hutcheson's idea ofmoral sense,
was the foundational formula of sociability as well as the principle on which he
relied to refute Mandeville's sceptical theory of morality. I also emphasise that, in
the context of 'private vices, public benefits' controversy, introducing usefulness or
utility as the standard of morals was how Hume sought to solve Mandeville's
paradox, by presenting the concept as guaranteeing the moral neutrality of generating
wealth. We look at Hume's arguments that our idea of beauty introduces utility as
the basis for our sociability without selfishness, because our sympathy with others
who possess beautiful objects and who enjoy their utility excites our love not as a
selfish passion, let alone as a vicious passion.
Moving on to Hume's political and economic theory, my dissertation focuses
on his emphasis on the role of taste for us to make use of our natural abilities for
production. I argue that a refined taste was regarded by Hume as vital for
moderation and the control of the passions and political zealotry so as to redirect
passions and their capacity for industry and public interest. I emphasise that Hume
presented a refined taste as capable of purging factional party rage which would
otherwise jeopardise prosperity, and of enabling us to form more moderate moral
ideas of government and public interest in the light of their utility as the standard of
morals.
My dissertation finally seeks to prove that, in the context of the 'private vices,
public benefits' controversy, Adam Smith's revolution, if it may be called so, lies in
his attempt to solve Mandeville's paradox by destroying and offering alternatives to
Humean utilitarian thinking. Smith is presented as a moral philosopher who shared
Hutcheson's and Hume's desire to respond to Mandeville's theory of sociability,
who shared their belief that a true theory of sociability takes account of our taste, but
who also developed his criticism of both Hutcheson and Hume. Smith's critical
responses to Hutcheson and Hume allowed him to develop the theory of sociability
which was needed to sustain his understanding of the workings of the market in a
fully commercial society in eighteenth-century Britain. We trace Smith's arguments
that virtue primarily consists in propriety, but only secondarily in utility, and that
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propriety is recommended to us by moral sentiments, but only secondarily by our
sense of utility. My dissertation, above all, emphasises that Smith's theory of beauty
and taste was a more specific yet comprehensive attack on Mandevi lie's theory of
passions, sentiments and sociability, which had argued that wealth was pursued by
private vices alone such as pride, vanity and ambition. I present how Smith argued
that the sense of beauty was not primarily concerned with the utility brought about
by the beauty but originated from the pleasure of seeing the order, harmony and
economy of organisation or arrangement. I also focus on Smith's argument that the
propriety in generating wealth is recommended to us by the sense of beauty, because
the sense of beauty propels ambition toward pursuing wealth as something proper in
itself rather than merely useful.
My dissertation stresses that Smith's idea of the roles of taste in his Wealth of
Nations was to approve and vindicate a modern commercial society as the product of
the morally neutral rather than vicious motives. I present Smith's arguments that
taste works as a customary sentiment which is not primarily affected by the thought
or idea of utility, as Hume had argued, but extends even to the common people. We
see that Smith thought of taste as an internalised faculty which is indispensable to the
motivation of vanity and ambition, which are complex sentiments beyond the reach
of utility calculation, in stimulating the demand for finer products and in
guaranteeing the moral neutrality of generating wealth.
My dissertation concludes that Smith's Wealth ofNations was his alternative
policy proposal to Mandevillian statecraft and the favourable trade balance policy. I
argue that Smith concluded that policies aimed at gaining a favourable trade balance,
that is, regulations upon commerce, were jeopardising the wealth of nations, and that
a policy of free trade should therefore replace them, so that the wealth of nations can
be maximised. I emphasise that the role of legislators in Smith was to turn 'private
interest' into the public interest by exploiting the advantage of the division of labour
and letting private interests unintentionally work for public benefits.
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3. The types of Whiggism revisited
To be fair to Pocock, however, I acknowledge that he has further elaborated his view
on Whiggism since the 1983 essay and presented a more up-to-date picture of
Whiggism in his paper, 'The varieties of Whiggism from Exclusion to Reform: A
history of ideology and discourse' (1985).22 Accordingly, I first reconsider the Whig
context of the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy by referring to Pocock
(1985) and others' works.
Harry Dickinson summarises that Whiggism can be characterised by its
justification of property and sociability. Philosophically and ideologically,
Whiggism defended, justified and promoted the interests and privileges of the
property-owning class.23 This gave rise to its credibility with the characteristic
commitment to the problem of sociability, or a balance between liberty (self-
interests) and order (public benefits).24 To achieve a balance between liberty and
order was their fundamental problem. They distinguished liberty from license, and
the observance of order from the arbitrary tyranny. They contended that there could
be no legitimate order without liberty, and there could be no real liberty without law.
They believed that a balance between liberty and order could best be achieved by
support for the rule of law achieved by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, the
Revolution Settlement of 1689, the Hanoverian Succession of 1714, the sovereignty
of King-in-Parliament, an aristocratic and hierarchical social order and a limited,
mixed constitutional monarchy.23
But there were considerable varieties among Whigs about how to interpret
sociability, the conflicting interests between liberty and order, and how best to
achieve these basic aims and principles. Their conflicting point was over the relative
importance of the two fundamental objectives of Whiggism: the protection of
22 J. G. A. Pocock (1985). Yet his questions and assumptions in the 1983 essay are still to be
addressed, as Pocock himself has done little either in the essay above or in any other of his works.
23 H. T. Dickinson (1981), p. 29.
24 Dickinson (1981), pp. 29-30.
25 Dickinson (1981), pp. 31 and 42. More in detail for their views on human nature, on the natural
sociability, on the origins of civil society, civil government and its ends and objectives, and on the
means by which they could be achieved, see Dickinson (1981), pp. 31-45.
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individual liberty and the maintenance of public order. More liberal Whigs such as
Court Whigs rated the rights and liberty of the subjects higher than public order,
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. More conservative Whigs such as
Country Whigs reversed these priorities. Under the early Hanoverians, Court Whigs
defended Crown patronage for the smooth working of a mixed government and a
balanced constitution. Country Whigs feared that the overly-increasing Crown
patronage was now threatening the parliamentary sovereignty for the sake of the
interests of the government.26 The term 'Country' or 'Court' therefore identifies an
attitude toward government rather than an ideological affiliation. Country Whigs
tended to draw the line ofmarking off the impermissible in the name of public order
and emphasise abstract constitutional theory as prescriptions. Court Whigs held
power or supported those in power, and sought to ease and smooth the process of
government, preferring convenience for administrations to strictures.27
a. Country Whigs
Country or opposition Whigs advocated liberty guarded by country gentlemen, who
they thought were therefore the most beneficial to the public order, and opposed to
luxury, consumption, wealth or, in their idiom, 'private vices', in an age of
advancing commercial civilisation. Their now somewhat out-of-date civic idiom was
first naturalised by James Harrington in the 1650s and later revised by Henry
Neville, a neo-Harringtonian, in the 1670s. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl
of Shaftesbury, grew up in this circle and he was close to Robert Molesworth and
Andrew Fletcher in the 1690s. They defined liberty in terms of the virtuous
participation of citizen-like subjects in their government for public order, rather than
for individual freedom, premised on a personal autonomy backed by the possession
of freehold land and the bearing of arms. They construed the landed gentlemen in
26 Dickinson (1981), p. 43.
27 Reed Browning (1982), p. 11. For the division between Court and Country Whigs, see also William
Speck (1981), pp. 63-5.
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the country as the receptacle of civic virtue.28
Country Whigs perceived England as populated with autonomous landed
gentlemen who were the embodiments and guardians of English virtue and liberty,
whose life combined the personalities of rentier, agriculturalist, businessman,
politician, officeholder, and member of local community. They juxtaposed Country
to Court and regarded the latter as the primary source of corruption.29 Civic writers
condemned the pursuit of wealth and its consumption as luxury, and instead
validated frugality.30 Their concern with virtue and liberty modulated into a concern
with manners. Independence, public-mindedness, martial strength, frugality and
simplicity were the manners conducive to liberty and of the Machiavellian classical
citizen. By contrast, self-indulgent, private, soft, sensuous, expensive and excessive
ways of living were threats to economic and moral independence and public order.
The cultures they admired as free and virtuous were Sparta, early Rome and Gothic
Europe, as opposed to Court policies and the actual direction of modern history.31
Among Country Whigs, radical republicans like James Harrington contended
that the Ancient Constitution failed to maintain the balance of powers and that a new
separation and balance of powers based on a genuine republic must be sought
instead.'2 They were Whigs in opposition and employed arguments about the
independence of legislative representatives from the executive and of property from
patronage, which led to the separation of powers and to republicanism.3 '
The more conservative Whigs among them expressed their position in terms
of the Ancient Constitution, emphasising the continuity of the constitution and
legitimising the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 as a return to the constitution after
the digression of James II's reign/'4 Their criticism of executive patronage, public
credit and standing armies was seen as originating in the republicanism of the
interregnum and even the Renaissance." They justified the Revolution as an act
28 Lawrence E. Klein (1994), p. 126.
29 Klein, pp. 143-4.
30 Klein, p. 145.
31 Klein, pp. 145-6.
32 Pocock (1985), p. 221. See also E. G. Hundert(l994), pp. 9-13.
33 Pocock (1985), p. 222.
34 Klein, p. 125.
35 Pocock (1985), pp. 216-7.
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carried out within the structure of the Ancient Constitution, designed to preserve it
and legitimated by it, though their arguments were neither complete nor
satisfactory.36 These Ancient Constitutionalists believed that the Revolution had
established or restored the mixed monarchy, part republican, part monarchical, in
Britain. They believed that property and religion would be secured in a perfect
equilibrium of political authority between king, lords and commons. They held that
such a constitution was rational, conforming to the classical ideals of a free
constitution, restating and perfecting the Ancient Constitution of England in the
gothic past.37
On the other hand, even more radical Country Whigs of 1688-89 were
theorists of social contract and natural rights, presenting the Revolution as an
opportunity for constitutional revision.38 These Ancient Constitutionalists claimed
that frequent or annual parliaments were rooted in medieval or Anglo-Saxon
antiquity, so that to deny them by prorogation or dissolution was to deny Englishmen
their constitutional inheritance or birthright.19 Some held that the Revolution was a
dissolution of the regime if not the government, an election of a prince by the people
and an affirmation of a right to do the same again when necessary.40 They held that
the Revolution had been a restatement of the classic principles of limited monarchies
in the feudal era in which they supposed that the power of kings had been held in
check by virtuous barons. They looked back to the heroic days of the Civil War and
the republican experiment that followed.41
Among them, John Locke went even further in claiming that the royal
prerogative must be exercised solely for the public order. He argued that it is
entrusted to the monarch to be so exercised; that if it is betrayed, such as in the
calling and dissolving of parliaments, that trust is dissolved and with it the
government. He contended that the people may judge whether this has happened
and, by drawing the sword, proclaim that the monarch has put himself in a state of
36 Pocock (1985), p. 228. Pocock called them 'the ruling Whigs'.
37 Nicholas Phillipson (1989), p. 19.
38 Klein, p. 126.
39 Pocock (1985), p. 226.
40 Pocock (1985), p. 228.
41 Phillipson (1989), p. 21.
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war with them.42 Pocock argues that Locke was a First Whig who never became a
Radical Whig or a significant contributor to their claim to 'frequent parliaments
regularly chosen by the people'. This Radical Whig claim had been made on
grounds of both natural and historical right in the manifestos of the army, the
Levellers and the Good Old Cause.43 Shaftesbury thought that Locke's work was
morally subversive unless carried further in the direction of sociability.44
Shaftesbury therefore thought that Radical Country Whigs had overemphasised
public order over individual liberty, and hence lost the sense of balance between
liberty and order in their quest for how best to achieve sociability. The more radical
their arguments became, therefore, the more stress was put on public order over
individual liberty.
b. Polite Whigs
Polite Whigs approved individual liberty more than Country Whigs did over public
order. Polite Whigs, who advocated politeness for cultivating sociability and against
enthusiasm, included Joseph Addison, Richard Steele and a group of literary figures
who were party journalists and cultivated essayists, catering to a new urban public of
the readers of periodicals.45 Their ideal of politeness had first appeared in the
Restoration, forming a part of the campaign to replace prophetic by sociable
religiosity. Their polemic against enthusiasm, which was the scars of the Puritan
interregnum, was to continue throughout the eighteenth century, and the concepts of
politeness, manners and taste were to remain the integral parts of their strategy.46
Their 'Augustan' ethos of politeness in the rise of commerce was an active civilising
force: by observation, conversation and cultivation, men and women are brought to
their awareness of sociability as a highly serious practical morality.47
42 Pocock (1985), p. 227.
43 Pocock (1985), p. 229. Pocock called the Radical Whigs before the Revolution 'the True Whigs'.
44 Pocock (1985), p. 230.
45 Pocock (1985), pp. 235-6.
46 Pocock (1985), p. 236.
47 Pocock (1985), p. 236.
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In the Polite Whig view, politeness had aesthetic value against religious and
moral enthusiasm. They advocated politeness as a remedy for either the fanaticism
of public order or that of individual liberty. Instead of Daniel Defoe's appeals to
pragmatism and profit for the sake of individual liberty, Addison's and Steele's
Tatler and Spectator essays preached polite manners and morals against the vagaries
of opinion and the fury of faction. They presented manners and morals as useful and
virtuous codes of conduct in a modern commercial society, for ordinary citizens to
learn and cultivate friendship and conversation as the best way of getting rid of their
eccentricity and enthusiasm, in such forums as the coffee-house, the tavern and the
tea-table.48 Their essays were extensively reprinted and imitated in London and the
provincial cities and towns, exerting a profound influence on a provincial culture that
was being transformed by commerce.49
Addison and Steele adapted classical moral codes to modern culture, by
extolling the virtues of Cicero's De Officiis which had taught men to be honest
citizens, temperate and prudent in relationships. They also adapted the formal
courtly rules of modern French politesse to the easier, more informal English urban
life. Like Shaftesbury after 1700s, they believed that true politeness could cultivate
our naturally benevolent feelings by improving imperfect taste, manners and
zealotry.50 'Taste' and 'politeness' were key concepts effectively employed by the
new Unionist elite, who attached themselves to such themes as moderns against
ancients, and imperial against republican values, in answering the challenge of civic
and republican virtue. They began to charge against Country Whigs their fanaticism
of moral virtue no less than of religion, just as religious enthusiasts flung themselves
into the fantasies of faith for lack of taste and polite discrimination.51
Polite Whigs addressed the problem of sociability most directly by
developing an elaborate language of manners which showed how propriety,
reinforced by the cultivation of taste and politeness, could encourage prudence as a
virtue necessary in the daily life of a free commercial polity. Their enterprise was
48 Phillipson (1989), p. 27.
49 Phillipson (1989), pp. 25-6.
50 Phillipson (1989), p. 27.
51 Pocock (1983), pp. 241 and 243.
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explicitly Ciceronian and designed to explore the resources of conversation as an
instrument for generating a reformation of manners. They attempted to show how
cultivating the arts of conversation could reform the morals and manners of citizens
whose behaviour was shaped by the imagination and passions, especially that of
pride, and to advocate the pursuit of virtue and decency as the path to a true
understanding of virtue.52 An essential element of Spectatorial propriety was
politeness as the skill of cultivating discretion and virtue, in which propriety became
its vehicle and was to curb narrow views of self-interest and develop sociability, or
more extensive views of public interest and morality.53 To them, politeness was a
matter of cultivating the arts, sciences and a love of beauty by means of
conversations which allowed the citizens to receive the truths of aesthetics and
sociability. In this sense, it was politeness which underwrote Spectatorial ethics and
the language of propriety on which their moderate defence of the Glorious
Revolution depended.54
Polite Whiggism also stood for what was called 'the Town', the leisured
urban environment spreading north and west from the old centres of Westminster and
the City of London following the growth of a parliamentary aristocracy and the
rentier class. The Town was meant to replace the court as the meeting point of
country and city: without the urbane and suburbane culture they taught, the country
would be unable to exercise their liberty.55 They were journalists at Grub Street who
wanted to create a public opinion that would transcend political party and be more
rational, more moderate, more in tune with common sense than that of the party
propagandists. They sought to control the fragmentation of opinion, to attack
religious and political zealotry, to bring about a reformation ofmanners and to secure
the constitution.56 Amidst the expansion of trade and increasingly complex
commercial relationships, they saw that manners began to be softened and passions
refined, and that 'conversation', 'intercourse' and 'commerce' could be used
synonymously to denote economic, cultural or social transaction. To them,
52 Nicholas Phillipson (1993), p. 308.
53 Phillipson (1993), pp. 309-10.
54 Phillipson (1993), p. 310.
55 Pocock (1985), p. 237.
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commerce became the mother of politeness and of a post-classical alternative ideal of
liberty, in which property was protected by authority and law, as was more
appropriate in the commercial stage of history. They took up Addisonian politeness
as a substitute for classical republican patriotism, in the names of 'taste and
science'.57
Polite Whiggism was formed in the latter years of William Ill's reign in
which party conflict was sharpened by the fears of oligarchy and by the conduct of a
war which was turning Britain into an imperial polity. Grub Street writers of a
newly-established and rapidly expanding periodical press revived the classic debate
about divine right, resistance and passive obedience, and brought them into
polemical focus.38 The revival of natural law contributed to form Polite Whigs such
as Addison and Shaftesbury.59 The natural jurisprudence of Grotius and Pufendorf
was therefore the source of their theories of limited resistance which were to be free
of radical, exclusionist implications. They were also to be useful to Whigs and
Tories alike who sought a more moderate defence of the Revolution of 1688 and the
Revolution Settlement of 1689.60 Addison and Steele addressed the problem of
creating a language of interest which would reinforce the increasingly shaky
authority of the language of rights on which the legitimacy of the Revolution
depended.61 In sum, Polite Whigs endeavoured to develop the language of politeness
and taste in order to establish a balance between the protection of individual liberty
and the maintenance of public order in their quest for attaining sociability.
c. Court Whigs
While Country Whigs identified liberty with civic virtue, and Polite Whigs with
56 Phillipson (1989), p. 24.
57 Pocock (1983), pp. 241 and 243.
58 Phillipson (1993), p. 304.
59 Pocock (1985), p. 219. Although Pocock selected Shaftesbury into this section of Whig, rather than
the Country Whig, see also p. 226. Polite Whigs are also called 'Independent Whigs'. See p. 234.
60 Phillipson (1993), p. 303.
61 Phillipson (1993), p. 306.
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manners and propriety, Court Whigs identified it with wealth, enlightenment and
progress.62 They advocated that sociability in a modern commercial society rested on
the protection of individual liberty and material progress that they perceived relied
hugely upon individual enterprises.
The general and fundamental axiom of Court Whiggism is the anti-utopian,
more pragmatic and more realist view of politics. As Whigs in power, they declared
that the perfect regime was beyond the capacity of human wisdom, and depicted their
Country opponents, unjustifiably, as Utopian, in order to damage the credibility of
opposition assaults.63
Court Whig thinkers defined the nature of the lawful government in Britain
by arguing that the British constitution, which specified lawfulness in a British
context, was a product of the Restoration of 1660 and the Glorious Revolution.64
They consequently magnified the monarch as a symbol of the regime.6:1 They
preached 'rational' obedience, in place of the Tory doctrine of passive obedience, in
order to justify both their legacy of the Glorious Revolution and their current regime.
They argued that the duty ofWhigs at the time of the Revolution had been resistance
because James II had assailed individual liberties, whereas their present duty was
obedience because their government was now lawful.66
Court Whig clergy linked the glorification of the monarch to the
superintendence of God. Court Whigs referred to the Bible, called kings 'vice-
regents of God' and taught that the obedience to authority was commanded by God
and conscience.67
According to J. H. Plumb's description of the 'Whig oligarchy', the Court
Whig party cemented their regime after a period of turbulent politics through 1714.
They established such highly specific measures as the Septennial Act of 1716, the
Peerage Bill of 1719 and other measures that aristocratic patronage wielders
62 Klein, p. 128. See also Pocock (1985), p. 231.
63 Browning, pp. 176-7.
64 Browning, pp. 196-7.
65 Browning, pp. 198-9.
66 Browning, pp. 199-200.
67 Browning, pp. 198-200.
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maintained until after 1760.68
This Whig oligarchy was founded on the management of a system of public
finance by a class of great landed proprietors.69 Contrary to Country Whigs, who
argued for the separation of powers and for republicanism, they employed arguments
leading to the sovereignty of Parliament, as Whigs who desired to protect individual
liberty.70 Court Whiggism was a defence of urban life and politics not as an ancient
polis but as a financial and military regime based on a decisive abandonment of the
classical and Gothic ideal of the citizen as armed proprietor. They replaced it with
an individual, leisured and acquisitive man paying for a standing army to defend his
liberty. In this sense, they called for an understanding of commercial modernity
based on the protection of individual liberty.71
The Whig 'oligarchy' or 'supremacy' was the effective domination of a party
exploiting a parliament so far sovereign that it had prolonged its own term without
elections in counties and even in boroughs. They effectively disfranchised the
borough electorates who had been strengthened, involved and enlarged by the gentry
in the preceding century.72 The regime was consolidated and typified by Sir Robert
Walpole.7' This is why it is sometimes argued 'that absolute monarchy reached its
height in England during the reign of George II'.74 They employed a modernist,
commercial and polite language in defence of the Whig aristocratic order, against
discontented groups in county and borough society who chose to employ republican,
classical and nostalgic language.7' They argued that liberty was not ancient but
modern, that the past was feudal, not free, that the constitution contained no
principles to which a return to more frequent parliament could be made.76
Defoe, for example, contended that liberty appeared only when individual
68 Pocock (1985), pp. 216 and 239. J. H. Plumb (1967).
69 Pocock (1985), p. 218.
70 Pocock (1985), pp. 221-2.
71 Pocock (1985), p. 235.
72 Pocock (1985), pp. 239-40.
73 Pocock (1985), p. 240.
74 Pocock (1985), p. 244. The Court Whig administrations commanded British affairs from 1721 to
1756: Robert Walpole from 1721 to 1742, Henry Pelham from 1743 to 1754, and his brother Thomas
Pelham-Holles, Duke ofNewcastle, from 1754 to 1756. See Browning, pp. 10-2.
75 Pocock (1985), p. 246.
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proprietors emerged from feudal subordination and acquired through trade control
over their own goods. Because the oligarchy acquired the control of the executive
and the power to exercise parliamentary sovereignty, the defence of oligarchy and
sovereignty went hand-in-hand with that of individual liberty and consequently a
commercial society.77 Defoe was a satirist on behalf of Court Whiggery, who
celebrated pragmatism and a willingness to get on with the ordinary life without
absurd and dangerous prejudices, alerting his readers to the pleasures and profits of
70
commerce.
Historically-minded ministerial propagandists like Lord Hervey did not
believe that there had been a free constitution of any sort before the Revolution of
1688-89. In his view, the earlier history of England had been nothing other than the
story of a procession of tyrants, whether regal, baronial or ecclesiastical, who had
ruled without any regard to individual liberty.79
As Pocock has shown, the foundations of this Whig oligarchy lay in the
military, financial and political structures that had been created in William Ill's reign
to enable Britain to take part in major wars with France.80 The militia controversy of
1698 therefore makes the distinction between Court Whiggism and Country
Whiggism clear. The most prominent theme of Country Whig polemic was the
reduction of William Ill's army. Fletcher held forth on the vices of a standing army
and the virtues of a militia.81 In his Discourse ofGovernment in Relation to Militias,
Fletcher found the Harringtonian ideal of armed civic virtue in a Gothic and
medieval past, entailing specialisation in the rise of commerce and a loss of liberty
due to standing armies exploiting and corrupting the freeholders.82 In an Anglo-Irish
context, Molesworth in Dublin had published his Account of Denmark and William
Molyneux was about to publish his Case of Ireland's Being Bound by Acts of
76 Pocock (1985), pp. 246-7. As for the Court Whig view of the root of liberty as in the Glorious
Revolution, see also Browning, pp. 196-199.
77 Pocock (1985), p. 247.
78 Phillipson (1989), p. 25.
79 Phillipson (1989), pp. 84-5.
80 Pocock (1985), p. 230.
81 Pocock (1985), p. 230.
82 Pocock (1985), p. 231.
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Parliament in England.83 As their discontent acquired in its growth a sympathy from
Jacobite and High Church resentments, the categories Country Whig and Tory began
to influence each other.84 Civic moralists thus saw in the division of labour, and the
standing army in particular, a threat to personal integrity, public order and their ideal
of self-sufficiency.
In the militia debate, Country Whigs held that the Glorious Revolution had
been a lost opportunity which failed to prevent a resurgence of royal power. They
believed that since 1696 the Court Whig aristocratic junta had destroyed the mixed
constitution by their advocacy of standing armies instead of militias, infrequent
elections after 1716, the monied interest and the later corruption of Walpole's
oligarchic government.83
To their Country Whig critics, however, Court Whigs defended that their
government had to be strong enough to preserve the Hanoverian Succession and the
Church from the Jacobites, to protect the empire and overseas trade from foreign
threats, and to mediate among diverse conflicting interests in modern Britain. They
claimed that the roots of liberty were modem, and not ancient, in the Glorious
Revolution, and not in the feudal past.86 Defoe, a Court Whig, reflected that liberty
was modem and could only be found in a commercial society, where individuals
profited by wealth and lost no liberty due to standing armies so long as they retained
parliamentary control of the military budgets.87 Defoe defended commercial
opulence, employing Mandeville's phrase, 'private vices, public benefits'.88
In Court Whiggism, the growth of standing armies was linked with that of a
'monied interest' of investors in the public fund.89 The Whig monied interest was an
alliance of urban dissent with great financial and military interests. Anticipating the
Whig oligarchy and the imperial parliamentarism of the Hanoverian reigns, the
83 Pocock (1985), p. 230.
84 Pocock (1985), p. 232. For a convergence of Tories and Country Whigs as the united opposition to
Court Whigs, see also Browning, pp. 21-30.
85 Phillipson (1989), pp. 21-2.
86 Phillipson (1989), p. 22.
87 Pocock (1985), p. 231, and Phillipson (1989), p. 24.
88 Hundert, p. 3. For the influence of Mandeville's paradox on Defoe, see John Robert Moore (1975),
pp. 122-4.
89 Pocock (1985), pp. 231-2.
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regime conducted the War of the Spanish Succession and other wars against France,
presenting itself as a system of public credit and national debt. The regime
accordingly maintained an increasingly expanding professional standing army and
parliamentary patronage, which waged and won wars abroad but was to pay for itself
by imposing land tax on the Country Whig-minded freeholders and gentry,90 even
though many exercise taxes equally hit Court Whig-minded mercantile interests and
most purchasers. This monied interest was a speculative society typified less by
merchants than by the stockbrokers and investors in public bonds, whose property
therefore consisted not of land or goods but of paper promises to repay in an
undefined future, seen by Country Whigs as unprecedentedly dangerous and
unstable.91
d. Scottish Whigs
Addison and Steele clearly played a crucial part in the formation of the language of
politeness in Scotland and eventually of Scottish Whiggism. Before the Seven
Years' War, the most popular polite institution was the club modelled on Addison's
and Steele's Spectator Club. These clubs in the taverns and coffee-houses of
countless provincial cities and towns were small and semiformal institutions. They
drew their members from the middling ranks of these local communities,
transmitting the polite culture of the metropolis to the provinces, altering it to local
tastes and supporting the sense of the identity of increasingly prosperous provincial
communities.92 These clubs can also be seen as instruments designed to establish a
framework of sociable relationships by the principles of friendship and sympathy,
providing their members with a sense of moral autonomy, as an alternative to the
polis in this world of provincial morality.
The Tatler and Spectator essays were reprinted in Edinburgh immediately
90 Pocock (1985), p. 234. See also Hundert, pp. 11-3.
91 Pocock (1985), p. 235.
92 Nicholas Phillipson (1983), p. 198. For the eighteenth-century clubs and societies in provincial
towns, see Peter Clark (1984); (1986); (1988) and (2000).
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after they had been published in London, and discussed and imitated throughout the
eighteenth century by local moralists, and thus the language of politeness took deep
root in Scotland. Polite societies proliferated in the City of Edinburgh throughout the
century, creating a complex network of sympathetic relationships.93
The Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707 had absorbed the Scottish political
institutions into that of the English state. The cultural problems which had resulted
from the Union were being tackled by Edinburgh's taverns, coffee-houses and salons
which had begun to create a refined club culture. They were designed to generate
politeness, eradicate religious and political factions, civilise the country and
strengthen its independence by reforming its constitution, its commerce and its
culture.94
The Union also originated in an urgent Scottish desire to participate in the
economic growth triggered by the new financial and military power of England. It
also ensured that the managers of patronage both controlled the politics of Scotland
and enlarged the ministerial interest at Westminster, taking the form of an
incorporation of the two parliaments.93 From Polite Whigs in England, Scots Whigs
were to take over the role of identifying liberty with commercial culture in their
search for freedom and virtue that could grow in the post-union political
dependency.96 Scottish Whigs advocated the furtherance of sociability, politeness,
taste, conversation and moral and economic improvement. What made them
distinctively Scottish, unlike Polite Whigs, was their emphasis on moral and
economic improvement. With no Tory landed interest in Scotland and an image of
the Scottish past as more barbarous than it probably had been, their belief that
politeness and commerce went together was to form an understanding of economic
growth immediately superimposable upon feudal and hunter-warrior stages of
97
society.
Scottish Whiggism also absorbed a Scottish tradition of study in Roman civil
law and direct it towards the science of jurisprudence in terms of manners, morals
93 Phillipson (1983), p. 199.
94 Phillipson (1989), pp. 6-7.
95 Pocock (1985), p. 237.
96 Pocock (1985), p. 249.
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and sociability.98 Scottish Whigs were going to develop a powerful series of theories
concerning the history of sociability, the psychological basis of morals and
aesthetics, and eventually, political economy. These together formed an ideological
vindication of the Union and took the form of what Duncan Forbes has called
'scientific Whiggism'.99
Along with other Scottish Whigs, Hume adopted Addisonian and
Shaftesburian Polite Whiggism. After having recognised the unpopularity of his
Treatise among the readership because of its overly-metaphysical style, Hume opted
for the polite Addisonian essay-style as an intelligent mode of moral discourse,
capable of attracting a sophisticated salon and coffee-house readership along with
intellectuals.100 Hume deployed a language of politeness which had been developed
in London in response to the political and religious enthusiasm of the early
eighteenth century, for his attempts to encourage contemporaries to reflect on the
opinions and ideas of interests as citizens.101
Hume began his Essays Moral and Political (1742) at the end of the
Walpolian era for an urban, gregarious and independent-minded readership, by
showing that his philosophy could be easily recast in the Addisonian language of
politeness. He emphasised the importance of friendship and conversation in shaping
sociability, which had been the central concerns of polite moralists.102
In a typically Polite Whig manner, Hume tried to introduce a balance in a
debate between the protection of individual liberty and the maintenance of public
order by evaluating as well as criticising both Court and Country Whig ideas. Hume
agreed with Bolingbroke that the British constitution had changed since 1688,
because the wealth and power of the court had increased, upsetting the original
balance of the constitution in the process. But Hume also agreed with Court Whigs,
on the other hand, that the wealth and influence of Parliament had also grown,
turning Britain into an elective monarchy or even a republic. Hume's question was,
97 Pocock (1985), p. 238.
98 Pocock (1985), p. 238.
99 Pocock (1985), p. 239.
100 Phillipson (1983), pp. 179-80.
101 Phillipson (1989), p. 23.
102 Phillipson (1989), pp. 53-5.
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however, whether liberty was indeed in danger. Hume was going to argue that the
increase in the wealth and power of both Crown and Commons had brought about a
new balance of power between Crown and Parliament, a different balance from any
that had existed before.103
Hume however was to be a critic as well as an advocate of Addisonian and
Shaftesburian politeness. Hume was to be a critic of English politeness. For, the
improvement of manners advocated by the polite moralists of Whiggism showed no
apparent reason why, for instance, polite coffee-house and tea-table conversation
should not lead to the creation of new political bigotry instead of an intended coterie
of good citizens.104 While the scepticism of Polite Whiggism gave Hume a critical
mind, Scotland was his vantage point for exploring the contradictions and confusions
of contemporary English polite culture with a degree of detachment from English
politics.105 Hume was to be a sceptical Whig in the sense that he saw that ideologies,
or rival conceptions of the constitution, were always dangerous and menacing in
contemporary political culture.106 In his science of politics, Hume's sceptic pointed
out the disadvantages and dangers in political institutions necessary to sustain liberty,
which "vulgar Whiggism' glorified as the unique perfection of the English
constitution. Hume shed light on the corrupt Court Whig management of Parliament;
an absence of discretionary powers in their executive ever greater than any other
form of government; the easily superstitious and enthusiastic party system including
both the Court and the Country.107
What Duncan Forbes has called Hume's 'sceptical Whiggism' would oppose
the 'vulgar Whiggism' that confused Bourbon absolutism with despotism and upheld
the belief in the Ancient Constitution.108 Hume was to argue that a polite liberty, the
freedom of a man to enjoy his property, might be possible under commercial
conditions, not only in a Whig parliamentary oligarchy but even in a Bourbon
absolute monarchy. Hume in this sense associated liberty with the authority whose
103 Phillipson (1989), pp. 61-2.
104 Phillipson (1989), p. 28.
105 Phillipson (1989), p. 29.
106 Phillipson (1989), pp. 18-9.
107 Duncan Forbes (1975), p. 182.
108 Pocock (1985), p. 251.
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protection it required.109 In other words, Hume saw no contradiction between Court
Whig quest for the protection of liberty and Country Whig quest for the maintenance
of public order, and consequently felt no need for their party rages and ideological
enthusiasms.
On the other hand, Smith was a 'philosophic Whig',110 who had adopted a
different method and agenda from Hume's sceptical Whiggism. Smith's agenda was
to make a case for a philosophic foundation of the unintended consequences of
intentional private actions, thereby presenting a philosophic solution to the
Mandevillian paradox.
The Humean sceptical Whiggism was not identical to political scepticism in
general. As Forbes put it, Hume was a sceptical Whig because he was a political
scientist, rather than a political ideologist. In a similar manner, Smith was a
philosophic Whig because he was a political 'philosopher'.111 Their 'scientific',
'sceptical' or 'philosophic' Whiggism was characterised by their applying
experimental philosophy to morals and political phenomena. Their vantage point
was their cool detachment and impartiality as spectators in, and the residents of, a
peripheral nation, towards what Duncan Forbes called 'vulgar' Whiggism, by which
he actually meant both Country and Court Whigs in London."2 Hume and Smith
were sceptical of the Radical Whig theory of political obligation, or their contract
theory of government, because it had been not only false in reasoning but also
parochial.113
As a Scots Whig, Smith rejected the Radical Whig idea of social contract
while retaining Hutcheson's classification of rights and duties. Smith also rejected
the Country Whig civic treatment of the forms of government, and agrarian laws, in
favour of a natural jurist comparative historical treatment of law and government.
As a Scots Whig, Smith departed from Hutcheson and, on slightly starker lines than
Hume, introduced a four-stages account of the growth of law and government that
109 Pocock (1985), p. 250.
1101 borrow this useful term from Nicholas Phillipson (2000), p. 84.
111 Forbes, p. 180.
1,2 Forbes, p. 180.
113 Forbes, p. 181.
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characterised the historicisation of Scottish social and political thought.114 While
complementing his theory of justice, Smith's four-stages scheme was a useful device
to explain sociability, by contrasting the private intentions or aims of individuals
with their unintended social or public consequences in its historical setting. It was
especially useful to describe sociability in an increasingly characteristic commercial
world of impersonal and anonymous interdependencies no longer similar to feudal
direct dependency."5 While Mandeville had presented the doctrine of unintended
consequences as a Court Whig defence of commerce, Smith's defence of commercial
society and sociability was not ideological but philosophic. For, while Smith showed
how the improvements, civility and liberty were associated with commerce, his
doctrine of unintended consequences drew attention equally to the defects of
commercial civilisation. He paid attention to the detrimental consequences of the
division of labour, the weakening defence of rich nations or the serious political
dangers posed by extra-parliamentary mercantile pressure groups."6 Smith's defence
of sociability in commercial society was therefore, at the same time, his criticism of
an ideological vindication by Court Whigs of commerce for their own interests.
Smith's arguments of the unintended public consequences of intended private actions
was to show that there was no contradiction between the two fundamental Whig
objectives of achieving sociability: the protection of individual liberty and the
maintenance of public order. As we shall see below, Smith argued that the former
naturally brought about the latter, because the intended private actions of individual
liberty could materialise the unintended public consequence of establishing the order
of society.
Phillipson argues that the polite social discourses of enlightened Scotland and
Scottish Whiggism however were also penetrated by a civic language alongside the
language of Addisonian politeness."7 It was a language which insisted upon the
importance of preserving Scottish independence, and a variant of the civic language
of virtue and corruption associated with Harrington and the militia controversialists
114 Donald Winch (1983), p. 264.
115 Winch (1983), pp. 264-5.
116 Winch (1983), pp. 265-6.
117 Phillipson (1983), pp. 199-200.
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of the 1690s.118 In the process, Scottish Whigs laid the foundations of a new polite
language of provincial morality, which was of peculiar interest to those increasingly
opulent provincial communities that sprang up in the commercial age."9
Scottish Whiggism was therefore mainly evolved from Polite Whiggism but
also incorporated some elements from the language of Country Whiggism. Scottish
Whigs attempted, in a typically Polite Whig manner, to make a balance between the
protection of individual liberty and the maintenance of public order in their theory of
sociability. But they stressed Country Whig sentiments in favour of public order
more than Court Whig interests in individual liberty in the age of the Court Whig
supremacy. This general attitude of Scottish Whigs, more critical of Court
Whiggism than ofCountry Whiggism, is equally applicable to Hutcheson, Hume and
Smith in a specific case of the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy. Contrary
to Pocock's picture, these Scottish moralists appear in the controversy as persistent
critics ofCourt Whig-minded Mandeville.
118 Phillipson (1983), p. 200.
119 Phillipson (1983), p. 202.
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Chapter One
Needs, passions and sentiments: the 'private vices,
public benefits' controversy: I
Eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophers set themselves two main questions
for their theory of morals: the nature of morals, and the principle of moral
approbation.' In this chapter, I shall argue that these questions were derived directly
from a debate about the relationship between 'private vices' and 'public benefits',
launched by Bernard Mandeville in 1714. The debate had been concerned with such
moral and economic issues as whether the passions and sentiments which encouraged
the pursuit of wealth were vicious or morally legitimate. This debate was a decisive
battlefield for Scottish argument pertaining to moral sentiments, sociability and taste,
and their functions in establishing virtues and the rules of justice as well as in
supplying the essentials of life by producing wealth. In terms of ethics, the debate
centred on the above two main moral questions in Scotland. As we shall see, Francis
Hutcheson was going to argue that morals rested on benevolence, and they were
approved by a moral sense. David Hume was going to argue that utility should be
the standard ofmorals, and a refined taste would be able to approve moral virtues in
the light of their utility. Adam Smith was going to argue that moral virtues lay in
their propriety, and moral sentiments would approve propriety as moral virtues.
What follows is a short sketch of an aspect of the controversy particularly in
view of Scottish theory of moral sentiments outlined above, rather than a detailed
1 As clearly set out by Francis Hutcheson, Illustrations on Moral Sense (1728), in An Essay on the
Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. Andrew
Ward (Manchester, 1999), p. 107, as well as by Adam Smith, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments (1759);
eds. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, as vol. I of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and
Correspondence ofAdam Smith (Oxford, 1976), VII. i. 2, p. 265 (abbreviated as TMS below). In both
books, the questions appear in their accounts of the history of moral philosophy.
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account of early-modern European discourse of the passions as a whole.2 But it is
still helpful for understanding Scottish Enlightenment's concerns and the
implications of their arguments.
1. Bernard Mandeville
What I call here the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy was to be launched
by Bernard Mandeville in 1714, as is graphically set out in The Fable of the Bees:
Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits (first volume, 1714). The debate was going to be
intense and prolonged in British moral philosophy throughout the eighteenth century,
concerning how to reconcile acquisitive passions driving men into commercial
relations and their needs to supply human wants and establish sustainable sociability
in the newly-emerging commercial society in Britain. Besides the relevance of the
issue of commercial sociability in eighteenth-century Britain, the controversy was
stimulated by the very power of Mandeville's style itself. Mandeville expressed his
original and unaccustomed understanding of sociability in a commercial age in so
forceful yet skilful terms that he could surprise and devastate his readers and set
21 suggest that any overall description of the theory of passions in early modern Europe, regardless of
its influence on the Scottish Enlightenment in particular, should include not only British novelists
such as Lawrence Sterne, Henry Mackenzie and Jane Austen, but also a fairly large number of French
writers from Du Bos and Rousseau to the most enlightened Marquis de Sade. Malcolm Jack,
Corruption and Progress: the Eighteenth-century Debate (New York, 1989) attempts to describe the
general and common features of what he calls the 'corruption debate', concentrating on Bernard
Mandeville, Jean Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson. The account analyses the context of the
debate, the similarities and differences of the three participants and the influences of the debate in the
eighteenth century, though apparently emphasising the influence of civic humanist culture in
eighteenth-century European thought. With a different naming of the debate, on the other hand, my
thesis concentrates more on the Scottish Enlightenment writers in order to understand the issues of
political economy in the debate. Meanwhile, Irwin Primer misleadingly called it 'the Mandeville-
Shaftesbury debate'. See Irwin Primer (1975), p. 126-7. John Dwyer, The Age of the Passions: An
Interpretation of Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment Culture (East Linton, 1998) is an
ambitious account of what he calls 'The Discourse of the Passions' in the Scottish Enlightenment.
Dwyer puts Smith in the context of other Scots writers such as John Millar, Allan Ramsay, James
Fordyce and James Macpherson. His argument shows that Smith was not really a typical
sentimentalist of his age, for he was more interested in the general tendency of commercial society
leading towards justice and self-control, than in the more popular concerns with an extended
benevolence and the love towards others. See, for example, pp. 82-4. Dywer's account shows much
of the characteristics and importance of the Scottish discourse of the passions, and Smith's position
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them out on a long, tricky intellectual journey of grasping what he had meant. Scots
moral philosophers of the next two generations, including Hutcheson, Hume and
Smith, could not escape Mandeville's challenge in their endeavours to understand the
sociability of human nature.
Mandeville was a Dutch physician born in 1670, who emigrated to England
in 1694 and settled in London, where he remained until his death in 1733.3
Following in his father's footsteps, he practised medicine as a specialist in neurotic
and digestive disorders. His concerns for 'passions' would have come from that
same speciality, as he was to coin the term 'hypochondriack and hysterick passions'
in his medical work, A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions: in
Three Dialogues (1711). In his most famous work, The Fable of the Bees,
Mandeville came to argue about passions in a way contrary to the contemporary
rationalist or deist position. Deists were rationalist in the sense that they believed in
natural law as a governing principle of the world, in human reasoning as the way to
understand this world, and in observation and experience as the basis for human
reasoning and the understanding of this world. According to their theory, human
reason was capable of reaching the true knowledge of the divine origin of the world
and natural law, and the true ethics of the will of God. To the deists, therefore, there
was no conflict between human reason and the truth, man's rational observation and
the will of God, private judgement and eternal, universal ethics.4 On the contrary,
Mandeville followed the sceptic or moral rigorist approach toward the issue of the
relation of private judgement and ethical or religious truth. The sceptics argued that,
though religion may offer the truth, human reason was incapable of grasping such
universal knowledge. The sceptics were rigorist because they advocated our need to
follow the strict ethics of religion since our impotent reason would not allow us to
with regard to it. In view of Smith's theory of the passions, however, the choice of context might not
necessarily be the best for considering Smith's ethical and economic arguments.
3 Little is known about the details of his life, but see F. B. Kaye, Introduction, in Bernard Mandeville,
The Fable of the Bees, vol. I, ed. F. B. Kaye (Oxford, 1924), pp. xvii-xxx (abbreviated as FB below),
and Hundert, pp. 2-12. For accounts on the 'radical' Enlightenment in the Hague or Amsterdam in the
late-seventeenth century, preceding the 'classical' Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, see Ira O.
Wade (1967) and (1971); Margaret C. Jacob (1981), as cited in Roy Porter (1990), pp. 45-6.
4 Kaye, pp. xxxix-xl.
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find true ethics elsewhere.5 Mandeville applied his moral rigorism or scepticism
mainly and extensively to his contemporary discussion about the corrupting effects
of luxury upon the human passions, which had been enthusiastically argued by many
writers throughout the Augustan age. But it was Mandeville who made the most
thorough case in both moral and economic terms. While denouncing the deist view
of human reason as capable of reaching the truth, Mandeville at the same time
shrewdly adopted and altered the rationalist view of human reason. He presented
human reason as still capable of pursuing our own private gain, if not public or
universal ethics. Mandeville made his paradox, 'private vices, public benefits', by
juxtaposing those two contradictory criteria. On the one hand, he denounced human
reason as vicious for its impotence in achieving universal virtue; a transcending of
the desires of corrupt human passions or a conquest of self could be attained only by
divine grace. Human reason was useful only for calculating and seeking private
gain: it was therefore a private vice. On the other hand, he stressed that such a vice
was indispensable in stimulating the passions of pride and vanity, producing wealth
and happiness, and thereby supplying the essentials of everyday life. 'Private vices',
therefore, contributed to 'public benefits'. In his paradox, Mandeville praised from a
rationalist point of view what he had denounced according to the sceptic or moral
rigorist criterion.6 In presenting his paradox as such, Mandeville built his argument
in three steps: private vice is a necessary evil for prosperity; therefore 'the State's
Craft' is required to turn private vices into public benefits; and finally, virtue is
useless for, or even harmful to, prosperity.
The first of his claims, that the 'vilest and most hateful qualities' such as the
passions of pride and vanity are the most necessary for a flourishing society,7 is
probably the one for which Mandeville was best known in his own age. His idea is
strikingly seen, for example, in the following verse:
These [Parasites, Pick-pockets, etc.] were call'd Knaves, but bar the Name,
The grave Industrious were the same:
All Trades and Places knew some Cheat,
5
Kaye, p. xlii.
6 The view I present is a development of Kaye's useful account: Kaye, pp. xlvii-xlix, li, lvi-lx, cxx-
cxxii and cxxv.
7 FB, I, p. 4.
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No Calling was without Deceit.8
THUS every Part was full of Vice,
Yet a whole Mass a Paradise;
Flatter'd in Peace, and fear'd in Wars,
They were th' Esteem of Foreigners,
And lavish of their Wealth and Lives,
The Balance of all other Hives.
Such were the Blessings of that State;
Their Crimes conspir'd to make them Great:
And Virtue, who from Politicks
Had learn'd a Thousand Cunning Tricks,
Was, by their happy Influence,
Made Friends with Vice: And ever since,
The worst of all the Multitude
Did something for the Common Good.9
Mandeville opened his case by arguing that the sociability or 'virtue' of industrious
good people amounted to no more than making friends by exploiting the vices of
others.
Virtue is made Friends with Vice, when industrious good People, who maintain their Families
and bring up their Children handsomely, pay Taxes, and are several ways useful Members of the
Society, get a Livelihood by something that chiefly depends on, or is very much influenc'd by
the Vice of others, without being themselves guilty of, or accessory to them, any otherwise than
by way of Trade, as a Druggist may be to Poisoning, or a Sword-Cutler to Blood-shed.
Wine merchants, for example, have to depend on vices such as drunkenness and
lavish indulgence, yet they contribute to the prosperity of a city through their
trading.10 The fact that this sociability in commerce was so extensive was seen in
that even thieves and robbers contribute to the public prosperity by creating jobs for
locksmiths. In delineating this sort of sociability, Mandeville was cautious enough to
admit that men were to be judged not by the consequences but by the motives of
actions, and to conclude that thieves and robbers should be prosecuted. Yet
Mandeville insisted that they still contribute to the public good through commercial
sociability, because of their vices."
Underlying Mandeville's claim was his basic idea of man as 'a compound of
various Passions'; and it is the passions, not reason, that are the great support of
* FB, I, pp. 19-20.
9 FB, I, p. 24.
10 FB, I, p. 85.
11 FB, I, pp. 86-7.
Needs, passions and Sentiments 34
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
sociability and a flourishing society.12 The passion of avarice, for instance, possibly
a root of evil, is still necessary to the society, because 'it is a Slave to Prodigality'.13
Prodigality, then, is called 'a noble Sin', as it 'makes the Chimney smoke, and all the
Tradesmen smile'.14 But among all the passions, Mandeville repeatedly emphasised
the passion of pride as the most beneficial quality to sociability and the most
necessary for producing wealth.
Pride is that Natural Faculty by which every Mortal that has any Understanding over-values, and
imagines better Things of himself than any impartial Judge, thoroughly acquainted with all his
Qualities and Circumstances, could allow him. We are possess'd of no other Quality so
beneficial to Society, and so necessary to render it wealthy and flourishing as this, yet it is that
which is most generally detested.
Pride encourages us to dress expensively, for example, because we are, by virtue of
sociability amongst strangers, judged by what we appear to be than by what we are.16
In other words, pride stimulates industry and improvement, without intending them.
... it is this, or at least the consequence of it, that sets the Poor to Work, adds Spurs to Industry,
17
and encourages the skilful Artificer to search after further Improvements.
Unlike Grotius, Locke and Shaftesbury, who believed that property had been
originally bestowed on communities for their common benefit, Mandeville believed
that private vices such as pride were necessary for unintentionally cultivating
sociability, driving production and contributing to public benefits.18 Like Pufendorf,
Mandeville presupposed, therefore, the idea of negative community. This is crucial,
because the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy following Mandeville
through Hutcheson, Hume and Smith was carried, as in the precedent Continental
natural jurisprudence, upon the presumption of the world as a negative community in
which passions must empower men to acquire sociability and supply needs.19 After
12 FB, 1, pp. 39-40.
13 FB, I, p. 101.
14 FB, I, p. 103.
15 FB, I, p. 124.
16 FB, I, pp. 127-8.
17 FB, I, p. 130.
18 FB, I, pp. 125-6.
19 See also Francis Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy (Glasgow, 1755), I, pp. 330-1
(abbreviated as System below): 'From what is said we see abundantly, that this earth, and all it
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Cicero, the natural jurists and the Jansenists, it was probably Mandeville who made
the most enduring case against the argument that men's self-preservation had been
possible by the supposed sufficiency of the original property given to men. In
Mandeville, on the contrary, it was passions that must have been endowed upon men
for their sociability and self-preservation.
The Means by which Nature obliges every Creature continually to stir in this Business of Self-
Preservation, are grafted in him, and (in Man) call'd Desires, which either compel him to crave
what he thinks will sustain or please him, or command him to avoid what he imagines might
displease, hurt or destroy him. These Desires or Passions have all their different Symptoms by
which they manifest themselves to those they disturb, and from that Variety of Disturbances
20
have been given them, as has been shewn already in Pride and Shame.
With sociability once established, passions then gave rise to pride, envy, avarice and
ambition, enlarging desires, multiplying wants and appetites and easily provoking
anger, in addition to hunger and lust, which were just as much necessary for self-
preservation. The establishment of sociability shifted the role of passions from
simply supplying needs toward gratifying greed.
As soon as his Pride has room to play, and Envy, Avarice and Ambition begin to catch hold of
him, he is rous'd from his natural Innocence and Stupidity. As his Knowledge increases, his
Desires are enlarg'd, and consequently his Wants and Appetites are multiply'd: Hence it must
follow, that he will be often cross'd in the Pursuit of them, and meet with abundance more
disappointment to stir up his Anger in this than his former Condition, and Man would in a little
time become the most hurtful and noxious Creature in the World, if let alone, whenever he could
over-power his Adversary, if he had no Mischief to fear but from the Person that anger's him.21
Therefore, industry was now contrary to contentment, but a thirst for gain and a
contains, was placed by God in that state the moralists call negative community, and not positive. The
negative is "the state of things not yet in property, but lying open to the occupation of any one."
Positive community is the "state of things in which not any individual but a whole society have an
undivided property." Goods in this positive community neither any individual member of the society,
nor any other, can occupy or dispose of without consent of the whole society, or those who govern it.
Now from the preceding reasons 'tis plain, that any man could acquire property, and see his right to
acquire any thing he first occupied, without consulting the rest of mankind; and it would be injurious
in any other person to hinder him. Thus we need not have recourse to any old conventions or
compacts, with Grotius and Puffendorf, in explaining the original of property: nor to any degree or
grant of our first parent, with Filmer.
All things fit for human use either yet remain in this negative community, or are in the
property of individual men, or of societies'.
20 FB, I, p. 200.
21 FB, I, pp. 205-6.
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desire to improve our conditions.22
The nature of sociability Mandeville discovered led him into the second main
strand of his argument that, considering the important roles of vices, the task of
government in establishing sociability in a commercial society is to turn private vices
into public benefits and happiness. Mandeville called such a duty 'the State's Craft':
THIS was the State's Craft, that maintain'd
The Whole of which each Part complain'd:
This, as in Musick Harmony,
Made Jarrings in the main agree;
Parties directly opposite,
Assist each other, as 'twere for Spight;
And Temp'rance with Sobriety,
Serve Drunkenness and Gluttony.23
In arguing in this way, Mandeville was taking the sceptic or moral rigorist line of
belief that the passions were too strong to be controlled by reason, so any attempt by
authority to encourage self-denial would fail. In other words, one passion could only
be restrained by exciting another stronger passion: otherwise, sociability would be
aborted.24 Flattery was the key to arousing such countervailing passion while
maintaining sociability, and this is what Mandeville thought is the origin of
morality.25 Thus, if skilful politicians invent morality in this way as a contrivance for
the ambitious to reap benefit not only from their too eager pursuit of appetites but
also from their ease and security, such a 'Foundation of Politicks' would soon secure
sociability and bring civilisation by encouraging men to refine their moral
judgement.
The first Care therefore of all Governments is by severe Punishments to curb his Anger when it
does hurt, and so by increasing his Fears prevent the Mischief it might produce. When various
Laws to restrain him from using Force are strictly executed, Self-Preservation must teach him to
be peaceable."
Once sociability had been shaped, the passions would redirect our attention
from needs and mere self-preservation towards greed and gratification, so the first
22 FB, I, p. 244.
23 FB, I, pp. 24-5.
24 FB, I, p. 42.
25 FB, I, pp. 42-3.
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responsibility of all governments is to curb such passions as anger by punishment,
and thereby render self-preservation peaceable.27 The passion of fear was useful in
this respect: if the fear of punishment keeps men's anger under control, it could be
deployed for the peace and quiet of society.28 Politicians therefore must know
precisely about the human passions and private appetites in order to turn them into
public benefits, by making use of the principle of honour, and thereby increasing
men's fear of shame in order to control their passions.
Whoever would civilise Men, and establish them into a Body Politick, must be thoroughly
acquainted with all the Passions and Appetites, Strength and Weaknesses of the Frame, and
29
understand how to turn their greatest Frailties to the Advantage of the Publick."
In Mandeville, 'the Principle of Honour' was 'the tye of Society'.
Do but increase Men's Pride, and his fear of Shame will ever be proportion'd to it; for the greater
Value a Man sets upon himself, the more Pains he'll take and the greater Hardships he'll undergo
to avoid Shame. '
Mandeville's scepticism might help to explain why he had no interest in
presenting a theory of justice. He thought it was not any law but 'Wisdom in all
Governments' that could control vices and passions, because in his view the human
passions were too strong for the rules of justice to tame. '1 His brief history and
description of brothels in Amsterdam was meant to show how 'the Wise Rulers of
that well-order'd City' brought 'Order', 'Prudence and Oeconomy' into that city, by
legalising prostitution on the grounds that it would help calm men's passions.'2
Compared with such wisdom, 'the Administration of Justice' is to be so extensive
and limitless that it is simply impossible for the purpose of turning private vices into
the public good and securing sociability.'3
Given the nature of commercial sociability and the roles of vices and
26 FB, I, pp. 46-7.
27 FB, I, p. 206.
28 FB, I, pp. 206-7.
29 FB, I, pp. 208-9.
30 FB, I, p. 218.
31 FB, I, p. 95.
32 FB, I, pp. 96-8.
33 FB, I, p. 98.
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statecraft in it, Mandeville added a final attack on the rationalist claim, by showing
that curing such vices would lead us out of prosperity into poverty. This idea is best
illustrated in the rhyme below:
As Pride and Luxury decrease,
So by degrees they leave the Seas.
Not Merchants now, but Companies
Remove whole Manufactories.
All Arts and Crafts neglected lie;
Content, the Bane of Industry,
Makes 'em admire their homely Store,
And neither seek nor covet more.34
Mandeville animated his argument here to emphasise The Unreasonableness and
Folly of those' who attempt to enjoy both riches and moral virtue at the same time, as
indicated in his design of The Fable of the Bees.
... the main Design of the Fable, is to shew the Impossibility of enjoying all the most elegant
Comforts of Life that are to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful Nation, and at
the same time be bless'd with all the Virtue and Innocence that can be wish'd for in a Golden
Age; from thence to expose the Unreasonableness and Folly of those, that desirous of being an
opulent and flourishing People, and wonderfully greedy after all the Benefits they can receive as
such, are yet always murmuring at and exclaiming against those Vices and Inconveniences, that
from the Beginning of the World to this present Day, have been inseparable from all Kingdoms
and States that ever were fam'd for Strength, Riches, and Politeness, at the same time. '
Mandeville's account of the passion of frugality would show that the classical and
rationalist value of self-denial is useless for economic prosperity. While prodigality
set all the men to work, frugality is 'a mean starving Virtue' for the poor, keeping
them away from trading, and therefore useless for prosperity.
Frugality is like Honesty, a mean starving Virtue, that is only fit for small Societies of good
peaceable Men, who are contented to be poor so they may be easy; but in a large stirring Nation
you may have soon enough of it. Tis an idle dreaming Virtue that employs no Hands, and
therefore very useless in a trading Country, where there are vast Numbers that one way or other
must be all set to Work. Prodigality has a thousand Inventions to keep People from sitting still,
that Frugality would never think of; and as this must consume a prodigious Wealth, so Avarice
again knows innumerable Tricks to rake it together, which Frugality would scorn to make use
34 FB, I, pp. 34-5.
35 FB, I, pp. 6-7.
36 FB, I, pp. 104-5.
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Mandeville's tactic here was to pay more attention to the consequent effects of frugal
practices over the society as a whole, rather than to a particular individual. Private
single persons or families might possibly become richer by being frugal, but to
assume the same logic to be applicable to the whole nation is simply an error,
because 'to make a Nation generally frugal, the Necessaries of Life must be scarce,
and consequently dear'. This is why 'there ever was in any Country a National
Frugality without a National Necessity'.37 Frugality might render people virtuous,
but also unemployed and poor at the same time.38 As wealth was inseparable from
'Luxury', so considerable trade was inseparable from fraud; advanced knowledge
and polished manners were inseparable from enlarged desires, refined appetites and
increased vices. This was what Mandeville thought sociability was all about. In
sum, Mandeville contended: 'To be at once well-bred and sincere, is no less than a
Contradiction'.39
Certainly, Mandeville's sceptic or moral rigorist position allowed him to say
'that in all Societies, great or small, it is the Duty of every Member of it to be good,
that Virtue ought to be encourag'd, Vice discountenanc'd'.40 He also wrote that 'If I
have shewn the way to worldly Greatness, I have always without Hesitation preferr'd
the Road that leads to Virtue'.41 However, it was his simultaneous manipulation of
the quasi-rationalist view that allowed Mandeville to stress at the same time that 'no
Society can be rais'd into such a rich and mighty Kingdom, or so rais'd, subsist in
their Wealth and Power for any considerable Time, without the Vices ofMan'.42 His
subtle juxtaposition of sceptic or moral rigorist and quasi-rationalist views had
already been presumed in a passage in the Introduction of The Fable of the Bees:
there he declared that, unlike most other writers, he should show his readers 'what
they really are' rather than 'what they should be'.43 His distinction between what he
asserted men had to be and what he could say men actually were, was thus calculated
to be the fulcrum of his paradox, 'private vices, public benefits'. In this sense, Kaye
37 FB, I, p. 183.
38 FB, I, p. 223.
39 FB, 1, p. 185.
40 FB, I, p. 229.
41 FB, I, p. 231.
42 FB, I, p. 229.
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called Mandeville's ethics 'a combination of philosophical anarchism in theory with
utilitarianism in practice'.44 Mandeville's radical philosophical anarchism, as a
sceptical reaction to contemporary rationalist thinking, was endeavouring to prove
the impossibility of certain existing ideas, such as definite or final agreement
between different men as to what is good, desirable or beautiful according to which a
system of morality is to be planned.45 According to Kaye, Mandeville then
juxtaposed philosophical anarchism with utilitarianism in practice, as the ideal way
of satisfying the various differing needs and desires of men. His practical
utilitarianism allowed their welfare, pleasure or happiness not necessarily to be
confined to one particular kind but their satisfaction to be as many diverse kinds as
there are tastes.46 By his practical application of the utilitarian standard, Mandeville
created the paradox, 'private vices, public benefits', calling such qualities as pride
and vanity private vices, which he then asserted would be useful for public benefits
(and which the non-rigorists would not call vices at all).47 Mandeville's concept of
luxury forcibly achieved the moral paradox of 'private vices, public benefits', by
confronting, in his usual manner, the ideal with the actual. Here Mandeville made
his point by exposing a contradiction in current opinion, which had escaped his
contemporaries, that luxury was morally evil yet inseparable from prosperity.48 His
premise, that Man is 'a compound of various Passions, ... which we all pretend to be
asham'd of, are the great Support of a flourishing Society', came from his belief that
our understanding ofmorality was not rooted in an understanding of our sociability.49
In other words, Mandeville's true originality in understanding sociability was, as
Kaye nicely put it, his 'considerations of the growth of society from the evolutionary
43 FB, I, p. 39.
44 Kaye, p. lvi.
45 Kaye, pp. lvi-lvii.
46 Kaye, pp. lviii-lix.
47 Kaye, p. lx.
48
Kaye, p. xcviii.
49 FB, I, pp. 39-40. An assessment in Hont and Ignatieff (1983) concerning the very distinction, that
Mandeville was concerned with the matters of right whereas Smith shifted his concern to the matters
of fact, therefore misses Mandeville's quasi-rationalist aspect and his theory of sociability. Smith's
argument seems to me to have been directed more toward Hutcheson than Mandeville. See Istvan
Hont and Michael Ignatieff (1983), p. 12.
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point of view', that is, society independent of morals.50 Before Mandeville, moral
philosophers were caged by theological prepossessions, and failed to realise 'social
evolution', or sociability, because they had been interested more in educing morals
than in analysing the facts of life.51 Mandeville's paradox was that commercial
society relied on the sociability of self-interested individuals bound to one another
not by their shared religious rectitude, but by the tenuous bonds of private vices such
as envy, emulation and manipulation.52 In this sense, Mandeville's paradoxical
thesis, 'private vices, public benefits', was meant as a threat to the contemporary
vocabulary of ethics, which, he argued, had promoted self-deception by obscuring
actual human motives and thereby failing to understand the novel circumstances of
modern commercial sociability.53 Similarly, Philip Pinkus argues that the strength of
Mandeville's paradox lay in the combination of his orthodox Anglican-style
scepticism concerning reason and his heresy as a writer in arguing about the
irrelevance and harmfulness of Christianity to the building of a prosperous society.
Pinkus concludes that Mandeville wrote a paradox (which showed the essential of
the vices that contribute to public benefits) but not a satire (a criticism of the
viciousness of vices from a certain moral judgement).54
Such were Mandeville's basic arguments in 1714. 'A Search into the Nature
of Society', a small essay Mandeville included in the second edition of The Fable of
the Bees in 1723, clarified Mandeville's view of sociability, this time by means of a
critique of Shaftesbury who now turned out to be the foremost target in his book.
The essay is said to have been a criticism of what Mandeville had come to see as a
dominant theory of sociability in a commercial society, uniting the physiology in his
Treatise (1711) with a French discourse of passions.
50 Kaye, p. cxii.
51 Kaye, p. cxiii.
52 Hundert, p. I.
53 Hundert, p. 17.
54 Philip Pinkus (1975), pp. 193-211. The interpretation of Mandeville as a writer of paradox rather
than of satire seems more valid than what David Hector Monro called 'the two Mandevilles' (the
ascetic and austere moralist, and the cynical worldly profligate) which seem 'ambivalent' to each
other. See David Hector Monro (1975), pp. 1-24 and 249-267. Monro's work presents a typical
account of Mandeville as a satirist.
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Mandeville was the first moralist of any importance to attack Shaftesbury's
system. It was in this essay of 1723 that Mandeville directly joined issue with
Shaftesbury."" Mandeville's criticism of Shaftesbury's system was that it was false
in neglecting private vices as the necessary evil in establishing sociability and
bringing prosperity in society.56 His criticism concerned in particular his concepts of
beauty and virtue, which had been the key terms in Shaftesbury's theory of
sociability.
Lawrence Klein describes Shaftesbury as 'the philosopher of politeness,
aiming at an intellectual and social elite',57 who regarded politeness as the sociability
of aesthetic value, by means of which private happiness was to be achieved as the
public goodness. Politeness as 'a criterion of proper behaviour' was, in a
contemporary definition, 'a dextrous management of our Words and Actions,
whereby we make other People have better Opinions of us and themselves'.58 In this
sense, politeness was 'a refined sociability, bringing aesthetic concerns into close
contiguity with ethical ones'.59 Politeness as a refined sociability was then the
sociability of gentlemen, or the range of the gentlemanly. Its spread witnessed the
creation, by gentlemen, of the world in a gentlemanly image.60 This new culture of
politeness was demanded by the new patterns of urban development in the later
seventeenth and eighteenth century. The pattern of urbanism, modelled on the
Westminster, but reproduced in provincial cities and towns all over Britain, created
new urban populations made up of aristocrats, gentry, pseudo-gentry, professionals
and commercial elements. The new commercialised approach to leisure gave rise to
a new array of institutions such as coffee-houses, clubs, assemblies, gardens and
theatres, not merely as the outlets of consumption, but as a means allowing new
forms of sociability.61
Shaftesbury wrote An Inquiry Concerning Virtue in the later 1690s and
included its revised version in Characteristicks ofMen, Manners, Opinions, Times
55 Thomas Fowler (1882), p. 138.
56 FB, I, pp. 323-5.
"Klein, p. 2.
58 Klein, pp. 3-4.
59 Klein, p. 4.
60 Klein, p. 7.
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(1711), assigning it a strategic importance.62 The work presented Shaftesbury as a
philosopher of sociability who wrote 'a moral treatise defending the possibility of
individual ethical action in accordance with real ethical standards on the basis of
natural human propensities to exist companionably with others'.6. Based on the
observation of 'the Oeconomy of the Passions', Shaftesbury tried to show that
serving oneself and serving others were one and the same, that happiness and
goodness therefore went together, that virtue was its own reward, and finally, that
there were thus reasons for us to be virtuous.64 These were his arguments against
egoistical moral thinking by insisting that at least some human affections were
sociable so that selflessness was a natural human capacity and human behaviour
could not be reduced to egoism.65 In his Inquiry, morality or moral goodness
consisted in both pursuing one's relatedness to others and to the world as well as in
one's capacity to act independently. The Inquiry was fundamentally concerned with
an ethical outlook that would balance the claims of self and others, autonomy and
relatedness. This theme in Shaftesbury ultimately generated his idea of polite
philosophy.66 Shaftesbury's account of sociability also relied on rationalism.
Though men were naturally sociable and capable of virtue, virtue was not merely a
natural affection, but an affection raised to consciousness and rationality, reflecting
one's connectedness to others and the demand that one act in ways that benefited
them. In the sense that sociability was those affections that drew people out of
solitude into beneficial relation with others, sociability could be a reliable criterion of
morality.67 Moral sociability was therefore constituted of selflessness.68
In his polite philosophy, Shaftesbury had defined beauty as a passion in its
own right:
Of all other beauties ..., the most delightful, the most engaging and pathetic, is that which is
drawn from real life, and from the passions. Nothing affects the heart like that which is purely
61 Klein, pp. 10-1 and 12-3. See also Peter Borsay (1989); cited in Klein, p. 11, footnote 19.
62 Klein, p. 48.
63 Klein, p. 52.
64 Klein, pp. 52-3.
65 Klein, p. 53.
66 Klein, p. 54.
67 Klein, pp. 56-7.
68 Klein, p. 58.
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from itself, and of its own nature; such as the beauty of sentiments, the grace of actions, the turn
of characters, and the proportions and features of a human mind.69
Beauty acquires its value if aimed at 'the pleasure and good of others' and kept away
from selfishness. This was exactly what Shaftesbury reckoned was the beauty of
arts. In arts, 'their chief theme and subjects' was 'purely manners and the moral
part': in other words, the entertainment of the imagination by showing 'a beauty of
the mind', and the fancy of the amiable characters or qualities.70 'And thus',
Shaftesbury concluded, 'after all, the most natural beauty in the world is honesty and
moral truth'.71 In the sense that beauty as a passion was the source of sociability,
virtue was to be derived from the common basis as beauty:
That in the very nature of things there must of necessity be the foundation of a right or wrong
taste, as well in respect of inward characters and features as of outward person, behaviour, and
action,... Thus are the Arts and Virtues mutually friends; and thus the science of virtuosi and
that of virtue itself become, in a manner, one and the same.72
Virtue such as private friendship, therefore, was to be disinterested, purely voluntary
and 'a free choice', regardless of its circumstances and interests.7' The passions,
hence, which Shaftesbury assumed give rise to beauty and virtue, are accordingly to
be unselfish and the hinge of sociability. After all, 'selfishness' was defined by
Shaftesbury as vicious and inconsistent with the public good.74 Shaftesbury
perceived beauty as vital for cultivating sociability and the public good in the sense
that he regarded goodness, beauty and truth as all one and the same: 'What is
beautiful is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable
is true; and what is at once both beautiful and true is, of consequence, agreeable and
good'.79 In his treatment of morals, the idea of moral beauty as the Greek conception
of a harmony or proportion in characters or conducts was therefore always
uppermost in his mind.76 The ultimate foundation of beauty and morality alike was
69 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (London, 1714); ed. J. M.
Robertson (Indianapolis, 1964), I, p. 90 (abbreviated as Characteristicks below).
70 Characteristicks, I, pp. 90-1.
71 Characteristicks, I, p. 94.
72 Characteristicks, I, pp. 216-7.
73 Characteristicks, I, pp. 67-9.
74 Characteristicks, I, pp. 247-8.
75 Shaftesbury, Miscellaneous Reflections, III. II, in Characteristicks-, quoted in Fowler, p. 125.
76 Fowler, p. 125.
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then found in the principles of harmony and proportion, either of the parts in relation
to each other, or of the whole in relation to other wholes. The idea of morality as
harmony and proportion was better replaced by that of sociability, or of goodness or
tendency to promote the general welfare.77
Shaftesbury's ideas of sociability that he presented in relation to the passions,
beauty and virtue, were what Mandeville chose as the target in his argument.
Accordingly, Mandeville began his criticism with his ideas of beauty and virtue.
Mandeville argued that beauty and taste varied according to various 'Modes and
Fashions' in different times and places: 'There are different Faults as well as
Beauties, that as Modes and Fashions alter and Men vary in their Tastes and
Humours, will be differently admired and disapproved of. This is why the best
paintings do not always bear the best prices: because, consequently, there is no such
agreed standard of pricing them. Instead, their prices depend on absurd measures
such as 'the Scarcity of his Works' and 'the Quality of the Persons in whose
Possession they are as well as the length of Time they have been in great Families'.78
Mandeville went on that 'In Morals there is no greater Certainty'.79 Virtues or values
can be discovered only when they are contrasted against vices and evils; morality is
therefore relative to its situations and circumstances, as beauty is.80 Mandeville
referred to Cicero whom he reckoned to be the most 'able and compleat Magistrate',
and satirised Cicero's reputed 'Politeness' on the grounds that it was merely a
product of vices such as vanity and prodigality.81 What Shaftesbury called the 'Love
of Company' too is not necessarily 'a Mark of some Intrinsick Worth in Man', but
simply based on self-interest: 'the Men of Sense and of good Knowledge' would
rather prefer 'Solitude' whereas companies of men are more eagerly sought after by
'the weakest Minds'.82 The love of company is itself a self-love, stimulated by
beauty and virtue, and decorating society.
77 Fowler, p. 127.
78 FB, I, p. 326.
79 FB, I, p. 330.
80 FB, I, p. 334.
81 FB, I, pp. 334-5.
82 FB, I, pp. 340-1.
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A good House, rich Furniture, a fine Garden, Horses, Dogs, Ancestors, Relations, Beauty,
Strength, Excellency in any thing whatever, Vices as well as Virtues, may all be Accessory to
make Men long for Society, in hopes that what they value themselves upon will at one time or
other become the Theme of the Discourse, and give an inward Satisfaction to them. Even the
most polite People in the World, and such as I spoke of at first, give no Pleasure to others that is
not repaid to their Self-Love, and does not at last centre in themselves, let them wind it and turn
it as they will.83
After all, in Mandeville's cynical assessment, Shaftesbury was a philosopher born in
ease and brought up inactive and retired, from whose circumstances his system of
polite philosophy, though 'amiable', was conceived and therefore it solely depended
on his peculiar life.84
Thus, sociability arises from 'not the Good and Amiable, but the Bad and
Hateful Qualities of Man, his Imperfections and the want of Excellencies'. Men's
'Appetites and Passions' are necessary 'for the welfare of all trades and Handicrafts',
because 'the Sociableness of Man arises only from these Two things, viz. The
multiplicity of his Desires, and the continual Opposition he meets with in his
Endeavours to gratify them'.8" On the other hand, the Shaftesburian amiable
qualities would conform to 'an Indolent Society', where everything is kept 'at Rest
and Peace', preventing men from 'Trouble and Motion it self [sic]. Such was
indeed Mandeville's descriptions of what he made of the positive community, where
'the Bounties and Benefits of Nature' supply the needs of men and therefore nothing
more is required. Whereas in what he believed as the negative community, the
wants, passions and vices are necessary evils only by means of which members of
society are kept at their labour and men's needs as well as greed are to be gratified.
... the Necessities, the Vices and Imperfections of Man, together with the various Inclemencies
of the Air and other Elements, contain in them the Seeds of all Arts, Industry and Labour; ... our
Pride, Sloth, Sensuality and Fickleness are the great Patrons that promote all Arts and Sciences,
Trades, Handicrafts and Callings; while the great Taskmasters, Necessity, Avarice, Envy, and
Ambition, each in the Class that belongs to him, keep the Members of the Society to their labour,
and make them all submit, most of them cheerfully, to the Drudgery of their Station; Kings and
Princes not excepted.' '
83 FB, I, p. 342.
84 FB, I, pp. 331-4.
85 FB, I, p. 344. See also I, pp. 346-7, 355.
86 FB, I, p. 366.
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The difference of opinions about sociability between Shaftesbury and
Mandeville would reflect the difference of their circumstances and political
positions. Shaftesbury was a civic-minded Polite Whig, whereas Mandeville was a
powerful propagandist for the Court Whig party.87 Shaftesbury started his political
career as a Country civic Whig when he was young. His grandfather, Anthony
Ashley Cooper, the first earl of Shaftesbury, left office in the 1670s and became the
leader of the Whig movement opposing royal policies and fought for 'exclusion', to
exclude Charles II's brother, James, from the throne.88 After Locke had gone into
exile, who had been responsible for the early education of Shaftesbury, 'the future
third earl spent some very unhappy years at Winchester school, which no doubt
encouraged his antipathy to the Tory-dominated educational establishments'.89
Shaftesbury became a Whig MP for Poole in Dorset, assuming an active role in the
Parliament from 1695 to 1698. As an opposition Whig (Country Whig in
opposition), he was associated with Robert Molesworth (1656-1725) and Andrew
Fletcher (1655-1716), and he entertained advanced ideas such as the varieties of
republicanism, deism and anti-clericalism. Their Whig politics was informed by
Country and civic traditions, attacking the Court and its corrupting power.90
Shaftesbury was a Whig in the strictest sense of the term, by descent, by
education and by conviction, but he noted in 1700 that the Whigs had been shameful
in their over great condescension to the Court and had greatly lost interest in the
country.91 Shaftesbury was civic-minded in the 1690s, but no longer a Country Whig
when writing the Characteristicks from 1708 to 1711, though he was still concerned
with the themes of virtue and independence.92 Between 1700 and 1702, when
Shaftesbury came back to politics, the Country party was abandoning Whiggery.
Shaftesbury ceased identifying himself with the Country, adjusting to a situation in
which the Court was regarded as necessary and the Whig as a necessary element of
87 Irwin Primer (1975) emphasises Mandeville's dependence upon, rather than criticism of,
Shaftesbury, but what he shows is no more than their shared interests in Whiggism and the theory of
sociability. Primer (1975), pp. 126-41.
88 Klein, p. 14.
89 Klein, p. 15.
90 Klein, pp. 16-7.
91 Fowler, pp. 10 and 16.
92 Klein, p. 132. See also pp. 135-7.
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power at the Court.91 Shaftesbury's thought, his moralism, deism and aesthetic
interests were a political project, not only an exercise in Whig radicalism but also the
legitimisation of the post-1688 Whig regime.94 He saw that Country was
increasingly becoming Tory, especially with respect to religion and foreign policy.95
Shaftesbury's notions of sociability and politeness seized the opportunity to
create a new public and gentlemanly culture of criticism in post-1688 England and
post-1707 Britain, attacking Tory loyalty to the Church and the Court in the name of
a new Whiggish culture.96 But he was not only criticising Tory ideology and control
but also a culture organised around a Whig Church and a Whig Court. He was
envisaging the shape of discourse and culture in new ways, and it was the culture of
politeness.97 Shaftesbury's proposition, 'All Politeness is owing to Liberty', shows
his Whiggism, that, if the Whigs were the party of liberty and if politeness was the
concomitant of liberty, then politeness could be attained only under Whig auspices.98
As a Whig who, contrary to the Tories, wished to see the power of the Church
and the Monarch reduced, Shaftesbury advocated the hegemony of gentlemen and
gentlemanliness in society as the culture of politeness. He however was against
those institutions which had traditionally shared the various forms of hegemony by
gentlemen: the Church and the Crown.99 The project of a Polite Whiggism, his
vision of modernity in society, culture and politics under Whig auspices, subsumed
Shaftesbury's polite philosophy as his alternative to contemporary philosophy which
he criticised by using his new concept of sociability in Inquiry Concerning Virtue.100
On the other hand, it was Court Whig party to which Mandeville was closely
attached. A part of Mandeville's income came from the South Sea Annuities held in
trust for him by Dutch merchants in Court Whig circle.101 Mandeville was under
93 Klein, pp. 139-41.
94 Klein, p. 1.
95 Klein, pp. 142-3.
96 Klein, p. 8.
97 Klein, p. 9.
98 Klein, p. 125.
"Klein, pp. 20-1.
100 Klein, p. 21.
101 Kaye, pp. xxiv-xxv.
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Court Whig patronage of the wealthy and powerful Earl of Macclesfield, Lord
Chancellor from 1718 to 1724, whose friendship would have amply insured
Mandeville against poverty and neglect.102
In his paper on Mandeville's original contribution to the Court-Country
debate on corruption, Dickinson maintains that Mandeville was clearly a Whig.
Mandeville criticised Tory notions of divine right, non-resistance and passive
obedience, while accepting Whig position in favour of the Revolution Settlement of
1688-89 and the Protestant succession. Mandeville also praised Whig constitutional
ideals of limited monarchy and the balanced constitution of the Crown, Lords and
Commons, in particular in Chapter XI, 'Of Government', of his Free Thoughts on
Religion, the Church andNational Happiness (1729).103
Among Whigs, Mandeville more broadly sympathised with Court Whigs than
with Country Whigs. Mandeville was tolerant on corruption, on the grounds that
human nature is intrinsically corrupt.104 Mandeville also legitimated Court Whig
method of carrying their policies through the full exploitation of royal patronage in
order to win parliament. Above all, The Fable ofthe Bees was a powerful defence of
luxury and consequently an attempt to ridicule Country Whig opposition such as
Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope and John Gay who accused Court reign of bribery
and corruption and yearned for a return to an ideal world of honest freeholders and to
a former golden age of civic virtue, frugality and the simplicity of a Spartan
existence.103
As Goldsmith shows, Mandeville's theory of society was a response to early
eighteenth-century ideology of Christian personal virtue and civic humanist public
virtue.106 Mandeville showed his sympathy with Court Whigs in his first known
publication in English, The Pamphleteers: A Satyr (1703), his thorough-going
defence of William III and his Whig ministers for their achievements of opposing
French tyranny and eschewing sloth, pleasure and luxury. Dutch William had been
102 Kaye, pp. xxvi-xxvii. For the relationship between Mandeville and Thomas Parker, Earl of
Macclesfield, see also Harry T. Dickinson (1975), p. 81.
103 Harry T. Dickinson (1976), pp. 560-1. Also Dickinson (1975), pp. 80-97.
104 Dickinson (1976), p. 562.
105 Dickinson (1976), p. 563.
106 Maurice M. Goldsmith (1985), pp. 1-78.
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put on the throne by Whigs in the Glorious Revolution, shortly after which
Mandeville himself came to England. On the other hand, he reminded the dangers of
tyranny and popery under James II, against the supporters of Popery and arbitrary
government.107 The Virgin Unmask'd (1709) too justified the struggle carried on by
Britain and her allies against the danger of Louis XIV's France to Protestant Europe.
He rejected the Tory and Country Whig view that the Dutch did not do their share for
the war while the English land-tax payers were paying for the war and, worse still,
enriching stockbrokers, profiteers and foreigners whose interests Tories and Country
Whigs regarded were protected by Court Whig government. He distinguished
modern warfare from war in classical antiquity, denying the relevance of classical,
108civic humanist ideals of warfare. Similar Court Whig sentiments were again
expressed in The Grumbling Hive (1705), the original verse fable from which The
Fable ofthe Bees (1714) grew.
The Grumbling Brutes had been content
With Ministers and Government.
But they, at every ill Success,
Like Creatures lost with Redress
Curs'd Politicians, Armies, Fleets.109
But 'No Bees had better Government', even when ministers were enriching
themselves at the public expense, because such peculation was a normal and
unavoidable part of human nature.'10 His most explicit party tract, The Mischiefs that
Ought Justly to be Apprehended fi-om a Whig-Government (1714), expressed a solid
but moderate Whiggism. Mandeville defended the Hanoverian succession in the
tense political atmosphere between the death of Queen Anne and the outbreak of the
Jacobite rebellion. He supported the political principles and aspirations of Court
Whigs, such as the Glorious Revolution and their theory of limited monarchy against
Tory theories of divine right, non-resistance and indefeasible hereditary succession
which he thought suggested Tory favour of the Pretender. He also pointed out that
Britain's mixed constitution meant a limited monarch, and carefully defended
107 Goldsmith, pp. 79-80; Dickinson (1975), pp. 81 and 84.
108 Goldsmith, pp. 80-4.
109 FB, I, p. 26, quoted in Goldsmith, p. 89.
110 Goldsmith, pp. 88-91. ■ -
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parliament's resistance to Charles I.
... for a Whig is one that stands up for Liberty and Property and the Welfare of the Nation; that is
Obedience and Submission to his Sovereign, as long as he rules by Law, and endeavours to
promote the Good of his Subjects, but thinks it lawful whenever the King, or his Favourites,
invade the Constitution, and break in upon the Privileges of the People, to resist both him and his
ministers.111
On this basis, Mandeville defended Britain's legitimate foreign monarchs, William
• 112*III and George I, against a Jacobite restoration. His final party political tract in
1720, Free Thought on Religion, the Church and National Happiness, again
exhibited his defence ofWilliam III and the Hanoverian dynasty in an explicitly anti-
Jacobite and implicitly anti-Tory sentiment. His support for the Glorious Revolution
of 1688-89 was expressed against Tory doctrine of the inviolability of hereditary
succession and passive obedience. His admiration yet again for William III and for
those who preserved England liberty, religion and peace at and after 1688 was
113
coupled with his praise for the Dutch Republic for standing up to Louis XIV.
Mandeville discussed the advantages of the current Whig government, defending
Court Whig politicians by claiming that their apparent abuses were in fact the trivial
private vices of individuals who as statesmen competently administered a benign
constitution."4 His argument that the Revolution had brought the constitution into
balance with contemporary property relationships was the official thesis of the
current government party.115 His argument was an elaboration of the government's
well-known position, and a defence of government's financial manipulation and what
had commonly been called 'corruption'. He argued that political unscrupulousness
through financial reward and the granting of office to manipulate parliamentary
institutions had become inevitable in the modern circumstances of prosperity, and
that it was now the function of a well-governed state where increasing opportunities
for private gain were the prerequisites of affluence."6
After 1720, Mandeville was never employed by Court Whigs in the cause of
111 The Mischiefs, p. 6, quoted in Goldsmith, p. 92.
112 Goldsmith, pp. 91-4; Dickinson (1975), p. 84; Hundert, p. 6.
113 Goldsmith, pp. 94-107.
114 Hundert, p. 6.
115 Hundert, pp. 8-9.
116 Hundert, p. 9.
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political propaganda, perhaps because of his notorious reputation as the author of The
Fable.117 This reputation was consolidated when the enlarged second edition of The
Fable was published in 1723 and the Middlesex Grand Jury's presentment appeared
in the press.118 The Grand Jurymen dealing with the case were Country opponents of
the current Court Whig government, having been chosen by Tory or possibly
Jacobite sheriffs. These men publicly sought to assert their moral opposition to
Robert Walpole whose principles they found were enunciated in The Fable.119 In
their assault on The Fable, those Grand Jurors spoke as Country Whigs in the
language of civic humanism or republicanism. They attacked Mandeville's intense
and comprehensive critique of modernity in the name of an antique Mediterranean
virtue of republican Rome and Sparta.120 Their hostility to The Fable was derived
from Mandeville's compelling sketch of contemporary commercial society
drastically transformed by the new mechanisms of exchange. It frighteningly
demanded the relegation of civic ideals to the realm of nostalgia and the adoption of
egoistic morality.121
Mandeville's political views were further reiterated in Part II of The Fable of
the Bees (1728) and An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of
Christianity in War (1732) with his now elaborated theory of society. Mandeville
emphasised the beneficial effects of a governmental system which he thought was
not necessarily the result of the wisdom of individual geniuses but that of long
experience over a great length of time from the independent actions of many,
ordinary human beings. By this, Mandeville argued that virtue and genius were
unnecessary in politics, because the matters of government could be reduced to
routine operations and easily taken decisions by those experienced in the trade but
possessed neither of unusual intellect nor of extraordinary moral virtue. This was
also the advantage Mandeville thought of the British constitution: it did not need to
be staffed by virtuous men or the men of genius such as those in the civic ideal of
philosophers as the classical guardians of republic. Mandeville's emphasis therefore
117 Hundert, p. 6.
118 Hundert, p. 7.
119 Hundert, p. 8.
120 Hundert, p. 9.
121 Hundert, p. 13.
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lay in the importance of the operation of government in which men's passions and
interests are checked and public benefits are produced out of private vices such as
i 99
bribery and graft. Even though Mandeville was not a Court Whig party partisan in
the sense that he withdrew from the actual party political issues after 1715, he was
still Court Whig-minded with his political positions prior to the Hanoverian
accession. For example, he advocated the defence of the Protestant succession and
the Glorious Revolution; the praise of British liberty and the mixed constitution; the
emphasis on the constitutional arrangement sufficiently checking the evils of private
19-3
vices so as to produce public benefits.
Dickinson concludes that Mandeville was not a typical Court Whig but an
independent Whig who developed his own evolutionary theory of civil society.
Dickinson argues that Mandeville can be described as a Whig in general terms, but
may not be easily categorised as a particular stereotype of Whig, whether Court or
Country.124 For example, Mandeville did not have a high opinion of Court Whigs in
power, in thinking that politicians did not have to be men of exceptional qualities:
they only needed experience and a knowledge of human nature for their dextrous
management in order to turn private vices into public benefits.12" Dickinson also
argues that Mandeville's attack on the Charity School movement was highly radical
Country Whig-minded, and that his readiness to acknowledge the positive value of
political opposition capable of placing some limitation on those in power was not a
Court Whig attitude at all.126 Dickinson finally points out that Mandeville's
distinctive evolutionary theory of civil society starkly disagreed with Whig contract
theory of government, in the sense that Mandeville described civil society as
evolving from sociability and not from positive or artificial arrangement such as
social contract.127 Court Whigs were at that time abandoning the appeal to the distant
past as the root of liberty in order to justify the current constitution which they
122 Goldsmith, pp. 107-118.
123 Goldsmith, pp. 118-119. In all these arguments, Goldsmith regards Mandeville's politics merely as
'Whig, if somewhat idiosyncratic' (p. 88). But it seems fair to regard Mandeville's views as Court
Whig-minded.
124 Dickinson (1976), pp. 561-562, 564 and 570.
125 Dickinson (1976), pp. 564-5.
126 Dickinson (1976), p. 565.
127 Dickinson (1976), pp. 566-7.
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regarded was rooted in no further back than the Revolution Settlement of 1688-89.128
While agreeing with many of these views, I still regard it as more appropriate
to understand Mandeville as a more Court-minded Whig than Country, even if not a
typical Court Whig ideologist. For example, Mandeville in fact defended Whig
contract theory.129 Mandeville's view that politicians could not be expected to be the
men of highest qualities was perhaps his low opinion of the actual Court Whigs in
power, but it was also a typically Court Whig non-utopian, sceptical and pragmatic
view of politics. Mandeville's emphasis on the order and economy of government,
in place of virtuous statesmen, would reflect Court Whig interest in introducing and
establishing the easy and smooth procedures of administrations. Modest Defence of
Public Stews was a suggestion by Mandeville for introducing such an easy and
smooth procedure of administration in a Court Whig style in order for magistrates to
manipulate human passions and to turn private vices into public benefits.1'0
Mandeville's attack on charity and charity schools was not necessarily his alliance
with radical Country Whigs on the issue but simply an expression of highly
conservative and wildly mercantilist view on the mass labouring poor. His
mercantilist advocacy of favourable trade balance was, as we shall see, more in line
with Court Whig commerce-based economic policies than Country Whig agrarian
ideals.
It seems to me that Mandeville's distinctive evolutionary theory of civil
society therefore did not necessarily 'put him nearest to the other idiosyncratic Whig,
David Hume'.131 Dickinson's term, 'an independent Whig', would be more
applicable to Hume and Smith than to more Court Whig-minded Mandeville. The
'private vices, public benefits' controversy was therefore launched by a Court Whig-
minded affection praising commercial civilisation while denouncing conventional
moral teaching.
128 Dickinson (1976), p. 568.
129 Free Thoughts, p. 298. See Primer (1975), p. 128.
130 See Richard I. Cook (1975), pp. 22-33.
131 See Dickinson (1976), p. 570.
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2. Francis Hutcheson
Mandeville's vocabulary of 'private vices, public benefits' had become an
established feature of popular journalism in England by the mid-1720s. The 1723
edition of The Fable of the Bees provoked a whole series of references.132 It then
infuriated Hutcheson with the implications of its attack on the possibility of
benevolence, and it was said that he could not give lectures as a professor of moral
philosophy at Glasgow without criticising Mandeville.133 What I call the 'private
vices, public benefits' controversy had thus been provoked by Mandeville's
challenge formulated in the paradox. The subsequent participants in the controversy
confronted his argument in The Fable of the Bees, that morals in the age of
commerce were political products in increasingly inter-subjective, whimsical human
relations.134 The Fable's influence might have been greater in Scotland than
anywhere else in the latter half of eighteenth century: from 1755 onward, the book
was published only at Edinburgh.13" The attacks on Mandeville in the controversy
was naturally going to focus on his paradox, coined by juxtaposing the moral rigorist
with the utilitarian and practical understanding of commercial sociability.136
Kaye thought not only that Hutcheson attacked Mandeville's moral rigorism
by showing that men do act from perfectly dispassionate unselfishness, but also that
Hutcheson's attempt to prove the fundamental benevolence of human nature was
largely a matter of giving new names to the same passions: Mandeville had called all
natural emotions selfish and evil, whereas Hutcheson proposed some of them as
benevolent.1'7 At least, Hutcheson was anxious to refute two of Mandeville's
charges: that human nature was vicious, and that virtue was the product of hypocrisy
or deception. Hutcheson's refutation was directed by his understanding of human
nature: that men were naturally attracted by what seemed to be virtuous characters or
conducts and distracted by vicious ones, and that men were genuinely interested in
132 J. Martin Stafford (1997) collects some of the earliest references to Mandeville.
133 Hundert, p. 57.
134 See Hundert, pp. 171-4.
135 Kaye, footnote 5, p. cxvii; FB, II, pp. 419ff.
136 Kaye, p. cxxv.
137 Kaye, p. cxxvii.
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seeking moral approbation for their own character or conduct. Hutcheson's moral
theory then went on to suggest that unless men were able to satisfy their moral wish
for self-approbation, they would remain imperfectly socialised and hence still
incapable of contributing to the public good. Hutcheson's moral sense theory
eventually offered his famous and controversial answer to the question of how virtue
could be free from hypocrisy and deception.138
This is the setting for the most enduring and profound attack on Mandeville's
views from Smith's teacher, Hutcheson. Hutcheson's first major work, An Inquiry
into the Original ofOur Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue; in two Treatises in which the
Principles of the Late Earl of Shaftesbury are explain'd and defended, against the
Author ofthe Fables ofthe Bees: ... (1725), offered a criticism of Mandeville's work
as well as a defence of Shaftesbury's theory, as proposed in the title. Mandeville had
attacked Shaftesbury's account of natural sociability. By defending Shaftesbury,
Hutcheson consequently passed Shaftesbury's ideas to many Scottish writers in a
particular form for the sake of criticising Mandeville.'39 Due to having become the
target of Mandeville's attack and the subject of Hutcheson's defence, Shaftesbury's
moral philosophy offered three important points to the subsequent controversy about
sociability. First, his adoption of a tendency to promote general welfare as the
criterion of action; second, his concept of virtue as resting mainly on the exercise of
benevolent affections; and finally, his theory of moral sense as pronouncing
immediately on the character of actions. The first point became in Hutcheson
sufficiently prominent to be expressed in a formula, and then by Hume it was
established as the main doctrine of moral philosophy.140 As for the second point,
Shaftesbury insisted so strongly that the generous, sympathetic and benevolent
affections of human nature were the foundations of the most useful and sublime
virtues, that he rather threw into the shade the self-regarding and prudent virtues
equally essential to both the happiness of individuals and the material well-being of
the public. In Scotland, Hutcheson, Hume and Smith were to restore the balance,
showing the various forms of self-regard and self-respect, when properly directed
138 Phillipson (2000), p. 72.
139 Klein, p. 2.
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and kept within proper bounds, which merited approbation, while fully recognising
the excellence of the sympathetic feelings. The final point, the idea of moral sense,
became the focal point of the subsequent controversy about the problems of morals
and received a philosophical sanction that a man could instinctively and without
reflection determine and act on the right course for himself, or express a valid
opinion on the ethical character of the actions of his own and others.141
As we have seen, Shaftesbury's system had centred on the analysis of the
notions of beauty and virtue, and the passions in which they were rooted, and
Mandeville's critique of Shaftesbury had been directed at that question. It is therefore
of no surprise to see that Hutcheson also began his project with the very topic of
beauty and virtue. Shaftesbury's theory of beauty and virtue was already perfectly
well known in Scotland. But Hutcheson's originality lies in the way he handled the
argument of beauty and virtue: he regarded them as internal senses. That is, Hutcheson
shifted the question of the nature of beauty to that of a sense of beauty, the issue that
dominated his first treatise, An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.
Hutcheson equally shifted the question about the nature of virtue to that of a moral
sense, which was then concerned with in his second treatise, An Inquiry concerning
Moral Good and Evil. These two treatises made Hutcheson's first book, Beauty and
Virtue.
The Shaftesburian theory of beauty had focused on the nature of beauty so as to
discuss beauty as of 'itself or 'of its own nature'.142 In view of his theory of moral
sense, Hutcheson rather preferred an idea of a sense of beauty to that of beauty, and
argued that beauty was an 'idea raised in us' and perceived by the sense of beauty
only. Hutcheson therefore began with his definition of 'sense'. He described the sense
of beauty as lying within men's power to perceive an idea of regularity, order and
harmony and the moral sense as lying within men's determination to approve the
affections, actions or characters of rational agents which men call virtuous.143 Thus
140 Fowler, p. 163.
141 Fowler, p. 166.
142 See Characteristicks, vol. I, pp. 135-6. As to the Stoic theory of beauty that Shaftesbury might
have inherited, see, for instance, Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV. 20.
143 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design (1725); ed. P. Kivy
(The Hague, 1973), pp. 24-5 (abbreviated as BOHD below). See also I. IX, p. 34.
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beauty itself was defined as 'uniformity amidst variety'.144 These two internal senses
were now understood by Hutcheson as sentiments, distinct from what Mandeville had
argued as passions such as pride, vanity and ambition, especially when the ideas of
beauty and virtue to be derived from them were stressed together.
In the first treatise, Hutcheson developed his argument about the sense of
beauty in two ways. In the first, he tried to show that a pleasure found by a sense of
beauty in the ideas of anything beautiful, regular and harmonious, does not
necessarily arise from any knowledge of the usefulness of the objects, or any
prospect of advantage, or a view of private interest. It arises from the very idea of
beauty and harmony itself which strikes us necessarily and immediately, preceding
any idea of advantage from it:143
Hence it plainly appears that some objects are immediately the occasions of this pleasure of
beauty, and that we have senses fitted to perceiving it, and that it is distinct from that joy which
arises upon prospect of advantage. ... Now this shows us that however we may pursue beautiful
objects from self-love, with a view to obtain the pleasures of beauty, as in architecture,
gardening, and many other affairs, yet there must be a sense of beauty, antecedent to prospects
even of this advantage.146
This is the basis of Hutcheson's critique of Mandeville: in Hutcheson's view,
beautiful objects might be pursued for the reasons of self-love, but a sense of beauty
which derives an immediate pleasure from such beautiful objects and consequently
acts as a motive for seeking beauty is indifferent to self-interest. The idea of beauty
is therefore formed indifferently to self-interest, rather than relatively to self-interest
as Mandeville had argued. Indeed, Hutcheson's distinction between beauty and a
sense of beauty thus enabled him to go on to his argument of the 'universality' of the
latter:
... men may have different fancies of beauty, and yet uniformity be the universal foundation of
our approbation of any form whatsoever as beautiful. ... even among the most uncultivated
nations, where uniformity still pleases, without any other advantage than the pleasure of the
contemplation of it.147
144 BOHD, II. II, p. 40.
145 BOHD, I. XII-XIII, p. 36.
146 BOHD, I. XIV, p. 37. See also III. V, pp. 50-1.
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Hence, the sense of beauty is now shown to be universal, timeless and unselfish, and
quite different from the self-regarding, time-bound passions and sentiments
Mandeville had described.
The second main feature of Hutcheson's argument of a sense of beauty, along
with his insistence on its indifference to self-interest, was his attempt to demonstrate
the use of the faculty of beauty for an imperfect and weak creature such as man.
This neo-Stoic line of reasoning was presented part of his proof of 'design' or
intention, rather than blind force or chance that the world was the product of.
Roughly speaking, this strand of his treatise might have constituted what is vaguely
thought of as moral theology. As for wisdom, it was 'the pursuing of the best ends
by the best means' whose evidence was to be seen in 'any machine with a great
complication of parts actually obtaining an end', because such cannot be the effect of
chance.148 As for general causes, Hutcheson then continued, they were witnessed in
'many useful or beautiful effects flowing from one general cause'. By these,
Interest must lead beings of limited powers, who are uncapable of a great diversity of operations,
and distracted by them, to choose this frugal economy of their forces, and to look upon such
management as an evidence of wisdom in other beings like themselves. ... Now the foundation
of this beauty plainly appears to be uniformity, or unity of cause amidst diversity of effects.149
The natural and immediate action in which a sense of beauty chooses 'this frugal
economy of their forces' is not selfish but disinterested, because weak beings such as
men are incapable of surviving without such an internal sense letting them pursue
their self-interests. Hutcheson finally referred to what he termed the final causes of
the internal senses: 'the great Author of nature' who is 'making such a connection
between regular objects and the pleasure which accompanies our perceptions of
them'. This 'great Author of nature' would 'create the world as it at present is as far
as we can observe, everywhere full of regularity and uniformity'.150 After all,
Hutcheson came to believe these final causes as 'moral necessity':
... we may conclude that supposing the Deity so kind as to connect sensible pleasure with certain
147 BOHD, VI. VII, pp. 78-9.
148 BOHD, V. XVIII, p. 71.
149 BOHD, V. XIX, pp. 71-2.
150 BOHD, VIII. II, pp. 89-90.
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actions or contemplations beside the rational advantage perceivable in them, there is a great
moral necessity from his goodness that the internal sense ofmen should be constituted as it is at
present so as to make uniformity amidst variety the occasion of pleasure.151
This argument was to follow natural jurists such as Pufendorf, when Hutcheson
decided to defend the Deity not as the creator of the positive community, but as that
of the negative community. Unlike Shaftesbury and the early-modern neo-Stoics,
Hutcheson preferred to see the Deity as the source of our capacity for sociability, by
virtue of his having given men a sense of beauty, rather than for having given them a
common ownership of property. In other words, Hutcheson believed that the sense
of beauty, rather than the existence of property, was the faculty on which sociability
depended. Here Hutcheson emphasised the Christian dimensions of his arguments
more systematically than Shaftesbury. His understanding of the sense of beauty as
endowed in man universally, timelessly and indifferently might reflect his Calvinist
or Presbyterian thinking. The point at issue was crucial because it seemed to show
that the pursuit of wealth and power was driven by benevolent as well as self-
regarding passions:
... the gratifications of our internal senses are as natural, real, and satisfying enjoyments as any
sensible pleasure whatsoever, and ... they are the chief ends for which we commonly pursue
wealth or power. ... there are ... objects of these internal senses which require wealth or power
to produce the use of them as frequently as we desire: as appears in architecture, music,
gardening, painting, dress, equipage, furniture, of which we cannot have the full enjoyment
without property. And there are some confused imaginations which often lead us to pursue
property even in objects where it is not necessary to the true enjoyment of them.152
... these internal sensations may be overlooked in our philosophical inquiries about the human
faculties, we shall find in fact that they employ us more and are more efficacious in life, either to
our pleasure, or uneasiness, than all our external senses taken together.153
In this way, Hutcheson could show the way men could acquire wealth and power
with the help of human passions and sentiments that should not necessarily be
'private vices', but simply disinterested and innocent endowments even in the
negative community. Hutcheson's first treatise was thus his refutation of the first
half of Mandeville's paradox, 'private vices'.
151 BOHD, VIII. II, p. 92.
152 BOHD, VIII. I, pp. 87-8.
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Hutcheson's second treatise, An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil,
which was juxtaposed with the first treatise in Beauty and Virtue, went on to examine
what Hutcheson called a moral sense, which worked with the sense of beauty he had
described in the first treatise. This treatise was going to be his refutation of the
second half of Mandeville's paradox, 'public benefits'. He began by emphasising
the disinterestedness of moral good and evil: moral goodness was 'our Idea of some
Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love toward the
Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action'. Moral evil was 'our
Idea of a contrary Quality, which excites Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor,
even from Persons unconcern'd in its natural Tendency'.134 The argument, that the
passions of love and dislike provoked by moral good and evil had nothing to do with
self-interest, was in parallel with the preceding account in the first treatise
concerning beauty. For, Hutcheson immediately pointed out that our sense of
pleasure, occasioned both in a sense of beauty and a moral sense alike, preceded
advantage or self-interest:
Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is Advantageous or naturally Good to us,
but what is apt to raise Pleasure mediately, or immediately. ... Thus Meats, Drink, Harmony,
fine Prospects, Painting, Statues, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be immediately Good; and our
Reason shews Riches and Power to be mediately so, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of
immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these natural Goods are pursu'd from Interest, or Self-
Love.155
Hutcheson's objection to Hobbes and Mandeville was explicit here, and he
frequently repeated that his objective was to prove that morals were not solely
motivated by self-interest, but inferred from our sentiments of love and respect for
rational agents who behaved benevolently to us.156 Unlike what Mandeville had
claimed before, therefore, moral praise would not always be given to any politician
who had been useful to the defence of his country. We would hate a traitor even
though he is thought to favour us; and on the other hand we might praise a gallant
153 BOHD, VIII. I, p. 89.
154 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, in British Moralists, ed. L. A.
Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1897), p. 69 (abbreviated as MGE below).
155 MGE, pp. 70-1.
156 MGE, pp. 71-4.
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enemy who is yet pernicious to us.'37 Yet, by following the dictate of our senses of
both beauty and morals, we would fulfil not only the public good but also our private
interest at once:
That as the AUTHOR ofNature had determin'd us to receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or
disagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to
receive from uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite us to the Pursuit of
Knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an Argument to us of his Goodness, as the
Uniformity it self proves his Existence, whether we had a sense of Beauty in Uniformity or not:
in the same manner he has given us a MORAL SENSE, to direct our Actions, and to give us still
nobler Pleasures; so that while we are only intending the Good of others, we undesignedly
promote our own greatest private Good.158
Our sense of beauty and our moral sense make it possible to pursue the good of
others along with our private interest, both external and moral, from the disinterested
motive of those sentiments. Hence Mandeville's paradox, 'private vices, public
benefits', was false. Hence also Mandeville's remark 'that the Moral Virtues are the
Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride' was neither true nor necessary
for Hutcheson.159
The second pivotal point of Hutcheson's moral sense theory, however, looks
even more striking. Hutcheson went on to show how a moral sense was able to
approve of the selfish passions as not only innocent but virtuous. Hutcheson began
with the passions of love and hatred, of which Mandeville had offered one of his
most impressive criticisms. Hutcheson first asked of the passions of love and hatred,
which he considered the most important affections in morals: 'Whether they can be
influenc'd by Motives of Self-Interest'.160 He answered: 'Since then, no Love to
rational Agents can proceed from Self-interest, every Action must be disinterested,
as far as it flows from Love to rational Agents'.161 This led him to conclude 'That
there must be some other Motive than Self-Love, or Interest, which excites us to the
Actions we call Virtuous',162 and to argue that this was a new proof of the existence
157 MGE, pp. 80-1. Mandeville's account at issue is in FB, 3rd ed., pp. 34 and 36. Hutcheson used the
third edition of The Fable of the Bees (1724). Hutcheson's remark followed a summary of his view
on the approbation of others by our moral sense {MGE, p. 80).
158 MGE, p. 83.
159 FB, I, p. 51.
160 MGE, p. 85.
161 MGE, p. 87.
162 MGE, p. 90.
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of the moral sense.163 This allowed him to challenge Mandeville's view that the love
of parents for their children was a product of self-interest. Mandeville had argued
that the natural affection of parents for their children was weak until their children
begin to show the signs of knowledge and affection.164 Hutcheson replied that, first,
'we may find in some Parents an Affection towards Idiots', and second, 'The
observing of Understanding and Affections in Children, which make them appear
moral Agents, can increase Love toward them without Prospect of Interest; ... pray,
may not this be a Foundation of weaker degrees of Love where there is no
proceeding tie of Parentage, and extend it to all Mankind?'165 He also thought that
conjugal love was evidence of a determination 'to study the Interest of others,
without any Views of private Advantage', strongly proving that benevolence to be
natural to us:166
Here we may remark the manner in which NATURE leads Mankind to the Continuance of their
Race, and by its strongest Power engages them to what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety
of Life; and yet supports them under it with an inexpressible delight. ... how dull and insipid
had Life been, were there no more [than a Desire or a Love of sensual Pleasure] in
MARRIAGE? Who would have had Resolution enough to bear all the Cares of a Family, and
Education of Children? Or who, from the general Motive of Benevolence alone, would have
chosen to subject himself to natural Affection toward an Offspring, when he could so easily
foresee what Troubles it might occasion?167
This enabled him to conclude that 'The ordinary Springs of Vice then among Men,
must be a mistaken Self-Love, made so violent as to overcome Benevolence; or
Affections arising from false, and rashly form'd Opinions ofMankind, which we run
into thro the weakness of our Benevolence'.168
This line of argument would finally lead him to an important conclusion that
the selfish passions are not vicious in themselves but innocent or even virtuous, if
directed by a moral sense. Hutcheson's argument here concerned the selfish passions
of ambition and shame. He defined the former as 'to delight in the good Opinion and
Love of others, even when we expect no other Advantage from them' and as an
163 MGE, p. 94.
164 FB, 3rd ed., p. 68.
165 MGE, pp. 95-6.
166 MGE, p. 140.
167 MGE, p. 151.
168 MGE, p. 103.
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immediate good.169 On the other hand, the latter, 'a grievous Sensation of Misery,
from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no
other Evil from them', is an immediate evil.170 As seen, Hutcheson's attitude toward
the passion of ambition was favourable, and he distinguished it from 'a violent desire
of Honour, and of Power' as a 'base Means to obtain them'.171 Hence, the selfish
passions of ambition and shame were both based on the 'strong Determination in our
Nature to Gratitude, and Love toward our Benefactors ... which are exceedingly
necessary to the Order and Happiness of human Society'.172 For, 'were there no
moral Sense, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as advantageous or hurtful, I see
no reason why we should be delighted with Honour, or subjected to the uneasiness of
Shame'.173 Such passions are selfish but at the same time virtuous:
Ambition, or Love of Honour is really selfish; but then this Determination to love Honour,
presupposes a Sense of moral Virtue, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him
who pursues it. And let it be observed, that if we knew an Agent had no other Motive of Action
than Ambition, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his most useful Actions, since they
flow'd not from any Love to others, or Desire of their Happiness.174
Hutcheson's conception of ambition as selfish as well as virtuous implies that
Hutcheson thought that virtue was in some sense useful. Were anything useful
accounted also as virtuous, it would not be necessary to make a distinction between
ambition as vicious or virtuous, as Mandeville had elaborated. The key issue in
Hutcheson's system was again his handling of the moral sense theory. If a moral
sense is a basis of ambition, then it would be possible for the ambitious to love the
public or to study the good of others, even when pretending to do so only for the sake
of the pleasure of honour. In this sense, sociability was still sustainable without
'private vices' but with honour as 'an additional Motive to Virtue'.17' This would be
completing Hutcheson's explicit criticism of Mandeville's account of virtue as 'the
Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride' to the purposes of self-love in
169 MGE, p. 130.
™ MGE, p. 131.
171 MGE, pp. 130-1
172 MGE, p. 130.
173 MGE, p. 131.
174 MGE, p. 132.
175 MGE, p. 132.
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the flatterer.176
Hutcheson's final point in this second strand of argument was that, in a state
of negative community, selfish passions such as ambition were not only innocent but
necessary:
The Actions which flow solely from Self-Love, and yet evidence no Want of Benevolence,
having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem perfectly indifferent in a Moral Sense, and neither
raise the Love or Hatred of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain Bounds,
within which we may not only act from Self-Love, consistently with the Good of the Whole, but
every Mortal's acting thus within these Bounds for his own Good, is absolutely necessary for the
Good of the Whole; and the Want of such Self-Love would be universally pernicious.177
Thus, if ambition was innocent and even virtuous, the pursuit of wealth and power
would be a means of generating virtue and hence of honour:
Wealth and Power, the great Engines of Virtue, when presum'd to be intended for benevolent
Purposes, either toward our Friends or our Country, procure Honour from others, and are apt to
beget Pride in the Possessor; which as it is a general Passion which may be either good or evil,
according as it is grounded, we may describe to be the Joy which arises from the real or imagin'd
Possession of Honour, or Claim to it.178
Hutcheson's conception of the passion of pride thus shows how that 'general'
passion which is neither moral nor evil successfully contributes to 'public benefits'
by exciting ambition and the love of honour which is impossible if only with private
advantage in view and without the love of others. Flourishing, therefore, is not
necessarily motivated by the vicious: hence Mandeville's paradox was wrong. This
theme was further developed in his Passions andAffections examined below.
Hutcheson's, and originally Shaftesbury's, analogy between beauty and
virtue came from his view of the sense of beauty as an internal, and not an external,
sense. The sense of beauty, harmony and proportion is a reflex sense, because it
presupposes the function of the external senses of sight and hearing. It should be
called an internal sense in order to distinguish its perceptions from the mere
perceptions of sight and hearing, and because 'in some other affairs, where our
external senses are not much concerned, we discern a sort of beauty, very like, in
many respects, to that observed in sensible objects, and accompanied with like
176 MGE, pp. 133-4.
177 MGE, p. 103.
178 MGE, p. 137.
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pleasure'.179 The sense of beauty therefore perceives beauty not only in external
objects, but also in universal truth, in the operation of general causes (the beauty of
history), and in virtuous characters and actions.180 This is why the sense of beauty
perceives beauty wherever there is uniformity amidst variety.181
Such a formulation of the analogy between beauty and virtue was the
foundation of his language of beauty, in which the word 'beauty' was meant and
used as encompassing 'wealth' and 'virtue'. In Japanese, for example, the word
'virtue' came to signify not only moral virtue but also an increasingly broad range of
'strengths', even economic and financial, amidst the expansion of commerce around
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Early-modern moralists and political
economists in Japan therefore began to use the term 'virtue' as synonymous with
'wealth', in addressing the relationship between 'wealth' and 'virtue' in the newly-
emerging commercial society. This is not the case in English, so the word 'beauty'
was introduced by Elutcheson into the debate concerning the relationship between
'wealth' and 'virtue', as a bridge between 'wealth' and 'virtue', and the theory of
beauty consequently became the crucial battleground in the 'private vices, public
benefits' controversy.182
Hutcheson's second major work, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the
Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), was in some
ways a development of his moral sense theory elaborated in his previous two
treatises. The work again consists of two treatises, An Essay on the Nature and
Conduct of the Passions, which is sometimes called the third treatise, and
179 BOHD, I.
180 Fowler, p. 210.
181 Fowler, p. 211.
182 The relationship between 'wealth' and 'virtue' was an issue in the emergence of commerce also in
early modern Japan. The Kaitokudo Academy, set up in Osaka by Osaka merchants, was a venue for
developing the debate, teaching manners of commerce to the urban residents. See Tetsuo Najita
(1987). Baien Miura (1723-89), one of the moralists and political economists at the time, was almost
reminiscent of his contemporary, Smith. Miura began his study in astronomy, went on to ethics and
politics, and eventually wrote a treatise on market economy (1773), centrally concerned with the
'reason' or 'logos' going through the nature, morals and society. The parallel of the issue and the
course of discourse in the early stage of commercial civilisation seems indismissable (dreadfully,
Japan even got a corrupt de facto premier called Okitsugu Tanuma (1719-88), an equivalent of Robert
Walpole), though both Smith and Miura shared the Dutch intellectual tradition, more or less.
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Illustrations upon the Moral Sense, in the same manner called the fourth treatise.
The third treatise began with his review of the 'natural powers in the human mind',
which was developed to confirm what had already been discussed. He had discussed
the external senses, a sense of beauty, a public sense, a moral sense, and a sense of
honour in the second treatise.183 But his particular attention now fell on a public
sense, 'our Determination to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be
uneasy at their misery',m possibly to provide a further refutation of Mandeville's
term 'public benefits'. Hutcheson began with his redefinition of the term 'public
sense' as 'sympathy', and which, he was anxious to prove, was by no means 'private
vices', or even a selfish desire:
That this sympathy with others is the effect of the constitution of our nature, and not brought
upon our selves by any choice, with view to any selfish advantage, they must own: whatever
advantage there may be in sympathy with the fortunate, none can be alleged in sympathy with
the distressed: and everyone feels that this public sense will not leave his heart, upon any change
of the fortunes of his child or friend; nor does it depend upon a man's choice, whether he will be
affected with their fortunes or not.185
The argument here, that men are capable of benevolence, completed his objectives
set out in the preface of the third treatise: extending his argument that virtues are
natural and not artificial, to a discussion of public affections 186 and, even more
crucially, to the question ofwealth and power:
... as soon as we come to apprehend the use of wealth or power to gratify any of our original
desires, we must also desire them. Hence arises the universality of the desires of Wealth and
Power, since they are the means of gratifying all other desires. How foolish then is the
inference, some would make, from the universal prevalence of these desires, that human nature is
wholly selfish, or that each one is only studious of his own advantage; since wealth or power are
as naturally fit to gratify our public Desires, or to serve virtuous purposes, as the selfish ones?
How weak also are the reasonings of some recluse moralists, who condemn in general all
pursuits of wealth or power, as below a perfectly virtuous character: since wealth and power are
the most effectual means, and the most powerful instruments, even of the greatest virtues, and
most generous actions? The pursuit of them is laudable, when the intention is virtuous; and the
neglect of them, when honourable opportunities offer, is really a weakness.187
183 Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with
Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728); ed. Andrew Ward (Manchester, 1999), pp. 12-3 (abbreviated
as Passions below).
184 Passions, p. 13.
185 Passions, p. 17. See also pp. 18-22, especially p. 20.
186 Passions, p. 7.
187 Passions, pp. 14-5.
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His issue here was to explore how to obtain 'the general calm desire of private good
of any kind, which alone would incline us to pursue whatever objects were
apprehended as the means of good, and the particular selfish Passions, such as
ambition, covetousness, hunger, lust, revenge, anger, as they arise upon particular
occasions'.188 Again, the moral sense was his solution, with its enlarged roles in
controlling the passions:
We obtain command over the particular passions, principally by strengthening the general desire
through frequent reflection, and making them habitual, so as to obtain strength superior to the
particular passions.189
Our moral Sense, though it approves all particular kind affection or passion, as well as calm
particular benevolence abstractly considered; yet it also approves the restraint or limitation of all
particular affections or passions, by the calm universal benevolence. To make this desire
prevalent above all particular Affections, is the only sure way to obtain constant Self-
Approbation.'90
The selfish passions, therefore, if directed toward benevolence by a moral sense,
would be approved in pursuing private good. The focus here though was rather more
on the passions than the moral sense, for Hutcheson refined his definition of passions
so as to evaluate their virtuous characteristics and thereby vitiate Mandeville's
account of passions as entirely vicious:
When the word passion is imagined to denote anything different from the affections, it includes,
beside the desire or aversion, beside the calm joy upon apprehended possession of good, or
sorrow from the loss of it, or from impending evil, a confused Sensation either of pleasure or
pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily motions which keeps the mind much
enjoyed upon the present affair, to the exclusion of every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens
the affection sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent all deliberate reasoning about our
conduct.191
It would be why, in the third treatise, passions are frequently presented as desires, in
terms of their unpredictable traits. His elaboration of his moral sense theory in the
third treatise was accordingly developed from his new understanding of the passions.
Here Hutcheson was again particularly concerned with ambition. Ambition was not
to pursue ourselves too far so as to end up with pain, since pain was not a necessary
consequence of the desire itself, but was due to the 'uneasy confused sensations,
188 Passions, p. 24.
189 Passions, p. 24.
190 Passions, p. 25.
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which often occasion fretfulness, anxiety, and impatience',192 or in other words,
delusions. Yet, in Hutcheson's view, such confused sensations or passions are
necessary and therefore endowed by Nature, in view of the human weakness of
reasoning and knowledge, in order to preserve the human species still in need of
supporting itself by its labour:193
... without a great deal of human labour and many dangers, this earth could not support the tenth
part of its inhabitants. Our nature therefore required a sensation, accompanying its desires of the
Means ofPreservation, capable to surmount the uneasiness of labour: this we have in the pains
or uneasiness accompanying the desires of food.194
Now Hutcheson came so far as to affirm the needs of not only passions themselves
but their confused sensations or delusions and hence the consequent pain brought
about by living sociably in the negative community.
As expected, his approval of such delusions due to passions then led
Hutcheson into his further defence of the indifference of passions to self-interest.
... how few of our passions can be any way deduced from Self-Love, or desire of private
advantage: and how improbable it is, that persons in the heat of action have any of those subtle
reflections, and selfish intentions, which some philosophers invent for them: how great a part of
the commotions of our minds arise upon the moral Sense, and from public Affections toward the
good of others.195
Every Passion or Affection in its moderate degree is innocent, many are directly amiable, and
morally good', we have senses and affections leading us to public Good, as well as private', to
Virtue, as well as to external Pleasure,196
Hutcheson also offered a meticulously casuistical account of various passions in
various circumstances,197 but this was simply a meticulous attempt to show how
passions were necessary and virtuous and therefore had to be regarded as
disinterested.
But the shift of Hutcheson's emphasis at issue in the third treatise was
191 Passions, pp. 23-4.
192 Passions, pp. 31-2.
193 Passions, p. 34.
194 Passions, p. 35.
195 Passions, p. 50.
196 Passions, p. 5 1.
197 Passions, pp. 43-50.
Needs, passions and Sentiments 70
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
designed to show that 'our passions are not so much in our power'.198 Opinions,
confused ideas or strange association of ideas, fancy or delusions would therefore
represent quite particular kinds of gratification that would be of great importance and
furnish us with endless labour and misery:
The common effect of these Associations of Ideas is this, 'that they raise the passions into an
extravagant degree, beyond the proportion of real good in the object: and commonly beget some
secret opinions to justify the passions. But then the Confutation of these false opinions is not
sufficient to break the Associations, so that the desire or passion shall continue, even when our
understanding has suggested to us that the object is not good, or not proportioned to the strength
of the desire.199
... if this sense or desire of beauty itself be accompanied with the desire of possession or
property; if we let it be guided by custom, and receive associations of foreign ideas in our fancy
of dress, equipage, furniture, retinue; if we relish only the modes of the great, or the marks of
distinction as beautiful; if we let such desires grow strong, we must be very great indeed, before
we can have any pleasure by this sense: and every disappointment or change of fortune must
make us miserable. ... A violent desire of distinction and eminence may bring on vexation and
sorrow for the longest life.200
In other words, if our passions are beyond our control and calculation, they would
not necessarily save our interests and could not therefore be regarded as necessarily
selfish.
It would be of interest here to see whether, even if Hutcheson had eagerly
rejected the Mandevillian claim of the selfishness of passions, he still had somehow
to reconcile the violent and therefore, possibly, vicious and painful consequences of
those passions in pursuing wealth in order to supply the needs of life and 'public
benefits'. His response was that the abuse or misuse of the desire for wealth and
power would be prevented by our ability to appreciate their genuine utility:
The Desire of Wealth must be as necessary as any other desires of our nature, as soon as we
apprehend the usefulness of wealth to gratify all other desires. While it is desired as the means
of something farther, the desire tends to our happiness, proportionably to the good economy of
the principal Desires to which it is made subservient. It is in every man's power, by a little
reflection, to prevent the madness and enthusiasm with which wealth is insatiably pursued, even
for itself, without any direct intention of using it. The consideration of the small addition often
made by wealth to the happiness of the possessor, may check this desire, and prevent that
insatiability which sometimes attends it.
Power in like manner is desired as the means of gratifying other original desires; nor can the
198 Passions, p. 52. This assumption is crucial not only here but to all of Hutcheson's moral
philosophy, precisely because his case is consistently that benevolent affections are so natural to us
that we have to assume the existence of a moral sense.
199 Passions, p. 55.
200 Passions, pp. 58-9. See also pp. 54, 57 and 85.
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desire be avoided by those who apprehend its usefulness. It is easy to prevent the extravagance
of this desire, and many of its consequent pains, by considering 'the danger of affecting it by
injurious means, supporting it by force, without consent of the subject, and employing it to
private Interest, in opposition to public Good.20'
This is the case of the temperate and the chaste, with relation to the appetites; of the men of
Moderation and Frugality, and corrected Fancy, with regard to the pleasures of imagination; of
the humble and the content, as to honour, wealth or power. Such persons upon good success,
want only the first transitory ecstasies; but have a full and lively sense of all the lasting good in
the objects of their pursuit; and yet are in a great measure secure against both the uneasiness of
violent desire, and the dejection of mind, and abject sorrow upon disappointment, or upon their
being exposed to the contrary evils.202
The vital point is that Hutcheson admitted the shift of direction of the passions in a
modern commercial age, from needs toward greed, which Mandeville had
mischievously emphasised and tactically made use of to prove his claim that the
passions were therefore 'private vices' but necessary for 'public benefits'. But
Hutcheson did not agree with Mandeville's paradox that those passions were
necessary for supplying the needs of life and gratifying other public desires.
Mandeville had thought that frugality was harmful to the 'public benefits' because of
its effect on consumption. Hutcheson thought it useful to correct delusions and
render passions virtuous.
Hutcheson's solution to the problem of correcting the passions relied in his
belief that we could 'refine' our 'taste'.
It is in vain to allege, 'that there is no disputing about tastes:' to every nature there are certain
Tastes assigned by the great Author of all. To the human race there are assigned a public taste, a
moral one, and a taste for honour. These senses they cannot extirpate, more than their external
senses: they may pervert them, and weaken them by false opinions, and foolish associations of
ideas; but they cannot be happy but by keeping them in their natural state, and gratifying them.203
With such true tastes and sentiments, we should be able to distinguish and compare
the pleasures of wealth and those of luxury, as the former is the means of happiness
to the virtuous, whereas the latter is an endless source of agony:
... wealth and power give greater happiness to the Virtuous, than to those who consult only
Luxury or external Splendour. If these desires are grown enthusiastic and habitual, without
regard to any other end than Possession, they are an endless source of vexation, without any real
enjoyment; a perpetual craving, without nourishment or digestion; and they may surmount all
201 Passions, p. 62.
202 Passions, pp. 67-8.
203 Passions, p. 72. See also p. 91.
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other affections, by aids borrowed from other affections themselves.204
As far as the desire for wealth is directed by proper tastes, there is to be no
commitment to vice, for wealth is necessary to supply needs as well as to gratify
other desires including those for 'public benefits'.205
Hutcheson's fourth treatise, Illustrations on Moral Sense, was then a
reappraisal of the role of the moral sense in controlling the passions and desires, and
addressed questions which had not been sufficiently dealt with in the second treatise.
Hutcheson first reconstructed his questions concerning the nature and motives of
moral sense: 'first, 'What Quality in any action determines our Election of it rather
than the contrary?' Or, if the mind determines itself, 'What Motives or Desires
excite to an action, rather than the contrary, or rather than to the omission?' Second,
'What quality determines our Approbation of one action, rather than of the contrary
action?'206 His answer was developed in his evaluation of his moral sense theory.
Hutcheson immediately rejected the traditional Old Epicurean response explained in
Cicero's De Finibus, and that of Hobbes, which had attributed all the desires of the
human mind to self-love, or the desire of private happiness. For Hutcheson, such
views could not account for the principal actions of human life such as friendship
and gratitude, as well as the sudden approbation in actions done in distant ages and
nations, which would have nothing to do with the approver's private happiness.207
Instead, the fact was
204 Passions, pp. 82-3.
205 See also Passions, p. 101. It was a received understanding that good tastes are the necessary
condition for the refinement of passions as well as the development of civilisation. See Encyclopaedia
Britannica; or a Dictionary ofArts, Sciences, & c. (2nd ed., Edinburgh, 1778), 'Taste', pp. 8544-6:
'There are vast countries where taste has not yet been able to penetrate. Such are those uncultivated
wastes, where civil society has never been brought to any degree of perfection, where there is little
intercourse between the sexes, and where all representations of living creatures in painting and
sculpture are severely prohibited by the laws of religion. Nothing renders the mind so narrow, and so
little, if we may use that expression, as the want of social intercourse; this confines its faculties, blunts
the edge of genius, damps every noble passion, and leaves in a state of languor and inactivity every
principle that could contribute to the formation of true taste'.
206 Francis Hutcheson, Illustrations on Moral Sense (1728), in An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of
the Passions and Affections with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. Andrew Ward (Manchester,
1999), p. 107 (abbreviated as MS below).
207 MS, pp. 108-9.
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that we have not only Self-Love, but benevolent Affections also towards others, in various
degrees, making us desire their happiness as an ultimate End, without any view to private
happiness: that we have a moral Sense or determination of our mind, to approve every kind of
[sic] affection either in ourselves or others, and all publicly useful actions which we imagined
flow from such affection, without our having a view to our private happiness, in our approbation
of these actions.208
His point here is, again, that a moral sense approves not only benevolent but also
publicly useful affections and actions. In Hutcheson's view, the moral sense was the
mechanism which made it possible for us to direct our passions to the public good.
To examine how to establish compatibility between the contrary motives of self-love
and 'public benefits', or in other words, sociability, was exactly what Hutcheson
regarded as the core ofmoral philosophy:
To represent these motives of self-interest, to engage men to publicly useful actions, is certainly
the most necessary point in morals. This has been so well done by the ancient moralists, by Dr.
Cumberland, Puffendorf, Grotius, Shaftesbury; it is made so certain ... that no man who
considers these things, can ever imagine he can have any possible interest in opposing the public
good; or in checking or restraining his kind affections, his very self-love and regard to his private
good might excite him to publicly useful actions, and dissuade from the contrary.209
On the other hand, though in many cases virtues reflect a calm undisturbed
temper, which may be the effect of rational choice, they are also to be derived from
affections or desires, and even from some implanted instincts. As seen above, the
opinion that otherwise there could be no action of any kind, was Hutcheson's pivotal
view of the passions.210 If virtuous actions had to be, as Hutcheson thought, both
innocent and meritorious, or useful to the public, a mere inactivity is not approved by
a moral sense, as it is not meritorious to anyone, even though possibly innocent. In
this sense, Hutcheson might have disagreed with the idea of a negative virtue of
justice, like the one fulfilled by a man sitting in a room and doing nothing. For, his
inactivity is not meritorious enough to supply the essentials of life even for himself,
and consequently he would starve.2" Whatever is vital for actions, such as
affections, desires, instincts or passions, is necessary for human survival, and
208 MS, p. 109.
209 MS, p. 140.
210 MS, p. 146.
211 To Hutcheson's theory ofjustice, 1 come back in Chapter Three below, when I discuss about his A
System ofMoral Philosophy.
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therefore actions have to equip such qualities to be approved as virtuous.212 Thus, by
the end of his fourth treatise, Hutcheson left no room for himself to show any
concession to Mandeville's paradox. By connecting his own name on the title-page
with that of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson immediately made clear that he was to follow
Shaftesbury. He accordingly developed Shaftesbury's arguments of the analogy
between beauty and virtue, the functions of the moral sense, benevolent feelings as
an original and irreducible part of human nature, and the standard of virtue as its
tendency to promote the general welfare.213 The moral sense is 'moral sense of
beauty in actions and affections, by which we perceive virtue or vice, in ourselves or
others',214 which pronounces immediately and instinctively on the character of
actions and affections, approving those which are virtuous and disapproving of those
which are vicious.2" But Hutcheson did so in order to defend the sense of beauty
and the moral sense for their roles in the negative community. Unlike Shaftesbury,
Hutcheson saw the source of our capacity for sociability in our sense of beauty and
our moral sense, rather than in the existence of property in the positive community.
For example, Hutcheson did not confuse the moral sense or moral faculty with the
moral standard. Certainly, Shaftesbury would have agreed with Hutcheson that the
moral criterion was its tendency to promote the general welfare of the public.
Hutcheson's view of human nature as benevolent, however, maintained not only that
benevolence is the sole and direct source of our actions, but also that it is the only
source of actions approved as virtuous, against Hobbes's and Mandeville's view of
human nature as selfish.216 Hutcheson's view was that actions from self-love, such as
prudence, temperance, cleanliness, industry, self-respect and other 'personal virtues',
are morally neutral, and neither necessarily vicious, because they are some of the
very conditions for the preservation of individuals and society in the negative
community, nor necessarily virtuous.217
212 In this sense, the bare absence of all malice is not enough to be approved as innocent, because it
still lacks moral goodness. Rather, a positive evil for the sake of positive good to others may be
approved as even more virtuous than innocence. See MS, pp. 156-7.
213 Fowler, p. 183.
2,4 Fowler, p. 184.
215 Fowler, p. 185.
216 Fowler, pp. 193-4.
217 Fowler, pp. 194-5.
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It has been widely believed that Hutcheson's moral standard was utilitarian.218
I argue that Hutcheson's moral standard was not a utilitarian one, since the moral
sense was regarded as acting immediately and instinctively. 'The Greatest
Happiness of the Greatest Number' was simply assumed to be achieved, only as a
result, and not as an intention or criterion, if the moral sense acted properly: that is,
immediately and instinctively, without involving any calculation of either private or
public advantage.
Like Shaftesbury's, Hutcheson's attitude toward Mandeville was determined
by his Whig beliefs. Irish Presbyterian youths were ineligible for admission to
Trinity College, Dublin, or to Oxford or Cambridge Universities, so that they were
obliged to opt for Scotland for their higher education. Many of them were therefore
carefully prepared for their Scottish university careers in dissenting academies.219
One of these academies was established in Dublin by Hutcheson after he had
returned from Glasgow to Dublin in 1718. Those students from Ireland who arrived
in Glasgow during this period showed a flair for student politics, for clubs, student
societies and for the theatre.220 Their target was the Augustinian mentality of
orthodox Calvinist instructors such as Loudon and Carmichael. The texts they used,
such as Malebranche and Pufendorf, were Augustinian in their theology, convinced
of the sin of fallen man and of the gulf separating his sensations, imagination,
passions, morals and politics from the ideal or heavenly world brought through
divine grace.221 Students around Hutcheson were in correspondence at this time with
a friend of Shaftesbury, Robert Molesworth, who had retired to Dublin in 1722 and
found in some of them an audience for his Whig ideology of virtue and liberty.222
They were encouraged by Molesworth's concern for the absence of liberty and virtue
in the Scottish universities. Molesworth responded to William Wishart and George
Turnbull, who wrote letters to him, with recommended readings for students ofmoral
218 For example, Fowler, pp. 189-93, which concludes that Hutcheson's description of the moral sense
as acting immediately and instinctively on the one hand and his utilitarian moral standard requiring so
much care and reflection in its application on the other were inconsistent.
219 James Moore (1990), p. 43.
220 Moore (1990), p. 45.
221 Moore (1990), p. 44.
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philosophy: Machiavelli's Discourses, Harrington's Oceana, and the writings of his
friend, Shaftesbury.223 Hutcheson's early treatises on moral philosophy were written
in this context of Polite Whiggism as part of a campaign waged by the friends of
Molesworth for the reform of higher education in Scotland and Ireland.224
Hutcheson's early treatises manifest a coherence in opposing the selfish systems of
natural jurisprudence of Pufendorf and Locke, as well as various forms of
Augustinian dualism in aesthetics, ethics and psychology, most notoriously
enunciated in Mandeville. This was a systematic and powerful attack on the ideas
and materials used in the Presbyterian academies and the Scottish universities.225
Mandeville's claims that human nature is vicious and that all motivations are
necessarily 'private vices', directly challenged the core of Hutcheson's philosophy
delineating man's natural sociability and of his account of the benevolent nature of
the social sentiments.226 As a Polite Whig, Hutcheson began by harnessing
Mandeville's arguments to a natural law tradition he regarded as the narrowly self-
love-based account of sociability and moral conduct associated also with Hobbes,
Pufendorf and Locke.227 Hutcheson presented his theory of beauty and virtue by
enlarging the concept of sociability developed in modern natural law theory, partly
accepted in the Polite Whig circles, and infusing the broader moral characteristic in
human nature.228 Hutcheson therefore wrote Beauty and Virtue (1725) against the
Radical Whig Locke as well as against the Court Whig Mandeville. Along with
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson criticised Locke for his misrepresentation of beauty, virtue,
the passions and the affections, when he derived all ideas of good and evil from
relation to a law and its sanctions. Endeavouring to distance himself from natural
law theorists and from Mandeville, Hutcheson was determined to show that our ideas
of beauty and virtue were independent from any law, interest or custom, or
education, but were real ideas, perceived by internal senses quite distinct from the
222 Moore (1990), pp. 45-6.
223 Moore (1990), p. 46.
224 Moore (1990), p. 47. Moore describes the context as the Country Whig, rather than the Polite
Whig.
225 Moore (1990), p. 53.
226 Hundert, pp. 78-9.
227 Hundert, p. 79.
228 Hundert, p. 80.
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dependent and contingent sensations of the external senses. A beautiful object or a
work of art is perceived by our distinctive sensibility as an idea which attends the
peculiar pleasures of the internal sense. Similarly, our moral approbation was not a
relational judgement in accordance with a law or rule imposed upon us, but an
immediate apprehension of a virtuous character by an idea of virtue.229 Hutcheson's
Moral Good (1725) was also written in opposition to a form of Augustinian dualism
enunciated in Mandeville's paradox of the 'private vices, public benefits' dichotomy,
a celebration of the grumbling hive-like society where every vice is asserted to
contribute to the opulence and manners of the state and its subjects.2'0 Our ideas of
virtue and vice as real ideas were defended by Hutcheson against Mandeville's
theory that moral ideas were fabrications cunningly devised by skilful politicians to
direct the private vices of their subjects toward the public benefits of the state.231 To
be persuaded by politicians, Hutcheson would have argued, subjects had to have
some notions of good and evil in their own mind beforehand.232
Meanwhile, Mandeville published Part Two of The Fable ofthe Bees in 1728.
It took the form of dialogues, in which Horatio was supposed to be a disciple of
Shaftesbury while Cleomenes represented Mandeville's own opinions.233 It is worth
considering this volume as a response to Hutcheson's criticism of the ideas presented
in the first volume.234
As in Part I, Part II was also overwhelmingly devoted to the defence of his
idea that the passion of pride is vicious yet the principal feature of human nature and
society. In the second dialogue, which was intended to demonstrate 'That a most
229 See Moore (1990), pp. 49-50 and Knud Haakonssen (1990), pp. 70-1.
230 See Moore (1990), p. 51.
231 See Moore (1990), pp. 51-2.
232 See Moore (1990), p. 52.
233 Fowler, p. 142. Hundert's accounts on Shaftesbury, as a Whig with both Country and Polite
elements mixed, make sense as an interpretation of Shaftesbury per se\ but not necessarily correct as
that of Shaftesbury as Mandeville's target. For, Mandeville mainly treated Shaftesbury, especially in
his 'Society' (1723), as a Country Whig, rather than Polite Whig. See Hundert, pp. 123-5.
234 Part II was written in the form of dialogue. There are six dialogues between interlocutors called
'Horatio' and 'Cleomenes', with the exception of the first dialogue where 'Fulvia' joins. 'Horatio'
was described as a man of strict honour and justice, representing Shaftesbury's ideas. On the
contrary, 'Cleomenes' was set as nearest to Mandeville himself, insisting the insincerity as universal.
See FB, II, pp. 15-21.
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beautiful Superstructure may be rais'd upon a rotten and despicable Foundation', it
was asserted that 'good Offices or Duties' that Cicero had argued, or 'Benevolence,
Humanity, or other Social Virtue' that Shaftesbury had emphasised, were all
practised from nothing other than the passion of 'Pride or Vain-glory'.235 Strikingly,
using Hutcheson's own language of beauty, Mandeville sought to show that 'a
beautiful Order and happy Contrivance' was made use of by the passion of pride,
simply to display 'Beauty and Conveniency' which were subsequently identified as
'Curiosities and Wealth'.236 One of the most fascinating aspects in Part II of The
Fable of the Bees was that the principle of pride is examined in terms of what could
have been called its abstract history. In abstract thinking, where 'Use of
Conjectures' was to be adopted to 'go directly to the Fountain Head, human Nature
itself, and look for the Frailty or Defect in Man', instead of troubling 'with enquiring
after the Time or Country', 'good Manners or Politeness' was explained as emerging
from 'Self-liking' for the sake of 'Self-preservation'. As this 'Self-liking', in other
words 'Self-love' or 'Pride', caused uneasiness and disturbance in the process of
self-preservation, 'good Manners or Politeness' was necessarily produced and
brought to perfection by labour to overcome the human infirmities. Self-liking, or
the passion of pride, was 'the Mother of Hope', as well as of good manners or
politeness, and, above all, 'the strongest Armour against Despair', which prevented
men from suicide: because, without self-liking, men would choose suicide from self-
love! In such abstract history, it could be observed that 'all this is done without
reflection'.237
Such quasi-historical insight into the passion of pride was then developed into
an interesting account of the progress of sociability derived from the passion of
pride. Against Shaftesbury's view that men are naturally fond and desirous of
society thanks to benevolence, Mandeville argued that men became sociable out of
needs. In Mandeville's view, a capacity to make our wants known to each other was
235 FB, II, pp. 64-5.
236 FB, II, pp. 66-7.
237 FB, II, pp. 128-39. See also p. 146. Mandeville later pointed out that the origin of society was also
the common passion of the fear of defenceless men from wild animals, as well as, at the later stage,
from the dangers of fellow men due to their passions of pride and ambition. See FB, 11, pp 247 and
266.
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vital for us to look out for and acquire the needs of life. In this sense, Hobbes's
claim that men became sociable only to overcome infirmity was equally questionable
to Mandeville.238 After all, Mandeville let 'Cleomenes' say that
I am willing to allow, that among the Motives, that prompt Man to enter into Society, there is a
Desire which he has naturally after Company; but he has it for his own Sake, in hopes of being
the better for it; and he would never wish for, either Company or any thing else, but for some
Advantage or other he proposes to himself from it.239
In sum, Mandeville thought that men were necessarily and viciously proud and
therefore sociable.
Such sociability, however, was to be considered as inevitably resulting in a
serious outcome, as far as it was thought to be based on the vicious passion of pride.
In one of the most striking and forceful analyses in The Fable, Mandeville charged
that:
... there is no Species but ours, that are so conceited of themselves, as to imagine every thing to
be theirs. The Desire of Dominion is a never-failing Consequence of the Pride, that is common
to all Men; ... This good Opinion, we have of themselves, makes Men not only claim a Right to
their Children, but likewise imagine, that they have a great Share of Jurisdiction over their
Grand-Children. ... the Authority, which Parents pretend to have over their Children, never
ceases: How general and unreasonable this eternal Claim is naturally in the Heart of Man, we
may learn from the Laws; which, to prevent the Usurpation of Parents, and rescue Children from
their Dominion, every civil Society is forc'd to make; limiting parental Authority to a certain
Term of Years.240
... in the Amours of Thousands [ofmarriage], that revel in Enjoyments, Children are reckon'd to
be the greatest Calamity that can befal them; and often, what criminal Love gave Birth to,
without Thought, more criminal Pride destroys, with purpos'd and considerate Cruelty. ... the
Savage is not prompted to Love, from that Consideration [of the Preservation of their Species as
the End of Love]: He propagates, before he knows the Consequence of it; and I much question,
whether the most civiliz'd Pair, in the most chaste of their Embraces, ever acted from the Care of
their Species, as a real Principle.241
With such sociability, Mandeville continued, children were produced as engines
were produced by an artificer.242
238 FB, II, pp. 176-8 and 180-1.
239 FB, II, p. 183.
240 FB, II, p. 204.
241 FB, II, pp. 227-8.
242 FB, II, p. 229. See also Bernard Mandeville, A Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick
Diseases: in Three Dialogues (2nd ed., London, 1730): 'When the crafty Tempter of Mankind,
meditating their Ruin, attack'd our first Parents in their Pride, he shew'd himself profoundly skill'd in
humane Nature; from which the Vice I named is so inseparable, that it is impossible the latter should
be ever entirely destroy'd, as long as the first remains. ... as it was destructive to unexperienc'd
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This led Mandeville to revise his views of statecraft. Mandeville now argued
that the dextrous management by which skilful politicians could turn private vices
into public benefits was acquired not by 'Genius, so much as Experience', for it must
have been 'a great while' before they finally found out 'the true Use of the
Passions'.243 As government was established on the grounds of past experience, it
could be compared with a machine:
... I know nothing to which the Laws and establish'd Oeconomy of a well-order'd City may be
more justly compared, than the Knitting-frame. The Machine, at first view, is intricate and
unintelligible; yet the Effects of it are exact and beautiful; and in what is produced by it, there is
a surprising Regularity: But the Beauty and Exactness in the Manufacture are principally, if not
altogether, owing to the Happiness of the Invention, the Contrivance of the Engine. ... There is
something analogous to this in the Government of a flourishing City, that has lasted
uninterrupted for several Ages: There is no Part of the wholesome Regulations, belonging to it,
even the most trifling and minute, about which great Pains and Consideration have not been
emply'd, as well as Length of Time; and if you will look into the History and Antiquity of any
such City, you will find that the Changes, Repeals, Additions, and Amendments, that have been
made in and to the Laws and Ordinances by which it is rules, are in Number prodigious: But that
when once they are brought to as much Perfection, as Art and human Wisdom can carry them,
the whole Machine may be made to play of itself, with as little Skill, as is required to wind up a
Clock; and the Government of a large City, once put into good Order, the Magistrates only
following their Noses, will continue to go right for a great while, tho' there was not a wise Man
in it.244
'By dividing the Employments in a great Office', and 'by careful Limitations of
every Man's Power', it would be possible to establish 'the utmost Regularity' and
'the whole Oeconomy' in public office.245 For Mandeville, who supported Court
Whig government, however, such systematisation of government was preferable, as,
Adam, by bringing Sickness and Death upon him, so it has still continued to be no less pernicious to
his forewarn'd Posterity, by principally obstructing the Progress of the glorious Art, that should teach
the Recovery as well as Preservation of Health' (pp. iii-iv). This much less read work dealing with his
original speciality consists of three fascinating conversations between a man of 'the hypochondriack
Passion' whose daughter has been hysteric for years and a physician from abroad who has loved and
settled in England, concerning the nature and practice of medicine. The Fable of the Bees might have
been Mandeville's mischievous diagnoses of prosperous Augustan England as a hysteric hive: 'We
must believe that it is in the animal Government as it is in all others; whatever Poverty the Country
endures, the Court has always Plenty, and very rarely is destitute of Necessaries. It is reasonable to
think, that the Soul, who has such a great Command and is so arbitrary over the Spirits, will have
them (if they are to be had) for her own immediate Use; and consequently the Brain, where she keeps
her more particular Residence, shall be the last Place in all the Body that wants them; and yet this
often happens in hysterick Women, when any thing extraordinary disturbs them; for upon the least
Violence, that hurries any Quantity of Spirits another way, the Brain remains unsupply'd, as is
manifest from their fainting Fits, in which the Act of Thinking is always more or less impair'd'
(Hypochondriack andHysterick Diseases, pp. 243-4). See also pp. 332 and 363.
243 FB, II, pp. 318-9.
244 FB, II, pp. 322-3.
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even if there might have been virtuous men, the number of such men was too small
for a nation to rely on.246
As seen so far, Mandeville was still convinced by his ideas of the viciousness
of the passion of pride and its paradoxical needs for public good. He attacked
Shaftesbury on the grounds that, while there was nothing mean in Shaftesbury's
Character[sticks, it had simply excluded the 'Rules or Instruction' for 'the labouring
Poor, which are by far the greatest part of a Nation'.247 Therefore, 'a Publick Spirit'
advocated by Shaftesbury 'can never be universally felt', since it ignored 'the
meanest Tradesmen'.248 This was precisely why Mandeville called Shaftesbury's
system 'a Theory never to be put into Practice',249 possibly thereby implying the
impracticality of Polite Whiggism and Whiggism in the opposition in general. After
all, Mandeville criticised Shaftesbury on the grounds 'that he labour'd hard to unite
two Contraries that can never be reconcil'd together, Innocence of Manners and
worldly Greatness', by neglecting the industrious multitudes.270 A similar criticism
was surely directed at Hutcheson as well, in his pointing out Hutcheson's
unawareness concerning the decisive gap between a public spirit and a passion of
ambition:
... I don't deny that there are Men, who take Pains to qualify themselves in order to serve their
Country; what I insist upon, is, that the Number of those, who do the same thing to serve
themselves with little regard to their Country, is infinitely greater. Mr. Hutcheson, who wrote
the Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, seems to be very expert at
weighing and measuring the Quantities of Affection, Benevolence, etc. I wish that curious
Metaphysician would give himself the Trouble, at his Leisure, to weigh two things separately:
First, the real Love Men have for their Country, abstracted from Selfishness. Secondly, the
Ambition they have, of being thought to act from that Love, tho' they feel none. ... certainly, it
is not the Care of others, but the Care of itself, which Nature has trusted and charged every
individual Creature with. When Men exert themselves in an extraordinary manner, they
generally do it to be the better for it themselves; to excel, to be talk'd of, and to be preferr'd to
others, that follow the same Business, or court the same Favours.251
Thus, Mandeville was still maintaining a threat to the 'private vices, public benefits'
245 FB, II, p. 325.
246 FB, II, p. 336.
247 FB, II, p. 47.
248 FB, II, p. 51.
249 FB, II, p. 58.
250 FB, II, p. 357.
251 FB, II, pp. 345-7.
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controversy, concerning how to argue not only about the divine assistance of men's
conduct but also about sociability by taking the practice of the generality ofmen into
account.
Interestingly, both Mandeville and his opponents, Polite Whigs, used the term
'politeness' to designate the problem of modern sociability by which pride, in the
affluent conditions of commercial society, was successfully transformed into the
materially productive, socially useful and orderly mannered styles of civility.252
Mandeville saw the newly-emerging sets of 'manners' as more suitable moral rules
for people, not of landed or aristocratic independence, but of commerce, the arts and
leisure. This was a world where the new forms of property, such as shares on the
exchange, the places of profit conferred by the government, and moveable capital,
instantly traded. They were now the material conditions for the wealth of nations
and the social basis of personality.233 What Mandeville called 'the Rules of
Politeness' was equated with 'Virtue' among an established oligarchic elite.254
Politeness in Mandeville was therefore not identical to the politesse featured in
Renaissance courtesy books, in seventeenth-century Parisian salons and then in the
court at Versaille. For Mandeville, 'Politeness' was the manners of 'the Town',
particularly the City of London, for monied commoners, rather than for those of the
Court for the titled at Westminster.25' Mandeville never conceded to the
contemporary political argument that the manipulative practices of the Whig elite or
the hypocrisy of the commercial populations threatened the social order. Hypocrisy
as a technique necessary for concealing avarice from one another was, in
Mandeville's view, a polite manner for persons bound by the web of commercial
relations for hiding vanity from the gaze of fellows.256 Later, in A Letter to Dion
(1732), Mandeville remarked that 'what I call Vices are the Fashionable Ways of
Living, the Manners of the Age, that are often practic'd and preach'd against by the
same People: Those Vices, that the Persons who are guilty of them, are angry with
252 Hundert, pp. 69 and 74.
253 Hundert, p. 117.
254 Hundert, pp. 117-8 and FB, II, p. 12.
255 Hundert, p. 118.
256 Hundert, pp. 178-9.
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me for calling them so'.257 It is not, therefore, as Fowler believed, that Mandeville
altogether refused to admit, as explanatory of any of the phenomena of human life,
any original feeling of sympathy, kindliness or sociability.258 What Mandeville
refused to admit was only that they were useful for commercial prosperity. What
Mandeville regarded as sociability was commercial sociability, distinct from the
sociability that Shaftesbury and other Polite Whigs had believed was fundamental to
the culture of politeness. When Mandeville talked about statecraft, or in his words,
'the dextrous management of politicians', he talked of it as the rules of politeness, as
the Huguenot refugee Abel Boyer defined politesse as 'a dextrous management of
our Words and Actions, whereby we make other people have better Opinion of us
and themselves'.259 Mandeville sought to show that modern manners of politeness
served the publicly beneficial end of prosperity, that the goal had become a necessary
policy ofmodern states to encourage and direct the pursuit of private ends. He added
that a strict regard for the standards of Stoic or Christian virtue could therefore bring
few of the benefits to be derived from commercial opulence.260 The 'private vices,
public benefits' controversy therefore had an aspect of polemic between Country or
Polite Whigs and Court Whigs concerning the moral legitimacy of commercial
civilisation.
3. David Hume
Hume's first major work, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) now needs to be
properly placed in the context of the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy. The
attacks on Mandeville in the controversy focused on his paradox, coined by
juxtaposing the moral rigorist with the practical and utilitarian standards of morals.261
257 Bernard Mandeville, A Letter to Dion, Occasion d by his Book call'd Alciphron, or The Minute
Philosopher (London, 1732), p. 31.
258 See Fowler, pp. 139-40.
259 Abel Boyer (1702), p. 106, as quoted in Hundert, pp. 119.
260 Hundert, p. 121. For the connection between Jansenism and Augustinianism, see Anthony Levi
(1964).
261 Kaye, p. cxxv.
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Kaye argues that Hutcheson attacked Mandeville's rigorism by showing that men do
act from perfectly dispassionate unselfishness. He also argues that Hutcheson's
attempt to prove the fundamental benevolence of human nature was largely a giving
of new names to the same passions. Mandeville had called all natural emotions
selfish and evil, whereas Hutcheson proposed some of them as benevolent.252 Hume
was going to follow Hutcheson's criticism of Mandevillian terminology and argue
that, if it be vice which produces all the benefits in the world, then such vice cannot
be called vice but good. In general, Kaye points out, critics who rejected
Mandeville's moral rigorism and philosophical anarchism, which had given rise to
the notorious paradox, were forced away from strict rigorism and towards a
utilitarian solution of the paradox.263 In Hume, this was going to be attempted by
showing how it was indeed possible for men to create the true ideas of morals, or to
search the reliable standard of morality, against Mandeville's rhetorical nonsense of
destroying the distinction between morals and vices. In Hume's view, the
Mandevillian paradox was 'little less than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice,
which is in general beneficial to society'.264 Usefulness, or utility, then was a
possible standard ofmorals for Hume.
In the end, Hume thought that Mandeville had failed to show sociability in
commercial society as an unintentional public consequence of intended private
actions through customs. Mandeville had instead simply presented it as a paradox,
but not as a natural process triggered by the senses rather than by the passions.
Hume therefore sought to show that our moral ideas would be formed in the light of
the usefulness or utility as the standard of morals. Hume was going to solve
Mandeville's paradox by introducing the idea of utility as the measure ofmorals.
In his Essays Moral and Political published in 1742, Hume presented his
view on what I call the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy, and Mandeville's
accounts ofmorals in particular. Hume distinguished two sects in moral philosophy.
262 Kaye, p. cxxvii.
263 Kaye, pp. cxxix-cxxxiii.
264 David Hume, 'Of the Refinement in the Arts', in Essays Moral, Political and Literary (1777); ed.
Eugene F. Miller, Indianapolis (1985), p. 280 (abbreviated as Essays below).
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The first was the sentiments of those inclined to think favourably of human nature.
The other was the sentiments of those inclined to give us a mean opinion of our
nature.265 The former belonged to the 'polite and fashionable moralists' such as
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who would be more advantageous to virtue. The latter
would not be enemies to virtue, either, because they did not necessarily have any bad
intention in exposing the frailties of human beings. Instead, they simply encouraged
us to 'consider the common course of human affairs with too much indignation'.266
Mandeville was a typical moralist of the latter sect, who commonly employed two
means to destroy the dignity of human nature. First, 'By making an unfair
representation of the case, and insisting only upon the weaknesses of human
nature';267 and second, 'By forming a new and secret comparison between man and
beings of the most perfect wisdom'.268 After all, Hume thought the controversy was
nothing but a matter of language:
There is much of a dispute of words in all this controversy. When a man denies the sincerity of
all public spirit or affection to a country and community, I am at a loss what to think of him.
Perhaps he never felt this passion in so clear and distinct a manner as to remove all his doubts
concerning its force and reality. But when he proceeds afterwards to reject all private friendship,
if no interest or self-love intermix itself; 1 am then confident that he abuses terms, and confounds
the ideas of things; since it is impossible for any one to be so selfish, or rather so stupid, as to
make no difference between one man and another, and give no preference to qualities, which
engage his approbation and esteem.269
He does not know himself: He has forgotten the movements of his heart; or rather he makes use
of a different language from the rest of his countrymen, and calls not things by their proper
270
names."
In my opinion, there are two things which have led astray those philosophers, that have insisted
so much on the selfishness of man. In the first place, they found, that every act of virtue or
friendship was attended with a secret pleasure; whence they concluded, that friendship and virtue
could not be disinterested. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous sentiment or passion
produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel a pleasure in doing a good to my friend,
because I love him; but do not love him for the sake of that pleasure.
265 Essays, Part I: Essays Moral and Political (published in 1742), Essay 11: 'Of the Dignity or
Meanness of Human Nature', pp. 80-1.
266 Essays, p. 81.
267 Essays, pp. 82-3.
268
Essays, p. 83.
269 Essays, p. 84. See also p. 83: 'It is also usual to compare one man with another; and finding very
few whom we can call wise or virtuous, we are apt to entertain a contemptible notion of our species in
general. ... When we find a man, who arrives at such a pitch of wisdom as is very uncommon, we
pronounce him a wise man: So that to say, there are few wise men in the world, is really to say
nothing; since it is only by their scarcity, that they merit that appellation'.
270 Essays, p. 85.
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In the second place, it has always been found, that the virtuous are far from being indifferent
to praise; and therefore they have been represented as a set of vain-glorious men, who had
nothing in view but the applauses of others. But this also is a fallacy. It is very unjust in the
world, when they find any tincture of vanity in a laudable action, to depreciate it upon that
account, or ascribe it entirely to that motive. ... To love the glory of virtuous deeds is a sure
proof of the love of virtue.271
Hume now decided to solve the paradox as an issue of moral terminology.
Even though the essay was published in 1742, after his Treatise, Hume had the issue
in mind in writing the Treatise in which he was concerned with how such moral
ideas as justice, industry and property could be formed as virtues for the benefits of
public interests. In his argument, he was anxious to show that these moral ideas
would be formed not as 'private vices', hypocrisies or disguises for our proud and
ambitious passions, as Mandeville had charged.
Hume began Book I of the Treatise, 'Of Understanding', by defining
perceptions into two sorts: impressions such as sensations, and ideas that are the faint
images of these impressions in thinking and reasoning. Hume then classified
passions into impressions.272 More precisely, passions according to Hume were to be
regarded as reflections derived from ideas, rather than sensations that had originally
arisen in the soul from unknown causes, though both sensation and reflection were
impressions. In this, Hume's primary concern was going to be reflection, rather than
sensation, because 'The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists
and natural philosophers than to moral'.273 Hume now had to deal with two faculties
of reflection: memory and imagination. Memory still retains its first vividness
considerably in the new impression. Imagination, on the other hand, entirely loses
that vividness, so that it is a perfect idea.274 What Hume defined as imagination
however was not an operation of the mind by chance alone, but a certain principle
which he was going to call the association of ideas. By the association of ideas, the
same simple ideas fall regularly into certain complex ideas such as moral ideas, and
271 Essays, pp. 85-6. Hume also identified Hobbes and Locke as modern proponents of 'the selfish
system of morals' in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, especially Appendix II, 'Of
Self-Love'. See editor's footnote 2, Essays, p. 84.
272 David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature (1739-40); eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton
(Oxford, 2000), LI. 1. 1, p. 7 (abbreviated as THN below).
273 THN, I. I. 2. 1, p. 11.
274 THN, 1.1. 3. l,p. 11.
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hence one idea naturally introduces another.273 In Hume, the analysis of passions
was indeed going to be his examination of the process of such association of ideas, in
which simple ideas were the causes of certain passions which then resulted in
producing the complex ideas.276 From the beginning of his Treatise, Hume had a
view of the extensive influence of such an association of ideas on sociability. When
the one has a power of producing a motion or any action in the other, Hume argued,
the relation of cause and effect in the association of ideas is 'to be the source of all
the relations of interest and duty, by which men influence each other in society, and
are plac'd in the ties of government and subordination'.277 By planning his own
theory of causation in this way, Hume would have sought the possible solution to
overcome the Pyrrhonian scepticism he saw in Mandeville's paradox. His theory of
the association of ideas was to show that sociability was a natural process relied on
the formation and refinement of the ideas of morals by the association of ideas
triggered by the senses rather than by the passions. His theory of the association of
ideas was therefore to show that sociability was not a paradox but an unintentional
public consequence of intended private actions directed through the association of
ideas and the formation and refinement of the true ideas of morals.
Quite naturally, the association of ideas, by which vivid simple ideas were
resolved into various complex ideas, was going to be analysed by Hume under his
argument of cause and effect. In discussing simple ideas, Hume preferred
strategically to concentrate on an analysis of belief, because a belief was, in Hume's
words, 'A lively idea related to or associated with a present impression',278 and
therefore a good example of a simple idea. Hume, then, went on to show how a
275 THN, 1.1. 4. 1, pp. 12-3.
276 THN, I. 1. 4. 7, p. 14. Book I of the Treatise accordingly examined the complex ideas of various
relations as effects of the association of ideas, such as the idea of space and time (Part II) and that of
cause and effect (Part III). Book II of Treatise was consequently devoted to analyses of how the
association of ideas produce such complex ideas as its effects, and Book III then went on to examine
the complex ideas of morals. The entire treatise could therefore be regarded as an analysis of the
effects of passions, resulting from the principle of the association of ideas: '...I content myself with
knowing perfectly the manner in which objects affect my senses, and their connections with each
other, as far as experience informs me of them. This suffices for the conduct of life; and this also
suffices for my philosophy, which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions,
or impressions and ideas' (I. II. 5. 26, p. 46).
277 THN, I. I. 4. 5, pp. 13-4.
278 THN, I. III. 7. 5, p. 67.
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belief initiates the association of ideas to produce complex ideas, and in particular
excites passions in the process:
The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and
bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect it can only have by making an idea
approach an impression in force and vivacity. ... Belief, therefore, since it causes an idea to
imitate the effects of the impressions, must make it resemble them in these qualities, and is
nothing but a more vivid and intense conception ofany idea. This, then, may both serve as an
additional argument for the present system, and may give us a notion after what manner our
reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions.
As belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions, so the passions in their
turn are very favourable to belief; and not only such facts as convey agreeable emotions, but very
often such as give pain, do upon that account become more readily the objects of faith and
• • 279
opinion.
What, then, causes such a belief, which excites passions to form complex
ideas by the association of ideas? Hume argued that it was custom operating upon
the imagination, which was the sole origin of belief. In the process, belief was
derived from a past repetition without any new reasoning or conclusion, so that the
past experience on which all our judgements concerning cause and effect depended
was never taken notice of, and was unknown to us.280 This was why Hume came to
conclude that the most conspicuous force and vividness of simple ideas which form
opinion or judgement amount not to knowledge but merely to probability.281 Reason,
Hume argued, might have been regarded as a cause, and truth might have been
believed as its natural effect, but, due to other causes interrupting as well as our
inconstant mental powers, our knowledge of truth, which should be derived from
reasoning, would simply degenerate into probability.282 Hume's hypothesis behind
his idea ofprobability was that
Reason can never show us the connexion of one object with another, tho' aided by experience,
and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the mind, therefore,
passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not
determin'd by reason, but certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects,
and unite them in the imagination.283
279 THN, I. III. 10. 3-4, p. 82.
280 THN, I. III. 8. 10-13, pp. 72-3. Hume defined cause as follows: 'A CAUSE is an object precedent
and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form
the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other' (I. III. 14.
31,p. 114).
281 THN, I. III. 13. 19, p. 104.
282 THN, I. IV. 1. 1, p. 121.
283 THN, I. III. 6. 12, p. 64.
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... that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing but custom;
and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our
natures.284
The faculty of imagination, in this sense, was crucial in Hume, as a power giving rise
to the complex idea of the continued and distinct existence of any object, because, in
this case, all impressions of objects are internal and fading inevitably.285 In this way,
imagination observes uniformity among objects, simply to suppose their continued
existence and even strengthen their certain coherence.286 In the same way, an opinion
of the identity of objects must arise from imagination, only by means of the
resemblance of certain perceptions which the imagination has a propensity to
suppose are the same. Such an idea of continued existence however is after all a
fiction and therefore false.287 Consequently, Hume was eventually forced to declare
that 'Carelessness and in-attention' alone could afford us remedy for sceptical doubt
with respect to reason, and that, therefore, he would rely entirely upon them.288
Hume summarised his argument and argued that experience and habit were
the principles which conspired to operate upon the imagination and made men form
certain ideas.289 In sum, in Hume's analytical scheme of the association of ideas,
experience and habit, or, above all, custom, produced a vivid and intense belief
which then becomes a cause of complex ideas such as opinion by exciting passions
in associating simple ideas. Complex ideas as such would, however, be but merely
something probable, and never be knowledge, since the imagination upon which
custom operated was beyond our reason. Consequently, Hume seems to have
regarded the passions as something delusive, by showing how easily the passions are
excited by the imagination in the association of ideas, only to form complex ideas
and opinions merely as something probable and never as knowledge. His quest for
the true ideas of morals, therefore, was to take such delusive character of passions
into account in analysing how simple ideas are associated into complex ideas in
284 THN, I. IV. 1. 8, p. 123.
285 THN, I. IV. 2. 15, p. 129.
286 THN, I. IV. 2. 22, p. 132.
287 THN, I. IV. 3. 43, p. 139.
288 THN, I. IV. 3. 57, p. 144. On this point, I have heard an interesting paper: John Sutton (1999).
289 THN, I. IV. 7. 3, p. 172.
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forming the ideas of morals.
Book II of the Treatise, 'Of Passions', consequently launches his detailed
examination of such delusive character of passions, following his scheme set out in
Book I. That is, how passions which are excited by simple ideas, in the association
of ideas, give rise to complex ideas. As in Book I, Hume classified passions into
reflection, or secondary impressions, distinct from sensation, or original
impressions.290 Following Hutcheson's Passions and Affections, Hume further
divided reflection into two: the calm reflective impressions, and the violent reflective
impressions. The former includes the sense of beauty and deformity in action,
composition and external objects. On the other hand, passions belonged to the
latter.291 Passions, thus classified into the violent reflective impressions, were still
further divided into two groups. One was the indirect passions, such as the passions
of pride and humility, of ambition and vanity, of love and hatred, of envy and pity,
and of malice and generosity. The other was the direct passions, such as desire and
aversion, the passions of grief and joy, of hope and fear, and of despair and
security.292 Hume's primary concern in Book II was the indirect passions, so that the
passions of pride and humility were discussed in Part I, and those of love and hatred
in Part II. The direct passions, however, were also dealt with in Part III, in terms of
needs and greed, the theme that resulted from the 'private vices, public benefits'
controversy. It is worth noting, again, that all of these passions concern the relations
between ourselves and others, or sociability, in forming the ideas of morals. This is
why these passions are to be analysed in Book II, before it is examined in Book III
how the ideas of morals are formed in the association of ideas excited by these
passions.
Hume, hence, began with the passions of pride and humility. As we shall see,
his discussions were in many ways going to be more sceptical than those of
Mandeville and Hutcheson, due to his introduction of the theory of the association of
ideas in Book I. In arguing the objects and causes of the passions of pride and
290 THN, II. I. 1. 1-2, p. 181.
291 THN, II. I. 1.3, pp. 181-2.
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humility, Hume focused on the influence of the association of ideas on pride and
humility.
In examining these qualities [of the causes of pride and humility], I immediately find many of
them to concur in producing the sensation of pain and pleasure, independent of those
affections.... Thus the beauty of our person, of itself, and by its very appearance, gives pleasure,
as well as pride; and its deformity, pain as well as humility. Every cause of pride, by its peculiar
qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness.293
Again, in considering the subjects, to which these qualities adhere, I make a new supposition...
that these subjects are either parts of ourselves, or something nearly related to us. Thus the good
and bad qualities of our actions and manners constitute virtue and vice, and determine our
personal character, than which nothing operates more strongly on these passions. In like manner,
'tis the beauty or deformity of our person, houses, equipage, or furniture, by which we are
render'd either vain or humble.294
That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the
passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the
passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd.295
... nature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a
peculiar impression or emotion, which we call pride: To this emotion she has assign'd a certain
ides, viz. that of self, which it never fails to produce.296
Having thus understood that the passions of pride and humility are caused in
relation to the self in the association of ideas, Hume asked how we get the passions
of pride and humility. Hume examined the particularly interesting and important
causes of these passions, such as virtue and vice, beauty and deformity, wealth and
power, in the context of the association of ideas.
First, let us look at virtue and vice. These are what Hume called the most
obvious causes of the passions of pride and humility, in the sense that virtue and vice
produce in us a real pleasure and pain, thereby exciting pride and humility.297 On the
other hand, pleasure and pain, which are the primary causes of virtue and vice, are at
the same time to be the causes of all their effects, and consequently, of the passions
of pride and humility.298 Interestingly enough, Hume was quite conscious here that
292 THN, II. I. 1.4, p. 182.
293 THN, II. I. 5. 1, p. 187.
294 THN, II. I. 5. 2, p. 187.
295 THN, II. I. 5. 5, p. 188.
296 THN, II. I. 5. 6, p. 188. See also his description of 'the general system': 'that all agreeable objects,
related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of impression, produce pride, and disagreeable
ones, humility' (II. I. 6. 1, p. 190).
297 THN, II. I. 7. 2-4, p. 193.
298 THN, II. I. 7. 5, p. 194.
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he was challenging what he thought were traditional views when he was talking of
virtue, instead of vice, as the cause of the passions of pride, and talking of vice, not
of virtue, as the cause of the passion of humility:
But not to dispute about words, 1 observe, that by pride I understand that agreeable impression,
which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us
satisfy'd with ourselves: And that by humility I mean the opposite impression. 'Tis evident the
former impression is not always vicious, nor the latter virtuous.299
Hume was obviously criticising not only Mandeville's rigorist moral standard but
also all derivations of the Augustinian theory of the passions of which Mandeville's
was one, which had regarded any passion of pride as vicious. Following
Hutcheson's view that the passion of pride pursuing benevolent desires were not
necessarily vicious but rather virtuous, Hume could now approve the passion of pride
as the effect of pleasure and therefore of virtue as well. Hume's innovation here
seems to be that he argued the passion of pride as the effect of virtue, such as the
consequence of feeling virtuous, but not as something virtuous in itself.
Next, let us look at beauty and deformity. Since beauty or deformity is
closely related to the self, a form which gives us a delight and satisfaction becomes
an object of pride. On the contrary, a form which gives us pain becomes an object of
humility. In this, both passions are due to a perfect transition of impressions and
ideas, so that beauty, which occasions pleasure in the mind, is immediately derived
from the idea of convenience and utility. '00
... whatever in ourselves is either useful, beautiful, or surprizing, is an object of pride; and its
contrary, of humility. Now 'tis obvious, that every thing useful, beautiful or surprizing, agrees in
producing a separate pleasure, and agrees in nothing else. The pleasure, therefore, with the
relation to selfmust be the cause of the passion.301
In Hume's view, of the three qualities from which the association of ideas arise, that
is, resemblance, contiguity in time and space, and causation (cause and effect),302 the
relation of resemblance is seldom a foundation of the passion of pride or of
299 THN, II. I. 7. 8, p. 194.
300 THN, II. I. 8. 1-2, pp. 195-6.
301 THN, II. I. 7. 5, p. 196.
302 See THN, 1.1. 4. 2, p. 13.
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The relation, therefore, of contiguity, or that of causation, betwixt the cause and object of pride
and humility, is alone requisite to give rise to these passions; and these relations are nothing else
but qualities by which the imagination is convey'd from one idea to another.304
In Hume's view, this was indeed why family relationship or friendship, and the
beauty, address, merit, credit and honours of our kindred were some of the most
considerable sources of our pride and vanity.305 For the same reason, riches and the
antiquity of our family or friend were also a subject of vanity, and this was why,
Hume commented, we remove the poor as far from us as possible.306 In this way,
beauty and deformity excite the passions of pride and humility in the same manner as
virtue and vice, by the association of ideas.
Finally, let us examine wealth and power as the causes of the passions of
pride and humility. Hume primarily defined property as a certain relation, which
produces most commonly the passion of pride:
such a relation betwixt a person and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the free use
and possession of it, without violating the laws ofjustice and moral equity. ... This in the mean
time is certain, that the mention of the property naturally carries our thought to the proprietor,
and of the proprietor to the property; which being a proof of a perfect relation of ideas is all that
is requisite to our present purpose. A relation of ideas, join'd to that of impressions, always
produces a transition of affections; and therefore, whenever any pleasure or pain arises from an
object, connected with us by property, we may be certain, that either pride or humility must arise
from this conjunction of relations. '07
Now riches are to be consider'd as the power of acquiring this property of what pleases; and 'tis
only in this view they have any influence on the passions.308
In the same manner, power excites the passion of pride, because 'power consists in
the possibility or probability of any action', and 'The passions are not only affected
by such events as are certain and infallible, but also in an inferior degree by such as
are possible and contingent'.309
303 THN, II. I
304 THN, II. I
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The very essence of riches consists in the power of procuring the pleasures and conveniences of
life. The very essence of this power consists in the possibility of its exercise, and in its causing
us to anticipate, by a true or false reasoning, the real existence of the pleasure.310
For the same reason, that riches cause pleasure and pride, and poverty excites uneasiness and
humility, power must produce the former emotions, and slavery the latter. Power or an authority
over others makes us capable of satisfying all our desires; as slavery, by subjecting us to the will
of others, exposes us to a thousand wants, and mortifications.3"
Like virtue and beauty, Hume explained, property and riches excite the passion of
pride, by the association between the idea of utility derived from property and that of
the self as a proprietor enjoying that utility.
This is the context in which Hume for the first time introduced his concept of
'sympathy'. In arguing that our reputation, our character and our name are also the
important causes of the passion of pride, Hume pointed out that virtue, beauty and
riches had little influence when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of
others in occasioning our passion of pride.312
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that
propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their
inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own.313
'Tis indeed evident, that when we sympathize with the passions and sentiments of others, these
movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and are conceiv'd to belong to another
person, as we conceive any other matter of fact. 'Tis also evident, that the ideas of the affections
of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and that the passions arise in
conformity to the images we form of them.314
Thus if our ideas of virtue, beauty and riches arouse the sympathy of others, our
passions of pride and humility are strengthened by our thought of being sympathised
with. In this process of the association of ideas, our passions of pride and humility
seemed, in Hume's view, to be transcended into our sentiments, and cease to be
passions any more. This distinction and relationship between passions and
sentiments is absolutely crucial in Hume's theory, because this is where our ideas of
virtue, beauty and wealth play a vital role in our sociability and in our formation of
the true ideas of morals through the association of ideas. On the whole, Hume
310 THN, 11. I. 10. 10, p. 205.
311 THN, II. I. 10. 11, p. 205.
312 THN, II. I. 11. 1, p. 206.
313 THN, II. I. 11.2, p. 206.
3,4 THN, II. I. 11.8, p. 208.
Needs, passions and Sentiments 95
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
offered an analysis of the passions of pride and humility by putting it on the basis of
his theory of the association of ideas. By such a methodical procedure, Hume
avoided meddling in a troublesome judgement as to whether or how far the passion
of pride is virtuous or vicious. In Hume's mindset, passions were neither virtuous
nor vicious in themselves, but simply the effect of virtue, beauty or riches, which
should be enhanced into sentiments and thereby help us form the true ideas of
morals.
The second set of passions Hume considered, following those of pride and
humility, was those of love and hatred, which would turn out to be more crucial in
the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy. There is a difference between the
passions of pride and humility and those of love and hatred. The immediate object of
pride and humility is self or that identical person of whose thought, actions and
sensations we are intimately conscious, whereas that of love and hatred is some other
person or a thinking being of whose thought, actions and sensations we are not
conscious.315 As for the causes of the passions of love and hatred, however,
the same qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or hatred; all the arguments that
have been employ'd to prove, that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure
independent of the passion, will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter.316
Strikingly enough, Hume accordingly concentrated on his analysis of riches and
power as the causes of the passions of love and hatred, rather than, as usually
expected, an analysis of virtue or benevolence. In Hume's view, esteem for others
which arises from their riches and power, or contempt for others which arises from
their poverty and meanness, is a typical species of love and hatred.317 In this, the
only possible cause of such esteem for the rich and powerful is our sympathy:
Upon the whole, there remains nothing, which can give us an esteem for power and riches, and a
contempt for meanness and poverty, except the principle of sympathy, by which we enter into the
sentiments of the rich and poor, and partake of their pleasure and uneasiness. Riches give
satisfaction to their possessor; and this satisfaction is convey'd to the beholder by the
imagination, which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity.
This agreeable idea or impression is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion. It
proceeds from a thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love. From this relation of
3,5 THN, II. II. 1.2, p. 214.
316 THN, II. II. 1.9, p. 216.
317 THN, II. II. 5. 1, p. 231.
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impressions, and identity of ideas, the passion arises, according to my hypothesis.318
In Hume, as in Hutcheson, sympathy was seen as a universal as well as an unselfish
propensity:
In all creatures, that prey not upon others, and are not agitated with violent passions, there
appears a remarkable desire of company, which associates them together, without any
advantages they can ever propose to reap from their union. This is still more conspicuous in
man, as being the creature of the universe, who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted
for it by the most advantages.319
The passions of love for the rich and powerful is not derived exclusively from the
agreeable expectation of advantage from them; if it had been, we would always
expect their friendship or good-will. The fact that we esteem the rich and great even
when they are dead, suggests that our sympathy is disinterested and is neither selfish
nor vicious.320
Hume's concept of sympathy formed the basis for his idea of beauty, which
could be seen as an alternative to that of Hutcheson who had identified the origin of
our idea of beauty in a natural sense, but not in sympathy.
This conclusion from a general view of human nature, we may confirm by particular instances,
wherein the force of sympathy is very remarkable. Most kinds of beauty are deriv'd from this
origin; and tho' our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, 'tis seldom we rest
there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures. A man, who
shows us any house or building, takes particular care among other things to point out the
convenience of the apartments, the advantages of their situation, and the little room lost in the
stairs, anti-chambers and passages; and indeed 'tis evident, the chief part of the beauty consists
in these particulars. The observation of convenience gives pleasure, since convenience is a
beauty. But after what manner does it give pleasure? 'Tis certain our own interest is not in the
least concern'd; and as this is a beauty of interest, not of form, so to speak, it might delight us
merely by communication, and by our sympathizing with the proprietor of the lodging. We enter
into his interest by the force of imagination, and feel the same satisfaction, that the objects
naturally occasion in him.
This observation extends to tables, chairs, scritoires, chimneys, coaches, sadles, ploughs, and
indeed to every work of art; it being an universal rule, that their beauty is chiefly derived from
their utility, and from their fitness for that purpose, to which they are destin'd. But this is an
advantage, that concerns only the owner, nor is there any thing but sympathy, which can interest
the spectator.321
As we have seen, Hume argued that our admiration for the rich was based on the
318 THN, II. II. 5. 14, p. 234.
319 THN, II. II. 5. 15, p. 234.
320 THN, II. II. 5. 9, p. 233.
321 THN, II. II. 5. 16-7, p. 235
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imagination and sympathy. In such imagination, our passion of love was an effect of
beauty in the association of ideas, where the idea of beauty is identified with that of
utility that riches confer, which the possessor is going to enjoy, and, without
referring to self-interest of the beholder, conveys pleasure. Beauty, therefore, always
excites an agreeable impression regardless of the spectator's standpoint or mindset,
so that beauty is not relative to the spectator's self-interest, as Mandeville had
claimed. In other words, our idea of beauty introduces utility as the basis for our
sociability without selfishness, because our sympathy with others who possess
beautiful objects and who enjoy their utility excites our love not as a selfish passion,
let alone as a vicious passion.
Finally, in Book II, having considered the indirect passions of pride and
humility, and of love and hatred, Hume examined the direct passions, and the will in
particular. The direct passions are to be the impressions 'which arise immediately
from good or evil, from pain or pleasure'.322 Among them is the will: 'by the will',
Hume stated, 'I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious
of knowingly give rise to any new motion ofour body, or new perception ofour mind
[Hume's italics]'.323 Hume's aim of arguing about the direct passions was to see if
the passions are beyond our will. And this discussion in Hume, as shall see, had also
a particular implication in the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy, concerning
the shift from needs toward greed as to the nature of passions in a modern
commercial society.
Hume's point was that all the passions, including even the will, were to be
regarded as necessity. Necessity here 'is nothing but a determination of the mind to
pass from one object to its usual attendant, and infer the existence of one from that of
the other'. This however is due merely to the effect of custom on the imagination,
because, Hume argued, the ultimate connection of any object, which is not
discoverable, is not a necessity. It is simply a constant, uniform and regular union
with which we are acquainted, and which enters into our idea of cause and effect.324
For example, sociability arises from necessity, not from our liberty:
322 THN, II. III. 1. 1, p. 257.
323 THN, II. III. 1.2, p. 257.
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We must certainly allow, that the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and
necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explaining them: And for a like reason
we must allow, that human society is founded on like principles; and our reason in the latter case,
is better than even that in the former; because we not only observe, that men always seek society,
but can also explain the principles, on which this universal propensity is founded.325
In this sense, society from necessity was described in Hume as something uniform
and orderly;
The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those of a man of
quality: So are his sentiments, actions and manners. The different stations of life influence the
whole fabric, external and internal; and these different stations arise necessarily, because
uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature. Men cannot live without
society, and cannot be associated without government. Government makes a distinction of
property, and establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic,
manufactures, law-suits, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all
those other actions and objects, which cause such a diversity, and at the same time maintain such
an uniformity in human life.326
Given this, Hume reached his conclusion that the actions of the will were to arise
from necessity, not from liberty.327 As far as all actions of the will have particular
causes, no will is to be let free to act from liberty.'28
In Hume, as in Hutcheson, all the passions are necessary for human survival,
so that none of them is vicious. Hume's theory of necessity as a whole was his
attack on the distinction and relationship between necessity and liberty which was
fundamental to all Christian moral theology. But in the context of the 'private vices,
public benefits' controversy, his theory appeared as a fundamentally sceptical view
of liberty and necessity. Mandeville had argued that all forms of acquisition beyond
our needs for mere physical survival were activated by passions that were invariably
argued as vicious. Hutcheson had attempted to vindicate the passions by showing
that they could be approved of if, even if unnecessary for survival, they were directed
at benevolent purposes. But both of them still shared a view that men had a liberty in
choosing the way they make use of their passions for the pursuit of wealth. Hume
was never convinced that men could have such a liberty in our perception of the
324 THN, II. 111. 1.4, pp. 257-8.
325 THN, II. III. 1.8, p. 258.
326 THN, II. III. 1.9, p. 259.
327 THN, II. III. 1. 15, p. 260.
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ideas of virtue, beauty and wealth. He argued that the constant association between
the ideas of human actions arising from the passions and those of their consequences,
that is, the causation of human actions in the association of ideas, was simply due to
the effects of custom on the imagination. He concluded that, therefore, this
necessary connection was merely a perception of the mind, which simply 'feels' such
necessity.329 Liberty or human will had therefore no role whatsoever in our use of
the passions. Hume could argue, against Mandeville, that, since the passions are
necessary, they are natural, and therefore neither virtuous nor vicious.330 But the real
Humean problem was now that, how, then, is it possible to discover the reliable
standard of morals and to form the true ideas of morals through such association of
ideas where men's perception leaves us no liberty in controlling the passions?
In Book III of the Treatise, 'Of Morals', following his arguments in the
previous two books, Hume went on to show how moral ideas can be formed as
complex ideas by the association of ideas involving passions. This topic was his
agenda in the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy, well prepared by now in
the previous two books in his Treatise to be tackled here in Book III. His pivotal
view of this topic can be seen immediately in his questioning of morals: 'Whether
'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and
pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy?'331 Needless to say, such a
question presumed his view that only perceptions, either impressions or ideas, were
328 THN, II. III. 2. 8, p. 265.
329 THN, II. III. 1. 16, p. 261.
330 Hume also used the word 'natural' as opposed to 'artificial', 'civil', and 'moral', depending on the
contexts. In Hume's view, the ambiguity of the word 'natural' is due to three reasons: first, virtue and
vice are equally natural as opposed to miraculous; second, virtue is the most unnatural in the sense
that it is the most unusual (!), whereas vice is quite natural; third, both virtue and vice are out of
nature in the sense that they are equally artificial, because at least the actions themselves are artificial
with their own design and intention. Hume consequently concluded that there is no point in disputing
if virtue and vice are determined either as natural or unnatural. See THN, III. I. 2. 8 and 10, pp. 304-5.
Hume also contemplated that, even though justice ought to be regarded as an artificial virtue, it is the
most 'natural' in the sense that it is an invention which is obviously and absolutely necessary,
proceeding immediately from original principles without the intervention of thought or reflection.
The rules of justice then are artificial, but not arbitrary, and therefore properly called the 'laws of
nature . See III. I. 2. 19, p. 311. These remarks are quite understandable if, by 'nature', Hume meant
'necessity'.
331 THN, III. I. 1. 3, p. 294.
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present to the mind.332 The same presumption also seems obvious in his rejection of
reason as a factor of moral distinction. As morals have an influence on the actions
and affections, morals cannot be derived from reason and discerned merely by ideas.
That is, reason alone is never able to have such an influence.1,1
Now 'tis evident, our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible any such agreement or
disagreement [consisting truth or falsehood discovered by reason]; being original facts and
realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and
actions. 'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounc'd either true or false, and be either
contrary or conformable to reason.334
In other words, actions are laudable or blameable, but not reasonable or
unreasonable. 'Moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason
is wholly inactive, and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience,
or a sense of morals'.333 Instead, virtue and vice must be discoverable 'by means of
some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference
betwixt them'.336 These impressions then operate upon us in a manner that the
impressions arising from virtue are agreeable, and those proceeding from vice are
uneasy.337
An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a
pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind. In giving a reason, therefore, for the pleasure or
uneasiness, we sufficiently explain the vice or virtue. To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but
to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling
constitutes our praise or admiration. ... The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all
kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations.338
Based on the idea above, Hume went on to consider the virtue of justice, and
how we could form the moral idea of justice. Hume's questions were, first,
'concerning the manner, in which the rules ofjustice are establish 'd by the artifice of
men , and second, 'concerning the reasons, which determine us to attribute to the
332 See THN, III. I. I. 2, p. 293.
333 THN, III. I. I. 6, p. 294.
334 THN, III. I. I. 9, p. 295.
335 THN, III. I. I. 10, p. 295.
336 THN, III. I. 2. I, p. 302.
337 THN, III. I. 2. 2, p. 302.
338 THN, III. I. 2. 3, p. 303.
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observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity \339 From the first
question of how the rules of justice are established, Hume derived the principle from
the passion of self-interest. In Hume, no other affection but the very passion of self-
interest will be sufficient and proper to 'counter-balance the love of gain, and render
men fit members of society, by making them abstain from the possessions of others'.
For Hume, Hutcheson's argument of benevolence as a virtue restraining the
acquisitive passions seemed implausible and such benevolence to strangers too weak
for the purpose. Other passions, on the other hand, would rather inflame the
interested affection. This was, Hume argued, 'since 'tis evident, that the passion [of
self-interest] is much better satisfy'd by its restraint, than by its liberty, and that by
preserving society, we make much greater advances in acquiring possessions, than by
running into the solitary and forlorn condition, which must follow upon violence and
an universal licence'. Perhaps with Mandeville in mind, Hume continued that 'For
whether the passion of self-interest be esteem'd vicious or virtuous, 'tis all a case;
since itself alone restrains it: So that if it be virtuous, men become social by their
virtue; if vicious, their vice has the same effect'.340 This then led Hume to reflect on
theories of the state of nature, based on assumptions about men's nature as
selfishness. As society is thus necessary and inevitable, the supposed state of nature
is a mere fiction.341 Hume eventually concluded ' that 'tis only from the selfishness
and confin 'd generosity ofman, along with the scanty provision nature has made for
his wants, that justice derives its origin [Hume's italics].342 A regard for public
interest, benevolence or reason therefore could not be the first and original motive
for our observing the rules of justice, because otherwise such rules would simply
have been redundant.343 Only the passion of self-interest can be the universal motive,
since
justice establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; that is, by a sense of interest,
suppos'd to be common to all, and where every single act is perform'd in expectation that others
are to perform the like. Without such a convention, no one wou'd ever have dream'd, that there
339 THN, III. II. 2. 1, p. 311.
340 THN, III. II. 2. 13, p. 316.
341 THN, III. 11.2. 14, pp. 316-7.
342 THN, III. II. 2. 18, p. 318.
343 THN, III. II. 2. 19-20, p. 318.
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was such a virtue as justice, or have been induced to conform his actions to it.344
Put in Hume's language in the previous books, it could be said that the moral idea of
justice is formed by associating the simple ideas of beauty and wealth through the
association of ideas excited by self-interest. Because self-interest is a passion in our
sociability which sympathises with others' pleasure of possessing and enjoying
property (appeared in our ideas of beauty and wealth), this association of ideas can
happen to form the complex moral idea ofjustice.
Turning to his second question concerning justice, of why we annex the idea
of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice, Hume came back to his theory of
sympathy. This was because, this time, Hume turned to the apparently 'unselfish'
side of the virtue of justice.
... when the injustice is so distant from us, as no way to affect our interest, it still displeases us;
because consider it as prejudicial to human society, and pernicious to every one that approaches
the person guilty of it. We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy, and as every thing, which
gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call'd vice, and whatever
produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated virtue; this is the reason why the sense
of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice.345
As anticipated, such an idea in Hume may cause a little confusion, because Hume
had already attributed the origin of justice to the passion of self-interest. For this,
Hume compromised as follows:
... self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: But a sympathy with public
interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue. This latter principle of
sympathy is too weak to controul our passions; but has sufficient force to influence our taste, and
gives us the sentiments of approbation or blame.346
Hume however complicated his argument further by introducing a concept of
statecraft for administering justice, possibly with Pufendorf and Mandeville in mind.
An esteem for justice, and an abhorrence of injustice, Hume continued, could still be
enhanced by 'the artifice of politicians'. This reminds us of Mandeville's argument
of statecraft, but Hume thought that their roles should be an assistance to, rather than
a manipulation of, those sentiments:
344 THN, III. II. 22. 1, p. 320.
345 THN, III. II. 2. 24, p. 320.
346 7Y/A^, III. II. 2. 24, pp. 320-1.
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Any artifice of politicians may assist nature in the producing of those sentiments, which she
suggests to us, and may even on some occasions, produce alone an approbation or esteem for any
particular action; but 'tis impossible it should be the sole cause of the distinction we make
betwixt vice and virtue.347
Mandeville had thought primarily that, because the passions of pride and vanity as a
principle of sociability were vicious, those passions should be manipulated
aggressively by politicians to produce public benefits. On the other hand, Hume on
the whole 'trusted' such sentiments as sympathy, the sense ofjustice and the sense of
beauty which would control and exploit those passions, as a foundation of
sociability:
Whatever restraint they [the rules of justice] may impose on the passions of men, they are the
real offspring of those passions, and are only a more artful and more refin'd way of satisfying
them. Nothing is more vigilant and inventive than our passions; and nothing is more obvious,
than the convention for the observance of these rules. Nature has, therefore, trusted this affair
entirely to the conduct ofmen, and has not plac'd in the mind any peculiar original principles, to
determine us to a set of actions, into which the other principles of our frame and constitution
were sufficient to lead us.348
Because of our sympathy with others for their pleasure of possessing and using their
property, we annex the idea of virtue (the respect of property rights) to justice, and
that of vice (the violation of property rights) to injustice. Thanks to this association
of ideas, the rules of justice and accordingly our moral idea of justice, once
established by self-interest, can be maintained by our sociable and 'unselfish'
sympathy. Statecraft may smoothen this process, but should neither accelerate nor
arrange it in a Mandevillian manner. Self-interest is strong enough to reject such an
intervention, and our sympathy is sufficient to supplement the working of self-
interest in the administration of justice. After all, we are sociable enough and
capable enough of forming our idea of justice for promoting public benefits (such as
the preservation of property) without being managed, or manipulated, by politicians.
Such was Hume's idea of justice as derived from self-interest. But as far as
politicians may assist the direction of justice, the virtue of justice is not a natural but
an artificial virtue. Hume finally examined natural virtues that do not depend on the
347 THN, III. II. 2. 25, p. 321. See also III. II. 5. 9, p. 334.
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artifice and contrivance of men, and how we form the moral ideas of such virtues.349
As in the case of justice, the natural virtues are in the same manner approved as
virtuous when they produce pleasure, and as vicious when they produce pain. What
is different about justice is that, as for natural virtues, such sentiment of pleasure is
specified by Hume to be the passion of pride or love, and that of pain to be the
passion of humility or hatred.330 Accordingly, unlike justice, the natural virtues are
not directly derived from the passion of self-interest but are more dependent on the
principle of sympathy.351 In particular, the natural virtues are distinguished by moral
sentiments. Sympathy produces our moral sentiments that then give rise to the
natural virtues. In this, moral sentiments approve the natural virtues 'because of their
tendency to the good ofmankind', based on the principle of sympathy.352
Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently 'tis
that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or
uneasiness in characters which are useful or pernicious to society, as if they had a tendency to
our own advantage or loss.353
The first example Hume argued as a natural virtue was the 'greatness of
mind'. Hume made the greatness of mind a natural virtue of a just proportion of the
passions of pride and self-esteem. '34 An excess of those passions is a vice, 'since it
causes uneasiness in all men, and presents them every moment with a disagreeable
comparison'.333 In other words, it is only a vice because others think it so. On the
other hand,
348 THN, III. II. 6. l,pp. 337-8.
349 THN, III. III. 1. 1, p. 367.
350 7Y/7V, III. III. 1.2, p. 367.
351 See THN, III. III. 1. 7, p. 368. Hume referred in passing to the sense of beauty as based on the
disinterested principle of sympathy: 'Our sense of beauty depends very much on this principle [of
sympathy]; and where any object has a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor, it is always as
regarded as beautiful; as every object, that has a tendency to produce pain, is disagreeable and
deform'd. Thus a conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse, the capacity,
security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form a principal beauty of these several objects. Here the
object, which is denominated beautiful, pleases only by its tendency to produce a certain effect. That
effect is the pleasure or advantage of some other person. Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom
we have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy. To this principle, therefore, is owing the beauty,
which we find in every thing that is useful' (THN, III. III. 1. 8, p. 368).
352 THN, III. III. 1. 10, p. 369.
353 THN, III. III. 1. 11, p. 370.
354 THN, III. III. 2. 1, p. 378.
355 THN, III. III. 2. 7, p. 380.
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whatever we call heroic virtue, and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of
mind, is either nothing but a steady and well-establish'd pride and self-esteem, or partakes
largely of that passion. Courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory, magnanimity, and all the
other shining virtues of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture of self-esteem in them, and
derive a great part of their merit from that origin.356
Possibly responding to Hutcheson, who had attempted to show that prosperity should
be brought from the passions and directed towards benevolent purposes, Hume
reflected that
I am content with the concession, that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride, which
secretly animates our conduct, without breaking out into such indecent expressions of vanity, as
may offend the vanity of others.357
Needless to say, such well-balanced passion of pride is approved, not only because it
is useful in encouraging us for business as well as agreeable in giving us an
immediate pleasure,358 but also because others sympathise with it for its utility and
agreeableness. In Hume's view, our sympathy, in particular with military glory or
heroism, was so persistent:
... when we fix our view on the person himself, who is the author of all this mischief [the infinite
confusions and disorder, such as the subversion of empires, the devastation of provinces, the
sack of cities], there is something so dazzling in his character, the mere contemplation of it so
elevates the mind, that we cannot refuse it our admiration. The pain, which we receive from its
tendency to the prejudice of society, is over-power'd by a stronger and more immediate
sympathy.359
By his argument, Hume here might have implied two points. One is that, as already
argued by Hutcheson, passions such as pride are useful and advantageous in the
sense that they motivate men for business. On the other hand, a sentiment such as
the sense of justice, though indispensable for preserving society, is not enough in
itself to encourage men to cultivate sociability and further the progress of
civilisation. The other point that Hume made is that the justification of the passion
of pride requires no implication of benevolence. Hutcheson had taken trouble to
show that the passion of pride must be directed towards benevolent purposes if we
356 THN, III. III. 2. 13, p. 382.
357 THN, III. III. 2. 13, p. 383.
358 THN, III. III. 2. 14, p. 383.
359 THN, III. III. 2. 15, p. 383.
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were to regard it as justified. Hume now argued that its excess was vicious not
because it ignored benevolence, but simply because it caused displeasure. He also
argued that, in the same manner, a just proportion of the passion was virtuous, not
necessarily because it accompanies benevolence but merely because others
sympathise with it for its utility and agreeableness. Hume agreed with Hutcheson in
disagreeing with Mandeville who had asserted that the passion of pride was always
vicious, but disagreed with Hutcheson in refuting Mandeville while confusing
benevolence with utility and agreeableness. We can form our moral idea of the great
mind as a natural virtue because we have moral sentiments and sympathy with others
who have well-balanced passion of pride, which we approve is agreeable in itself and
useful in cultivating sociability and furthering the progress of civilisation. For
Hume, such well-proportioned pride cannot be called vice or hypocrisy, as
Mandeville had argued.
After the greatness of mind, other examples Hume showed here as natural
virtues were what he was to call natural abilities. As the heroic virtue is based on the
passion of pride, so these natural abilities are in the same manner approved for their
utility and agreeableness to the person possessed of them.160 Strikingly, Hume listed
some qualities of the mind as natural abilities, such as industry, activity and
application, which are advantageous in the conduct of life, as well as temperance,
frugality, economy and resolution, which motivate us for business and actions. At
the same time, Hume regarded prodigality and luxury, among others, as vices
drawing ruin upon us, and demoralising us.361 By his listing, Hume might have
opposed Mandeville who had thought of frugality as a threat to prosperity, and
luxury as a leverage for public benefits.362 As shown above, Hutcheson trusted the
passion of frugality as a good means of restraining the delusive effects of other
acquisitive passions. In Hutcheson's view, on the other hand, luxury most
represented such delusive force. Hume now went so far as to approve the ability of
frugality for positively driving men toward prosperity, not only acknowledging its
360 THN, III. III. 4. 5, p. 389.
361 THN, III. III. 4. 7, p. 389.
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role of negatively controlling other passions. For Hume, it was perfectly possible for
us to form the moral ideas of industry, activity, application, temperance, frugality,
economy and resolution, not as 'vices' or hypocrisies, but as morals. In other words,
these natural abilities cannot be called vices, as Mandeville had argued, because they
are useful for public benefits and therefore agreeable.
In concluding A Treatise ofHuman Nature, Hume once again emphasised the
importance of his principle of sympathy. Hume summarised that
sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions;... They must derive all their merit from our
sympathy with those, who reap any advantage from them: As the virtues, which have a tendency
to the good of the person possess'd of them, derive their merit from our sympathy with him.363
On the whole, Hume put his theory of morals on his foundational theory of the
association of ideas. In his scheme, simple ideas of pleasure or agreeableness to
utility are associated into complex ideas of morals. This process of the association of
ideas is occasioned by our moral sentiments, our sympathy with others and our
passions. In the process, the passion of self-interest (in the case of justice) or that of
pride or love legitimated by sympathy from others (in the case of natural virtues) are
to be excited, and finally give rise to the complex ideas of public good or morals.
Hume's concept of sympathy, in place of Hutcheson's idea of moral sense, was the
foundational formula of sociability as well as the principle on which he relied to
refute Mandeville's sceptical theory of morality. Hume's development beyond
Hutcheson, though, was that he no longer required benevolence for the passions to be
approved as virtuous. Hume consequently went so far as to say that whatever may
be useful to public benefits must be regarded as virtuous, even when not benevolent,
on the grounds that it would always be approved of sympathetically by others if only
for its utility and agreeableness. As our simple ideas of virtue, beauty and wealth
implied the usefulness or utility of objects, our moral ideas, which were to be formed
out of these simple ideas, would involve the usefulness or utility as the standard of
363 Beside those qualities of the mind, Hume added the beauties of body and fortune to the natural
abilities. Hume's argument concerning them is a repetition of the one in Book II. See THN. III. III. 5.
3-5, pp. 392-3.
363 THN, III. III. 6. 2, p. 394.
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morals. And in the context of 'private vices, public benefits' controversy, this was
how Hume sought to solve Mandeville's paradox: by introducing the idea of utility
as the measure of morals.
The disagreement between Hutcheson and Hume on this point can be seen in
the subsequent correspondence between them concerning an approach to moral
subjects. Hutcheson thought that Hume was not showing 'a certain Warmth of the
Cause of Virtue' in his 'abstract Enquirys', probably meaning by that, that Hume had
not paid enough attention to benevolence. For this, Hume replied that, in examining
the mind, 'One may consider it either as an Anatomist or as a Painter; either to
discover its most secret Springs & Principles or to describe the Grace & Beauty of its
Actions'.364 As a moral philosopher, Hume adopted the former sort of anatomical
approach. Hume contended to Hutcheson:
Actions are not virtuous nor vicious; but only so far as they are proofs of certain Qualitys or
durable Principles in the Mind. This is a Point I Shou'd have established more expressly than 1
have done. Now I desire you to consider, if there be any Quality, that is virtuous, without having
a Tendency either to the public Good or to the Good of the Person, who possesses it. ... You
are a great Admirer of Cicero, as well as I am. Please to review the 4th Book, de finibus
bonorum & malorum; where you find him prove against the Stoic, that if there be no other Goods
but Virtue, 'tis impossible there can be any Virtue; because the Mind woud then want all
Motives to begin its Actions upon: And tis on the Goodness or Badness of the Motives that the
Virtue of the Action depends. This proves, that to every virtuous Action there must be a Motive
or impelling Passion distinct from the Virtue, & that Virtue can never be the sole Motive to any
Action. You do not assent this; tho' I think there is no Proposition more certain or important. I
must own my Proofs were not distinct enough, & must be altered.365
This is Hume's comment on Hutcheson's argument of passions, summarising his
disagreement with its emphasis on benevolence. This was also going to be the
starting point for Smith in the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy in the quest
for refuting Mandeville's moral theory.
364 See David Hume, The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford, 1932), letter 13, from
Hume to Hutcheson, dated 17 September 1739, p. 36.
365 See Letter 13, pp. 34-5.
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Chapter Two
Sociability and beauty in The Theory of Moral
Sentiments
Smith set himself two questions for his theory of morals: that is, the nature of virtue,
and the principle of moral approbation.1 Both had a particular ethical significance
for Smith. In this chapter, I seek to show that these questions were derived from an
earlier debate about the relationship between 'private vices' and 'public benefits'.
The debate was a decisive battlefield for Smith's argument pertaining to moral
sentiments, sociability and taste, and their functions in establishing virtues and the
rules of justice as well as in supplying the needs of life by producing wealth. The
two moral questions determined his plan and structure of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments, which, taken as a whole, was to analyse the sentiments or affections from
which any action proceeds and upon which its whole virtue or vice must depend.
Smith decided to pursue this analysis in two respects: first, in relation to the cause or
motive which excites such sentiment or affection; and second, in relation to the end
or effect which it produces. As shown below, Smith eventually concluded that the
first determined the propriety or impropriety of the cause which excites the
sentiment, and the second determined the merit or demerit of the action.2 For now all
we need to remember is that this distinction was important, because Smith was going
to argue that virtue rested on the propriety of the action which excited the sentiment
from which action proceeded. Indeed, Smith was conscious that the relation of the
1 TMS, VII. i. 2, p. 265. Smith clarified these questions in reflecting the history of moral philosophy.
Quite likely, in his original ethics lectures, the section of the history of moral philosophy would have
come at the beginning, which eventually presented at the end of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments (Part
VI in earlier editions, and Part VII in the final edition). The heading of Section I of Part VII was
therefore: 'Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments'.
2 TMS, I. i. 3.5-7, p. 18.
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cause of the action to the sentiment from which the action proceeded, was the factor
which determined the virtue of the action, and he thought that this relationship was
one that had been previously neglected in moral philosophy.3 To analyse the
propriety of action, Smith accordingly began his ethical dissertation by developing
his theory of sympathy, which was eventually going to answer his second question of
morals as well, with regard to the power or faculty which recommended us the
propriety of action and the approbation of it.
In general, Kaye points out, critics who rejected Mandeville's moral rigorism
and philosophical anarchism, which had given rise to the notorious paradox, were
forced away from strict rigorism and towards a utilitarian solution of the paradox.4
As shown below, however, Smith, included by Kaye amongst those critics who were
pushed by Mandeville's paradox in the general direction of the utilitarian line of
thinking, was an exception. Smith's revolution, if it may be called so, lies in his
attempt to solve the paradox by destroying and offering alternatives to both moral
rigorism and utilitarian thinking. Following Hutcheson, Smith did not offer a
utilitarian test or standard ofmorals, as Fowler believed. Hence it is not necessarily
the case that Smith 'curiously adopts two criteria of actions, their propriety and their
merit'. And it is not the case either that, 'when closely examined, Adam Smith's two
criteria can be reduced to the one criterion proposed by Hutcheson, that is, as it was
afterwards called, the utilitarian test or standard of conduct'.5 Smith's only criterion
ofmoral conducts was their propriety. As far as moral sentiments such as sympathy,
the sense of justice and resentment act according to their pleasure or pain, resulted
from what they perceive as the propriety or impropriety of characters or actions, so
Smith argued, the merit or utility of those characters or actions would be led by an
invisible hand and eventually achieved naturally and unintentionally.
In an attempt to answer his first question on morals, wherein virtue consists,
Smith began The Theory of Moral Sentiments with his theory of sympathy.
Presenting an answer to the question required Smith first to emphasise strikingly the
disinterested character of human nature:
3 TMS, I. i. 3. 8, p. 18.
4 Kaye, pp. cxxix-cxxxiii.
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How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature,
which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.
To Smith, this disinterested nature ofmen was 'a matter of fact'.6 By beginning The
Theory ofMoral Sentiments with this emphasis on the disinterested nature of men,
Smith immediately distanced himself from natural law theorists as well as from
Mandeville, who had presumed human nature as fundamentally selfish. Smith
stressed the fact that we are able to sympathise with any kind of passion, either joyful
or sorrowful:
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of
others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however,
without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion
whatever.7
Unlike Hume, Smith also emphasised that sympathy did not so much consist in the
communication of passions as in an attention to the situation of others. For instance,
extremely strong passions may cause us to inquire into another person's situation
rather than to sympathise.8
Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the
situation which excites it.9
The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself
would feel if he was reduced to the same ... situation.10
Smith even went on to argue that we can sympathise with the dead who have no
passions. Such sympathy is based on our 'very illusion of the imagination', from
which. Smith continued, arises one of the most important principles of human nature.
It is 'the dread of death', which in Smith's view is 'the great restraint upon the
injustice of mankind', which in turn 'guards and protects the society'." From the
5 See Fowler, pp. 232-3.
6 TMS, I. i. 1. 1, p. 9.
7 TMS, I. i. 1. 5, p. 10.
8 TMS, I. i. 1.6-7 and 9, p. 11.
9 TMS, I. i. 1. 10, p. 12.
10 TMS, I. i. 1. 11, p. 12.
11 TMS, I. i. 1. 13, pp. 12-3.
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very beginning of his discussion of sympathy, which was meant eventually to answer
his question of wherein virtue consists, Smith seems to have been criticising
Mandeville by showing that the sympathetic sentiments, which are neither vicious
nor selfish, are the principle of sociability and contribute to the public good by
preserving the order of society. Or rather, Smith's questions themselves were part of
the project of Scottish moral philosophy to criticise Mandeville's theory of passions,
sentiments and sociability.
With the questions plausibly formulated and the discussion of sympathy thus
having been introduced, Smith now confidently embarked on a long, knife-edged
journey to show the mechanism of the disinterested principle of sympathy in
establishing sociability. Smith saw it in the harmony of passions achieved by
sympathy. Smith showed that we judge the propriety or impropriety of the affections
of others by their concord or dissonance with our own:
To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as
to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such, is the
same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them.12
Although the compassion, or fellow-feeling, of the spectator can never be the same
as the original sentiments of the person principally concerned, these two sentiments
still 'have such a correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony
of society'. What is demanded in the process is that 'Though they will never be
unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required'.13
Since the passions of different individuals can never be in unison, to establish
sympathy between such passions would in turn require us to see the varying point of
propriety of each passion, or in other words, the pitch of every passion that the
spectator can go along with. Smith next dealt with this issue in Section II of Part I.
The issue about propriety would then finally offer Smith a satisfactory answer to his
question of wherein virtue consists, because Smith was going to derive his
conclusion, that virtue consists in propriety, exactly from his discussion concerning
the issue. As seen below, the issue was raised by Smith in an attempt, primarily, to
12 TMS, I. i. 3. 1, p. 16.
13 TMS, I. i. 4. 7, p. 22.
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refute Mandeville's theory of sociability, which had argued that sociability was a
product of private vices.
Among the passions that Smith considered, two most important groupings
were the unsocial passions and the selfish passions.14 In Smith, the unsocial passions
were indispensable in establishing justice and in the protection of property in society.
The selfish passions, on the other hand, were crucial in refining taste and in the
production of wealth. In discussing justice in Part II, Smith began with the
distinction between the unsocial passions of hatred and resentment.13 Though both
passions are unsocial, the passion of hatred is satisfied merely by the misfortune of
the offender whether or not we help bring it about.16 The passion of resentment, on
the other hand, 'cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to
grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have suffered
from him'. In other words,
Resentment would prompt us to desire, not only that he should be punished, but that he should
be punished by our means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had done to us.
This is exactly the reason why Smith argued that the principle of justice derived from
the passion of resentment:
The natural gratification of this passion tends, of its own accord, to produce all the political ends
of punishment; the correction of the criminal, and the example to the public.17
In this process, the role of sympathy is vitally important: the passion of resentment,
... as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper and approved of, when the
14 Smith was accordingly going to devote the rest of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments to his analyses of
these two kinds of passions. The former, the unsocial passions, were studied in Parts II and III, in
relation to justice, and the latter, the selfish passions, were enquired into in the following Parts IV and
V, in relation to beauty. The argument about the propriety of the social, unsocial and selfish passions
was going to be further developed from a viewpoint of the Stoic virtue of self-command in the final
edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments (TMS, VI. iii. 14-53, pp. 242-62).
15 In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith first looked at the selfish passions in the rest of Part I,
and next went on to argue about justice as derived from the unsocial passions in Parts II and III. In
Parts IV and V, Smith then came back to discuss beauty in view of the selfish passions. In my thesis,
however, I look at his theory of justice first, and later take up his idea of beauty, for convenience.
This order also corresponds to the structure of Smith's jurisprudence lectures, which first discussed
justice and then went on to beauty and political economy.
16 TMS, II. i. 1.6, p. 68.
17 TMS, II. i. 1. 6, p. 69.
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heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by¬
stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.18
In this, sympathy should be neutral and independent of the interest of the impartial
spectator. The administration of punishments would then be proper. This view was
not Humean, in the sense that Smith thought that a punishment could be carried out
without considering the public utility of the punishment, which Hume had argued
should be the standard of morals. In Smith's words, the propriety of punishment
depends on whether the motive of the actions can be sympathised with, regardless of
the merit or demerit of the action:
... we cannot at all sympathize with the resentment of one man against another, merely because
this other has been the cause of his misfortune, unless he has been the cause of it from motives
which we cannot enter into.19
In his jurisprudence lectures, Smith referred to an example of fidelity in marriage and
argued that the indignation of the public against the infidelity of a wife would 'arise
from their sympathy with the jealousy of the husband', but not from their
consideration of the demerit of the infidelity. Marriage might have the merit but
such 'utility in this constitution of our nature', that is, to train our children up 'to
become useful members of society', would be established unintentionally by our
passions.20 In sum, the propriety of carrying out a punishment will be determined by
our views of the motives of criminal actions themselves, not primarily by their
tendency to promote good or evil, in view of whosoever's interest. Responding to
Hume, Smith argued that the same is true in the case of moral judgements in general.
Virtue primarily consists in propriety, but only secondarily in utility.
Smith was now in a position to offer an answer to his second question: by
what power or faculty of the mind is that propriety recommended to us? It is by the
moral sentiments, of which resentment is one of the most important for sociability.
Smith admitted that the passion of resentment was unsocial and 'odious'.
18 TMS, II. i. 2. 2, p. 69.
19 TMS, II. i. 4. 3, pp. 73-4.
20 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762-63 and 1766); eds. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and
L. J. Stein, as vol. V of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith
(Oxford, 1978) (B), 102-3, p. 438 (abbreviated as LJ below).
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Let it be considered that resentment, though, in the degree in which we too often see it, the most
odious, perhaps, of all the passions, is not disapproved of when properly humbled and entirely
brought down to the level of the sympathetic indignation of the spectator.21
Nevertheless, resentment which is proper and consequently sympathised with, is
fundamental to establishing sociability.
The very existence of society requires that unmerited and unprovoked malice should be
restrained by proper punishments; and consequently, that to inflict those punishments should be
regarded as a proper and laudable action. Though man, therefore, be naturally endowed with a
desire of the welfare and preservation of society, yet the Author of nature has not entrusted it to
his reason to find out that a certain application of punishments is the proper means of attaining
this end; but has endowed him with an immediate and instinctive approbation of that very
application which is most proper to attain it. The oeconomy of nature is in this respect exactly of
a piece with what it is upon many other occasions. With regard to all those ends which, upon
account of their peculiar importance, may be regarded, if such an expression is allowable, as the
favourite ends of nature, she has constantly in this manner not only endowed mankind with an
appetite for the end which she proposes, but likewise with an appetite for the means by which
alone this end can be brought about, for their own sakes, and independent of their tendency to
produce it. Thus self-preservation, and the propagation of the species, are the great ends which
Nature seems to have proposed in the formation of all animals.22
These are further remarks with which Smith tried to convince his readers of the
unintended consequences of the passion of resentment for the public good and the
contrivance of nature working in them. As the disinterestedness of sympathy is a
matter of fact, Smith contended, so the unsocial passion of resentment being vital for
the establishment of sociability is equally a matter of fact:
Let it be considered too, that the present enquiry is not concerning a matter of right, if I may say
so, but concerning a matter of fact. We are not at present examining upon what principles a
perfect being would approve of the punishment of bad actions; but upon what principles so weak
and imperfect a creature as man actually and in fact approves of it.23
Again, the same is true in the case of moral judgements in general. Propriety as
virtue is always recommended to us by our sense of propriety in the mind.
In Section II of Part II of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Smith then went
on to examine the virtue of justice as the basic virtue in establishing sociability,
following his analysis of the unsocial passion of resentment. Again, Smith
contrasted resentment with hatred. Hatred is 'a passion which is naturally excited by
21 TMS, 11. i. 5. 8, p. 76.
22 TMS, II. i. 5. 10, p. 77.
23 TMS, II. i. 5. 10, p. 77.
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impropriety of sentiments and behaviour', or by ingratitude. As ingratitude,
however, does not do real and positive harm, mere 'want of gratitude, therefore,
cannot be punished'.24 'Resentment', on the other hand, 'seems to have been given
us by nature for defence, and defence only. It is the safeguard of justice and the
security of innocence'.25 In Smith, justice is accordingly a
virtue, of which the observance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be
extorted by force, and of which the violation exposes to resentment, and consequently to
punishment. ... the violation of justice is injury: it does real and positive hurt to some particular
persons, from motives which are naturally disapproved of. It is, therefore, the proper object of
resentment, and of punishment, which is the natural consequence of resentment.26
Consequently, it also turns out to be the fact that observing the rules of justice,
though necessary for the establishment of sociability, does no real positive good.
Hence,
Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our
neighbour. ... We may often fulfil all the rules ofjustice by sitting still and doing nothing.27
Having thus defined the virtue of justice, Smith now came to one of his most
important concerns in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: the role of justice in our
pursuit of wealth. His concern here was provoked by Mandeville's argument that
wealth was produced by pursuers' private vices such as pride, vanity and ambition.
In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain
every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should jostle, or
throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of
fair play, which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as good as he: they
do not enter into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other, and cannot go
along with the motive from which he hurt him. They readily, therefore, sympathize with the
natural resentment of the injured, and the offender becomes the object of their hatred and
indignation. He is sensible that he becomes so, and feels that those sentiments are ready to burst
out from all sides against him.28
Here Smith makes various assumptions. First, spectators do not seem to think that
the pursuit of wealth is vicious as long as persons concerned do no real and positive
24 TMS, II. . 1. 3, p. 79.
25 TMS, II. . 1.4,p. 79.
26 TMS, II. . 1. 5, p. 79.
27 TMS, II. . 1.9, p. 82.
28 TMS, II. .2. 1, p. 83.
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harm to anyone, do not incur their resentment and are not troubled by the impartial
spectators. In other words, we seem to regard the pursuit of wealth as innocent as
long as justice is respected. Second, and even more important, human nature is
judgmental, and therefore men are sensible to the violations of justice, and learn to
regulate their own conduct in the pursuit ofwealth. Smith confirmed that
The violator of the more sacred law of justice can never reflect on the sentiments which mankind
must entertain with regard to him, without feeling all the agonies of shame, and horror, and
consternation. ... By sympathizing with the hatred and abhorrence which other men must
entertain for him, he becomes in some measure the object of his own hatred and abhorrence.29
In sum, men are perfectly capable of forming the moral idea of justice, and,
therefore, it was human nature which assured that the pursuit ofwealth was generally
carried on in a way which did not offend people's natural sense of justice.
Smith further endeavoured to show that this sense of justice was not
motivated by self-interest but was implanted by nature as the constitution of human
nature. 'It is thus that man', Smith went on, 'who can subsist only in society, was
fitted by nature to that situation for which he was made'.30 For justice 'is the main
pillar that upholds the whole edifice' of human society, and if justice is removed, the
fabric of society 'must in a moment crumble into atoms'.
In order to enforce the observation of justice, therefore, Nature has implanted in the human
breast that consciousness of ill-desert, those terrors of merited punishment which attend upon its
violation, as the great safe-guards of the association of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the
violent, and to chastise the guilty.31
By using the terminology he had already used to describe the passion of resentment.
Smith again depicted such a sense of justice as a 'means adjusted with the nicest
artifice to the ends which they are intended to produce'. His analogy of a watch with
the sense of justice helps illuminate his case:
The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for which it was made, the
pointing of the hour. All their various motions conspire in the nicest manner to produce this
effect. If they were endowed with a desire and intention to produce it, they could not do it better.
Yet we never ascribe any such desire intention to them, but to the watch-maker, and we know
that they are put into motion by a spring, which intends the effect it produces as little as they
29 TMS, II. ii. 2. 3, p. 84.
30 TMS, II. ii. 3. l,p. 85.
31 TMS, II. ii. 3. 4, p. 86.
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do.32
In the end, as propriety as virtue is all the time recommended to us by our sense of
propriety in the mind, so the innocence of the pursuit of wealth is guaranteed, not
only by our natural sense of justice but also by our belief in the disinterested nature
of the sense of justice. Smith concluded that the moral sentiments in general are
intended autonomously to control human conduct to lead men into establishing
sociability, in the same manner as the artifice built into a watch.
By referring to the sense of justice, Smith has shown how human nature is
judgmental and therefore morally neutral, by being conscious of the likely outcome
of his own injustice to others. In other words, Smith emphasised how cautious
human nature is of the unsocial passion of the resentment of other people. The same
is universally applicable to all cases of the moral sentiments recommending us
propriety as virtue in establishing sociability. Smith concentrated on the example of
justice and the sense of justice or resentment because they are the most important
virtue and moral sentiment for establishing sociability. But to complete his answer
to the above two questions he had set for his theory ofmoral sentiments, now in Part
III, Smith turned to another judgmental aspect of human nature: that we are attentive
to our own passions as well as to those of others.
We begin ... to examine our own passions and conduct [in front of others], and to consider how
these must appear to them, by considering how they would appear to us if in their situation. We
suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it
would, in this light, produce upon us.33
To show this self-reflective nature of men, Smith presented his description of 'man
within the breast'. The man within the breast is distinct from the man without, or an
actual spectator, in the sense that the former is a mind's eye which reflects upon
one's own conduct and passions, whereas the latter merely looks at those of others.
In Smith's words, the man within is a 'vice-gerent' of the author of nature 'upon
32 TMS, II. ii. 3. 5, p. 87.
33 TMS, III. 1.5. p. 112. See also III. 1.2, p. 110 and III. 1.3, p. 111.
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earth to superintend the behaviour of his brethren',34 or 'This inmate of the breast,
this abstract man, the representative of mankind, and substitute of the Deity'.33 The
role of the man within is 'counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love'. For
fulfilling such an act, the man within should be 'not the soft power of humanity', 'not
that feeble spark of benevolence', but 'reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of
the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct'.36
Needless to say, together with the sense of justice, the man within is equally
crucial in establishing justice. In Smith's words, the man within would aid 'our
moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety', in forming 'the general
rules ofmorality' founded upon the experience of what such faculties approve of or
disapprove of.37 In this respect, the man within the breast is also a guardian of the
sense of duty. In Smith, the sense of duty consisted of the regard to those general
rules of conduct, built into the human nature for directing man's behaviour.38 For,
'those important rules ofmorality are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will
finally reward the obedient, and punish the transgressors of their duty',39 and who has
within us set up 'those vice-gerents' promulgating those rules.40 Those rules are
properly called laws because 'Those vice-gerents of God within us, never fail to
punish the violation of them, by the torments of inward shame, and self-
condemnation; and on the contrary, always reward obedience with tranquillity of
mind, with contentment, and self-satisfaction'.41 Smith accordingly described the
man within the breast in the same terminology of depicting the unsocial passion of
resentment as a divine means endowed in the human nature to establishing justice:
... by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most
effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some
sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of
Providence.42
34 TMS, p. 128: added in 2nd edn. and dropped in 6th edn.
35 TMS, p. 130: added in 2nd edn. and dropped in 6th edn.
36 TMS, III. 3. 4, p. 137: added in 2nd edn. and dropped in 6th edn.
37 TMS, III. 4. 7-8, p. 159.
38 TMS, III. 5. 1, pp. 161-2.
39 TMS, III. 5. 3, p. 163.
40 TMS, III. 5. 6, p. 165.
41 TMS, III. 5. 6, p. 166.
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In explaining the impartial spectator, one of Smith's purposes was to show
how we learn the just pursuit of wealth. As the unsocial passion of resentment
enables men to avoid committing injustice to others in the pursuit of wealth, so the
man within the breast guarantees wealth as a proper reward for observing the general
rules ofmorality.
If we consider the general rules by which external prosperity and adversity are commonly
distributed in this life, we shall find, that notwithstanding the disorder in which all things appear
to be in this world, yet even here every virtue naturally meets with its proper reward, with the
recompense which is most fit to encourage and promote it; and this too so surely, that it requires
a very extraordinary concurrence of circumstances entirely to disappoint it. What is the reward
most proper for encouraging industry, prudence, and circumspection? Success in every sort of
business. And is it possible that in the world of life these virtues should fail of attaining it?
Wealth and external honours are their proper recompense, and the recompense which they can
seldom fail of acquiring.43
Because we come to believe that wealth is in this manner brought about as a reward
of the laws of the Deity, the pursuit of wealth is proper and by no means vicious.
In the first three Parts of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith's two
questions, wherein virtue consists, and by what power or faculty of the mind it is that
virtue is recommended to us, are thus mostly answered. Virtue consists in propriety,
and propriety is recommended to us by moral sentiments. Sympathy is a key
emotion in human nature in judging propriety and making the moral sentiments
sociable. The sense of justice or resentment recommends us to punish injustice and
establish justice as a virtue fundamental to sociability. Justice then enables us to
judge the innocence or propriety of the pursuit of wealth. The issue left to Smith was
then to show exactly how wealth is pursued in a manner that troubles none of our
moral sentiments. This is because justice only provides us with the means to judge
the propriety of the pursuit of wealth, but does not guarantee its propriety itself. As
Smith said above, 'We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and
doing nothing'. Smith still has to answer the second question in relation to the
pursuit of wealth: by what power or faculty in the mind is it that the propriety of the
pursuit of wealth is recommended to us? His answer was that it is by the selfish
passions. Smith had already dealt with the question in passing in Part I, when he
42 TMS, III. 5. 7, p. 166.
43 TMS, III. 5. 8, p. 166.
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considered the effects of circumstances upon the sense of propriety.44 Smith began
with a comparison between the selfish passion of joy and that of sorrow. Aware that
it would have been taken for granted previously 'that our propensity to sympathize
with sorrow must be very strong, and our inclination to sympathize with joy very
weak', Smith observed that
Notwithstanding this prejudice, however, I will venture to affirm, that, when there is no envy in
the case, our propensity to sympathize with joy is much stronger than our propensity to
sympathize with sorrow; and that our fellow-feeling for the agreeable emotion approaches much
more nearly to the vivacity of what is naturally felt by the persons principally concerned, than
that which we conceive for the painful one.45
Such sympathy with other people's joy or the selfish passion of joy, offered
Smith an answer to the above question in relation to the pursuit of wealth. Smith
maintained:
It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our
sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty. ... Nay, it is chiefly from
this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty. For to what
purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? what is the end of avarice and ambition, of the
pursuit of wealth, of power, and pre-eminence? The wages of the meanest labourer can supply
them. ... From whence, then, arises that emulation which runs through all the different ranks of
men, and what are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of human life which
we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with
sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive
from it. It is vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always
44 Section III of Part I, following the sections on the sense of propriety and the passions in relation to
propriety, was titled: 'Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with
regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state
than in the other'.
45 TMS, I. iii. 1. 4-5, pp. 44-5. The view is corresponding to Smith's case that the point of propriety of
every passion is different in different passions. Smith had already shown that the pitch of each
passion which the spectator can go along with was just in the same proportion as the human nature
was more or less disposed to sympathise with it (TMS, 1. ii. intro. 1-2, p. 27). In Smith's view, the
propriety of the degree of the unsocial passions such as hatred and resentment is almost lowest. For
they are exceedingly difficult to get sympathy from spectators (I. ii. 3. 1, p. 34). On the other hand,
the propriety of the degree of the social passions such as generosity, humanity and kindness is high,
according as they are easily sympathised with by the indifferent spectators (I. ii. 4. 1, pp. 38-9).
Though the propriety of the degree of the selfish passions is medium, as they hold a middle place
between the social and unsocial passions (I. ii. 5. 1, p. 40), the selfish passion of joy has an affinity
with agreeable social passions easily sympathised with, whereas the selfish passion of sorrow has an
affinity with painful unsocial passions hard to be sympathised with. Smith himself reflected that the
state of joy, that is, the state in health, out of debt and with a clear conscience, is 'natural and
ordinary' for the greater part of mankind, and therefore is more easily sympathised with, while the
state of adversity is rare and hence more difficult to be sympathised with, especially in a wealthy
modern commercial society. Interestingly, Smith therefore named the state of joy the 'natural state'
(I. iii. 1. 7-8, p. 45).
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founded upon the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation. The rich man
glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw upon him the attention of the
world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions with
which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him.46
In other words, the selfish passion of ambition is excited by 'the condition of the
great, in those delusive colours in which the imagination is apt to paint it'.47 A
person's admiration for a great king is therefore based on the inclination of human
nature to sympathise with the joy and happiness of the rich and powerful more than
with the sorrow and misery of the poor and weak.
All the innocent blood that was shed in the civil wars, provoked less indignation than the death
of Charles I. ... Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the [selfish] passions of
the rich and the powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society. Our
obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for the advantages of
their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from their good-will. Their benefits
can extend but to a few; but their fortunes interest almost every body. We are eager to assist
them in completing a system of happiness that approaches so near to perfection; and we desire to
serve them for their own sake, without any other recompense but the vanity or the honour of
obliging them. Neither is our deference to their inclinations founded chiefly, or altogether, upon
a regard to the utility of such submission, and to the order of society, which is best supported by
it.48
Such was Smith's description of how the selfish passion of ambition contributed to
the establishment of sociability. In his account, Smith implied that the selfish
passions were not vicious but innocent, as far as they were sympathised with. The
46 TMS, 1. iii.2. 1, pp. 50-1.
47 TMS, I. iii.2. 2, p. 51.
48 TMS, 1. iii. 2. 2-3, p. 52. Smith consistently argued that the obligation of subjects to obey their
sovereign was not based on social contract (LJ (A), v. 118, p. 317), but on the principle of authority
(LJ (A), v. 119-20, p. 318; IJ(B), 12-3, p. 401) and of utility {LJ {A), v. 120-21, p. 318; LJ {B), 13-4,
p. 402). In Smith, authority was derived from the sense of beauty and sympathy with the joy of the
rich and powerful. See LJ {B), 12-3, p. 401. This is why Smith regarded a hereditary monarch as the
most secured authority, with his superior fortune and superior antiquity {LJ {A), v. 129-31, pp. 321-2).
Smith vaguely understood that, in general, the principle of the Tory was that of authority, and that the
principle of the Whig was that of utility. But, in Smith's view, both were insufficiently argued in the
sense that the Tory were implausibly sticking to the theory of the divine rights of king, and the Whig
were in vain endeavouring to reconcile their doctrine to social contract theory. See LJ (A), v. 123-4,
pp. 319-20; LJ {B), 14-5, p. 402. Smith was instead attempting to present the principle of authority
based on the sense of beauty, in place of the divine rights of king, mixed with that of utility to a lesser
extent which was not based on the social contract. This was to show how the opinions of impartial
spectator could justify the resistance of subjects to their sovereign, in cases of absurdity and
impropriety of sovereign's conducts {LJ {A), v. 124-7, pp. 320-1; LJ (B), 15-8, pp. 402-4). The
principle of authority was therefore to be the foundation of that utility, because of the effect of
prevailing 'custom' of thinking it proper and right to pay respect to the powerful {LJ {A), v. 131-2, p.
322). As for the distinction of ranks and the order of society as based on the respect for the rich and
the powerful, see also TMS, VI. ii. 1. 20, pp. 225-6 and VI. iii. 30, pp. 252-3.
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passion of ambition is aroused by sympathy with great riches and power. As far as
wealth is pursued by men with an impartial spectator in mind who would sympathise
with the passion of the joy of possessing riches and power, such prosperity and the
consequent establishment of the distinction of ranks and sociability will be perfectly
justified. Thus it has been shown that the propriety of the pursuit of wealth is
recommended to us by the selfish passions, distinctive to the sense of justice and
resentment.
Part IV again picked up the same issue, that is, his insight into the inclination
of the human sentiment to sympathise with the selfish passion of joy more than that
of sorrow, but for a different purpose. Thinking that he has already answered his two
ethical problems with his general theory of morals, Smith now launched a more
specific yet comprehensive attack on Mandeville's theory of passions, sentiments
and sociability, which had argued that wealth was pursued by private vices such as
pride, vanity and ambition. In the remaining part of this chapter, I seek to show that,
for such a purpose, Smith now developed his theories of beauty and taste, which has
been fairly neglected so far. Revisiting his second question, in view of the issue of
achieving the propriety of the pursuit of wealth, Smith began by considering the
effect of the idea of utility upon the sense of propriety. Despite the chapter title, his
concern in Chapter I of Part IV was to show that beauty is NOT bestowed upon the
production of wealth, by the appearance of utility.49 In this argument, Smith's
second question of morals asked to see if private vices ever recommend to us the
propriety of the pursuit of wealth. If they do, then Mandeville was right in
contending that men could contribute to public benefits only with their private vices.
Smith began with Hume's account of beauty. Hume had argued that beauty
was derived from utility, which would give the possessor pleasure and convenience."0
There Hume had presumed his own theory of sympathy as 'the communication of
passions'; in this case, the communication of agreeable sentiments from utility
between the possessor and the spectator. As Smith had already argued that sympathy
49 See the sub-headings of Part IV: 'Of the EFFECT of UTILITY upon the sentiment of Approbation
Consisting of One Section'; Chapter I: 'Of the beauty which the appearance of UTILITY bestows upon
all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty'.
50 TMS, IV. 1. 2, p. 179. For Hume's account of beauty in detail, see Chapter One above.
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was to be excited by the spectator's curiosity to the situation of the person principally
concerned, Smith accordingly had to comment on Hume's view of beauty. Quite
justifiably claiming the originality of his account of beauty, Smith argued:
But that this fitness, this happy contrivance of any production of art, should often be more
valued, than the very end for which it was intended; and that the exact adjustment of the means
for attaining any conveniency or pleasure, should frequently be more regarded, than that very
conveniency or pleasure, in the attainment of which their whole merit would seem to consist, has
not, so far as I know, been yet taken notice of by any body. That this however is very frequently
the case, may be observed in a thousand instances, both in the most frivolous and in the most
important concerns of human life.51
Reminding his readers that his view of the sense of justice and the unsocial passion
of resentment was a divine means endowed by nature to its end, Smith again chose
the same example of a watch to clarify what he meant:
A watch, in the same manner, that falls behind above two minutes in a day, is despised by one
curious in watches. He sell it perhaps for a couple of guineas, and purchases another at fifty,
which will not lose above a minute in a fortnight. The sole use of watches however, is to tell us
what o'clock it is, and to hinder us from breaking any engagement, or suffering any other
inconveniency by our ignorance in that particular point. But the person so nice with regard to
this machine, will not always be found either more scrupulously punctual than other men, or
more anxiously concerned upon any other account, to know precisely what time of day it is.
What interests him is not so much the attainment of this piece of knowledge, as the perfection of
the machine which serves to attain it.52
By making beauty in this manner, in parallel with his account of the unsocial passion
51 TMS, IV. 1. 3, pp. 179-80. Even though his claim of the originality can be accepted, Smith knew
Buffer's observation of beauty, which for instance had presented an anti-utilitarian argument of
beauty, by stating that beauty did not necessarily consist in convenience for which each part of the
body was designed, because a very large mouth for instance was surely useful for eating but not
always beautiful. See Claude Buffier, First Truths, and the Origin of our Opinions, Explained
(London, 1780), pp. 70-1. This argument might have offered Smith a weapon to criticise Hume's
utility-oriented account of beauty. After arguing 'that beauty consists in the particular form which is
most common among other particular forms found in things of the same species' (First Truths, p. 71),
however, Buffier in fact eventually reached his conclusion that 'ifwe suppose that true beauty is to be
found in the world, it must incontestably be that form which is most common to all nations; and if
particular people, through prejudice, and particular habits, will not at first concur in this opinion, time
and reflection must at length incline them to the more numerous party, that is, to the side of opinion of
Reason and Nature' (First Truths, p. 75). Smith seems to have followed Buffier's conclusion all
through his argument of beauty in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. As a Jesuit, Buffier too had
naturally stated that nature was something existing and acting in conformity with the laws that God
had established, so that, in this sense, what was natural was opposed to what was considered
supernatural or miraculous (First Truths, p. 230). Smith examined Buffier's account of beauty in
detail in Part V. But Smith more or less described Buffier as a philosopher who had derived beauty
from custom, though it should be noted that Smith was more interested in the sense of beauty, rather
than beauty itself, and its origin in human nature.
52 TMS, IV. 1. 5, p. 180.
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of resentment and the sense of justice, Smith came to imply that such a sense of
beauty was not something vicious which intended only its own gratification, but
indifferent to self-interest because it had been designed by nature to contribute
unintentionally to the public good. The sense of beauty is not primarily concerned
with the utility brought about by the beauty. Instead, Smith presented the matter of
fact that
How many people ruin themselves by laying out money on trinkets of frivolous utility? What
pleases these lovers of toys is not so much the utility, as the aptness of the machines which are
fitted to promote it.53
Smith thought that the sense of beauty was originated from the pleasure of seeing the
order, harmony and economy of organisation or arrangement. Smith then proceeded
to show how such a disinterested sense of beauty could generate economic
prosperity.
To show how the sense of beauty contributes to public benefits, Smith came
back to the selfish passion of ambition. Smith first depicted a gloomy reality of
ambition to illustrate how little the passion of ambition, and in turn the sense of
beauty, was concerned with the real utility it pursued:
The poor man's son, whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition, when he begins to look
around him, admires the condition of the rich. ... It appears in his fancy like the life of some
superior rank of beings, and, in order to arrive at it, he devotes himself for ever to the pursuit of
wealth and greatness. To obtain the conveniencies which these afford, he submits in the first
year, nay in the first month of his application, to more fatigue of body and more uneasiness of
mind than he could have suffered through the whole of his life from the want of them. ... if in
the extremity of old age he should at last to attain it, he will find to be in no respect preferable to
that humble security and contentment which he had abandoned for it. ... he begins at last to find
that wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring
ease of body and tranquillity of mind than the tweezers-cases of the lover of toys; and like them
too, more troublesome to the person who carries them about with him than all the advantages
they can afford him are commodious.54
Despite such fatal consequences however, ambition pursues wealth and power in
view of the beauty, or the order, harmony and economy of organisation or
arrangement that wealth and power might possibly bring about to him and from
which his sense of beauty would take the pleasure of seeing and experiencing them.
53 TMS, IV. 1. 6, p. 180.
54 TMS, IV. 1. 8, p. 181.
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Again, this was a matter of fact for Smith. Smith next explained the working of this
sense of beauty in terms of his concepts of sympathy and impartial spectator. The
ambitious more eagerly pursue 'The palaces, the gardens, the equipage, the retinue of
the great, ... of which the obvious conveniency strikes every body', than a curiosity
in the basic essentials of life, of which 'Their conveniency may perhaps be equally
great, but it is not so striking'. This is
because in this, as in all other cases, we constantly pay more regard to the sentiments of the
spectator, than to those of the person principally concerned, and consider rather how his situation
will appear to other people, than how it will appear to himself. If we examine, however, why the
spectator distinguishes with such admiration the condition of the rich and the great, we shall find
that it is not so much upon account of the superior ease or pleasure which they are supposed to
enjoy, as of the numberless artificial and elegant contrivances for promoting this ease or
pleasure.55
Sympathy with the rich and powerful is the product of our curiosity in their situation
or the beauty, order, harmony and economy of organisation or arrangement that their
wealth and power might possibly bring about to them and from which their sense of
beauty would take the pleasure of seeing and experiencing them. It is not always the
product of our curiosity in the ease and utility in their situation or of their riches and
power, as Hume had assumed. The selfish passion of ambition would therefore be
more concerned with an impartial spectator and his supposed admiration for the
beauty that wealth and power might possibly bring about to the rich and powerful
and from which an impartial spectator's sense of beauty would be expected to take
the pleasure of seeing them, than with the frivolous or even troublesome utility with
which they would end up.
We are then charmed with the beauty of that accommodation which reigns in the palaces and
oeconomy of the great; and admire how every thing is adapted to promote their ease, to prevent
their wants, to gratify their wishes, and to amuse and entertain their most frivolous desires. If we
consider the real satisfaction which all these things are capable of affording, by itself and
separated from the beauty of that arrangement which is fitted to promote it, it will always appear
in the highest degree contemptible and trifling. But we rarely view it in this abstract and
philosophical light. We naturally confound it in our imagination with the order, the regular and
harmonious movement of the system, the machine or oeconomy by means of which it is
produced. The pleasures of wealth and greatness, when considered in this complex view, strike
the imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment is well
worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow upon it.56
55 TMS, IV. 1. 8, p. 182.
56 TMS, IV. 1. 9, p. 183.
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And it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and
keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. ... The earth by these labours of mankind
has been obliged to redouble her natural fertility, and to maintain a greater multitude of
inhabitants. It is to no purpose, that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his extensive fields,
and without a thought for the wants of his brethren, in imagination consumes himself the whole
harvest that grows upon them. The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number
of inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining. The rich only select from the heap what is
most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their
natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole
end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the
gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all
their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of
the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal
portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the
interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.57
In such a manner, the selfish passion of ambition is motivated and led by the sense of
beauty into contributing unexpectedly to the public good (supplying the needs of
life). The selfish passions may thus be approved of, on the grounds that the poor
would sympathise with the beauty and pleasure supposed to be enjoyed by the rich.
Keeping in mind the expectation of such sympathy from the multitude, the ambitious
are led in turn by delusion into unintentionally contributing to public benefits by their
selfish pursuit of wealth. In other words, as the unsocial passion of resentment and
the sense of justice pursue a punishment to the injustice done, for its own sake,
regardless of its ultimate utility to the public, so the selfish passion of ambition,
motivated by the sense of beauty, pursues the beauty of the life of the rich and
powerful for its own sake, without considering its frivolous utility. But in the end,
both the senses of justice and of beauty will be tricked into contributing
unintentionally to public benefits, even though exclusively intending their own
interest. Smith's famous term 'the invisible hand' was therefore coined to denote the
artifice endowed by nature to deceive the passions into contributing to public
benefits, in the same manner as the artifice built in a watch.'8
57 TMS, IV. 1. 10, pp. 183-5.
58 See Encyclopaedia Britannica; or a Dictionaty ofArts, Sciences, & c. (2nd edn., Edinburgh, 1778),
'Moral Philosophy, or Morals', pp. [l]-[33] and 5197-5202 (after p. 5192, p. [33] overlaps with p.
5197): 'When the mind becomes more sensible to those objects or appearances in which it perceives
beauty, uniformity, grandeur, and harmony, ...; to these objects the mind is led by nature, or taught
by custom, the opinion and examples of others, to annex certain ideas of moral character, dignity,
decorum, honour, liberality, tenderness, and active or social enjoyment. The consequence of this
association is, that the objects to which these are annexed must rise in their value, and be pursued with
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In Chapter II of Part IV, Smith slightly shifted his question, looked at the
beauty bestowed by the appearance of utility upon the characters and actions ofmen,
and asked how far the perception of this beauty affects our sense of propriety.59 As
in Chapter I, Smith began with his criticism of Hume on beauty. Hume had thought
that our approbation of virtue was derived from a perception of beauty resulting from
the appearance of the utility of characters and actions as judged by the spectators.60
Smith's response was the same as the one in Chapter I:
it will be found, upon examination, that the usefulness of any disposition of mind is seldom the
first ground of our approbation; and that the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a
sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility.61
Among the examples Smith referred to in order to illustrate his point, the virtue of
prudence was crucial to his second question of morals in relation to the pursuit of
wealth. The virtue of prudence, Smith argued, 'of all the virtues that which is most
useful to the individual', consisted of two qualities:
first of all, superior reason and understanding, by which we are capable of discerning the remote
consequences of all our actions, and of foreseeing the advantage or detriment which is likely to
result from them: and second, self-command, by which we are enabled to abstain from pleasure
or to endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a greater pain in some
proportionable ardour. The enjoyment of them is often attended with pleasure; and the more
possession of them, where that is wanting, frequently draws respects from one's fellow-creatures:
This respect is, by many, thought equivalent to the pleasure of enjoyment. Hence it happens that the
idea of happiness is connected with the mere possession, which is therefore eagerly sought after,
without any regard to the generous use or honourable enjoyment. Thus the passion, resting on the
means, not the end, i.e. losing sight of its natural objects, becomes wild and extravagant.
... by the deception formerly mentioned, the merit or the conduct which intitled, or should be
intitle, to those marks of distinction, shall be forgot or neglected, and the badges themselves be
passionately affected or pursued, as including every excellency. If these are attained by any means,
all the concomitants which nature, custom, or accidents have joined to them, will be supposed to
follow of course. ...
When men are once engaged in active life, and find that wealth and power, generally called
INTEREST, are the great avenues to every kind of enjoyment, they are apt to throw in many engaging
moral forms to the object of their pursuit, in order to justify their passion, and vanish over the
measures they take to gratify it, as independency on the vices or passions of others, provision and
security to themselves and friends, prudent oeconomy, or well-placed charity, social communication,
superiority to their enemies, who are all villains, honourable service, and many other ingredient of
merit'.
59 See the sub-heading of Chapter II of Part IV: 'Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility
bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be
regarded as one of the original principles of approbation'.
60 TMS, IV. 2. 2-3, pp. 187-8.
61 TMS, IV. 2. 5, p. 188.
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future time.62
Based on his account of the sense of beauty, Smith argued 'that superior reason and
understanding are originally approved of as just and right and accurate, and not
merely as useful or advantageous'.63 As for self-command, the reason was the same:
That self-command, in the same manner, by which we restrain our present appetites, in order to
gratify them more fully upon another occasion, is approved of, as much under the aspect of
propriety, as under that of utility.64
When we act in this manner, the sentiments which influence our conduct seem exactly to
coincide with those of the spectator. ... when we act as if the remote object interested us as
much as that which immediately presses upon the senses, as our affections exactly correspond
with his own, he cannot fail to approve of our behaviour: and as he knows from experience, how
few are capable of this self-command, he looks upon our conduct with a considerable degree of
wonder and admiration. Hence arises that eminent esteem with which all men naturally regard a
steady perseverance in the practice of frugality, industry, and application, though directed to no
other purpose than the acquisition of fortune.65
The virtue of prudence might be somehow selfish, in the sense that it aims at fortune
for its own sake with the superior reason, understanding and self-command, but it
does so by controlling the selfish passions, and by being approved of by the spectator
as proper and even beautiful. Hence the virtue of prudence makes it possible for us
to pursue wealth in an innocent manner, by being approved of by an impartial
spectator expecting no gain at all from us. In sum, in Smith's view, prudence was a
virtue which rendered men both virtuous and wealthy, through the sense of beauty,
and was convincing enough to show Mandeville that wealth and virtue could
possibly coexist. Smith's second question of morals in relation to the pursuit of
wealth, namely, by what power or faculty of the mind it is that the propriety of the
pursuit of wealth is recommended to us, was then partly answered. It was by the
sense of beauty, because the sense of beauty propels ambition toward pursuing
wealth as something proper in itself rather than merely useful. Smith tried to prove
this by denying that the appearances of utility would not affect the sentiment of
approbation.
62 TMS, IV. 2. 6, p. 189.
63 TMS, IV. 2. 7, p. 189.
64 TMS, IV. 2. 8, p. 189.
65 TMS, IV. 2. 8, pp. 189-90.
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In concluding his account of beauty, Smith considered in Part V the influence
of custom upon the notion of beauty and the moral sentiments. Now Smith had to
solve the remaining problem, whether private vices ever recommend to us the
propriety of the pursuit of wealth, as Mandeville had argued. For his argument,
Smith reflected upon the association of ideas, or in Smith's words, 'the habitual
arrangement of our ideas', to see how custom bestows a union between two or more
particular objects, and causes impropriety or deformity in their separation.66 Smith
admitted that our judgement with regard to the beauty of natural objects is influenced
by custom and fashion. He then introduced Buffier's account of beauty which had
argued that beauty was determined by custom and regarded beauty as the form and
colour most usual among the things of that particular sort to which it belonged.67
Smith acknowledged that the system was 'ingenious', in observing how custom
played a part in our judgement of beauty. He however concluded that custom was
not the sole principle of beauty, but merely affecting our judgement of it together
with other principles such as utility and fitness of the means to the end.68 On the
other hand, the influence of custom upon our moral sentiments is, in Smith's view,
even less profound:
the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation, are founded on the strongest and most
vigorous passions of human nature; and though they may be somewhat warpt, cannot be entirely
perverted.69
In other words, custom has no influence on matters of 'the general style of character
and behaviour' and 'things of the greatest importance' such as 'truth and justice', but
only on 'the propriety and impropriety of particular usages' and 'the matters of small
moment'.70 This is because otherwise 'no society could subsist a moment'.71 By
thus vitiating the effects of custom upon the notion of beauty and in particular upon
the moral sentiments in general, Smith attempted to exclude the turning of vicious
customs into public benefits. In other words, Smith answered Mandeville by
66 TMS, V. 1.2, p. 194.
67 TMS, V. 1. 8, p. 198.
68 TMS, V. 1.9, pp. 199-200.
69 TMS, V. 2. 1, p. 200.
70 TMS, V. 2. 12-3, p. 209.
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redefining 'private vices' as vicious customs. This was because passions such as
pride, vanity and ambition could be innocent and justified as far as they are
controlled by prudence and consequently approved of by an impartial spectator.
While these passions, motivated by the sense of beauty, could recommend to us the
propriety of the pursuit of wealth, private vices or vicious customs could certainly
not.
Smith used the term 'invisible hand' in the paragraph quoted above for
describing the 'deception' imposed upon men by nature. By this 'deception', Smith
said, men rouse and keep industry. By this 'deception', Smith wrote, 'in spite of
their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency,
though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom
they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they [the
rich or landlords] divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements'.72 In
this, Smith appreciated such innocent vanity of 'the proud and unfeeling landlord' as
a benefactor distributing wealth among his retainers and tenants and even to
strangers. Smith however became more critical of such a landlord later in his
jurisprudence lectures and The Wealth of Nations for rendering his tenants and
retainers dependent upon his authority, and causing violence, rapine and disorder in
the country.73 As examples, Smith referred to William II, Thomas Becket (1118-70;
Archbishop of Canterbury, 1162-70) and Richard Neville (1428-71; Earl of
Warwick, 'the King-maker') as such feudal barons.74 But Smith also regarded his
contemporary, 'Mr. Cameron of Lochiel, a gentleman of Lochaber in Scotland', as a
71 TMS, V. 2. 16, p. 211.
72 TMS, IV. 1. 10, pp. 183-5.
73 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations (1776); eds. R. H.
Campbell and A. S. Skinner, as vol. II of The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of
Adam Smith (Oxford, 1976), III. iv. 6-9, pp. 414-8 (Abbreviated as WN below).
74 LJ (A), i. 120 and 158; (B), 59; WN, III. iv. 5, p. 413. Luxury and rustic hospitality of the nobility
in the middle ages was treated in relation to succession as a method of acquiring property, and the
right of primogeniture in particular in the middle ages (LJ (A), i. 117-20, pp. 50-1; LJ (B), 159, p.
464). As for the introduction of the right of primogeniture for the sake of the security of property, see
LJ (A), i. 131-5, pp. 55-7; LJ (B), 161, p. 465. The right of primogeniture, on the other hand, was
understood to have been hindering agriculture and family (LJ (B), 163-4, p. 466). David Hume
referred to Thomas Becket's power as a feudal baron in The History ofEnglandfrom the Invasion of
Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688 (1754-62); (New York, 1983), vol. I, p. 234.
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violator of the peace in the Scottish Highlands, who had 'carried, in 1745, eight
hundred of his own people into the rebellion with him'.75 As those names might
imply, together with the context of his argument in which those figures were treated,
Smith's story of 'an invisible hand' would not have concerned a modern commercial
society, but such feudal baronies as those in early eighteenth-century Scottish
Highlands, or even in Norman England. For, the 'invisible hand' distributed wealth
among the lower ranks of society where neither foreign commerce nor any of the
finer manufactures could not have been seen. In his jurisprudence lectures and The
Wealth ofNations, Smith turned his attention to the transition from the feudal to the
commercial stage in European history. Now his aim was to see exactly how 'private
vices' were going to contribute to 'public benefits' in a modern commercial society,
and to see if his theory of sociability in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments was equally
applicable to it. The main players in his scheme were the country landlords, and the
merchants and manufacturers in the towns. In this, Smith explained the
establishment of liberty and independence of tenants and retainers in the country as
resulting from the mutual interest between the country lords and the townsmen.
Smith's concerns here were the role of the vanity and taste of the country proprietors
on the one hand, and the role of self-interest of the merchants and manufacturers in
the town on the other. These are therefore the 'private vices' Smith is now
considering. They supported each other in the following manner:
The inhabitants of trading cities [such as Venice, Genoa, and Pisa], by importing the improved
manufactures and expensive luxuries of richer countries, afforded some food to the vanity of the
great proprietors, who eagerly purchased them with great quantities of the rude produce of their
own lands.76
A taste for the finer and more improved manufactures, was in this manner introduced by foreign
commerce into countries where no such works were carried on. But when this taste became so
general as to occasion a considerable demand, the merchants, in order to save the expense of
carriage, naturally endeavoured to establish some manufactures of the same kind in their own
country. Hence the origin of the first manufactures for distant sale that seem to have been
established in the western provinces of Europe, after the fall of the Roman Empire.77
Smith referred to some European examples as the first manufactures for distant sale
75 WN, III. iv. 8, pp. 416-7.
76W, III. iii. 15, pp. 406-7.
11'WN, III. iii. 16, p. 407.
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occasioned by foreign commerce stimulated by their taste in this manner. These
were 'the antient manufactures of silks, velvets, and brocades, which flourished in
Lucca during the thirteenth century'; 'the manufactures of fine cloths that antiently
flourished in Flanders, and which were introduced into England in the beginning of
the reign of Elizabeth'; 'the present silk manufactures of Lyons and Spital-fields'.78
These examples show how much our ideas of beauty are established by custom and
ambition. On the landlords' side, Smith showed how their taste, inflamed by their
passion of vanity, caused their ruin and thereby unintentionally contributed to the
public good, by distributing their wealth. In this, foreign commerce and
manufactures 'gradually furnished the great proprietors with something for which
they could exchange the whole surplus produce of their land, and which they could
consume themselves without sharing it either with tenants or retainers'. In other
words, for which 'they exchanged ... the price of the maintenance of a thousand men
for a year, and with it the whole weight and authority which it could give them'.
Smith argued: 'thus, for the gratification of the most childish, the meanest and the
most sordid of all vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power and
authority'.79 And thereby,
Indirectly, perhaps, he [a great proprietor] maintains as great or even a greater number of people
than he could have done by the antient method of expence. For though the quantity of precious
productions for which he exchanges his whole revenue be very small, the number of workmen
employed in collecting and preparing it, must necessarily have been very great. Its great price
generally arises from the wages of their labour, and the profits of all their immediate employers.
By paying that price he indirectly pays all those wages and profits, and thus indirectly
contributes to the maintenance of all the workmen and their employers.80
The effects of this in Smith were twofold: first, that unnecessary retainers and tenants
were to be dismissed;81 second, the creation of the long lease of his lands to his
tenants, in exchange for higher rents: 'The expensive vanity of the landlord made
him willing to accept of this condition', that is, 'that they [tenants] should be secured
78W, III. iii. 19, pp. 407-8.
79 WN, III. iv. 10, p. 418-9. In other words, the nobility declined, from their self-love, by spending
their wealth on 'elegance' instead of on the previous 'plain and hospitable way of living', as a result
of'the introduction of arts, commerce, and luxury'. See LJ (A), iv. 157-9, pp. 261-2. Or, for 'all the
costly trinkets' and 'insignificant pageantry' by the 'frivolous passions'. See WN, V. iii. 3, pp. 908-9.
80 WN, III. iv. 11, p. 420. See also LJ (A), iv. 157-9, pp. 261-2.
81 WN, III. iv. 13, p. 420.
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in their possession, for such a term of years as might give them time to recover with
profit whatever they should lay out in the further improvement of the land' to pay
higher rents to the landlord.82 As the result, Smith concluded,
The tenants having in this manner become independent, and the retainers [sub-tenants and
peasants] being dismissed, the great proprietors were no longer capable of interrupting the
regular execution of justice, or of disturbing the peace of the country. ... A regular government
was established in the country as well as in the city, nobody having sufficient power to disturb its
operations in the one, any more than in the other.83
A revolution of the greatest importance to the publick happiness, was in this manner brought
about by two different orders of people, who had not the least intention to serve the publick. To
gratify the most childish vanity was the sole motive of the great proprietors. The merchants and
artificers, much less ridiculous, acted merely from a view to their own interest, and in pursuit of
their own peddler principle of turning a penny wherever a penny was to be got. Neither of them
had either knowledge or foresight of that great revolution which the folly of the one, and the
industry of the other, was gradually bringing about.
It is thus that through the greater part of Europe the commerce and manufactures of cities,
instead of being the effect, have been the cause and occasion of the improvement and cultivation
of the country.84
82 WN, III. iv. 13, p. 421; LJ(A), iii. 124-5, p. 190;L/(B), 140-1, p. 454.
83 WN, III. iv. 13, p. 421. Discussing the decline of baronial feuding during the Tudor period, Hume
had written: 'The encrease of the arts, more effectively than all the severities of law, put an end to this
pernicious practice. The nobility, instead of vying with each other, in the number and boldness of
their retainers, acquired by degrees a more civilized species of emulation, and endeavoured to excel in
the splendour and elegance of their equipage, houses, and tables. The common people, no longer
maintained in vicious idleness by their superiors, were obliged to learn some calling or industry, and
became useful both to themselves and to others. And it must be acknowledged, in spite of those who
declaim so violently against refinement in the arts, or what they are pleased to call luxury, that, as
much as an industrious tradesman is both a better man and a better citizen than one of those idle
retainers, who formerly depended on the great families; so much is the life of a modern noble man
more laudable than that of an ancient baron' (The History ofEngland, vol. Ill, pp. 76-7; quoted in N.
Phillipson (1989), pp. 110-1). The churches and clergymen also lost their authority based on their
estates ('the most profuse hospitality' and 'the most extensive charity') in the same manner as the
country proprietors, 'upon the gratification of their own private vanity and folly' {WN, V. i. g. 22 and
25, pp. 801 and 803-4).
84 WN, III. iv. 17-8, p. 422. For what Hume called 'a revolution in manners' and described in terms of
the growth of enlightenment and trade, see The History ofEngland, vol. Ill, pp. 63-7 and 121-2; vol.
IV, p. 336; vol. V, p. 68. Summarising 'the revolution' in eighteenth-century Scotland, Henry G.
Graham wrote: 'Probably no period was so quietly eventful in shaping the fortunes and character of
the country as the eighteenth century. Others are more distinguished by striking incidents, others are
more full of the din and tumult and strife which arrest attention and are treated as crises, although they
may neither stir the depth nor affect the course of a people's life; but in that century there was a
continuous revolution going on - a gradual transformation in manners, customs, opinions, among
every class; the rise and progress of agricultural, commercial, and intellectual energy, that turned
waste and barren tracts to fertile fields - stagnant towns to centres of busy trade - a lethargic, slovenly
populace to an active, enterprising race - an utterly impoverished country to a prosperous land. These
facts constitute the real history of the Scots in the eighteenth century' (Graham, pp. viii-ix). Graham's
The Social Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century (first edition, London, 1901) seems to have
characterised eighteenth-century Scottish society with a transition from the feudal to the commercial
stage based on Smith's description of European history. For instance, Graham too emphasised the
roles of providence (or invisible hand) and taste in rustic hospitality as a vehicle of distribution (third
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In this way, Smith showed how the proprietors' passion of vanity, inflaming their
taste, as well as the merchants' and manufacturers' passion of interest, unexpectedly
contributed to the improvement and cultivation of the country, along with the
security and independence of the cultivators. Smith eventually attributed the
transition from the feudal to the commercial stage in European history to the
unintentional result of the intentional motives. As usual, Smith was sarcastic in
describing the behaviour of both proprietors and city manufacturers and merchants.
But he was not blaming their vanity and their pursuit of wealth on the grounds that
no injustice had ever been committed. In other words, 'private vices' as such are not
to be condemned as injustices by Smith. Smith therefore was able to approve and
vindicate a modern commercial society as the product of the morally neutral rather
than vicious motives, even if not necessarily virtuous, against Mandeville who had
argued that 'private vices' were a necessary evil for the public prosperity. Smith
looked back to European commercial history from the viewpoint of a resident of a
backward nation who was concerned with the ongoing transition from the feudal to
the commercial stage in his own country.85 The process became more obvious in
Scotland after the 1760s: that is, after Smith had written The Theory of Moral
edition, pp. 4, 12, 29-32 and 162-3), in a transformation ofmanners and habits (p. 56-60, 73, 199-200
and 218-19), in agricultural 'improvement' (pp. 172-3 and 201-4), in the expansion of trade and the
consequent proliferation of domestic manufactures and industry after the Union of 1707 (pp. 204-6
and 515-20) and in the fall of nobility (pp. 205 and 209-10). Many points have been disproved by
such subsequent historians as Handley, Richards, Whyte, Mitchison and Devine from the viewpoints
of social and historical anthropology which, for instance, effectively challenge such terms as
'progress' and 'improvement' and show why they are hardly impartial. But a comparison between
Graham and these historians could give us an insight into Graham's, and hopefully Smith's,
preoccupations in writing Scottish and European history. See James E. Handley (1953); Eric Richards
and Monica Clough (1989); Eric Richards (2000); Ian D. Whyte (1979) and (1983), pp. 119-40;
Rosalind Mitchison (1978); T. M. Devine (1976), pp. 177-190; (1984), pp. 1-8 and (1988); L. M.
Cullen and T. C. Smout (1976), pp. 3-18; Alistair J. Durie (1976), pp. 88-99; R. H. Campbell (1976),
pp. 204-15; G. Whittington (1983), pp. 141-64; G. Gordon (1983), pp. 165-90. Roy Porter similarly
argues that Smith's Wealth ofNations was an example of creating a scientific myth that was to replace
a Christian one, as highly effective propaganda for a new age of technology and industrialisation. See
Porter, pp. 21-3. See also pp. 38 and 41 for his argument that eighteenth-century intellectuals tried to
find or forge a new religiom of humanity in place of traditional Christianity admist the secularisation
of Europe, rationalising and refining it, or creating a more credible alternative fit for the times.
85 Smith had extensive interests in the histories of foreign countries, including the Continent, eastern
Europe, Tartary and Arabia, even China and Japan, as part of researching the manners and the course
of development of sociability and human nature 'in the ordinary and naturall progress of things',
provoked by needs, rather than by pride and vanity as Mandeville had thought.
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Sentiments. His attention in his jurisprudence lectures and The Wealth ofNations
consequently shifted to the role of sociability and taste in the newly emerging
commercial society. This was a society where even the lowest and most despised
member of society possessed superior abundance and affluence than the most
respected savage could possess, but no longer where everybody was equally and so
miserably poor. This was a society where 'It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest',86 but no longer where rustic hospitality might have supplied the
basic essentials of life. Nevertheless, Smith eventually became convinced that
'private vices' do not have to be vicious to contribute to 'public benefits' in a modern
commercial society, as in a feudal society. Both in a feudal barony and in a modern
commercial society, taste (or the sense of beauty, as Smith had previously called it)
works as a customary sentiment which is not primarily affected by the thought or
idea of utility, as Hume had argued. Taste is a more powerful convention than a
mere idea of beauty that Hutcheson had discussed, which extends even to the
common people far outnumbering the confined group of aesthetes who could form an
idea of beauty by associating the ideas of utility and public interests. In this sense,
taste is an internalised faculty which is indispensable to the motivation of vanity and
ambition, that complex sentiment beyond the reach of utility calculation, in
stimulating the demand for finer products. It is an internalised faculty which is also
crucial to the propriety of the pursuit of wealth, working under the auspices of an
'impartial spectator', or more crucially, the internalised 'man within the breast',
together with whom it would guarantee the moral neutrality of ambition. Smith's
concepts of the sense of beauty, or taste, and 'an impartial spectator' were his
solution to Mandeville's paradox by showing how the propriety of the pursuit of
wealth could be guaranteed by the moral neutrality secured by them. They were also
his solution to Mandeville's paradox by overcoming Hutcheson's and Hume's
concepts of the moral sense and the sense of utility respectively as the principles of
moral approbation. Smith would have thought that, as the principle of moral
approbation, the moral sense and the sense of utility were not sufficiently customary,
86 WN, I. ii. 2, pp. 26-7; also U(A), vi. 46; (B), 220.
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conventional or extended enough to establish the sociability of the common people
except among only a confined group of those with high taste who would be capable
enough of understanding the public utility and interests. The judgmental or self-
critical aspect of human nature and sociability escaped Hutcheson's theory of moral
sense and Hume's theory of utility as the principles of moral approbation because
only a comparison of our own judgement and that of others could render us able to
assess other people's moral approbation. Smith's new concepts of the sense of
beauty, taste, 'an impartial spectator' and 'the man within the breast' solved this
problem.
If The Theory ofMoral Sentiments is to be put in the context of the 'private
vices, public benefits' controversy, Smith would appear as a moral philosopher who
was equally anxious to refute Mandeville, but still not quite convinced by Hutcheson
and Hume with their strategies for challenging Mandeville. Smith would have
thought that Hutcheson's moral sense and Hume's sense of utility were not
satisfactory concepts to explain the sociability of a modern commercial society. For
Smith, a modern commercial society had appeared to be a place where not only
philosophers but also the vast majority of common people now could form the moral
idea of propriety and approve or disapprove the morality of characters and conducts.
For Smith, a modern commercial society was a place where these vast majority of
common people now were capable of properly pursuing wealth and of judging the
propriety of the pursuit of wealth. Fortunately for us, Smith was quite explicit about
what he had made of Mandeville, Hutcheson and Hume. To contextualise Smith in
the controversy, it is therefore of use here to look at the final Part of The Theory of
Moral Sentiments where he reflected on the history of moral philosophy, including
the moral systems ofMandeville, Hutcheson and Hume.
As mentioned above, Smith began his theory of moral sentiments with two
questions: wherein does virtue consist?; and by what power or faculty of the mind is
it, that an excellent and praiseworthy character is recommended to us? Smith wrote
his account of the history of moral philosophy in terms of the above two questions, in
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the same manner as he constructed his general theory of morals.87 In terms of the
first question, Smith considered Mandeville's system and called it 'the licentious
system' which took away altogether the distinction between vice and virtue and was
consequently 'wholly pernicious'.88 Smith criticised Mandeville on five grounds.
First, he reckoned that Mandeville had failed to make 'a real and essential distinction
between vice and virtue'. For, Mandeville had considered that whatever was done as
being done from the selfish passions, and vanity in particular, and therefore regarded
human virtue as 'the mere offspring of flattery begot upon pride'.89 Second, he
thought that Mandeville had defined 'vanity' inaccurately. In Smith's view, the love
of virtue, or the desire of doing what is honourable and noble was not vanity.
Equally, the love of true glory, or the desire of acquiring esteem by what is really
estimable was not vanity either. Smith had already argued that vanity only meant to
desire praise more than was deserved, or for what is not deserved at all.90 Third,
Mandeville in this way exaggerated the imperfection of human virtue, and regarded
whatever fell short of complete self-denial to be 'no more than a concealed
indulgence of our passions'. For example, Mandeville called it 'gross luxury and
sensuality' whenever our self-command fell short of 'the most ascetic abstinence'.
Smith stated:
Every thing, according to him, is luxury which exceeds what is absolutely necessary for the
support of human nature, so that there is vice even in the use of a clean shirt, or of a convenient
habitation.91
Fourth, as Hume had already pointed out, Mandeville was misled by 'the ambiguity
of language',92 'to represent every passion as wholly vicious, which is so in any
degree and in any direction'. Mandeville thus treated 'every thing as vanity which
has any reference, either to what are, or to what ought to be the sentiments of
87 In Part VI (Part VII in the final edition), Smith's history of moral philosophy is to be found in
Section II: 'Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue', and in Section
III: 'Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation'.
88 TMS, VII. ii. 4. 6, p. 308.
89 TMS, VII. ii. 4. 7, pp. 308-9.
90 TMS, VII. ii. 4. 8, p. 309.
91 TMS, VII. ii. 4. 11, p. 312.
92 TMS, VII. ii. 4. 11, p. 312.
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others'.93 And finally, Smith concluded that Mandeville's system was in this way
based on 'ascetic doctrines' which had placed virtue in the entire extirpation and
annihilation of all our passions. Accepting such presumptions, Mandeville simply
claimed, first, 'that this entire conquest never actually took place among men', and
second, that, if it had, 'it would be pernicious to society, by putting an end to all
industry and commerce'. After all, in the opinion of Smith, Mandeville thus merely
pretended to prove from the first claim above 'that there was no real virtue', and
from the second assumption 'that private vices were public benefits'.94
This excellent critique clarifies Smith's concerns in writing The Theory of
Moral Sentiments. Smith felt it necessary to refute Mandeville, because, as he was
quite conscious, Mandeville's system nevertheless 'in some respects bordered upon
the truth'. It had been at least devastating enough to 'have imposed upon so great a
number of persons' and to 'have occasioned so general an alarm among those who
are the friends of better principle', despite all the faults above that Smith criticised.9'
It 'bordered upon the truth' because, it might have seemed to Smith, it vividly
described and wittily exposed an aspect of modern commercial sociability in which
unintended public consequences were brought about by intentional private actions.
This would also be the reason why other Scots moralists such as Hutcheson and
Hume, who defined a role of moral philosophy as being concerned with the issue of
sociability, could not have ignored Mandeville either. But Smith's remark above,
despite having been a harsh critic ofMandeville's Fable, would show that the idea of
the unintentional public consequences of intended private actions probably
influenced Smith most among participants in the controversy.
When it came to Hutcheson and Hume, Smith criticised their systems both in
respect of their approaches to the nature of virtue and to the principle of moral
approbation. Smith's criticism of Hutcheson on the nature of virtue concerned his
discussion of the selfish passions. Smith reckoned that
93 TMS, VII. ii. 4. 12, p. 312.
94 TMS, VII. ii. 4. 12, p. 313.
95 TMS, VII. ii. 4. 14, p. 313.
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Dr. Hutcheson was so far from allowing self-love to be in any case a motive of virtuous actions
[that] This was a selfish motive, he thought, which so far as it contributed to any action,
demonstrated the weakness of that pure and disinterested benevolence which could alone stamp
upon the conduct ofman the character of virtue.96
In Smith's view, this led Hutcheson into ignoring the propriety and approbation of
such inferior virtues as prudence, vigilance, circumspection, temperance, constancy
and firmness.97 Disagreeing at this point with Hutcheson, Smith argued that the
passion of self-interest is still praiseworthy as far as it is according to nature and
propriety in acquiring the means to preserve individuals. The pursuit of wealth is in
this sense not at all vicious: for example, 'the habits of oeconomy, industry,
discretion, attention, and application of thought' are all 'cultivated from self-
interested motives'. On the other hand, Smith continued,
Carelessness and want of oeconomy are universally disapproved of, not, however, as proceeding
from a want of benevolence, but from a want of the proper attention to the objects of self-
interest.98
With regard to Hutcheson's understanding of the selfish passions, Smith adopted
Mandeville's criticism of Hutcheson. As seen above, Mandeville had responded to
Hutcheson that it was more important to argue about matters of fact, than matters of
right. In like manner, Smith reflected that Hutcheson was primarily concerned with
the matters of right of the Deity, 'an independent and all-perfect Being, who stands
in need of nothing external, and whose happiness is complete in himself. Smith also
insisted that it was more important to concern the matters of fact of 'so imperfect a
creature as man, the support of whose existence requires so many things external to
him, [who] must act from many other motives [such as selfish]'.99 In fact, this
criticism of Hutcheson was rather unfair. For, Hutcheson had argued that we need
benevolent passions as well as selfish passions, and he too had emphasised the roles
of human passions in supplying the needs of life, having accepted the view of the
negative community, instead of the positive community. Nevertheless it was crucial
that Smith concentrated on Hutcheson's defect in his account of the selfish passions
96 TMS, VII. ii. 3. 13, p. 303.
97 TMS, VII. ii. 3. 15, p. 304.
98 TMS, VII. ii. 3. 16, p. 304.
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and developed a justification of the production ofwealth, by clarifying the conditions
of such passions in which they could be regarded as innocent.
As for Hutcheson's discussion of the principle of moral approbation, Smith,
like Hume, praised Hutcheson for realising that it was based on a sentiment but not
on self-love: 'Dr. Hutcheson had been at large pains to prove that the principle of
approbation was not founded on self-love'.100 In this sense, Smith valued Hutcheson
for his critique of Mandeville. Smith however criticised in two ways Hutcheson's
theory of moral sense, which Hutcheson had argued as the principle of moral
approbation.101 First, in Smith's view, moral sense could not explain the difference
between our approbation of different sorts of sentiment. Our approbation of a tender,
delicate and humane sentiment was of a different kind to our approbation of a great,
daring and magnanimous sentiment.102 Second, Smith was to argue that only a
comparison of our own judgement and that of others could render us able to assess
other people's moral approbation.103 In this sense, in Smith's view, the judgmental
or self-critical aspect of human nature escaped the theory of moral sense. Smith
concluded that there was no such faculty exerting 'itself alone and unmixed with
sympathy or antipathy, with gratitude or resentment'.104 Smith's introduction of the
concepts of 'an impartial spectator' and 'the man within the breast' solved this
problem.
As for Hume's system with regard to the nature of virtue, which placed virtue
in utility, Smith claimed that it coincided with Smith's own system which made it
consist in propriety. In Part VI, Smith insisted that Hume was only different in
making utility, not sympathy, the measure of the proper degree of all the
affections.103 With regard to the principle of moral approbation, on the other hand.
Smith agreed with Hume in having supposed it to be founded on sympathy. But
99 TMS, VII. ii. 3. 18, p. 305.
100 TMS, VII. iii. 3. 4, p. 321.
101 See TMS, VII. iii. 3. 2, p. 321. Also VII. iii. 2. 9, pp. 320-1. Smith precisely understood that moral
sense was discussed in Hutcheson as analogous to the sense of beauty. See VII. iii. 3. 6-7, p. 322.
102 TMS, VII. iii. 3. 13, pp. 324-5.
103 TMS, VII. iii. 3. 14, p. 325.
104 TMS, VII. iii. 3. 16, pp. 326-7.
105 TMS, VII. ii. 3. 21, pp. 305-6.
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Smith seems to have been concerned that Hume had supposed sympathy as
concerning only with utility of a well-contrived machine rather than with the motives
or passions of persons that Smith was to regard to be more important in morals.106
And the concern was in fact decisive, as Smith argued that our approbation of virtue
is based on that of the impartial spectator, whereas Hume had thought it based on
sympathy. As Hume had argued, the idea of utility might have been approved of as
moral goodness by sympathy, as sympathy was in Hume the communication of
passions and therefore the pleasure of utility might be directly transmitted through
sympathy. But Smith was to argue that virtue rested primarily in propriety, and only
secondarily in utility, and that propriety could only be approved through interactive
and self-judgmental process involving others. His new concepts of sympathy, 'an
impartial spectator' and 'the man within the breast' solved this problem concerning
the principle of moral approbation.
Smith indeed elaborated his own moral theory by challenging and
overcoming Hume more than anyone else. In elaborating his theory of sympathy, for
instance, Smith might have had Hume's idea of sympathy in mind, though their ideas
of sympathy were significantly different. The first feature of Smith's theory of
sympathy was that sympathetic emotions can relate to any kind of passion, either
joyful or sorrowful. This was a development from Hume's view that pleasure from
sympathy was only with the joyful passions and not with the sorrowful passions and
therefore an idea of pleasure from sympathy with agreeable emotions would give rise
to the passions of pride and love whereas an idea of uneasiness from the sorrowful
passions would excite the passions of humility and hatred. Hume called Smith's new
idea of sympathy, applicable to both joyful and sorrowful passions, 'the Hinge of
your System' and commented that 'I wish you had more particularly and fully
prov'd, that all kinds of Sympathy are necessarily Agreeable'.107 In the second
edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Smith further clarified the point at issue:
I answer, that in the sentiment of approbation there are two things to be taken notice of; first, the
sympathetic passion of the spectator; and, secondly, the emotion which arises from his observing
106 TMS, VII. iii. 3. 17, p. 327.
107 See Hume, The Letters ofDavid Hume, letter 169, from Hume to Adam Smith, dated 28 July 1759,
p. 313.
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the perfect coincidence between this sympathetic passion in himself, and the original passion in
the person principally concerned. This last emotion, in which the sentiment of approbation
properly consists, is always agreeable and delightful. The other may either be agreeable or
disagreeable, according to the nature of the original passion, whose features it must always, in
some measure, retain.108
His other emphasis on the nature of sympathy, that sympathy was an attention to the
situation of others principally concerned, was also his evaluation of Hume's theory
of sympathy as the mere communication of passions. His theory of sympathy was
therefore to insist, along with Hutcheson, on the judgmental character of human
nature.
Smith's new discussion of sympathetic feelings as pleasurable allowed him to
argue about the unsocial and therefore disagreeable passion of resentment as the
principle of justice. In turn his argument of resentment was obliged to respond to
Mandeville, who had emphasised that it was a matter of fact that unsocial passions
such as pride and vanity, or 'private vices' in the Mandevillian idiom, contributed
more to 'public benefits' than did sociable passions. Certainly Smith stressed in the
same manner the importance of discussing matters of fact, instead ofmatters of right.
But Smith approved the unsocial passion of resentment as the principle of justice, not
necessarily despite its unsocial nature, but more importantly because resentment
could be justified if it was proper and consequently sympathised with by an impartial
spectator, for its own sake and independent of its utility. In Smith, it was apparently
plausible to argue that such an unsocial passion too was to be sympathised with by
others, because, whatever passions they would be, sympathy with passions must be
always pleasant.
At the same time Smith's insight into the nature of sympathetic feelings
required him to look at Hutcheson's and Hume's criticism of Mandeville. In
describing the sense ofjustice, which in Smith guaranteed the moral neutrality of the
pursuit of wealth as well as the disinterested character of human nature, Smith not
only disagreed with Mandeville but also responded to and corrected Hutcheson's and
Hume's strategies for refuting Mandeville. With Hume's view in mind, Smith
argued that
108 TMS, footnote to I. iii. 1. 9, p. 46.
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The concern which we take in the fortune and happiness of individuals does not, in common
cases, arise from that which we take in the fortune and happiness of society.
The passion of resentment, and the sense of justice, would be excited to see a
particular case of injustice, rather than to consider the demerit and damage caused by
injustice for the whole fabric of society in general:
so when a single man is injured, or destroyed, we demand the punishment of the wrong that has
been done to him, not so much from a concern for the general interest of society, as from a
concern for that very individual who has been injured.109
To Smith, Hume's so-to-speak utilitarian account of justice, which had assumed the
passion of self-interest to be the basis of it, seemed still to be showing the selfish
nature of justice, which in turn seemed more or less to make an unnecessary
concession to Mandeville. Smith therefore attempted to eliminate such an
implication in his account of justice, by stressing the propriety more than the utility
of the virtue of justice. Smith's endeavour in this was possible on the grounds of his
theory of sympathy that sympathetic feelings brought pleasure more from viewing
the propriety than the utility of the passions, either agreeable or disagreeable. Now
with Hutcheson in mind as well, Smith also contended that such concern for injustice
did not necessarily require the social passions like 'love, esteem, and affection'.
The concern which is requisite for this, is no more than the general fellow-feeling which we have
with every man merely because he is our fellow-creature. We enter into the resentment even of
an odious person, when he is injured by those to whom he has given no provocation."0
Justice, after all, is derived solely from the unsocial passion of resentment, without
the help of either the consideration of the public utility of justice, or any other
benevolent motives. Even if the unsocial passion of resentment is painful in itself,
sympathy with the proper resentment assures an impartial spectator the pleasure
always derived from propriety. In sum, despite Mandeville's claim, and as
Hutcheson and Hume rightly objected, human nature is least vicious even if selfish in
the pursuit of wealth. For, the propriety of human conduct is continuously under the
109 TMS, II. ii. 3. 10, p. 89.
110 TMS, II. ii. 3. 10, p. 90.
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supervision of the sympathetic feelings of spectators, in seeking the pleasure of
seeing the propriety of characters and actions. This is due to the judgmental or self-
critical character of human nature. It is therefore neither because, as Hutcheson had
thought, justice and other virtues were derived from benevolence, nor because, as
Hume had insisted, justice was derived from the passion of self-interest in view of its
public utility.
A similar response is seen in Smith's account of the man within the breast
counteracting the selfish passions. This too was a criticism of Mandeville, showing
that human nature was not entirely selfish:
It is a stronger love, a more powerful affection [than the love of our neighbour, and the love of
mankind, that is], ... the love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and
superiority of our own characters."1
As in his account of the sense of justice, this also showed Smith's departure from
Hutcheson and Hume, in the sense that Smith supposed the man within the breast as
a force restraining the selfish passions neither with his benevolence to others, nor
with his sense of utility. Hume especially had regarded any motive contributing to
the public good to be virtuous, on the grounds that virtue is utility. In Hume, self-
love, therefore, was virtuous if it controlled itself for the reasons of utility. But to
Smith, Hume seemed to have again invited Mandeville's claim that human nature
was accordingly selfish. Smith therefore portrayed the man within the breast as
encouraging passions to seek the means to the end, that is, prosperity, exclusively for
the sake of the means itself, without referring to its utility. As spectators feel
pleasure in seeing the propriety of a means to an end, in this case, an action of
restraining selfish passions, so the person principally concerned in the same manner
feels pleasant if he is conscious of being proper in restraining his own selfish
passions. In this process, the man within the breast by no means needs to consider
the outcome of such restrictive behaviour of himself, that is, prosperity brought about
by his frugality. For, the man within the breast can restrain the selfish passions
solely from the pleasure of seeing the propriety of such restriction, without
calculating his utility in doing so. Nevertheless, if the man within the breast that
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Smith portrayed is a mere fiction or a delusion, it would then be the case that Smith
has not yet answered Mandeville."2
As for his account of the selfish passions, Smith kept thinking of Mandeville
and was still anxious to refute Mandeville's claims with his own theory of sympathy.
By showing how the selfish passion of ambition would contribute to prosperity and
the establishment of the order of society, Smith tried to disprove Mandeville's claim
that prosperity was solely derived from private vices. As far as wealth is pursued in
view of other people's sympathy with the selfish passion of the joy of the rich and
powerful, such a pursuit must be approved to be at least innocent. Smith might have
reluctantly admitted that pride and vanity, or ambition, would be the origin of
prosperity. But Smith had to stress that the selfish passions, especially that of joy,
were easily sympathised with by others and therefore they were not at all vicious. In
this sense, while Hutcheson had endeavoured to disprove vanity to be the origin of
prosperity, Smith was rather concerned to disprove the selfish passion of ambition to
be vicious, though admitting it as the origin of prosperity. After all, sympathy with
the selfish passion of the joy of the rich and powerful is a pleasant feeling derived
from the pleasure of seeing the propriety of the riches and power in bringing ease and
enjoyment. This is still the case even when the spectators have no prospect of
enjoying the riches and power they are looking at. This was the basis Smith referred
to as showing human nature as the disinterested, and the pursuit of wealth in view of
111 TMS, III. 3. 4, p. 137: added in 2nd edn. and dropped in 6th edn.
112 Court Whigs had preached 'rational' obedience, in place of the Tory doctrine of passive obedience,
in order to justify both their legacy of the Glorious Revolution and their current regime. They argued
that the duty of Whigs at the time of the Revolution had been resistance because James II had assailed
liberties, whereas their present duty was obedience because their government was now lawful. Court
Whigs then referred to the Bible as calling kings 'vice-gerents of God' and teaching that obedience to
authority was commanded by God and conscience. See, Browning, pp. 199-200. On the contrary,
Smith's impartial spectator was an external moral authority that an individual should obey in terms of
their own characters and conducts. The man within the breast was then an internalised authority, or a
'vice-gerent of God', offering conscience for an individual to follow in terms of their characters and
conducts, and, through such obedience, leading them into unintentionally contributing to the order of
society. It was an alternative authority to magistrates or ministers who would have been hardly
impartial as Court Whig cronies appointed by their vested interests. It was also an alternative
authority to an absolute hereditary monarch that the Tory doctrine of passive obedience had preached
to obey categorically, such as James II who had assailed liberties. Smith's ideas of impartial spectator
and the man within the breast were his theory of duty and obedience for the sake of public good.
These concepts eventually solved the difficulties Hutcheson and Hume had had in offering an
alternative account to Court Whig doctrine of authority and obedience in their response to Mandeville.
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such innocent sympathy from the spectators as in the same manner morally neutral.
Finally, Smith's theory of sympathy culminated in his account of the sense of
beauty, which in turn allowed Smith to show that the selfish passions of ambition and
so on can justifiably contribute to the public prosperity, without violating justice.
With his account of beauty, Smith responded to Mandeville with two points. First,
the selfish passions are by no means vicious, but to be approved once they are
sympathised with by an impartial spectator and his sense of beauty for their joy for
wealth and power. This is the case because, in Smith's view, spectators' sense of
beauty derives its pleasure primarily from seeing the beauty and propriety of
property for attaining the ease and pleasure of the proprietor, even without
considering their own gain from the proprietor. Second, wealth and power would
accordingly be approved of as far as the selfish passions thus justifiably exciting and
enjoying prosperity are not vicious but sympathised with by spectators' sense of
beauty."' By understanding the sense of beauty in this manner, Smith consequently
showed that the statecraft that Mandeville had insisted had to be necessary in
contriving private vices into public benefits by the dextrous management of skilful
politicians, should be simply redundant. This was because the sense of beauty, like
113 The implication of the idea that the sense of beauty is crucial in sociability and industry was
apparent to his contemporaries. See Encyclopaedia Britannica; or a Dictionary ofArts, Sciences, &
c. (2nd edn., Edinburgh, 1778), 'Beauty', pp. 1077-79: 'Beauty, in many instances, promotes industry;
and as it is frequently connected with utility, it proves an additional incitement to enrich our field and
improve our manufactures. These, however, are but slight effect, compared with the connections that
are formed among individuals in society by means of beauty. The qualifications of the head and heart
are undoubtedly the most solid and most permanent foundations of such connections: But as external
beauty lies more in view, and is more obvious to the bulk of mankind, than the qualities now
mentioned, the sense of beauty has a more extensive influence in forming these connections. At any
rate, it occurs in an eminent degree with mental qualifications, in producing social intercourse, mutual
good-will, and consequently mutual aid and support, which are the life of society: it must not however
be overlooked, that the sense of beauty does not tend to advance the interests of society, but when in a
due mean with respect to strength. ... the appetite for gratification, prevailing over affection for the
beloved object, is ungovernable, and tends violently to its end, regardless of the misery that must
follow. ... This suggests an important lesson, that moderation in our desires and appetites, which fits
us for doing our duty, contributes at the same time the most to happiness; even social passions, when
moderate, are most pleasant than when they swell beyond proper bounds'. Also in 'Moral
Philosophy, or Morals': '... their [intellectual powers'] immediate exercise or their proper objects
yields the most rational and refined pleasure. ... For, being daily conversant with beauty, order, and
design, in inferior subjects, he ['who has a taste formed to these ingenious delights, and plenty of
materials to gratify it'] bids fair for growing in due time an admirer of what is fair and well-
proportioned in the conduct of life and the order of society, which is only order and design exerted in
their highest subjects. ... Therefore to cultivate a true and correct taste, must be both our interest and
our duty, when the circumstances of our station give leisure and opportunity for it, ....' (p. 15).
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the sense of justice, eventually functions as a justifier of the selfish passions
producing and enjoying prosperity in a non-vicious, morally neutral way.
Smith's account of the sense of beauty finally led him to criticise Hume's
view of custom as an initiator of the association of ideas. In Hume's scheme, custom
gave us a simple idea of pleasure, which then should excite the passions in the
association of ideas in order finally to produce a complex idea of morals. For
showing that such important ideas of justice and beauty could never be affected by
an arbitrary and peculiar custom, Smith excluded custom from the principle of
sympathy. In this, Smith did so by showing how a vicious custom resulted in a
vicious society, perhaps with both Mandeville and Hume in mind. Smith's example
of the murder of new-born infants in ancient Greece is striking: in which he showed
how 'so dreadful a violation of humanity', or 'the most unjust and unreasonable
conduct' was approved as a custom only 'from views of remote interest or
conveniency', or 'by far-fetched considerations of public utility', and eventually
corrupted human nature."4 By thus stressing how a private vice turned into a public
vice, Smith completed his refutation of Mandeville who had emphasised private
vices contributing to public benefits. In this, Smith ruled out vicious customs from
the primary sources of prosperity and confirmed the innocent and justified passions
to be the sole motives of the pursuit of wealth. But the project at issue was going to
be more fully worked out in his subsequent jurisprudence lectures and The Wealth of
Nations, as shown below.
In sum, Mandeville had thought that all passions were vicious but inevitably
necessary for prosperity. Hutcheson next had attempted to show that passions
necessary for the public good were benevolent and hence virtuous, as wealth thus
produced could be useful for benevolent purposes. He had also argued that selfish
motives are necessary for prosperity even if they are not benevolently intended.
Hume in turn had brought the dispute to a matter of words, and maintained that
whatever passions were useful for prosperity were virtuous, since he had assumed
that virtue was utility. Considering the merits and demerits of their arguments, Smith
concluded that if passions were proper, they would be innocent, pleasant and hence
1,4 TMS, V. 2. 15, pp. 209-10.
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useful for prosperity. His theory was that virtue was propriety, that the sympathy of
spectators then derived its pleasure mainly from seeing the propriety of the passions,
and that the utility of those passions hence was rather difficult to foresee with regard
to its ultimate consequences. His main concern in all of these arguments in The
Theory ofMoral Sentiments, his jurisprudence lectures, and The Wealth ofNations
was to prove that human nature was neither selfish nor vicious, and the pursuit of
wealth by the passions could accordingly be morally neutral.
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Chapter Three
Government and political economy: the 'private vices,
public benefits' controversy: II
As the author of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Adam Smith had two things left to
do after 1759, whether in subsequent editions of the book, in his proposed volume of
natural jurisprudence or in a new book. First was to reconsider Mandeville's
conclusion that private vices should be manipulated by the skilful and dextrous
management of politicians for public benefits, particularly through an economic
policy, as we shall see below, to maintain the nation's favourable trade balance so as
to prevent the decrease of the wealth of nations. Having thought that he had refuted
Mandeville's premise that public benefits were always derived from private vices,
Smith now had to offer an alternative conclusion and policies. The second objective
was to show that, despite Mandeville's claim, private vices could never contribute to
public benefits.
In this chapter we look at how Mandeville's economic policy that statecraft
should keep a favourable trade balance in foreign trade was derived from his
precedent argument that the task of government in establishing sociability in a
commercial society is to turn private vices into public benefits and happiness. We
then look at how Hutcheson's A System of Moral Philosophy (1755) argued that
fulfilling duties would enable us to be virtuous as well as wealthy at the same time
through the moral sense. I emphasise that this compatibility of virtuous and wealthy
was the hinge in the System of his criticism of Mandeville, who had argued that these
two were contradictory each other. We finally look at Hume's political and economic
theory, especially his emphasis on the role of taste for us to make use of our natural
abilities for production. I argue that a refined taste was regarded by Hume as vital for
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moderation and the control of the passions and political zealotry so as to redirect
passions and their capacity for industry and public interest. I emphasise that Hume
presented a refined taste as capable of purging factional party rage which would
otherwise jeopardise prosperity, and of enabling us to form more moderate moral
ideas of government and public interest in the light of their utility as the standard of
morals.
In the next chapter, I then seek to show that, in The Wealth ofNations, Smith
was particularly interested in the role of 'legislators', not skilful 'politicians', and in
the sort of private vices practised in commercial activity, which 'legislators' ought to
address. As Hundert has shown, Mandeville had provided the first sketch of
commercial society as a whole entity, and an analysis of the mechanisms which
controlled its operations.1 As his work, more than any other, called into question
contemporary assumptions about the problems of sociability, his theory could only be
answered by supplying a new theory of sociability.
1. Bernard Mandeville
What did Mandeville mean by saying that the role of politicians in a modern
commercial polity was to control the passions of their subjects and turn their private
vices into public benefits? His answers centred on two main points: luxury and the
balance of trade on the one hand, and the poor labouring masses on the other.
Mandeville defended luxury against Country Whigs who had criticised it as
corrupt, effeminising and enervating the whole society to be unfit for wars. The
assumptions of many neo-mercantilist writers during the first decade of the
Restoration, that the pursuit of self-interest was the sole motive required to
understand economy, were effectively incorporated into Mandeville's comprehensive
account of the broader social implications of modern luxury. His seventeenth-
century predecessors had regarded luxury, which was unnecessary for sustaining a
frugal survival, as a desire more for its aesthetic value and vanity than for actual
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material needs. They had examined the psychology of envy, desire and imaginary
wants, treating market relations as something more than the mere exchange of
goods.2 Mandeville added that it was either hypocritical or meaningless to describe
the recently-emerging emulative conduct in a commercial market for the material
marks of approbation in a traditional moral language of the Stoic, Christian or
Country Whig.3
Mandeville defined luxury simply as anything beyond the basic essentials
needed to sustain physical existence.4 For those who argued that the above definition
was too rigorous, Mandeville insisted that there was to be a restriction to extending
the meaning of the word 'Luxury',5 and that otherwise it might be claimed that there
is no luxury.
I would only shew, that if once we depart from every thing Luxury that is not absolutely
necessary to keep a Man alive, that then there is no Luxury at all; for if the wants of Men are
innumerable, then what ought to supply them has no bounds; what is call'd superfluous to some
degree of People, will be thought requisite to those of higher Quality; and neither the World nor
the Skill of Man can produce any thing so curious or extravagant, but some most Gracious
Sovereign or other, if it either eases or diverts him, will reckon it among the Necessaries of Life;
not meaning every Body's Life, but that of his Sacred Person.'
Having assumed, as always, that avarice and prodigality were necessary to a
commercial society as the private vices which inevitably contributed to public
benefits,7 Mandeville asserted that luxury should be consumed as much as possible,
and then directed his argument into how much a whole nation could spend on luxury.
The neo-mercantilist writers during the first decade of the Restoration had argued
that, if a nation could maintain a favourable trade balance with every country, the
wealth of the nation would be kept within itself. There then would be no threat to its
constitution which might be triggered by importing and consuming foreign luxury
1 Hundert, pp. 14-5.
2 Hundert, pp. 182-3. Those mercantilists were also the advocates of what was later going to be Whig
policy for a favourable trade balance. For an interpretation of Mandeville as a conventional
mercantilist, see Thomas A. Home (1978).
3 Hundert, pp. 183-5.
4 FB, I, p. 107.
5 FB, I, pp. 107-8.
6 FB, I, p. 108.
7 FB, I, pp. 250-1.
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and spending its balance in foreign trade.8 Mandeville offered an amendment to this
'mercantilist' theory of luxury which had insisted on the favourable trade balance
with every country. He argued that, if a nation could keep a favourable trade balance
as a whole in foreign trade, by the skilful management of good politicians, it would
guarantee the wealth of the nation, regardless of the quantity of foreign luxury
consumed in that nation.
Every Government ought to be thoroughly acquainted with, and steadfastly to pursue the Interest
of the Country. Good Politicians by dextrous Management, laying heavy Impositions on some
Goods, or totally prohibiting them, and lowering the Duties on others, may always turn and
divert the Course of Trade which way they please; ... above all, they'll keep a watchful Eye over
the Balance of Trade in general, and never suffer that all the Foreign Commodities together, that
are imported in one Year, shall exceed in Value what of their own Growth or Manufacture is in
the same exported to others.
If what I urg'd last be but diligently look'd after, and the Imports are never allow'd to be
superior to the Exports, no Nation can ever be impoverish'd by Foreign Luxury; and they may
improve it as much as they please, if they can but in proportion raise the Fund of their own that is
to purchase it. ... no Luxury or other Vice is ever able to shake their Constitution. ... of all the
famous States and Empires that World has had to boast of hitherto, none ever came to Ruin
whose Destruction was not principally owing to the bad Politicks, Neglects, or Mismanagements
of the Rulers.10
In Mandeville's view, no luxury had ever been able to shake the constitution, and
any ruin of great empires had been owed to their bad management, not luxury. What
is more, for Mandeville, luxury was an important means for developing the division
of labour in commercial society by stimulating the private vices such as avarice and
prodigality and thereby contributing to public benefits by stimulating industry.
Therefore, despite the Country Whig claim, there must be no fear for luxury
effeminising and enervating the whole society to be unfit for wars, because there
would always be some kinds of people fit for wars.'1 If sense of honour, which in
Mandeville was a sentiment equivalent to virtues, was nurtured by luxury by
associating it with military honour, luxury could even play a role in strengthening the
army.12 After all, since luxury was not to be made general across the whole nation,
8 FB, I, pp. 108-13.
9 FB, I, pp. 113-6.
10 FB, I, pp. 116-7.
11 FB, I, pp. 119-20.
12 FB, I, pp. 120-3.
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and, therefore, the balance of trade was kept favourable, luxury was no threat to
commercial polity, because luxury could not corrupt a whole country.
... what I have insisted on the most, and repeated more than once, is the great Regard that is to
be had to the Balance of Trade, and the Care the Legislature ought to take that the Yearly
Imports never exceed the Exports; and where this is observed, and the other things 1 spoke of are
not neglected, 1 still continue to assert that no Foreign Luxury can undo a Country.
Mandeville's accounts of luxury and of nation's balance of trade were to
argue against the Country Whig view which had opposed luxury, the division of
labour and a standing army while advocating a classical citizen or militia. The most
prominent theme of their 1698 polemic was the reduction of William Ill's army.
Andrew Fletcher held forth on the vices of a standing army and the virtues of a
militia.14 In his Discourse ofGovernment in Relation to Militias, Fletcher found the
Harringtonian ideal of armed civic virtue in a Gothic and medieval past, entailing
specialisation in the rise of commerce and a loss of liberty due to luxury and standing
armies exploiting and corrupting the freeholders.15 In an Anglo-Irish context, Robert
Molesworth in Dublin had published his Account ofDenmark and William Molyneux
was about to publish his Case of Ireland's Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in
England,16 Civic moralists thus saw in the division of labour, the spread of luxury as
a result and the standing army in particular, a threat to personal integrity and their
ideal of self-sufficiency. As a Court Whig sympathiser, Mandeville countered with
his claim that commercial prosperity enhanced by the division of 'Art into many
Branches' entailed the liberation of the majority from previous dependencies on
landed power. He argued that the expansion of commerce brought forth much better
mutual dependencies between the division of labour in the entire commercial
society.17 As a Court Whig supporter, Mandeville's arguments for what he called
'States-Craft' was designed to defend the economic and financial interests of the
Whig oligarchy of his time. Rather than attempting to curb the corruption
encouraged by enlarging commercial stimulation and luxury, Mandeville argued that
13 FB, I, pp. 248-9.
14 Pocock(1985), p. 230.
15 Pocock(1985), p. 231.
16 Pocock (1985), p. 230.
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politicians had now to manipulate private egoism for the sake of public benefits. He
was going to infuriate his readership by showing how broadened opportunities for
avarice became prerequisites of the wealth of nations and that modern subjects would
accordingly be governed best by the existing government. In this new social order,
Mandeville recognised that the government now controlled the new powers of
finance following a transformation in British public finance which triggered an
explosion of moveable capital.18 Mandeville tried to attribute corruption not to the
governmental functions in this new order but to corrupt human nature itself, and to
legitimate their political administrations as necessary for rendering human nature
useful for national prosperity.19
Mandeville's advocacy of the division of labour was therefore the hinge of
his understanding of commercial sociability. He saw in the division of labour, unlike
his Country Whig opponents, mutual dependencies that could generate public
benefits by channelling the private vices of every individual into the now closely-
knitted interrelations of commercial society. Along with his ideas of luxury and the
balance of trade, Mandeville's ideas of policies towards the poor labouring masses
and charity for them was accordingly influenced by this understanding of
commercial sociability. Mandeville recommended to his government a moderate
wage for labourers, which in his view would force the poor to spend continuously
and hence keep industry going.20 Moderate wages would therefore render labourers
neither dispirited nor idle: 'The only thing then that can render the labouring Man
industrious, is a moderate quantity of Money; for as too little will, according as his
Temper is, either dispirit or make him Desperate, so too much will make him
Insolent and Lazy'.21 On the contrary, too much wealth would make a country idle
and declining: for example, Spain had declined because of its combination of
frugality and vast wealth.22
17 Hundert, pp. 196 and 204.
18 Hundert, pp. 20-2. For Mandeville's accounts of statecraft, see also Hundert, pp. 77-8.
19 Hundert, pp. 22-3.
20 FB, I, pp. 193-4.
21 FB, I, p. 194.
22 FB, I, pp. 194-6.
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Mandeville was equally unfavourable to charity and charity-schools for the
labouring poor, as, in his view, charity would break mutual interdependencies
between the division of labour in a wholly commercial society by rendering the
labouring poor over-dependent on charity. In his 'An Essay on Charity, and Charity-
Schools', Mandeville said that, though charity would be a love to strangers for
nothing, with no obligation,23 and be counterfeited by the passions of pity or
compassion,24 charity would, besides pity, often be motivated by pride, avarice and
self-love as well.25 Charity would also be given to release ourselves from the
suffering from pity.26 More importantly, however, charity, if too excessive, would
breed idleness and destroy industry: 'Charity, where it is too extensive, seldom fails
of promoting Sloth and Idleness, and is good for little in the Commonwealth but to
breed Drones and destroy Industry'.27 Mandeville was accordingly critical of
charity-schools.28 Charity-schools would equally promote idleness, keeping the poor
from working and encouraging villainy: 'Charity-Schools, and every thing else that
promotes Idleness, and keeps the Poor from Working, are more accessory to the
Growth of Villainy, than the want of Reading and Writing, or even the grossest
Ignorance and Stupidity'.29 Moreover, reading and writing taught at charity-schools
would be no remedy for crimes by rogues,30 because, for instance, reading and
writing had not been able to prevent the South-Sea Bubble of 1720-21, committed by
the wealthy and educated people.31 As the plenty and cheapness of provisions, which
was Mandeville's definition of prosperity, depended on a multitude of industrious
poor, charity-schools would prevent them from working with cheerfulness and
content, and lead the whole of society into scarcity and expensiveness.32
Mandeville even extended his wildly mercantilist argument regarding charity-
schools to education in general. Education was not necessary to everyone, especially
23 FB, , p. 253.
24 FB, , p. 254.
25 FB, , pp. 257-8.
26 FB, , pp. 258-9.
27 FB, , p. 267.
28 FB, , pp. 268-70
29 FB, ,p. 271.
30 FB, , p. 275.
31 FB, , p. 276.
32 FB, , pp. 286-8.
See also, pp. 261, 64 and 85-6.
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for sons entering into trading (and other hard labour),33 because education would
incapacitate youths in a commercial society.34 In his view of the division of labour as
mutual interdependencies within a commercial society, education was an institution
which would distort the nature of society by encouraging too many children to take
up 'advantageous' professions.35 In the mutual interdependencies of the division of
labour, on the one hand, hard and dirty labour was to be done by someone, and the
children of the poor were best fitted for it.36 On the other hand, in foreign trade, the
more industrious people are, the more successful the country is. If kept in ignorance,
labourers remained content and industrious in their work.
To be happy is to be pleas'd, and the less Notion a Man has of a better way of Living, the more
content he'll be with his own; and on the other hand, the greater a Man's Knowledge and
Experience is in the World, the more exquisite the Delicacy of his Taste, and the more
consummate Judge he is of things in general, certainly the more difficult it will be to please
him.37
Therefore it would be important to keep labourers' knowledge confined within their
occupation to keep them ignorant and industrious, thereby gaining advantage in
foreign trading.
As by discouraging Idleness with Art and Steadiness you may compel the Poor to labour without
Force, so by bringing them up in Ignorance you may inure them to real Hardships without being
ever sensible themselves that they are such. ... When by these two Engines we shall have made
Provisions, and consequently labour cheap, we must infallibly out-sell our Neighbours; and at
the same time increase our Numbers. This is the Noble and Manly way of encountering the
38
Rivals of out Trade, and by dint of Merit out-doing them at Foreign Market.
As seen above, stimulating industry and keeping the balance of trade favourable to
the nation had been the policy goal that Mandeville advocated for the Court Whig
government, so Mandeville was making his argument against education in order to
gain an advantage in foreign trade. In sum, Mandeville concluded that, while
luxuries were less detrimental to a rich society,39 high wages were more so by ruining
33 FB, I, pp. 296-7.
34 FB, I, p. 299.
35 FB, I, pp. 300 and 302.
36 FB, I, p. 311.
37 FB, I, p. 314.
38 FB, I, p. 317.
39 FB, I, p. 304.
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servants:40 if the labouring poor were maintained without education, they would
therefore be more conducive to the public peace.41
Mandeville's ideas of charity and education further clarified the arguments in
his essay, 'A Search into the Nature of Society'. There Mandeville denounced moral
virtues as a useful means for encouraging industry, based on his mercantilist view
that education was an institution that would nurture moral qualities unnecessary for
industry. As seen above, in Mandeville's understanding of the nature of commercial
society, sociability arises from private vices, or the bad and hateful qualities of men,
not the good. 'Sociableness' would arise from the multiplicity of his desires, as well
as the continual opposition (obstacles) in his endeavouring to gratify them.42 Society,
the wealth of nations, arts and inventions were necessary only for gratifying wants,
imperfections, appetites, pride and vanity, but not the amiable virtues and loving
qualities.43 Amiable qualities would provide comfort to an indolent society, because
rest and peace would prevent trouble and motion, and the bounties and benefits of
nature would allow men to save labour; on the contrary, it was needs, vices and
imperfections that would create all arts, industry and labour.44 Evil was therefore an
inevitable factor in forming sociability, so that private vices were to be turned into
public benefits 'by the dextrous Management of a skilful Politician'.45 This could be
done by keeping the favourable trade balance so as to have luxury abound within the
nation, and by keeping the labouring poor ignorant and, consequently, industrious.
Concerning these political and economic arguments by Mandeville, various
views have been presented in order to interpret Mandeville as an economic theorist.46
F. B. Kaye argued in 1924 that Mandeville was the foremost proponent of laissez-
faire and individualism prior to Smith. Following Kaye, Nathan Rosenburg argued
in 1963 that Mandeville was a laissez-faire theorist who did allow government
intervention to ensure a favourable trade balance but not necessarily to arrange the
economy by the traditional mercantilist prohibition of foreign luxury import and
40 FB, I, p. 305.
41 FB, I, p. 308.
42 FB, I, p. 344.
43 FB, I, pp. 346-7 and 355.
44 FB, I, p. 366.
45 FB, I, p. 369.
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excessive specie export.47 On the other hand, in 1953, Jacob Viner interpreted
Mandeville as a mercantilist who saw a role for the 'skilful politician' in producing
good from evil.48 Thomas Home elaborated this view and argued in 1978 that
Mandeville was a typical mercantilist who shared views not only with his
contemporary mercantilist thinkers but also even with laissez-faire theorists a
concept of economic man.49 Examining all the above interpretations, Goldsmith
argued in 1985 that Mandeville was a theorist of the spirit of commercial society
who examined human motives and passions and their link to the public benefits of
prosperity and wealth, but not a theorist of the economic structure of commercial
society. He concluded that Mandeville, therefore, was neither a mercantilist nor a
laissez-faire economist.50
I think that all of the above interpretations of Mandeville as either a
mercantilist or a laissez-faire theorist have an assumption in common: that a
mercantilist is an interventionist. This however is an assumption that is now worth
challenging. The policy of the prohibition of foreign luxury import and excessive
specie export was first proposed by old mercantilists such as Thomas Mun before
and after the Restoration of 1660, but not shared with by later mercantilists after the
Glorious Revolution. These later mercantilists such as Dudley North, Josiah Tucker
and Charles Davenant argued that government should provide only a framework of
laws protecting people and property within which the commerce operates and should
not interfere with domestic trade. They were therefore non-interventionists as far as
the domestic trade was concerned, but that was still for the sake of the mercantilist
policy of achieving a favourable trade balance. Therefore, it still seems fair to regard
Mandeville as a mercantilist.31
46 See Goldsmith, pp. 123-4.
47 Nathan Rosenburg (1963), pp. 183-96. See Goldsmith, p. 123.
48 Jacob Viner (1953), pp. 11-15. See Goldsmith, p. 123.
49 Home (1978). See Goldsmith, p. 124.
50 Goldsmith, p. 124.
51 Isaac Rubin argued that the later mercantilists uncovered the connection between the movement of the
precious metals (money) and the overall growth of trade and industry, and were free of the naive notions
of their forerunners that increases in the quantity of precious metals was a source of a nation's wealth.
See Rubin, pp. 40-1. See also Thomas Mun (1621) and (1664); Sir Dudley North (1669) and (1691);
Charles Davenant (1696), (1698) and (1699); Josiah Tucker (1755), (1775) and (1781). Sir Dudley
North however was the first of the early prophets of the idea of free trade, criticising the state
Government and political economy 160
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
Mandeville's ideas of statecraft, or government, were thus aimed at
preserving what he believed as mutual interdependencies between the division of
labour in a wholly commercial society, because it was these closely-knitted
commercial relationships that were turning private vices into public benefits. His
concerns here centred on maximising the consumption of luxury, keeping the poor
labouring masses industrious and, above all, keeping the favourable trade balance.
How then could these objectives be achieved? Later in the second volume of The
Fable, published in 1728, Mandeville presented his polemic for attaining these
mercantile objectives by preserving the order and economy of commercial
relationships. Interestingly enough, while criticising Shaftesbury and Hutcheson,
Mandeville presented his arguments in the Hutchesonian language of beauty, as
Hutcheson had done for his description of order and economy in the universe?2 In
Mandeville's use of the language, statecraft now appeared as something economic
and aesthetic: 'Oeconomy of a well-ordered city' was 'the Beauty and Exactness'
which would produce 'a surprising Regularity', owing to 'the Happiness of the
Invention, the Contrivance of the Engine'?' Once established, the government
would be a machine running uninterrupted for a great while even without a wise
man: '... the Government of a large City, once put into good Order, the Magistrates
only following their Noses, will continue to go right for a great while, tho' there was
not a wise Man in it'?4 By dividing the works in administration and by the careful
limitations of every official's power, the utmost regularity in public office would be
established." Economy would play a role in statecraft, because, even though the
most knowing, the most virtuous and the least self-interested are the best politicians,
it would be quite unlikely that we could find such people to be politicians. The next
best are perhaps those wise laws to guard and entrench the constitution, and
contrivances to avoid detriment from a want of the knowledge or probity of
restrictions upon foreign trade and the level of interest. See Rubin, pp. 58-63.
52 See Chapter One above, pp. 60-1.
53 FB, 11, p. 322.
54 FB, II, pp. 322-3.
55 FB, II, pp. 325-6.
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ministers.56 After all, though there are virtuous men, the number is too small for a
nation to rely on for useful government.57 Therefore, order and economy, rather than
virtuous statesmen, were to keep government functioning for attaining and
preserving the order and economy of commercial relationships. This was because it
was the order and economy of commercial relationships, after all, that could sustain
commercial sociability, as the mechanisms of turning private vices into public
benefits.
The order and economy of statecraft was reconsidered by Mandeville in his
last work in 1732, A Letter to Dion. This short book was his polemical reply to
Alciphron: Or, The Minute Philosopher (1732), in which George Berkeley had
attacked Mandeville as a lawless libertine and atheist. Mandeville thought that
Berkeley had misunderstood his argument in The Fable.™ But what is more
important is the development in Dion of his argument about statecraft attaining and
preserving order and economy. Here Mandeville developed his discussion of
government or statecraft into that of political economy, by describing how law
converts private vices into public benefits, rather than in preventing private vices:
It is the Business of all Law-givers to watch over the Publick Welfare, and, in order to procure
that, to submit to any Inconveniency, any Evil, to prevent a much greater, if it is impossible to
avoid that greater Evil at a cheaper Rate. Thus the Law, taking into Consideration the daily
Encrease of Rogues and Villains, has enacted, that if a Felon, before he is convicted himself, will
impeach two or more of his Accomplices, or any other Malefactors, so that they are convicted of
a Capital Crime, he shall be pardon'd and dismiss'd with a Reward in Money. There is no Doubt
but this is a good and wise Law; for without such an Expedient, the Contrary would swarm with
Robbers and Highwaymen Ten-times more than it does; .... All this while it is evident, that in
this Case the Law has only Regard to the Publick Good, and, to procure that, sets aside all other
Laws, and proceeds rather contrary to the Common Notions we have of Justice; which,
according to the Civilians, consists in a constant and perpetual Desire of giving every one his
Due: and for Fear he should have some Goodness left, and that natural Compassion might make
him unwilling to destroy his dearest Friends, and perhaps his Brother, with his Breath, the Law
invites him to it by a large Sum of Money, and actually bribes him to add to the Rest of his
Crimes that Piece of Treachery to his Compassions, whom he had sworn Fidelity to, and perhaps
drawn into the Villany.59
When the Law was made, it was well known, from what was observed of Thieves, Pickpockets,
and House-breakers, that those Common Villains will do any Thing to get Money, and still more
to save Life, when they are conscious that it is forfeited. The knowledge of this was the
56 FB, II, pp. 334-6.
57 FB, II, p. 336.
58 Hundert, p. 2.
59 Dion, pp. 42-4.
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Foundation of that Law.60
This shews the Usefulness of such a Law, and at the same Time the Wisdom of the Politician, by
whose skilful Management the Private Vices of the Worst of Men are made to turn to a Publick
Benefit.61
Mandeville was clarifying the role of the politician as converting private vices into
public benefits, rather than as merely preventing private vices. In Part II of The
Fable of the Bees (1728) and An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the
Usefulness of Christianity in War (1732), as we have seen above, Mandeville
emphasised the beneficial effects of a governmental system. He thought that it was
not necessarily the result of the wisdom of individual geniuses but that of long
experience over a great length of time from the independent actions of many,
ordinary human beings. By this typically Court Whig sentiment, Mandeville argued
that virtue and genius were unnecessary in politics, because the matters of
government could be reduced routine operations and easily taken decisions by those
experienced in the trade but possessed neither of unusual intellect nor of
extraordinary moral virtue. This was also the advantage Mandeville thought of the
British constitution: it did not need to be staffed by virtuous men or the men of
genius such as those in the civic ideal of philosophers as the classical guardians of a
republic. Mandeville's emphasis therefore lay in the importance of the operation of
government in which men's passions and interests are checked and public benefits
62
are produced out of private vices such as bribery and graft. It was Court Whig
view that such a system of government was more suitable in the now highly
commercialised polity. His argument about government was therefore concerned
with how to introduce the order and economy of government as the means of
encouraging luxury and industry, keeping the poor labouring masses industrious,
keeping the balance of trade favourable to the nation, thereby converting private
vices into public benefits. In this sense, his argument here was developed from that
of politics into that of political economy. He was no longer concerned with how
virtuous statesmen could prevent the private vices of multitude. He now emphasised
the role of law for politicians to introduce the order and economy into government
60 Dion, p. 44.
61 Dion, p. 45.
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for manipulating human weaknesses in order to secure a public good. Hutcheson
would have to respond to this theory in A System of Moral Philosophy, after
believing that he had once refuted, in his Beauty and Virtue and Passions and
Affections, the foundations of The Fable.
2. Francis Hutcheson
After his death, Francis Hutcheson's son, a second Francis Hutcheson, posthumously
published in two volumes, A System ofMoral Philosophy, in Three Books in 1755
(written from 1734 to 1737), with a life of the author by William Leechman,
professor of divinity at Glasgow.63 The work was, as the title indicates, his attempt
to present his moral philosophy as an entire system ranging from moral theology and
the theory of beauty to ethics, jurisprudence and political economy. It has been
suggested by James Moore and others that there is a radical inconsistency between
the philosophy of A System and that set out in his earlier works. Moore argues that
Hutcheson had two separate systems. One is a coherent public philosophy
expounded in the first four philosophical treatises written in Dublin in the 1720s as
Beauty and Virtue (1725) and Passions and Affections with Moral Sense (1728); and
the other is a parallel academic philosophy conceived in accordance with the
curriculum at Glasgow after 1730.64 The former consists of complementary treatises
in aesthetics, ethics and psychology, formulated as polemical and illustrative
discussions. The latter, written in Latin, is a system of logic, metaphysics and moral
philosophy, but is in many respects contradictory to the former.65 Hutcheson's early
treatises of public philosophy comprehended a coherent aesthetics, ethics and
psychology, postulating the natural sociability or abilities to perceive and act in a
manner consistent with a sense of beauty and morals. They also comprised a Stoic
discourse of the ethical value of citizenship. These early works, in other words, were
62 Goldsmith, pp. 107-118.
63 Fowler, pp. 180-1.
64 Moore (1990), pp. 41-2.
65 Moore (1990), p. 42.
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designed for adults and citizens.66 Hutcheson's Latin works, on the other hand, were
designed for his young moral philosophy students at Glasgow College.67 Moore also
argued that Hutcheson's System was an aborted attempt to integrate his two
'systems' into a single text.68
Whatever the case (I come back to this issue in my Conclusion), Hutcheson's
main philosophical problem now was to produce an alternative idea of statecraft, or
government, to Mandeville's. As shown below, this was going to be done through
his wide-ranging arguments about duties and rights in his jurisprudence and political
economy. Book I, Concerning the Constitution of HUMAN NATURE, and the
SUPREME GOD, revisited his ethics in the first eight chapters of A System,
beginning with his redefinition of passions and affections, various senses of beauty,
and the moral sense. Hutcheson repeated his arguments in ethics that the sense of
beauty was innocent from any vice even in the pursuit of wealth and power,69 that the
moral sense was a principle which would make the selfish subversive to public
benefits,70 and that beauty had a role in sociability:
As the order, grandeur, regular dispositions and motions, of the visible world, must soon affect
the mind with admiration; ... men of genius and attention must soon discover some intelligent
beings, one or more, presiding in all this comely order and magnificence.71
Hutcheson also reiterated his belief in benevolence as the principle of human nature,
citing Shaftesbury while denouncing the Hobbesian and Mandevillian account of
sympathy.72 The pleasure of wealth and power was again justified as a means for
virtuous purposes, and frugality, moderation and temperance were emphasised for
turning the pursuit of wealth and power into virtuous ends.73
Hutcheson's jurisprudence began with his idea of duty:
what affections and duty are incumbent on us toward the Deity thus abundantly made known to
every attentive mind[?]
66 Moore (1990), p. 53.
67 Moore (1990), p. 57.
68 Moore (1990), pp. 58-9.
69 System, I, pp. 18-9.
70 System, I, p. 26.
71 System, I, p. 35.
72 System, I, pp. 44-9.
73 System, I, pp. 136 and 163-4.
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In this matter, as much as any, our moral faculty is of the highest use. It not only points out the
affections suited to these perfections, but sacredly necessary to a good character.74
That Hutcheson was attempting to make his jurisprudence based on ethics (the theory
of senses and affections) is not surprising because An Inquiry concerning Moral
Good and Evil (1725) had already dealt with his theory of obligation and rights as
jurisprudence in its final section.75 As for his theory of obligation, Hutcheson had
asked, 'Can we have any Sense of OBLIGATION, abstracting from the Laws of a
Superior?'76 Basing his jurisprudence on his ethical theories, Hutcheson clearly
insisted that the sense of obligation, on which the system of laws has to be founded,
must be motivated by the moral sense:
... that our first Ideas of moral Good depend not on Laws, may plainly appear from our constant
Inquirys into the Justice of Laws themselves; and that not only of human Laws, but of the divine.
... It must then first be suppos'd, that there is something in Actions which is apprehended
absolutely good; and this is Benevolence, or a Tendency to the publick natural Happiness of
rational Agents; and that our moral Sense perceives this Excellence: and then we call the Laws
of the DEITY good, when we imagine that they are contriv'd to promote the publick Good in the
most effectual and impartial manner.77
In this sense, obligation should be distinguished from constraint. For Hutcheson,
obligation was directed by laws which the moral sense, not the sovereign, made. On
the contrary, constraint was the sanction of rewards or punishments which oppose
our moral sense, under what we call an evil or unjust lawgiver for the supposed
• • 78
contrary intention.
As for his theory of rights, Hutcheson had in the same manner derived rights
from the moral sense.79 In this, Hutcheson defined vice as a violation of perfect
rights, 'betrays such a selfish Desire of advancing his own positive Good, as
74 System, I, p. 209. Chapter IX, titled 'The DUTIES toward GOD\ and first, of just sentiments
concerning his NATURE', contained no account of the duties toward God except his proofs of God's
existence and attributes. Chapter X was titled 'The AFFECTIONS, DUTY, and WORSHIP, to be
exercised toward the DEITY.
75 Section VII: 'A deduction of some complex Moral Ideas, viz. of obligation, and right, perfect,
imperfect, and external, alienable, and unalienable, from this Moral Sense'.
76 MGE, p. 153.
77 MGE, p. 158. See also p. 155.
78 MGE, p. 159.
79 MGE, p. 160.
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overcomes all Compassion toward the Misery of others'.80 His definition possibly
criticised Mandeville's too broad definition of vices by confining them to those only
so judged by the moral sense. In all this, Hutcheson's theory of rights had also been
presented as part of his political economy. In this sense, his theory of right also
gives us an introductory sketch of what his political economy was supposed to be.
Rights would guarantee 'the Goods of the Whole', which owed to men's 'Labour and
Industry'. In his political economy, Hutcheson was to legitimate self-love as useful
and necessary to industry and public good, whenever the moral sense approves it.81
In his language, 'useful' and 'necessary' were synonymous with 'morally good',
because self-love could abide by laws based on the moral sense (such as the
preservation of the fruits ofmen's own innocent labour).82
In his System, obligation motivated by the moral sense was seen as a duty to
God.83 But more importantly in his System, Hutcheson classified duties into two
categories: the first was a duty of being virtuous; and the second was a duty of being
prosperous:
We know that the benign intentions of the Deity are partly to be executed by the active virtues of
good men; and that in these virtues a great share of their supreme perfection and happiness
consists.
The same resignation and trust we exercise for ourselves, and our own interests, we shall also
exercise for all who are dear to us by any virtuous bonds, for any honourable cause in which we or
others are engaged; that it shall be prosperous in this life, or tend to the future glory and happiness
of those who have espoused it.84
It appears that the duty of being virtuous had been dealt with in Beauty and Virtue, as
Hutcheson's ethics, while the duty of being prosperous was now to be fully
developed in the System as his jurisprudence and political economy. In this sense,
Hutcheson's entire 'system' of moral philosophy, ranging from moral theology and
the theory of beauty to ethics, jurisprudence and political economy, could be seen as
an overarching system of the theory of duties, both moral and economic. The duty of
being virtuous, together with the duty of being prosperous exercised through our
80 MGE, p. 162.
81 MGE, p. 164.
82 MGE, p. 165.
83 System, I, p. 210.
Government and political economy 167
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
interests, would enable us to be virtuous as well as wealthy at the same time. This
compatibility of virtuous and wealthy would be the hinge of his criticism in the
System of Mandeville, who had argued that these two were contradictory each other.
Hutcheson sought to show that, as far as both duties are to be exercised as duties to
God, both virtue and wealth would be fulfilled through the divine grace of our sense
of beauty and harmony. This was going to lead Hutcheson into criticising
Mandeville's approval of luxury and making way for setting prosperity as a duty:
All the good we enjoy, all the pleasures of sense, all the delights of beauty and harmony, are so
many favours conferred on us by God. ... He gave to all animal kinds, human or brutal, their
powers, senses, instincts, affections.85
the noblest and most lasting enjoyments are such as arise from our own affections and actions,
and not the passive sensations we receive from those external things which affect the body.86
As Hutcheson had already argued in his earlier treatises, the pursuit of wealth and
power could be virtuous if controlled and moderated by the sense of beauty and the
moral sense. Both duties of being virtuous and of being prosperous could therefore
achieve the Stoic Cardinal Virtues of justice, temperance, fortitude and prudence,
which would bring men into nobler virtues as well as prosperity and, hence,
happiness.87
Once the scheme of Hutcheson's arguments of duties had been formulated,
the rest of his System would be straightforward (see a diagram below).
THE DUTY To God To the public To oneself
Ofbeing virtuous Moral theology Ethics Ethics
Ofbeingprosperous Moral theology Jurisprudence Jurisprudence and
Political Economv
Book II, Containing a Deduction of the more special LAWS of NATURE, and
84 System, I, p. 211. See also I, pp. 221-2.
85 System, I, p. 212.
86 System, 1, Chapter XI: 'The CONCLUSION of this BOOK, shewing the WAY to the SUPREME
HAPPINESS of our NA TURD, p. 221.
87 As to justice, see System, 1, p. 222; temperance, I, pp. 222-3; fortitude, I, p. 223; prudence, I, pp.
223-4.
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Duties of Life, previous to Civil Government, and other adventitious States, then
developed his ethics (how to be virtuous) and jurisprudence (how to be prosperous),
as a theory of the duties of being virtuous and of being prosperous respectively. It
shows how both of these two duties served the private as well as the public interests.
This was to follow Book I that had concerned his moral theology and the theory of
beauty, as duties to God of being virtuous and of being prosperous.88
In his jurisprudence, Hutcheson accordingly dealt with two kinds of duties, a
duty to the public of being prosperous, and that to the individual,89 And his concern
in the System was going to be dominated by these two duties for the rest of the book.
Hutcheson shows here, first, that we are able to perform our duties to God, to
ourselves and to others by pursuing prosperity and, second, that the moral sense will
show us how this can be done virtuously. His jurisprudence started with a new
definition of'right' as a 'right' action for fulfilling the duty to the public as well as to
the individual ofbeingprosperous:
The actions approved as right, are such as are wisely intended either for the general good, or
such good of some particular society or individual as is consistent with it.90
[Therefore,] a man hath a right to do, possess, or demand any thing, "when his acting,
possessing, or obtaining from another in these circumstances tends to the good of society, or to
the interest of the individual consistently with the rights of others and the general good of
society, and obstructing him would have the contrary tendency."91
And, like the duties to the public as well as to the individual of being virtuous, the
duties to the public as well as to the individual of being prosperous would also be
fulfilled through the moral sense, naturally derived from the duties to God of being
prosperous:
The righteousness or goodness of actions is not indeed the same notion with their tendency to
88 The purpose of Book I was to show 'that the course of life which God and Nature recommends to us
as most lovely and most conductive to the true happiness of the agent, is that which is intended for the
general good of mankind in the wisest manner that our reason and observation can suggest'. The
purpose of Book II, on the other hand, is 'to enquire more particularly into the proper means of
promoting the happiness of mankind by our actions, which is the same thing with inquiring into the
more special laws of nature' by 'abstracting from those adventitious states or relations which human
institutions or actions have constituted' (System, I, p. 227).
89 Book II, Chapter III, 'The general Notions ofRIGHTS, and LA WS, explained; with their divisions'.
90 System, I, p. 252.
91 System, I, p. 253.
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universal happiness, or flowing from the desire of it. This latter is the highest species of the
former. Our moral sense has also other immediate objects of approbation, many narrower
affections, which we must immediately approve without thinking of their tendency to the interest
of a system. In like manner we immediately condemn many unkind passions and actions,
without considering their distant effects upon society.92
In this, the duty to the public of being prosperous was more important than that to the
individual: therefore, a private right of possessions by innocent industry is still
subordinate to any grand interest of a community, or the public interest, as a superior
moral form.93 Such a 'sense of right' would constitute the 'sense of liberty' as
sociability, balancing the interests between the private and the public.94 Such a
'sense of right' would equally constitute the sense of justice as sociability,
controlling the private resenting passion of victims for bringing justice for the sake of
the public interests, as well as for the private. Hutcheson envisaged the Stoic ideal of
the control of passions for the general good, in which he supposed 'wise magistrates,
parents, guardians' as Stoic sages who were to direct others towards the duties to the
public of being prosperous. They should do this through their moral sense and the
sense of right, without viewing their own interests, naturally derived from their
duties to God of being prosperous.95 This is Hutcheson's idea of the foundation of
government which was also tacitly criticising Mandevillian statecraft or government
based on hypocrisy and flattery.
His distinction between the duty to the public of being prosperous and that to
the individual made his distinction between private rights and general rights.96 While
the preservation and practice of general rights were later going to be defined as
duties to the public of being prosperous, the preservation and practice of private
rights was defined as those to the individual of being prosperous.97 Hutcheson then
developed his account of private rights into a theory of political economy (see the
previous diagram above). For the support of human life, a great many external
92 System, I, pp. 253-4. See also I, pp. 267-8. As to the duties ofbeing virtuous, see I, p. 228.
93 System, I, p. 254.
94 'This very sense of right seems the foundation of that sense of liberty, that claim we all naturally
insist upon to act according to our own inclination in gratifying any desire, until we see the
inconsistence of its gratification with some superior principles' {System, I, p. 255).
95 System, I, pp. 256-7.
96 System, I, p. 284.
97 System, I, p. 285.
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things are required as essentials and conveniences such as food, clothing, habitations,
which cannot be obtained without art and labour, and the friendly help of our
fellows. For, a man in absolute solitude could scarce procure to himself the bare
essentials of life and much less could he procure any conveniences.98 But all this
could be easily possible through sociability and the advantageous division of
labour.99 The core of Flutcheson's theory of political economy and sociability was
that such duties to the individual of being prosperous as the preservation and practice
of private rights must be derived from the moral sense:
when men are not forced into violence for their own defence, peace and justice are still eligible
to the powerful and artful as well as to others; since they know not what universal indignation
may be raised by any thing injurious, from the moraI sense of mankind, from sympathy with the
sufferer, and apprehensions of their own future dangers: and a friendly just kind deportment, as it
naturally engages the good-will, the esteem, and good offices of others, is the only probable
method of obtaining security, and all the external advantages and pleasures of life.100
This was another criticism ofMandeville's statecraft by showing that the production
of wealth through the division of labour, or sociability, was not vicious. Wealth
could be pursued virtuously, as far as the duties to the individual of being prosperous
are respected and fulfilled by the preservation and practice of private rights and,
therefore, by the moral sense. For instance, 'natural private rights' such as natural
liberty are 'not only suggested by the selfish parts of our constitution, but by many
generous affections, and by our moral sense, which represents our own voluntary
actions as the grand dignity and perfection of our nature'.101 Equally, 'adventitious
private rights' such as property rights are innocent as they are in accordance with the
duties to the individual of being prosperous through the moral sense. Again
Hutcheson was criticising Mandeville by showing that the production of wealth
secured by the preservation and practice of property rights was 'innocent' so far as
98 System, I, p. 287.
99
System, I, pp. 288-9. See also I, pp. 289-90. In a footnote, Hutcheson acknowledged the second
book of Cicero's De Officiis.
100 System, I, p. 292.
101 System, I, p. 295. Natural private rights are 'such as each one has from the constitution of nature
itself without the intervention of any human contrivance, institution, compact, or deed'. Natural
liberty is 'a natural right to exert his powers, according to his own judgment and inclination, for these
purposes [his own happiness], in all such industry, labour, or amusement, as are not hurtful to others
in their persons or goods' (1, p. 294).
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the private rights are preserved and practised as the duties to the individual of being
prosperous, through the moral sense:
the first impulses of nature toward supporting ourselves, or those who are dear to us, point out
the right of the first occupant to such things as are fit for present use. The obstructing this
innocent design must appear morally evil, as it is ill-natured to hinder any man to take his natural
support from the things granted for this purpose by God and nature, while others can otherways
support themselves. [Thus] the first rule of property, that "things fit for present use the first
occupant should enjoy undisturbed."102
From these strong feelings in our hearts [such as 'tender generous affections in the several
relations of life'] we discover the right of property that each one has in the fruits of his own
labour; that is, we must approve the securing them to him, where no publick interest requires the
contrary; and must condemn as cruel, unsociable, and oppressive, all depriving men of the use
and free disposal of what they have thus occupied and cultivated, according to any innocent
inclination of their hearts.'03
Even though a property right was an 'adventitious' private right, it constitutes a part
of natural liberty that must be used in order to achieve a duty to the individual of
being prosperous. As it can therefore be fulfilled through the moral sense,
Hutcheson was against any intervention to property rights.104 This was because
preserving and practising property rights was a duty to the individual of being
prosperous through the moral sense. In this Calvinist or Presbyterian thinking,
Hutcheson presented the moral sense as universally and equally implanted in men
and as above any external authority.105
In discussing contracts, the preservation and practice of property rights were
also regarded as a duty to the individual of being prosperous, which was to be
derived from the duties to the individual ofbeing virtuous as well.106 Hutcheson was
again to criticise Mandeville by showing how sociable commerce secured by
sincerity in contracts achieves both wealth and virtue, as it is carried out through
preserving and practising property rights as the duties to the individual of being
prosperous as well as ofbeing virtuous.
102 System, I, pp. 317-8. Adventitious private rights are rights arisen 'from some human institution,
compact, or action' (I, p. 293).
103 System, I, pp. 319-20. See also I, pp. 321-2.
104 System, I, pp. 322-3. Hutcheson explicitly criticised Plato and Thomas More (I, pp. 323-4).
However, on the contrary, general rights as the duties to the public of being prosperous are, as
discussed below, to be fulfilled through the moral sense of magistrates, without viewing their
interests, naturally derived from their duties to God of being prosperous.
105 System, I, p. 339.
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Hutcheson finally turned to examine the preservation and practice of general
rights as duties to the public of being prosperous, distinct from the preservation and
practice ofprivate rights as duties to the individual of being prosperous. This sort of
rights and duties were based on men's 'more extensive affections toward societies
and mankind', or benevolence.107 The most important general right in Hutcheson's
discussion in jurisprudence and political economy was the social contract.
Hutcheson described the social contract as a general right that is indispensable for
achieving the duties to both the public and the individual of being prosperous,
through the moral sense. The social contract, in Hutcheson's view, would have been
naturally required by the sociability ofmen:
'Tis never for itself agreeable to any one to have his actions subject to the direction of others, or
that they should have any power over his goods or his life. Men must have first observed some
dangers or miseries attending a state of anarchy to be much greater, than any inconveniences to
be feared from submitting their affairs along with others to the direction of certain governors or
councils concerned in the safety of all: and then they would begin to desire a political
constitution for their own safety and advantage, as well as for the general good. As men are
naturally endued with reason, caution, and sagacity; and civil government, or some sort of
political union must appear, in the present state of our nature, the necessary means of safety and
prosperity to themselves and others, they must naturally desire it in this view; and nature has
endued them with active powers and understanding for performing all political offices.108
Hutcheson's ideas were again a criticism of Mandeville who had described
sociability as derived from 'private vices'. Hutcheson was showing sociability from
the moral sense as fulfilling the duties 'for their own safety and advantage, as well as
for the general good'. But he was also criticising Pufendorf and Hobbes for seeing
the social contract as only for private safety, not the general interest.109 After all,
Hutcheson sought to show that the moral sense, not self-love (as Hobbes and
Mandeville had thought) was a motive of civil polity."0
Hutcheson then presented civil laws as a means of achieving the duties to the
public as well as to the individual of being prosperous, but which were still to be
106 System, II, pp. 15-6.
107 System, Book II, Chapter XVI, 'Concerning the general RIGHTS of HUMAN SOCIETY, or
Mankind as a System', II, p. 105.
108 System, Book II, Chapter IV, 'The MOTIVES to constitute CIVIL GOVERNMENT, II, pp. 212-3.
109 System, II, p. 222.
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derived from the duties to the public as well as to the individual of being virtuous.
Such civil laws should be preserved and practised through the moral sense of
legislators, who never have their interests in mind in carrying their duties which are
also to be to God.
As the end of all laws should be the general good and happiness of a people, which chiefly
depends on their virtue: it must be the business of legislators to promote, by all just and effectual
methods, true principles of virtue, such as shall lead men to piety to God, and all just, peaceable,
and kind dispositions towards their fellows; ... It is poor policy merely to punish crimes when
they are committed. The noble art is to contrive such previous education, instruction, and
discipline, as shall prevent vice, restrain these passions, and correct these confused notions of
great happiness in vicious courses, which enslave men to them.1"
Such legislators would be required to possess some virtues, in order to achieve their
duties to the public, to the individual and ultimately to God of being virtuous and
prosperous. Those virtues were piety,112 sobriety,113 industry, justice"4 and
fortitude."5 Among them, the most important in Hutcheson's argument was
industry:
Industry is the natural mine of wealth, the fund of all stores for exportation, by the surplus of
which, beyond the value of what a nation imports, it must increase in wealth and power. ...
Goods prepared for export should generally be free from all burdens and taxes, and so should the
goods be which are necessarily consumed by the artificers, as much as possible; that no other
country be able to undersell like goods at a foreign market."6
The best remedy is to raise the demand for all necessaries; not merely by premiums upon
exporting them, which is often useful too; but by increasing the number of people who consume
them: and when they are dear, more labour and application will be requisite in all trades and arts
to procure them."7
As to taxes for defraying the publick expences, these are most convenient which are laid on
matters of luxury and splendour, rather than the necessaries of life; on foreign products and
manufactures, rather than domestick; and such as can be easily raised without many expensive
offices for collecting them. But above all, a just proportion to the wealth of people should be
observed in whatever is raised from them, otherways than by duties upon foreign products and
manufactures, for such duties are often necessary to encourage industry at home, tho' there were
110 System, II, p. 224.
111 System, II, p. 310. In a footnote Hutcheson added: 'This was the aim of the institutions of
Lycurgus, Solon, Plato, Numa, and of the old Persians, according to Xenophon, and of the Chinese'
(p. 310).
112 System, II, pp. 310-7.
113 System, II, pp. 317-8.
114 System, II, pp. 321-3.
115 System, II, pp. 323-5.
116 System, II, p. 318.
117 System, II, pp. 318-9.
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no publick expences."8
Here is Hutcheson's case for a favourable trade balance as the conclusion of his
jurisprudence or government: gaining a trade surplus was now what the legislators
had to deliver as their virtue and economic duty to the public of being prosperous,
through their moral sense. More importantly, even though Hutcheson criticised
Mandeville's concept of luxury as a vice,119 both still advocated a favourable trade
balance as a policy goal for legislators, whether it is a necessary vice (in
Mandeville's view) or a necessary virtue and duty of legislators (in Hutcheson's
view). This might explain why Hutcheson dared not publish A System in his lifetime,
though it was not a concern for his son who published it along with a biography. But
Hutcheson's conclusion was the inevitable outcome of his arguments due to his
assumption of the superiority of public laws over private laws, the superiority of
general rights over private rights, hence the superiority of legislators' duties to the
public over those to the individual™ Hume and Smith would have to offer an
alternative policy and roles of legislators, after Mandeville and Hutcheson.
Mandeville had not necessarily presented his moral and economic ideas as a
sophisticated academic system, but they were still coherent in a remarkably simple
paradox, 'private vices, public benefits'. His moral idea was a rigorist and ascetic
interpretation of what he called (and what others might not call) 'private vices' such
as pride, vanity, luxury and honour, which are normally innocent and sometimes
even virtuous. His economic idea was, on the contrary, a sceptical and, indeed,
pragmatic and realist interpretation of what he called 'public benefits' that a modern
118 System, II, pp. 340-1.
119 "Tis vain to alledge that luxury and intemperance are necessary to the wealth of a state as they
encourage all labour and manufactures by making a great consumption. It is plain there is no
necessary vice in the consuming of the finest products, or the wearing of the dearest manufactures by
persons whose fortunes can allow it consistently with all the duties of life. And what if men grew
generally more frugal and abstemious in such things? More of these finer goods could be sent abroad:
or if they could not, industry and wealth might be equally promoted by the greater consumption of
goods less chargeable: as he who saves by abating of his own expensive splendour could by generous
offices to his friends, and by some wise methods of charity to the poor, enable others to live so much
better, and make greater consumption than was made formerly by the luxury of one' (System, II, p.
320). For Hutcheson's criticism of Mandeville's definition of luxury, see also Hundert, pp. 201-2.
120 System, II, pp. 376-7. See also p. 327.
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commercial polity began to deliver through the newly-emerging sociability of
commerce. His paradox put these contradictory interpretations together and tried to
show that it was rather ironic that the opulence of a modern commercial society was
possible only when there were private vices in it. Unlike Mandeville, Hutcheson
attempted to present his moral and economic theories as a unified academic system
of moral philosophy. The hinge of his system rested on his theory of duty. On the
one hand, there was the moral duty to be virtuous, and on the other hand, there was
the economic duty to be prosperous. But for Hutcheson, these two different duties
were not contradictory, because both were demanded through the moral sense. In
other words, to be virtuous as well as prosperous was not a contradiction as
Mandeville had claimed, but rather was a duty as a citizen of a modern commercial
polity. And Hutcheson tried to convince Mandeville's and his own readers of this by
presenting both of these two duties based on his moral theology, his moral sense
theory and the theory of the sense of beauty that he had already developed in his
earlier treatises. Hutcheson's criticism of Mandeville may have required him to
write it as an academic system that was to be more credible than a paradox.
3. David Hume
As we have seen, Hume tried to show that Mandeville's rigorist definition of 'vices',
which had called even something beneficial to the public prosperity 'vices', was an
abuse of language. Hume therefore argued that anything useful should be called
virtuous, and sought to show how it was still possible for us to form the ideas of
morals. Hume tried to show how our simple ideas of virtue, beauty and wealth, all of
which implied the usefulness or utility of objects, could be associated into our
complex ideas of morals such as justice, thanks to our sociability, sympathy with
others, and our sociable passions. Hume also argued that a well-balanced pride could
direct us to form a moral idea of the great mind, not as a vice or hypocrisy, as
Mandeville had argued, but as a natural ability. Such moral ideas as industry,
activity, application, temperance, frugality, economy and resolution could equally be
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formed, not as 'vices', hypocrisies or disguises for our proud and ambitious passions,
but as virtues and natural abilities. As our simple ideas of virtue, beauty and wealth
implied the usefulness or utility of objects, our moral ideas, which were to be formed
out of these simple ideas, would involve the usefulness or utility as the standard of
morals. And in the context of 'private vices, public benefits' controversy, this was
how Hume sought to solve Mandeville's paradox: he introduced the idea of utility as
the measure ofmorals.
But he left his argument of justice as a special case, in which there is still
room for government to assist, even if not manage or manipulate, human passions to
administer and maintain the rules of justice. IfHume's arguments of moral ideas had
refuted Mandeville's ideas of 'private vices', his arguments of government and, as we
shall see, of political economy, now seek to refute Mandeville's ideas of 'public
benefits'. In particular, Hume sought to show how such natural abilities as industry,
activity, application, temperance, frugality, economy and resolution could contribute
to public benefits, with the direction of magistrates. In this, Hume thought that the
administration of justice, derived from a general 'sense' of common interests, would
replace the roles of politicians that both Mandeville and Hutcheson had thought,
though for different reasons, would control natural passions. In this, Hume came to
emphasise the role of taste for us to make use of our natural abilities for production.
Magistrates then were expected to understand the nature of human taste so as to assist
and direct our natural abilities. In his arguments of government and politics, Hume
accordingly sought to replace the Mandevillian language of passions and greed with a
new language of taste.
Book III of the Treatise opened up Hume's account of government. Hume's
questions concerning justice in his argument of government were: first, in what
manner are the rules of justice established by the contrivance of men?; and second,
for what reasons do we attribute a moral beauty and deformity to the observance or
neglect of these rules?12' Referring to the traditional view of natural jurisprudence,
of Cicero in particular, and using its language, Hume attributed its origin to the
contradiction between the slender means and human infirmity endowed by nature
121 THN, Book III, Part II, 'Ofjustice and injustice', p. 311.
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and the simultaneous demand for needs scarcely met by these slender means.122 To
supply the basic needs and to compensate the infirmities were both possible by
sociability alone, which provides the force through the conjunction of labour, the
ability through the partition of employment (the division of labour), and the security,
through mutual succour.123 Sociability was rendered necessary therefore by the
circumstances of human nature. On the other hand, there were incommodious and
even contrary particulars to the necessary union, such as selfishness. We have the
partiality and unequal affection to others (by the passions of lust and natural
affection, such as natural appetite between the sexes; natural affection between
parents and children; the strongest attention to ourselves; a lesser one to our relations
and acquaintances; and the weakest one to strangers). These factors influence our
behaviour and conduct in society as well as our ideas of vice and virtue.124 The
remedy for this contradiction should be derived not from nature but from contrivance
such as property rights. Property right therefore was a 'convention' to bestow
stability on the possession of external goods acquired by his own industry and good
fortune and his peaceable enjoyment of them. In other words, it was a convention to
abstain from the possessions of others. Society is to be maintained in this manner so
that the well-being and subsistence of all the members in it can be protected, even
without sacrificing our own interests entirely.125 Justice as a contrivance would then
be crucial to balance our own and others' interests and therefore to produce both
wealth and virtue, though a minimum and negative virtue. Hume offered his account
of justice as his response to Mandeville's claim that self-love is always vicious and
that it should be turned into public benefits by a statecraft other than justice. In
Hume, convention such as justice was a general sense of common interest, which
was to regulate all the members of society by certain rules.126 This sense of mutual
interest would give us a confidence in the future regularity of our conduct, on whose
expectation our 'moderation' and abstinence could only be founded. The ideas of
122 THN, III, pp. 311-2. The first question, how the rules of justice are established, was considered in
Section II, 'Of the origin ofjustice and property'.
123 THN, III, p. 312.
124 THN, III, pp. 312-4.
125 THN, III, p. 314.
126 THN, III, pp. 314-5.
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justice and injustice, property, right and obligation, could arise only after this
convention of abstinence from the possessions of others was observed. As
selfishness is a 'natural' passion, the rules ofjustice and property are an artificial and
moral convention.127 Hume was disagreeing with Mandeville on how to restrain a
'natural' passion such as selfishness for the benefit of public interest. Hume argued
that the artificial rules of justice were a possible remedy, while Mandeville had no
trust in justice but in what he had called, using the language of politeness, dextrous
management by a wise politician, for such a remedy.128 In other words, Hume
thought that the administration of justice, derived from a general 'sense' of common
interests, would replace the roles of politicians that both Mandeville and Hutcheson
had thought, though for different reasons, would control natural passions. Unlike
Hutcheson, Hume described such a 'sense' as a judgement capable enough of
foreseeing the consequent public benefits. Unlike Hutcheson, Hume described the
sense of beauty in the same manner. Hume argued that the sense of beauty, or the
same love of order and uniformity, arranging books in a library, and the chairs in a
parlour, would contribute to the formation of society, and to the well-being of
mankind, by modifying the general rules of justice concerning the stability of
possession.129 In this argument, justice was seen as general rules that should always
be observed. The senses such as the sense of beauty would be the efficient causes of
such observation and, in practice, ultimately supply the need of life. Any dispute
concerning the real existence and extent of property and possession, consequently,
could be decided only by the imagination, the fancy and sentiments concerning the
relationship between the idea of the proprietor and that of the object.130 Such consent
was also the foundation of the division of labour: a mutual exchange of property by
consent and commerce should be founded on a law of nature, because it was
necessary for satisfying different parts of the world and different men by nature fitted
127 THN, III, p. 315. Language and money (gold and silver as the common measure of exchange) were
also established in the same manner.
128 James Moore argues that Hume's statecraft of justice was a refinement of a less elegant remark by
Mandeville. See James Moore (1994), footnote 27, p. 56. But Hume's theory of justice was not
necessarily what Moore regards as a sceptical account of justice that Hume is supposed to have
adopted from Court Whig ideology into his 'sceptical Whiggism', as I shall argue below.
129 THN, III, Part II, Section III, 'Of the rules, which determine property', footnote 71, p. 324.
130 THN, III, pp. 326-7, 329. See also Hume's footnotes 75, pp. 327-9, and 76, p. 330.
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to different commodities and employment.131 Simple ideas of pleasure and
convenience, or even needs, would give rise to the imagination, the fancy and
sentiments such as the sense of beauty. The sentiments would then associate these
simple ideas so as to form the complex ideas ofjustice and property, and accordingly
produce both virtue and wealth.
Following his theory of justice, Hume offered an alternative to both
Mandeville's and Hutcheson's accounts of legislators and government. Hume
speculated that civil government was established to cure men's natural weakness to
prefer their own interest to others', and therefore to make themselves observe the
laws of justice and equity. To do this, they would immediately have had to motivate
a few persons to become civil magistrates. They were to be indifferent to the
greatest part of the state, have little interest of their own in any act of injustice, be
satisfied with their present condition in society and have an immediate interest in
executing justice for the upholding of society.132 Because the rules of justice alone
had had no power to constrain men so that they would observe the laws of nature or
the rules of justice, government had to be invented to execute the rules of justice and
thereby maintain society.133 A moral obligation to submit to government would
therefore have arisen not from a promise, consent, or original contract.134 Hume
regarded the social contract theory as fallacious and sophistical,13" and argued that a
moral obligation to submit to government must have arisen from the public interest
for security and protection.136 In this obligation, the rights of magistrates could be
confirmed by five causes. First, long-term possession in any one form of
government or succession of princes, reinforced by their subjects who had been
accustomed to their authority as time passed, whose imagination therefore could now
easily oblige loyalty for their authority.137 Second, the actual possession, had long
possession not been the case: that is, to submit quietly to the present government
without inquiring too curiously into its origin would be the most conformable maxim
131 THN, III, Part II, Section VII, 'Of the origin of government', p. 310.
132 THN, III, pp. 344-5.
133 THN, III, p. 348.
134 THN, III, pp. 350-2.
135 THN, III, Part II, Section IX, 'Of the measures of allegiance', p. 352.
136 THN, III, p. 354.
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to prudence and morals. Even though the possession of the present government had
been acquired by the sword, such right of the stronger was to be received as
legitimate and be authorised by morality, because government was always
necessary.138 Third, the right of conquest, aided by the notions of honour and glory
commanded submission to the conquerors. Fourth, the right of succession by the
eldest son to the authority of the founding father, had all the three rights above not
been available. Like the rules of justice, this right was also derived from
imagination.139 And finally, positive laws, after the legislature had established a
certain form of government and a succession of princes. All the five causes above
should conform to the public good, however. Only then would they form the
strongest title to sovereignty, and be regarded as sacred and inviolable.140 The above
third and fourth causes had been rejected by Hutcheson as the rights of magistrates
demanding obligations from their subjects. For, Hutcheson had supposed that their
rights should be obliged for public benefits in the name of God, rather than, as did
Hume, for needs and general interests merely for the sake of society. Always to
follow custom was Hume's alternative to the roles of magistrates set by Hutcheson.
Approving the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89,141 Hume concluded that
Time and custom give authority to all forms of government, and all succession of princes; and
that power, which at first was founded only on injustice and violence, becomes in time legal and
obligatory.142
In his Essays Moral and Political (1742), however, Hume went on to
emphasis the role of taste for us to make use of our natural abilities for contributing
to public benefits. Hume accordingly set the role of magistrates in understanding the
nature of human taste so as to assist and direct our natural abilities. In his arguments
of government and politics, Hume consequently sought to replace the Mandevillian
language of passions and greed with a new language of taste. Hume opened up his
Essays Moral and Political with an essay 'Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion',
137 THN, III, p. 356.
138 THN, III, pp. 356-7.
139 THN, III, pp. 357-8.
140 THN, III, p. 359.
141 THN, III, pp. 360-2.
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where he began to replace the Mandevillian language of passion with a language of
taste, and closed the volume with an essay 'Of the Standard of Taste', where he
perfected his language of taste. In his new language, the delicacy of passion was
something which makes people 'extremely sensible to all the accidents of life, and
gives them a lively joy upon every prosperous event, as well as a piercing grief,
when they meet with misfortunes and adversity'.143 On the other hand, the delicacy
of taste was something which 'produces the same sensibility to beauty and deformity
of every kind, as that does to prosperity and adversity, obligations and injuries'.144 In
Hume's view, the delicacy of taste was to be more important than that of passion,
because it places our happiness on objects chiefly depended upon by ourselves (such
as books, diversions, friends). These are to be attained by the delicacy of taste, rather
than things external which are very little at our disposal (such as accidents of life).
Taste is more vital to happiness than passions.145
Hume was to give two reasons as to why taste, in place of passions, had
become a primary concern.
They [the beauties to be studied by taste] draw off the mind from the hurry of business and
interest; cherish reflection; dispose to tranquillity; and produce an agreeable melancholy, which,
of all dispositions of the mind, is the best suited to love and friendship.146
... a delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, by confining our choice to few people,
and making us indifferent to the company and conversation of the greater part of men.147
In his language, 'taste' was going to be described as fulfilling the proper production
of both wealth (by drawing off us from the excessive passions, business and interest)
and virtue (love and friendship). In his language, 'taste' should now be distinguished
from the sense of beauty that Hume had previously discussed in his Treatise. The
sense of beauty had more to do with utility as the standard of morals. 'Taste' on the
other hand had more to do with moderation and the control of the passions. This
concept was then to replace Mandeville's language of passions and greed with a new
142 THN, III, p. 362.
143 Essays, pp. 3-4.
144 Essays, p. 4.
145 Essays, p. 5.
146 Essays, pp. 6-7.
147 Essays, p. 7.
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language of taste with the concept of friendship taken from Cicero. His science of
politics, for instance, should be the science of how to control passions or political
zealotry, by promoting moderation and exploiting passions and their capacity for
industry, from particular factional interests toward more general public interest.
With taste refined to control zealotry and passions, they would achieve both virtue
and wealth.148 Hume's replacement of Mandeville's language of passions and greed
with a language of taste required him to distinguish between private interest,
factional interest and public interest:
It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the
same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in
fact. But to satisfy us on this head, we may consider, that men are generally more honest in their
private than in their public [in this case, factional] capacity, and will go greater lengths to serve a
party, than when their own private interest is alone concerned.149
The role of magistrates could be more effective if they redirect factional passions
into the public [in this case, general and social] interest, rather than redirect the
private into the general public as in Mandeville and Hutcheson.'50 Hume was
therefore disagreeing with Mandeville and Hutcheson on their understanding of
private interest: Hume regarded private interests as useful for public interests and
therefore virtuous. Instead, Hume regarded factional interests as more vicious than
private interests. Passions were seen as vices, but in Hume they were now assumed
to be a source of factions, rather than of private vices.151 Hume was now increasingly
concerned with factions from interest:
In despotic governments, indeed, factions often do not appear; but they are not the less real; or
rather, they are more real and more pernicious, upon that very account. The distinct orders of
men, nobles and people, soldiers and merchants, have all a distinct interest; but the more
powerful oppress the weaker with impunity, and without resistance; which begets a seeming
tranquillity in such governments.152
Commercial factions from interests, instead of private vices, and their pernicious
148 Essay 3: 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science', Essays, p. 27.
149 Essay 5: 'Of the Independency of Parliament', Essays, pp. 42-3.
150 'if we find that, by the skilful division of power, this [separate] interest [of each court, and of each
order of men] must necessarily, in its operation, concur with public, we may pronounce that
government to be wise and happy' (Essays, p. 43).
151 Essay 8: 'Of Parties in general', Essays, p. 56.
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effects upon public interests and prosperity were then going to be the main concern
in Hume's Political Discourses and later in Smith's Wealth ofNations. After having
refuted Mandeville concerning the passions as private vices, Hume and Smith now
confronted another set of vices: the factional vices based on the collective passions
and interests. But they were going to show how such vices led the public into
disadvantage in economic terms, rather than into public benefits. One of their
concerns was public debts, because public debts had made the real distinctions from
interest clearer and more remarkable in Britain. It had thereby become a more
serious issue not only in financial terms but also in ethical terms in the sense of
whether it is justified to impose the fiscal burden of the present generation onto the
future generations not yet born.153 In a new language of taste, in place of
Mandeville's language of passions and greed, Hume's and Smith's science of politics
was to be written, concerning how to control passions or political zealotry.
Promoting moderation and exploiting passions and their capacity for industry will be
a key issue for magistrates to assist what Hume had argued as natural abilities and to
direct them from particular factional interests toward more general public interest.
With taste refined to control zealotry and passions, they would achieve both virtue
and wealth in the end.
This is also where Hume's, and possibly Smith's, account of government
might have touched upon a party political dimension. Hume talked about parties
before and after the Glorious Revolution. Before the Revolution, the Court party was
'A passionate lover of monarchy ... displeased at any change of the succession; as
savouring too much of a commonwealth'. The Country party, on the contrary, was
'A passionate lover of liberty ... apt to think that every part of the government ought
to be subordinate to the interests of liberty'. After the Revolution, the Tory party
was 'a lover ofmonarchy, though without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the
family of STUART', whereas the Whig was 'a lover of liberty though without
renouncing monarchy; and a friend to the settlement in the PROTESTANT line
152 Essays, pp. 59-60.
153 'The interests of these two bodies [landed and trading part of England] are not really distinct, and
never will be so, till our public debts encrease to such a degree, as to become altogether oppressive
and intolerable' (Essays, p. 60).
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[Hume's Italics]' f4 Hume could have argued that those factions formed their
distinctive complex ideas of government in their association of ideas by stimulating
their simple ideas of their distinctive interest and principle [in this case, their
distinctive custom, habit or belief] with their factional passions. Such complex ideas
of government derived from party ideologies would have been regarded by Hume as
pernicious to the public. Again, a refined taste could equip men with a true idea of
their own interests as citizens and with more moderate sociable passions. These
would lead them into associating a more secure moral idea of government, an idea
more beneficial to public interests. Such a moral idea could be formed without any
party zealotry but out of a refined taste, and eventually out of habit.
This is why Hume discussed the new needs of studying commerce in the
science of politics, which should be totally 'free from party-rage, and party-
prejudices' and 'contributes most to public utility, and even to the private satisfaction
of those who addict themselves to the study of it'.1" The study of commerce was
necessary 'to make a full comparison of civil liberty and absolute government, and to
show the great advantages of the former above the latter'.136 The issue of commerce
in terms of political ideology was represented by his account on the relationship
between commerce and liberty."7 Public debt however is one of several threats to
civil liberty in free governments.158 Public debt was going to be a main concern in
Hume's Political Discourses as well as in Smith's Wealth ofNations, as a threat to
civil liberty. In their arguments, public debt will be regarded as having been derived
from the factional or party political passions and interests, especially those of Court
Whigs, which they thought discouraged the passion of avarice as a spur to industry.
How to refine our taste will still be an issue to it, in order for us to form true ideas of
government and public interests free from party political rages.
Hume opened his Essays Moral and Political with an essay 'Of the Delicacy
of Taste and Passion', where he began to replace the Mandevillian language of
passion with a language of taste. Tater, Hume was to close the volume with an essay
l5'1 Essays, Essay 9: 'Of the Parties ofGreat Britain', p. 71.
155 Essays, Essay 12: 'Of Civil Liberty', p. 87. See also pp. 88-9.
156 Essays, p. 89.
157 Essays, p. 92.
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'Of the Standard of Taste' in 1759, where he perfected his language of taste. A
standard of taste is necessary, because 'It is natural for us to seek a Standard of
Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a
decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another'.159 For this,
Hume thought that 'a more accurate definition of delicacy' is necessary:160
Though it be certain, that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in
objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there
are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.
Now as these qualities may be found in a small degree, or may be mixed or confounded with
each other, it often happens, that the taste is not affected with such minute qualities, or is not able
to distinguish all the particular flavours, amidst the disorder, in which they are presented. Where
the organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact as to
perceive every ingredient in the composition: This we call delicacy of taste, whether we employ
these terms in the literal or metaphorical sense.161
Following his arguments about factional passions and interests and party prejudices,
Hume referred to prejudice as an obstruction to taste:
to enable a critic the more fully to execute this undertaking [the practice of contemplating any
order of beauty], he must preserve his mind free from all prejudice, and allow nothing to enter
into his consideration, but the very object which is submitted to his examination.162
Factional passions were possibly a prejudice which perverted the taste of beauty in
their business, thereby preventing their contributing to public opulence. In other
words, taste could work for a good understanding of the suitability of the means to
the end:
Every work of art has also a certain end or purpose, for which it is calculated; and is to be
deemed more or less perfect, as it is more or less fitted to attain this end. The object of
eloquence is to persuade, of history to instruct, of poetry to please by means of the passions and
the imagination. These ends we must carry constantly in our view, when we peruse any
performance; and we must be able to judge how far the means employed are adapted to their
respective purposes.163
Taste is a good, sound judgement that enables us to take advantage of 'means of the
158 Essays, pp. 95-6
159 Essays, p. 229.
160 Essays, p. 234.
161 Essays, p. 235.
162 Essays, p. 239.
163 Essays, p. 240.
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passions and the imagination' for achieving our ends. Taste should be applied also to
the skilful management by magistrates seeking to control passions and factional
zealotry for public benefits, as industry should be deduced only from such passions.
Following the Essays Moral and Political, Hume developed his political
essays and published the Political Discourses in 1752. In these essays, Hume was to
launch and develop what he had proposed as a new study of commerce which should
be free from party rages and prejudices. The fact that Hume wrote these essays still
in the context of 'private vices, public benefits' controversy could be seen in his
response to Mandeville's definition of luxury. Hume said of luxury as a 'great
refinement in the gratification of the senses', as neither innocent nor blameable: 'The
bounds between the virtue and the vice cannot here be exactly fixed, more than in
other moral subjects'.164 Luxury does not necessarily stimulate passions, as
Mandeville had contended, but simply refines senses. If properly pursued, therefore,
luxury would not be vicious but innocent:
These indulgences are only vices, when they are pursued at the expence of some virtue, as
liberality or charity; in like manner as they are follies, when for them a ruins his fortune, and
reduces himself to want and beggary. Where they entrench upon no virtue, but leave ample
subject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generosity or
compassion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged such by
almost all moralists.165
Hume's purpose in the essay was to target the two contradictory strands in
Mandeville's arguments which together had made the famous paradox 'private vices,
public benefits'.
We shall here endeavour to correct both these extremes [libertine principles bestowing praises
even on vicious luxury and representing it as highly advantageous to society, and severe morals
blaming even the most innocent luxury and representing it as the source of all the corruptions,
disorders, and factions, incident to civil government], by proving, first, that the ages of
refinement are both the happiest and most virtuous; secondly, that wherever luxury ceases to be
innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial; and when carried a degree too far, is a quality
pernicious, though perhaps not the most pernicious, to political society.166
164 Essays, Part II: Political Discourses (published in 1752), Essay 2: 'Of Refinement in the Arts', p.
268.
165 Essays, p. 269.
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To show that luxury was possibly both beneficial and virtuous was going to be
Hume's solution to the Mandevillian paradox.
As for the first point, that the age of refinement was both happy and virtuous,
Hume sought to show how luxury, if innocent, contributes to both private happiness
and prosperity as well as to public benefits. As to how luxury brings about private
happiness, Hume argued that luxury fostered the virtue of sociability and humanity in
the age of improvement.167 As to how luxury brings about public benefits, Hume
argued that luxury augmented industry.168 Luxury would also refine our delicacy of
taste and thereby give rise to the moderation, curbing the factional passions.169 In
sum, in the age of commerce, luxury would be the foundation of liberty, security and
independence:
a progress in the arts is rather favourable to liberty, and has a natural tendency to preserve, if not
produce a free government. ... where luxury nourishes commerce and industry, the peasants, by
a proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradesmen and
merchants acquire a share of the property, and draw authority and consideration to that middling
rank of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty. ... They covet equal laws,
which may secure their property, and preserve them from monarchical, as well as aristocratical
tyranny.170
Hume's second point in this essay, that innocent luxury is always beneficial, was his
more explicit criticism of Mandeville. As in the previous Essays Moral and
Political, his criticism concerned Mandeville's language of passions:
No gratification, however sensual, can of itself be esteemed vicious. A gratification is only
vicious, when it engrosses all a man's expence, and leaves no ability for such acts of duty and
generosity as are required by his situation and fortune.171
let us never pronounce vice in itself advantageous. Is it not very inconsistent for an author to
assert in one page, that moral distinctions are inventions of politicians for public interest; and in
the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public? And indeed it seems upon any
system of morality, little less than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice, which is in general
beneficial to society.172
166 Essays, p. 269.
167 Essays, p. 271.
168 Essays, p. 272.
169 Essays, pp. 273-4.
170 Essays, pp. 277-8.
171 Essays, p. 279.
172 Essays, p. 280.
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As in his account of government and politics, Hume was going to write his account
of political economy in a new language, in place of Mandeville's contradictory
language of passions. There, he was to develop his accounts of the management by
magistrates of commerce, or in other words, political economy as the science of
magistrates for domestic politics.
Political economy in Hume's Political Discourses was to be concerned with
the general principles of domestic politics and commerce, where the regularities of
behaviour are to be found. The study was therefore to be free from any party rage
and prejudice. In Hume, the regularities of behaviour are attributed to two universal
causes. They were the institutions of government and the passions that tended to
operate 'at all times, in all places, and upon all persons'.173 A study of commerce, for
instance, would require us to examine these 'general principles' which 'must always
prevail in the general course of things'. For Hume, as the chief business of
philosophers was 'to regard the general course of things', so the chief business of
politicians in the domestic government of the state was to take 'the concurrence of a
multitude of causes' into account.174 For magistrates, political economy was to be a
science of political and economic management skills on how to direct people's
passions, natural abilities (such as industry and attention) and labour to increase the
needs of life, manufactures and liberal arts.
Every thing in the world is purchased by labour; and our passions are the only causes of labour.
When a nation abounds in manufactures and mechanic arts, the proprietors of land, as well as the
fanners, study agriculture as a science, and redouble their industry and attention. The
superfluity, which arises from their labour, is not lost; but is exchanged with manufactures for
those commodities, which men's luxury now makes them covet. By this means, land furnishes a
great deal more of the necessaries of life, than what suffices for those who cultivate it. In times
of peace and tranquillity, this superfluity goes to the maintenance of manufacturers, and the
improvers of liberal arts.175
If industry, which Flume had argued in his Treatise as a natural ability whose idea
men were perfectly capable of forming in the association of ideas, could be managed
to stimulate labour, there would be no opposition between the state, or the sovereign,
173 See Essays, p. 113. See also 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science' and editor's footnote 1,
pp. 254-5.
174 Essays, Essay 1: 'Of Commerce', pp. 254-5.
175 Essays, p. 261.
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and the subjects, or individuals. He thought that 'Thus the greatness of the sovereign
and the happiness of the state are, in a great measure, united with regard to trade and
manufactures'.176 The governance of passions and natural abilities as the domestic
politics of commerce was also important for military causes.177 But more
importantly, the civilising powers of commerce, especially foreign commerce and
trade, would enhance both the power of the sovereign and the happiness of subjects.
The same method of reasoning will let us see the advantage offoreign commerce, in augmenting
the power of the state, as well as the riches and happiness of the subject. It encreases the stock
of labour in the nation; and the sovereign may convert what share of it he finds necessary to the
service of the public.178
If we consult history, we shall find, that, in most nations, foreign trade has preceded any
refinement in home manufactures, and given birth to domestic luxury. The temptation is
stronger to make use of foreign commodities, which are ready for use, and which are entirely
new to us, than to make improvements on any domestic commodity, which always advance by
slow degrees, and never affect us by their novelty. The profit is also very great, in exporting
what is superfluous at home, and what bears no price, to foreign nations, whose soil and climate
is not favourable to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted with the pleasures of luxury
and the profits of commerce; and their delicacy and industry, being once awakened, carry them
on to farther improvements, in every branch of domestic as well as foreign trade. And this
perhaps is the chief advantage which arises from a commerce with strangers.179
In Hume, political economy as a science for magistrates was to be management skills
on how to make use of 'the pleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce; and
their delicacy and industry [Hume's italics]' for public benefits, rather than turning
private vices into public benefits. It would be of no surprise to see that Hume was
writing his account of political economy in a language of taste. 'The delicacy of
taste' would still have been regarded by Hume as an important means for the
refinement of those passions and natural abilities in the domestic politics of
commerce.
How, then, can magistrates ensure their subjects 'become acquainted with the
pleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce; and their delicacy and industry,
being once awakened, carry them on to farther improvements, in every branch of
domestic as well as foreign trade'? What did Hume have in mind for those
176 Essays, p. 262.
177
Essays, pp. 262-3.
178 Essays, p. 263.
179 Essays, pp. 263-4.
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magistrates as to their means of refining those passions and natural abilities in the
domestic politics of commerce? An essay 'Of Money' offered a few concrete
measures for magistrates to stimulate people's industry and hence increase the wealth
of a nation. Among them the most important was 'encreasing' of money which
would promote industry, even though the 'plenty' of money itself is of no
consequence:
in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, every
thing takes a new face: labour and industry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterprising,
the manufacturer more diligent and skilful, and even the farmer follows his plough with greater
alacrity and attention.180
To account, then, for this phenomenon, we must consider, that though the high price of
commodities be a necessary consequence of the encrease of gold and silver, yet it follows not
immediately upon that encrease; but some time is required before the money circulates through
the whole state, and makes its effect be felt on all ranks of people. ... In my opinion, it is only
in this interval or intermediate situation, between the acquisition ofmoney and rise of prices, that
the encreasing quantity of gold and silver is favourable to industry. ... It is easy to trace the
money in its progress through the whole commonwealth; where we shall find, that it must first
quicken the diligence of every individual, before it encrease the price of labour.181
we may conclude, that it is of no manner of consequence, with regard to the domestic happiness
of a state, whether money be in a greater or less quantity. The good policy of the magistrate
consists only in keeping it, if possible, still encreasing; because, by that means, he keeps alive a
spirit of industry in the nation, and encreases the stock of labour, in which consists all real power
and riches. ... This will be easily accounted for, if we consider, that the alterations in the
quantity of money, either on one side or the other, are not immediately attended with
proportionable alterations in the price of commodities. There is always an interval before
matters be adjusted to their new situation; and this interval is as pernicious to industry, when
gold and silver are diminishing, as it is advantageous when these metals are encreasing.182
This would have been a policy resulting from Hume's view of luxury, if innocent, as
the source of benefits as well as virtues. But more importantly, this was a policy
derived from Hume's view of money, explicitly contrasted with a factional, and
certainly Mandeville's, and possibly even the Court Whig, view. All of them had
identified wealth with money and thus encouraged policies aimed at increasing the
quantity of a nation's bullion or money through a favourable trade balance:
MONEY is not, properly speaking, one of the subjects of commerce; but only the instrument
which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. It is none
of the wheels of trade: It is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and
180 Essays, Essay 3: 'Of Money', p. 286.
181 Essays, pp. 286-7.
182 Essays, p. 288.
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After having criticised the mercantilists or Court Whig view of the relationship
between the plenty of money and low interest,184 Hume then went on to criticise the
mercantile factional passions of the fear and jealousy of trade, which were
manipulated for their policy of aiming at favourable trade balance.185 In the
following famous sentences, Hume was vigorously vitiating the mercantile obsession
with the favourable trade balance policy, and the policy effect (or ill-effect) of their
prohibition on the exportation ofmoney:
Suppose four-fifths of all the money in GREAT BRITAIN to be annihilated in one night, and the
nation reduced to the same condition, with regard to specie, as in the reigns of the HARRYS and
EDWARDS, what would be the consequence? Must not the price of all labour and commodities
sink in proportion, and every thing be sold as cheap as they were in those ages? What nation
could then dispute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to sell manufactures
at the same price, which to us would afford sufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, must
this bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to the level of all the neighbouring
nations? Where, after we have arrived, we immediately lose the advantage of the cheapness of
labour and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is stopped by our fullness and
repletion.
Again, suppose, that all the money ofGREAT BRITAIN were multiplied fivefold in a night,
must not the contrary effect follow? Must not all labour and commodities rise to such an
exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their
commodities, on the other hand, became comparatively so cheap, that, in spite of all the laws
which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a
level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which had laid us under such
183 Essays, p. 281. See also p. 283.
184 'NOTHING is esteemed a more certain sign of the flourishing condition of any nation than the
lowness of interest' (Essays, Essay 4: 'Of Interest', p. 295), but low interest was not due to plenty of
money, which had no other effect than to raise the price of labour and commodities (pp. 295-6).
Hume was criticising the mercantilist view, insisting the rate of interest was caused by the quantity of
money in circulation, and therefore ultimately by the growth or decline of industry and commerce:
that is, real economy, rather than monetary economy. Hume's criticism of the mercantilist view
concerned their confusion between cause and effect: 'Those who have asserted, that the plenty of
money was the cause of low interest, seem to have taken a collateral effect for a cause; ... It is true,
when commerce is extended all over the globe, the most industrious nations always abound most with
the precious metals: So that low interest and plenty ofmoney are in fact almost inseparable. But still
it is of consequence to know the principle whence any phenomenon arises, and to distinguish between
a cause and a concomitant effect' (pp. 303-4). Hume was criticising their factional passions which
would have given rise to the mis-association of ideas and thereby resulted in the mercantile
regulations. In Hume, as already seen, the association of ideas was formed by the passions. The mis-
association of ideas by the mercantilists was therefore formed by their factional passions, and led
them into practising ill policies.
185 'there still prevails, even in nations well acquainted with commerce, a strong jealousy with regard
to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and silver may be leaving them. This seems to
me, almost in every case, a groundless apprehension' (Essays, Essay 5: 'Of the Balance of Trade', p.
309). Jealousy and fear were the cause of the two mercantile policies: prohibition of the exportation
of commodities, and prohibition of the exportation ofmoney (pp. 308-9).
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disadvantages?
Now it is evident, that the same causes, which would correct these exorbitant inequalities,
were they to happen miraculously, must prevent their happening in the common course of nature,
and must for ever, in all neighbouring nations, preserve money nearly proportionable to the art
and industry of each nation.186
In Hume's own words, this is 'our general theory',187 because 'We need not have
recourse to a physical attraction, in order to explain the necessity of this operation.
There is a moral attraction, arising from the interests and passions of men, which is
full as potent and infallible'.188 For Hume, this was the mechanism which explained
that the more universal natural abilities of industry and interests exceeded the
perverted factional passions of jealousy and fear with regard to the balance of trade.
Hume was then going to use his theory to show how the Union of England and
Scotland had been advantageous to both countries,189 whereas jealousy and hatred
between France and Britain had been devastating to industry in both countries.190
This is the point where Hume was not only refuting the favourable trade balance
policy by mercantilists but also attempting to demonstrate the mutual advantage of
free commerce. There would be no need to have fear that trading will cause a nation
harm insofar as it contributes to the improvement and prosperity of its neighbours:
I will venture to assert, that the encrease of riches and commerce in any one nation, instead of
hurting, commonly promotes the riches and commerce of all its neighbours; and that a state can
scarcely carry its trade and industry very far, where all the surrounding states are buried in
ignorance, sloth, and barbarism.191
I go farther, and observe, that where an open communication is preserved among nations, it is
impossible but the domestic industry of every one must receive an encrease from the
186 Essays, pp. 311-2. The idea that the circulation ofmoney will regulate itself to correspond with the
demand of commodity circulation was first developed by Sir Dudley North, the first of the earliest
prophets of the idea of free trade. Mercantilists had understood that trade was the exchange of a
product, or use value, for money, or exchange value, because for them its aim was to increase the
nation's stock of money. With North, trade was now understood as an exchange of certain products
for others, where money functions simply as a medium. See Rubin, pp. 58-60. Hume's issues in his
Political Discourses, namely the balance of trade, the rate of interest, and money, were the topics that
had been constantly debated within mercantilist writings, and Hume gave the brilliant development
and decisive formulation to them, and to those expressed by North in particular. See Rubin, pp. 79-
82.
187 Essays, p. 3 16.
188
Essays, p. 313.
189 Essays, p. 314.
190 Essays, p. 315.
191 Essays, Essay 6: 'Of the Jealousy of Trade' (1759/60), p. 328.
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improvements of the others.192
Nature, by giving a diversity of geniuses, climates, and soils, to different nations, has secured
their mutual intercourse and commerce, as long as they all remain industrious and civilised.
Nay, the more the arts encrease in any state, the more will be its demands from its industrious
neighbours. ... The industry of the nations, from whom they import, receives encouragement
[by daily adopting, in every art, the inventions and improvements of our neighbours]: Their own
is also encreased, by the sale of the commodities which they give in exchange.193
The affection for his argument here was cosmopolitan, with a faith in free
communication bringing about co-prosperity to all the parties concerned.
I shall therefore venture to acknowledge, that, not only as a man, but as a BRITISH subject, 1
pray for the flourishing commerce ofGERMANY, SPAIN, ITALY, and even FRANCE itself. I
am at least certain, that GREAT BRITAIN, and all those nations, would flourish more, did their
sovereigns and ministers adopt such enlarged and benevolent sentiments towards each other.194
This was also to show what sorts of sentiments the magistrates should have in their
management of political economy. It was 'benevolent sentiments' towards public
benefits transcending national borders, overcoming the jealousy and fear between
parochial commercial entities. Hume's 'general theory' was to show how the skilful
management of magistrates with such sentiments would always and naturally result
in avoiding a negative trade balance.
From an essay 'Of Money' onward, Hume had been offering concrete
measures for magistrates to stimulate their people's industry and hence increase the
wealth of a nation. Those measures should enable magistrates to make their subjects
'become acquainted with the pleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce; and
their delicacy and industry, being once awakened, carry them on to farther
improvements, in every branch of domestic as well as foreign trade'. And there
Hume focused on a measure of free trade, which would stimulate the natural ability
of industry, not only in one country but also in neighbouring nations. His argument
was also his criticism of the mercantile or Court Whig policy of aiming at a
favourable trade balance and, above all, their factional passions. Now, from an essay
'Of Taxes' onward, Hume was to analyse another such measure, taxation. This was
192 Essays, p. 328.
193 Essays, p. 329. See also p. 324.
194 Essays, p. 331.
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also to argue against the mercantile or Court Whig policy in the subsequent essay 'Of
Public Credit'. Taxation could be a means of exciting what Hume had called the
natural abilities of industry and frugality:
When a tax is laid upon commodities, which are consumed by the common people, the necessary
consequence may seem to be, ... that the poor encrease their industry, perform more work, and
live as well as before, without demanding more for their labour. Where taxes are moderate, are
laid on gradually, and affect not the necessaries of life, this consequence naturally follows; and it
is certain, that such difficulties often serve to excite the industry of a people, and render them
more opulent and laborious, than others, who enjoy the greatest advantages.195
His taxation argument led him into his criticism of the Court Whig policy of public
debts. An essay 'Of Public Credit' was written at a time when public debt in Britain
was growing at an alarming rate and when there also was a controversy as to whether
public debt was beneficial or harmful. Contrasting ancient and modern attitudes
towards public debts,196 Hume cited five disadvantages of public debts:
First, It is certain, that national debts cause a mighty confluence [concentration] of people and
riches to the capital [LONDON], by the great sums, levied in the provinces to pay the interest;
and perhaps, too, by the advantages in trade above mentioned, which they give the merchants in
the capital above the rest of the kingdom.197
They [public stocks] banish gold and silver from the most considerable commerce of the state,
reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all provisions and labour dearer
than otherwise they would be.
The taxes, which are levied to pay the interests of these debts, are apt either to heighten the price
of labour, or be an oppression on the poorer sort.
As foreigners possess a great share of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner,
tributary to them, and may in time occasion the transport of our people and our industry.
The greater part of the public stock being always in the hands of idle people, who live on their
revenue, our funds, in that view, give great encouragement to an useless and unactive life.198
In the end, those disadvantages would lead a nation to its own destruction: 'It must,
indeed, be one of these two events; either the nation must destroy public credit, or
public credit will destroy the nation'.199 But the problem of public debts had not only
an economic and political but also an ethical dimension: whether it could be justified
195 Essays, Essay 8: 'Of Taxes', p. 343. See also p. 345.
196 Essays, Essay 9: 'Of Public Credit', pp. 349-50.
197 Essays, p. 354.
198 Essays, p. 355.
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to impose public debt upon future generations for the sake of present generation.
The balance of power in EUROPE, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all deemed too
unequal to be preserved without our attention and assistance. But our children, weary of the
struggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may sit down secure, and see their neighbours
oppressed and conquered; till, at last, they themselves and their creditors lie both at the mercy of
the conqueror. And this may properly enough be denominated the violent death of our public
credit.200
Hume's account of public debts was in this sense his total rejection of the mercantile
or Court Whig economic policy, along with its political as well as moral
philosophical foundation. In an essay: 'A Character of Sir Robert Walpole', first
published in 1742 but subsequently withdrawn, Hume's criticism of Walpole's Court
Whig factional passion concerned public debt in particular.201
Hume's stance towards ideologies, whether Court Whig, Country Whig or
Tory, would be implied further in some of the closing essays in his Political
Discourses. These essays show his strategy in presenting his new study of
commerce which he had proposed should be free from party rages and prejudices. In
an essay 'Of the Coalition of Parties', Hume made it clear that his intention was to
promote a coalition of Tory and Whig parties, by supporting Tories more than Whigs
who were then dominant:
There is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end [a coalition of parties], than to
prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party over the other, to encourage
moderate opinions, to find the proper medium in all disputes, to persuade each that its antagonist
may possibly sometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the praise and blame, which we
bestow on either side. The two former essays, concerning the original contract and passive
obedience, are calculated for this purpose with regard to the philosophical and practical
controversies between the parties, and tend to show that neither side are in these respects so fully
supported by reason as they endeavour to flatter themselves. We shall proceed to exercise the
same moderation with regard to the historical disputes between the parties, by proving that each
of them was justified by plausible topics; that there were on both sides wise men, who meant
well to their country; and that the past animosity between the factions had no better foundation
than narrow prejudice or interested passion.202
Hume was not necessarily a Tory himself, as is often alleged, and not a Whig either.
199 Essays, pp. 360-1. See also pp. 363 and 364. On this point, see Istvan Hont (1993), pp. 321-48.
200
Essays, p. 365. See also p. 350.
201 Essays, Part III: Essays Withdrawn and Unpublished, Essay 8: 'A Character of Sir Robert
Walpole', pp. 575 and 576.
202 Essays, Essay 14: 'Of the Coalition of Parties', p. 494.
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He was simply trying to balance the political debate, against factions and interested
passions of both parties. But Hume was mainly targeting, in preceding essays, as he
himself wrote, the Whig doctrines of original contract, of the right of resistance, and
their historical interpretation of the ancient constitution, perhaps because the Whig
was the dominant political ideology at that time. An essay 'Of the Populousness of
Ancient Nations' was his criticism of the Country Whig civic humanist interpretation
of history.203 Hume had some trouble in proving modern populousness over the
ancient, and made use of it as a vindication of the happiness and virtue brought by
the prosperity of a modern commercial society. Hume's conclusion was that happy
and virtuous modern nations are more populous, whereas the passions of hatred and
faction must have led the ancients into depopulation and therefore into unhappiness
and vices. Another essay 'Of the Original Contract' was his criticism of the Radical
Whig theory of original contract, drawn loosely from John Locke's Second Treatise.
Arguing that the Whig doctrine was contradicted by common opinion and practice,204
Hume, as usual, offered a utilitarian interpretation.203 The next essay 'Of Passive
Obedience' was a logical outcome of his utilitarian critique of the Radical Whig
social contract theory: that is, a utilitarian convention theory.206 The subsequent
essay 'Of the Coalition of Parties' was therefore a reasonable conclusion from his
view of passive obedience as convention, in which he naturally decided that, for the
most useful government, factions and rebellions were nothing but menaces.
However, again, this was not to say that Hume was a Tory: the following essay 'Of
the Protestant Succession' showed his preference for the Whig arguments of the
Hanoverian succession over the Jacobite arguments in support of the Stuart
succession.207 Hume's typically utilitarian approbation of the Protestant succession
was based on his assessment of practices which had already achieved public order,
and of the consequences likely to follow (public disorder) if the already established
203
Essays, Essay 11: 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', pp. 420-1. Hume was also against the
Country Whig interpretation of the ancient constitution as virtuous and benign (Essay 14: 'Of the
Coalition of Parties', p. 501).
204 Essays, Essay 12: 'Of the Original Contract', p. 475.
205 Essays, p. 481.
206 Essays, Essay 13: 'Of Passive Obedience', p. 490.
207 Essays, Essay 15: 'Of the Protestant Succession', pp. 507-8.
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settlement was destroyed.208 The closing essay, 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth',
was an attempt to create a perfect commonwealth as a faction-free polity. For
example, Hume proposed some remedies to divisions within the senate.209 His
approbation of the Protestant succession as well as his idea of a perfect
commonwealth partly show that Hume was balancing the political debates, from
neither the Tory nor Whig side, but simply by comparing the pros and cons of the
arguments from both sides. This was Hume's strategy in presenting his new study of
commerce which should be free from party rages and prejudices.
Hume's arguments about government and political economy were thus to
show how to stimulate such natural abilities as industry and attention as well as
passions for production, without committing factional party rage and thereby
jeopardising prosperity. Magistrates were expected to understand the universal
principles of these natural abilities and passions and to assist them so as to work for
public benefits, rather than to manipulate them and administer the whole range of
commercial activities. In particular, magistrates could increase the quantity of
money circulating in the economy, as well as tax their population, while reducing
public debt. Free trade policy was consequently advocated by Hume as an
alternative to the mercantilist, Court Whig and Mandeville's policy of aiming at a
favourable trade balance. By these means, they could refine the taste of their
subjects, lead them out of factional interests, and thereby help them form more
moderate ideas of government and public interests. Hume therefore sought to solve
the Mandevillian paradox by showing that men were perfectly capable of forming
such moral ideas as justice, industry and government, not as 'private vices' but as
morals; that morals were a matter of taste; that refining taste would eventually
achieve both wealth and virtue at the same time, by stimulating industry as well as by
enabling men to form the more secure ideas of political authority and public interests
without factional enthusiasm. A refined taste would equip men with the judgement
or perception of the utility of morals, and enable them to form the moral ideas in the
light of the usefulness or utility as the standard of morals. Hume therefore sought to
208 Essays, p. 511.
209 Essays, Essay 16: 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', p. 524.
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solve Mandeville's paradox by introducing the idea of utility as the measure of
morals.
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Chapter Four
Legislators and free trade in The Wealth ofNations
When The Wealth ofNations appeared in 1776, it is said, Smith's extensive debts to
Mandeville were apparent to his colleagues with whom he had previously confronted
Mandeville's challenge to the moral legitimacy of commercial society.1 The Wealth
of Nations rejected Mandeville's conclusion that private vices could contribute to
public benefits by the skilful and dextrous management of politicians. So far as
economic management was concerned, this meant following an economic policy to
maintain the nation's favourable trade balance. Smith was now faced with the
problem of drawing his own political conclusions. In particular, he wanted to show,
in The Wealth of Nations, that, despite Mandeville's claim, private vices never
contributed to public benefits. It was in this context that he addressed the question of
the roles of 'legislators', not 'politicians', in the state. If The Theory of Moral
Sentiments had successfully shown that innocent private passions could be productive
of public benefits, The Wealth ofNations was to show that private vices could not
only be unproductive of public benefits but also be harmful to them.
In Part IV of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Smith had already described
what his study of 'police, the extension of trade and manufactures' involved. This
should be a 'great system of government', 'so beautiful and grand a system' that 'we
are uneasy till we remove any obstruction that can in the least disturb or encumber
the regularity of its motions'. The sense of beauty was to be aroused in the beholder
of the 'great system of government', 'so beautiful and grand a system'. The study
1 Hundert, p. 219. Hundert's accounts of Smith's debts to Mandeville are in general helpful in
pointing out the resemblance of Smith's treatment of sociability to Mandeville's. But they are not
entirely comprehensible in ignoring Smith's theories of sympathy and beauty which he developed
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therefore was to stimulate the sense of beauty to encourage the social passions.
The same principle, the same love of system, the same regard to the beauty of order, of art and
contrivance, frequently serves to recommend those institutions which tend to promote the public
welfare. ... When the legislature establishes premiums and other encouragements to advance
the linen or woollen manufactures, its conduct seldom proceeds from pure sympathy with the
wearer of cheap or fine cloth, and much less from that with the manufacturer or merchant. The
perfection of police, the extension of trade and manufactures, are noble and magnificent objects.
The contemplation of them pleases us, and we are interested in whatever can tend to advance
them. They make part of the great system of government, and the wheels of the political
machine seem to move with more harmony and ease by means of them. We take pleasure in
beholding the perfection of so beautiful and grand a system, and we are uneasy till we remove
any obstruction that can in the least disturb or encumber the regularity of its motions. All
constitutions of government, however, are valued only in proportion as they tend to promote the
happiness of those who live under them. This is their sole use and end. From a certain spirit of
system, however, from a certain love of art and contrivance, we sometimes seem to value the
means more than the end, and to be eager to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures,
rather from a view to perfect and improve a certain beautiful and orderly system, than from any
immediate sense or feeling of what they either suffer or enjoy.2
Smith hoped that the study of government and political economy would arouse 'the
public passions of men' to encourage them to contribute to public benefits by
appealing to their sense of beauty. It was not Smith's strategy to explain what the
advantages of a well-governed state were and how much better it was to be well
housed, well clothed and well fed. 'These considerations will commonly make no
great impression'. Instead, Smith described 'the great system of public police [or
government] which procures these advantages', and explained 'the connexions and
dependencies of its several parts, their mutual subordination to one another, and their
general subserviency to the happiness of the society'. He wanted to 'show how this
system might be introduced into his own country, what it is that hinders it from
taking place there at present, how those obstructions might be removed, and all the
several wheels of the machine of government be made to move with more harmony
and smoothness, without grating upon one another, or mutually retarding one
another's motions'. Smith described graphically of what such an account of
government and political economy would have had to consist. It was 'the study of
politics, of the several systems of civil government, their advantages and
disadvantages, of the constitution of our own country, its situation, and interest with
following the arguments of Hutcheson much more than those of Mandeville and Hume. See Hundert,
pp. 219-36. I am presenting an alternative interpretation of Smith's relation to Mandeville.
2 TMS, IV. 1. 11, p. 185.
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regard to foreign nations, its commerce, its defence, the disadvantages it labours
under, the dangers to which it may be exposed, how to remove the one, and how to
guard against the other'. It would be 'of all the works of speculation the most
useful'.3 As the respect to persons in power was derived from their making 'the
wheels of the government go on more smoothly',4 the account of government and
political economy would have to show how it can be achieved, how to animate the
public spirit and how to make it contribute to public benefits.
Although in his jurisprudence lectures, Smith defined 'police' simply as a
promotion of the opulence of the state,5 later in The Wealth ofNations he described
'political oeconomy' as follows:
Political oeconomy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, proposes
two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more
properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly,
to supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the publick services. It
proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.6
When he was contrasting a legislator with a politician, Smith was consciously
offering the science of a legislator as an alternative to Mandevillian statecraft with
which politicians were to turn private vices into public benefits. In Smith, 'the
science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be governed by general
principles which are always the same', was to be clearly distinguished from 'the skill
of that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose
councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs'.7 In his own view,
Smith was writing his Wealth ofNations for legislators, based on 'general principles'
that Hume had emphasised in his study of political economy. Mandeville on the
other hand had written his Fable of the Bees for the intelligent citizen, advocating the
statecraft of skilful politicians while counting on their high taste and understanding
of his paradox. Smith's legislators should be 'allowing every man to pursue his own
3 TMS, IV. 1. 11, pp. 186-7.
4 LJ (A), v. 122, p. 319.
5 LJ(A), i. 1-9, pp. 5-7; Z,J(B), 5-6, pp. 398-9.
6 WN, Book IV: 'Of Systems of political Oeconomy', Introduction, IV. intro. 1, p. 428.
7 WN, IV. ii. 39, p. 468.
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interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice'.8 Only in
this way could they 'provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or
more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for
themselves'. They would be required to understand what exactly constitutes public
benefits, by studying a system of 'what is properly called Political Oeconomy, or of
the nature and causes of the wealth of nations'.9 In this respect, Smith could have
given his book such a title as 'an enquiry into the nature and causes of the public
benefits'. Indeed, Lord Lauderdale, a critic of Smith, was later going to publish a
book An enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Public Wealth (1804). The very
words 'the wealth of nations' came from Mandeville (originally from Defoe), but
Smith was going to give a new definition and analysis of it in his book.
In what follows I want to present Smith's account of government and
political economy as it appears in his jurisprudence lectures and in The Wealth of
Nations in terms of three questions. First, what constitutes injustice, and how
injustice is detrimental to public benefits; second, how private interests contribute to
public benefits; third, what policy legislators have to adopt in order 'to enrich both
the people and the sovereign'. In this way, it can be shown that Smith's
jurisprudence and political economy was his response to Mandeville's Fable of the
Bees in what I call the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy.
Smith's accounts of injustices seem challenging Mandeville's definition of
'private vices'. The fact that Smith was unsatisfied with Mandeville's definition of
'vices' was apparent in his criticism of Mandeville's language of luxury. Smith
defined luxuries as contrasted to the customary essentials of life:
By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the
support of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people,
even of the lowest order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a
necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no
linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would
be ashamed to appear in publick without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to
denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, no body can well fall into without
extreme bad conduct. ... Under necessaries therefore, I comprehend, not only those things which
8 WN, IV. ix. 3, p. 664.
9 WN, IV. ix. 38, pp. 678-9.
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nature, but those things which the established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the
lowest rank of people. All other things, I call luxuries; without meaning by this appellation, to
throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate use of them. Beer and ale, for example,
in Great Britain, and wine, even in the wine countries, I call luxuries. A man of any rank may,
without any reproach, abstain totally from tasting such liquors. Nature does not render them
necessary for the support of life; and custom no where renders it indecent to live without them.10
In the above criticism of Mandeville's definition of luxuries, Smith emphasised that
luxuries should be totally free from any 'appellation, to throw the smallest degree of
reproach upon the temperate use of them'. In other words, Mandeville's definition of
luxuries would, by condemning the temperate use of luxuries, fatally confuse the
innocent use of luxuries with blameable injustices. In defining 'vices' or moral evils,
such Mandevillian allegations as calling any luxury 'vices' should certainly be
rejected. In the jurisprudence lectures he was delivering while writing The Theory of
Moral Sentiments in which he had already attacked Mandeville's argument about
luxuries, Smith stated that his account of justice was going to be an account of
injustice, or impropriety." In other words, justice could be understood as nothing but
the security from injury (injustice), or the preservation of perfect rights.12 Hence his
theory of justice under three subheadings: injustice to a man (or a violation of his
natural rights, including his liberty, and the right to free commerce);1' injustice to a
man as a member of a family; injustice arising from the relations between master and
servant. These three together were going to constitute his jurisprudence as 'the
theory of the rules by which civil governments ought to be directed',14 and 'of the
general principles of law and government'. By replacing Mandeville's definition of
'private vices' with his own definition of injustice, Smith's 'general principles of law
and government' was going to replace Mandevillian account of statecraft.15
There can be found numerous cases of injustice to which Smith referred in his
jurisprudence lectures and The Wealth of Nations, but I will concentrate on his
10 WN, V. ii. k. 3, pp. 869-70. See also V. ii. k. 15, p. 876. His criticism of Mandeville went on in his
argument that taxes upon consumable commodities should be only upon luxuries (V. ii. k. 7, p. 872).
See also I. viii. 37; V. ii. c. 12; V. ii. k. 27. In this sense, the tax upon luxuries could be a policy for a
legislator for controlling sober and industrious people towards industry. This view is contrasted with
Mandeville's view of luxuries as the principal drive of prosperity.
11 LJ (A), i. 10-11, pp. 7-8; LJ{B), 6-7, p. 399.
12 LJ (A), i. 1 -9, pp. 5-7; LJ (B), 5-6, pp. 398-9.
13 LJ{A), i. 12-3, p. 8; LJ(B), 7-8, p. 399; LJ {B), 191, p. 480.
14 LJ (A), i. 1, p. 5.
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criticisms of monopolies and slavery as injustices. Regarding monopolies, Smith
argued that such exclusive privileges would be detrimental to society, promoting
poverty.16 But more importantly, Smith criticised monopolies as unjust. For,
punishment with death, for instance, for the exportation of wool, in consideration of
public utility which was alleged to be derived from the regulation of the woollen
trade, was without 'the concurrence of the impartial spectator with the resentment of
the injured'.17 If an impartial spectator could not go along with the resentment of the
injured, that is, monopolists in this case, punishment in such a case would be an
injustice, or improper punishment against non-crime. This was because, in such a
case, the alleged violation does not satisfy Smith's definitions of crime: first, 'an
infringement of our natural rights'; second, 'an attack upon our property'.18 Rather,
the regulations of monopolised industry and punishments against the violations of
such regulations themselves must be an infringement of natural rights. Later in The
Wealth ofNations, Smith accused the vices of the regulations of industry, with a new
economic analysis of the natural and market price of commodity, as the regulations
which 'keep up the market price, for a long time together, a good deal above the
natural price'.19 What Smith called 'the Policy of Europe', such as 'the exclusive
privileges of corporations' and 'apprenticeship in the town', all 'evidently dictated
by the same corporation spirit'.20 But more seriously, regulating the exclusive
privileges of corporations and the number of apprenticeship in the town constitute an
injustice:
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other
property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the
1SZ,J(B), 5, p. 398.
16 LJ (A), ii. 30, 33-6 and 39, pp. 82-5; LJ (B), 175, pp. 471-2. On the other hand, the right of
inheritance was an exclusive privilege arisen from nature {LJ {A), ii. 27-8, pp. 81-2; LJ (B), 174, p.
471).
17 LJ (A), ii. 89-92, pp. 104-5; LJ (B), 181-2, pp. 475-6. See also LJ (B), 201, p. 485. Punishment
was discussed by Smith in relation to delinquency as a cause of personal rights or obligations,
criticising Grotius and Pufendorf. Smith's account of punishment had been developed in TMS, II. ii.
3. 6-11. Appendix II of the Glasgow edition of TMS includes an earlier version of Smith's views on
punishment. See also editors' footnotes 44 and 45, LJ (A), p. 104.
18ZJ(A), ii. 93, p. 105.
19 Book I, Chapter VII: 'Of the natural and market Price of Commodities', WN, I. vii. 20, p. 77. See
also I. vii. 26, p. 78; 1. vii. 28, p. 79 and LJ{B), 306; (A), vi. 88.
20 WN, Book I, Chapter X: 'Of Wages and Profit in the different Employments of Labour and Stock',
Part II: 'Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe', I. x. c. 1-6, pp. 135-6.
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strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity
in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbour, is a plain violation of this most
sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman, and of
those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he
thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom they think proper. To judge
whether he is fit to be employed, may surely be trusted to the discretion of the employers whose
interest it so much concerns. The affected anxiety of the law-giver lest they should employ an
improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it is oppressive.21
Smith's outrage against monopolist manufacturers and merchants became evident
when he accused them of injustice, rather than of distorting the natural balance of
industry, as is often assumed. Smith cautiously acknowledged that to restore
freedom of trade was as absurd as to establish an Oceana or Utopia, because of the
prejudices of the public as well as the private vested interests of so many
individuals.22 His sense of justice however apparently urged him to bitterly accuse
their too huge 'private interests' and violent practices;
But the cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to affirm, are mild and gentle, in comparison
of some of those which the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers has extorted from the
legislature, for the support of their own absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of
Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in blood.23
Among numerous other instances of injustice to which Smith referred in his
jurisprudence lectures and The Wealth of Nations, his criticism of slavery as an
injustice was as adamant as his attack on monopolies. In his jurisprudence lectures,
Smith discussed slavery in terms of injustice arising from the relationship between
master and servant. He made three points. First, slavery was less economical than
free tenancy.24 Second, slavery was detrimental to the population, as many women
who were not suitable for hard slave labour tended to turn into prostitutes and
become less fertile.2' Third, slavery would decrease the number of freemen of large
21 WN, I. x. c. 12, p. 138.
22 WN, Book IV: 'Of Systems of political Oeconomy', Chapter II: 'Of Restraints upon the Importation
from foreign Countries of such Goods as can be produced at Home', IV. ii. 43, p. 471. See also IV. ii.
40, pp. 468-9.
23 WN, IV. viii. 17, pp. 647-8. See also LJ(A), ii. 91, WN, IV. ii. 43, p. 471 and IV. viii. 20, p. 649. In
this new Chapter VIII: 'Conclusion of the Mercantile System', Smith's accusation of manufacturers
(targeting wool manufacturers) was escalating since the previous edition. The chapter had been
Appendix in the second edition, and incorporated as Chapter VIII of Book IV in the third edition
onwards.
24 LJ (A), iii. Ill, p. 185; LJ (B), 138, p. 453.
25 LJ (A), iii. 131-3, pp. 192-4; LJ (B), 132, p. 451.
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fortune, who are rather of service to promote trade and commerce by spending and
distributing their wealth, led by their self-love.26 In The Wealth ofNations, Smith
elaborated his point why slaves were more expensive than free workers, in terms of
his analysis of wages.27 This was followed by his introduction of a historical
dimension to his argument against slavery. He endeavoured to show that, as entails
had been hindering agriculture in Europe, so had slavery. 'It seldom happens,
however, that a great proprietor [protected by entails] is a great improver'. So are
slaves who occupied the land under such landlords. Tenants at will in the ancient
state of Europe and bailiffs in ancient England were good examples of such slaves,
while, to a lesser extent, Metayers in France and steel-bow tenants in Scotland were
similar slaves who had still survived even in Smith's own days.28 From his historical
insight, Smith derived his conclusion: 'The experience of all ages and nations, I
believe, demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only
their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any'. This ineffectiveness was due to
the fact that slaves had no interest in their performance and therefore they were
disinclined to expend their own labour.29 More importantly, however, Smith
criticised slavery not just because it hindered both private interests and public
benefits but also because it was an injustice:
The proprietors of land were antiently the legislators of every part of Europe. The laws relating
to land, therefore, were all calculated for what they supposed the interest of the proprietor. It
was for his interest, they had imagined, that no lease granted by way of his predecessors should
hinder him from enjoying, during a long term of years, the full value of his land. Avarice and
injustice are always short-sighted, and they did not foresee how much this regulation must
obstruct improvement, and thereby hurt in the long-run the real interest of the landlord.30
26 LJ {A), iii. 134-44, pp. 194-8; LJ {B), 139, p. 453. The mechanism had been graphically described
in TMS, IV. 1. 10.
27 WN, Book I, Chapter VIII: 'Of the Wages of Labour', I. viii. 41, pp. 98-9.
28 WN, Book III, Chapter II: 'Of the Discouragement of Agriculture in the antient State of Europe after
the Fall of the Roman Empire', III. ii. 7-8, 11 and 13, pp. 385-6, 389 and 391.
29 WN, III. ii. 9, p. 387. See also III. ii. 20, p. 395. To enquire a cause of the slow progress of
opulence in the history of commerce had been one of the objectives of Smith's account of government
in his jurisprudence lectures {LJ {B), 285, p. 521). The oppression of civil government with regard to
agriculture was then regarded as due to the system of dividing lands into great portions and having
them cultivated by slaves, villains, steel bows, or tenants, who had no labour incentives {LJ (B), 289-
93, pp. 522-4). The oppression of civil government with regard to commerce was also regarded as
due to manufactures run by slaves {LJ (B), 299-300, p. 526), as well as the policies of government
(taxes, monopolies, corporations and apprenticeship) {LJ{B), 306-7, p. 529).
30 WN, III. ii. 16, p. 393. Farmers and yeomanry had also been distracted by private and public
services arbitrarily imposed (III. ii. 17-8, pp. 393-4), as well as by public taxes (III. ii. 19, pp. 394-5).
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Slavery was often preferred by the passion of pride, which would cause its injustice:
The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him so much as to be
obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the law allows it, and the nature of
the work can afford it, therefore, he will generally prefer the service of slaves to that of
freemen.31
Here Smith referred to Mandeville's, along with others', language, 'the love of
Dominion and that usurping Temper all Mankind are born with',32 but he was
showing that such private vices would never contribute to public benefits. Smith's
overall message in his criticisms of monopolies and slavery was therefore clear:
injustice never pays in the long run. Smith was counter-arguing that, while what
Mandeville had called vices were not exactly vices lest the language had been
abused, private vices, if they were genuinely unjust, could and should never bring
public benefits.
Smith's account of government and political economy in his jurisprudence
lectures and The Wealth ofNations could be organised into three main strands of
argument as his response to Mandeville's Fable of the Bees in what I call the 'private
vices, public benefits' controversy. Following his argument about what constitutes
injustice, I now go on to his second question, that is, how private interests contribute
to public benefits. This is also an inquiry concerning sociability, by refining and
associating his account of justice (or injustice and private vices) and of wealth (or
public benefits).
Smith's description of sociability in The Wealth ofNations could be seen in
terms of two questions. First, how private actions amalgamate into unintentional
public outcomes. And second, how, in such an aggregation, 'value in exchange',
which is primarily pursued by private interests and eventually maximised in a nation
31 WN, III. ii. 10, p. 388. See also LJ (A), iii. 114, p. 186; (B), 134, p. 452: slavery was based on 'the
love of domination and authority', or 'this love of domination and tyrannizing'. Smith explained 'the
love of domination and authority' as 'a certain desire of having others below one, and the pleasure it
gives one to have some persons whom he can order to do his work rather than be obliged to persuade
others to bargain with him' (LJ (A), iii. 130, p. 192).
32 FB, i. 319, vol. I, p. 281.
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as a whole, can be converted into the maximisation of 'value in use' and, therefore,
of public benefits. Smith attempted to show, with trouble, that both of these were the
built-in mechanisms of a modern commercial society, and commercial sociability
was capable enough of properly and effectively fulfilling them.
The first question concerning sociability, how private actions amalgamate
into unintentional public outcomes, is graphically illustrated in the following famous
'invisible hand' passage:
But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the exchangeable value of
the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the same thing with that
exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to
employ his capital in the support of domestick industry, and so to direct that industry that its
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual
revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the
publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of
domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that
industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it.
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who
affected to trade for the publick good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among
merchants, and very few words need to be employed in dissuading them from it.33
This passage is slightly different from the previous 'invisible hand' sentence in The
Theory ofMoral Sentiments. The above 'invisible hand' is leading private pursuits
of 'value in exchange' into its maximisation in public as a whole. The previous
'invisible hand' in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, on the other hand, was leading
private pursuits of 'value in use' into its distribution in public as a whole. In The
Wealth of Nations, Smith decided to take the trouble to explain two phenomena.
First, how private interests pursue 'value in exchange', instead of 'value in use', in
the first instance. Second, how the pursuit of 'value in exchange' can be converted
into the production of'value in use' and, therefore, of public benefits.
The above second question concerning sociability, how the private pursuit of
'value in exchange' can result in the production of 'value in use', then, was an
economic analysis of delusion or deception that Smith had already touched on in The
Theory ofMoral Sentiments. This is where Smith developed his language of taste
33 WN, IV. ii. 9, pp. 455-6.
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into a language of political economy. This analysis was never advanced by anyone
else before or after Smith, which has consequently made it distinctively Smithian in
its character.
Regarding the above first question, Smith began with the difference and
discrepancy between 'value in use' and 'value in exchange' in the following, rather
trivial, paradox of value:
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the
utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the
possession of that object conveys. The one may be called 'value in use;' the other, 'value in
exchange.' The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in
exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently
little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce any thing;
scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value
in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it.34
Smith was following a popular example, which had also appeared in Mandeville and
Hutcheson.35 But Smith primarily argued the paradox in the context of his theory of
taste, in which taste had been regarded as the grounds for value in exchange. The
demand for a diamond, for example, would arise from its beauty, and ultimately from
the passion of vanity, or taste:
The demand for those [precious] metals arises partly from their utility, and partly from their
beauty. ... Their principal merit, however, arises from their beauty, which renders them
peculiarly fit for the ornaments of dress and furniture. No paint or dye can give so splendid a
colour as gilding. The merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced by their scarcity. With the
greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, which
in their eyes is never so compleat as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of
opulence which nobody can possess but themselves. ... These qualities of utility, beauty, and
scarcity, are the original foundation of the high price of those metals, or of the great quantity of
other goods for which they can every where be exchanged. This value was antecedent to and
independent of their being employed as coin, and was the quality which fitted them for that
employment.36
The demand for the precious stones arises altogether from their beauty. They are of no use, but
as ornaments; and the merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced by their scarcity, or by the
34 WN, I. iv. 13, pp. 44-5.
35 FB, II, p. 350; System, II, pp. 53-4; Short Introduction, 209-10. See editors' footnote 31, WN, pp.
45-6.
36 WN, I. xi. c. 31, pp. 189-91. See also LJ (A), vi. 106 for 'a natural value' of metals as opposed to
Locke's view of the agreed value ofmetals; also Imitative Arts, I. 13, TMS, I. iii. 2. 1 and WN, V. ii. e.
6 for the passion of vanity as a source of value in exchange; also WN, II. iii. 39 and IV. ix. 47 for
variety (not expense) as a source of value in exchange, implying that value was arising from
uniformity amidst variety, or in other words, beauty. See editors' footnotes 25 and 28, WN, pp. 189-
90.
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difficulty and expence of getting them from the mine.37
In his jurisprudence lectures, Smith had already argued, in his language of
taste, that taste was the grounds for value in exchange. In setting objectives for
government, Smith asked how to address to human weakness and needs from it,38
and argued that, once human weakness and needs were to some extent satisfied,
'more elegant niceties and refinement', in addition to needs, would be sought after,
by the sense of beauty. 'The taste of beauty, which consists chiefly in the three
following particulars, proper variety, easy connection, and simple order, is the cause
of all this niceness'.39 Hence, the sense of beauty and imitation would contribute to
the arts and sciences, producing 'the conveniences of it [human life] according to the
nicety and delicacy of our taste', besides needs.40 Overall, taste creates value in
exchange, delusively and deceivingly, resulting in the increase in value in use in the
end and contributing to civilisation, in which, as far as taste is innocent, prosperity
could be regarded as innocent and just. Smith used the language of taste so as to
show how taste, pursuing beauty which commands a huge purchasing power, or
value in exchange, could innocently bring the utility and conveniences of life, or
value in use, without even intending it. Taste, as such, pursuing beauty which
commands a huge purchasing power, would also be described as 'the propensity to
exchange' which causes the division of labour:
This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect
of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives
occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity
in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another.41
37 WN, I. xi. c. 32, p. 191.
38 LJ(A), vi. 8-12, pp. 334-5; LJ (B), 206-7, pp. 487-8.
39 LJ (A), vi. 12-4, pp. 335-6; LJ (B), 208, p. 488. Smith was using Hutcheson's language of beauty.
See editors' footnotes 8 and 9, LJ (A), p. 335. The same logic was applied also to imitation (LJ (A),
vi. 14-5, p. 336; LJ (B), 209, p. 488). 'The imitative arts', 5-7, in Adam Smith, Essays on
Philosophical Subjects (1795); eds. W. P. D. Wightman and J. C. Bryce, as vol. Ill of The Glasgow
Edition of the Works and Correspondence ofAdam Smith (Oxford, 1983) (abbreviated as EPS below),
refers to the same example of Dutch paintings. See editors' footnote 10, LJ (A), p. 336.
40 LJ (A), vi. 16, pp. 336-7; LJ (B), 209, p. 488.
41 WN, Book 1: 'Of the Causes of Improvement in the productive Powers of Labour, and of the Order
according to which its Produce is naturally distributed among the different Ranks of the People',
Chapter II: 'Of the Principle which gives occasion to the Division of Labour', I. ii. 1, p. 25. See also
I. ii. 3, p. 27; Early Draft, 2. 12-3, in WN\ LJ (A), vi. 44-6, pp. 347-8; U(B), 218-20, pp. 492-3. The
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'The propensity to exchange' would pursue a purchasing power, or value in
exchange, eventually fulfilling the increase of the utility and conveniences of life, or
value in use, through the division of labour, or 'by the higgling and bargaining of the
market'42 without even intending it. Smith was clearly distancing himself from
Mandeville,43 by arguing that prosperity was derived not from any selfish motives.
Smith was also criticising Hume, by denying utility as the cause of taste, exchange
and the division of labour. In this respect, Smith remained Hutchesonian as a
political economist, hence introducing Hutcheson's language of taste.44
What, then, did Smith mean by arguing that value in exchange was to be
derived from taste? Smith went on to partly explain it for each of three great sources
of revenue in society: wage, profit and rent. In the case of wages, Smith called
attention to the point that wages in different professions were to be determined,
among others, by the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employment
involved.45 In this case, the natural rate ofwages would be determined by the natural
taste:
The natural taste for those employments makes more people follow them than can live
comfortably by them, and the produce of their labour, in proportion to its quantity, comes always
too cheap to market to afford anything but the most scanty subsistence to the labourers.46
Even if the above quotation was concerned with hunting and fishing, the same could
be said for employment in general. For, in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Smith
had already thought of professions in terms of their nature and propriety. The
beauty, character and conduct of each profession should be judged in the light of the
idea of 'propriety independent of custom' of the profession concerned, which would
idea of the division of labour had come from Mandeville (FB, II, pp. 284, 335-6 and 421). See
editors' footnotes 17, LJ {A), p. 341, and 22, LJ (A), p. 348. But Smith was arguing it not as vicious,
by showing it not as derived from human policy based on selfish motives, but from a natural and
therefore morally neutral propensity to exchange.
42 WN, I. v. 4, pp. 48-9.
43 FB, II, p. 284. See editors' footnote 8, WN, pp. 27-8.
44 System, I, pp. 288-9. See editors' footnote 9, WN, p. 28.
45 WN, Book I, Chapter X: 'Of Wages and Profit in the different Employments of Labour and Stock',
Part I: 'Inequalities arising from the Nature of the Employments themselves', I. x. b. 2, p. 117.
46 WN, I. x. b. 3, p. 118. The same could be said for the natural rate of profits (I. x. b. 4, p. 118).
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be determined by the nature of the profession.47 There ought to be, therefore, a
natural rate of wages in each profession. It depends on the beauty, nature and
character of each profession, even though it would be difficult and unlikely that the
natural rate could always be fulfilled in the 'money price' of labour, because of the
various conditions and customs. His idea that the natural rate of wages as
exchangeable values was determined by the sense of beauty, or taste, among other
things, would be seen equally in his argument of how the probability or
improbability of success in each employment would affect the natural rate of
wages.48 For instance, the beauty of genius or superior talents in employment would
hugely boost the natural wage:
There are some very agreeable and beautiful talents of which the possession commands a certain
sort of admiration; but of which the exercise for the sake of gain is considered, whether from
reason or prejudice, as a sort of publick prostitution. The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of
those who exercise them in this manner, must be sufficient, not only to pay for the time, labour,
and expence of acquiring the talents, but for the discredit which attends the employment of them
as the means of subsistence. The exorbitant rewards of players, opera-singers, opera-dancers,
&c. are founded upon those two principles; the rarity and beauty of the talents, and the discredit
of employing them in this manner.49
When arguing that liberal wages were to stimulate, rather than discourage,
industry, Smith was following Hume in his criticism of Mandeville. Mandeville had
argued that offering high wages encouraged idleness among the labouring poor and
therefore would be harmful to industry and prosperity, because industry was a
necessary vice for prosperity:30
The liberal reward of labour, as it encourages the propagation, so it increases the industry of the
common people. The wages of labour are the encouragement of industry, which, like every
other human quality, improves in proportion to the encouragement it receives. A plentiful
subsistence increases the bodily strength of the labourer, and the comfortable hope of bettering
his condition, and of ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty, animates him to exert that
strength to the utmost. Where wages are high, accordingly, we shall always find the workmen
more active, diligent, and expeditious, than where they are low.sl
His argument of the effects of liberal wages was also where Smith was coming back
47 TMS, V. 2. 5.
48 WN, I. x. b. 21, p. 122.
49 WN, I. x. b. 25, p. 124.
50 FB, I, p. 192. See editors' footnote 41, WN, p. 99.
51 Book I, Chapter VIII: 'Of the Wages of Labour': WN, I. viii. 44, p. 99.
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to his previous account of ambition and delusion, dealt with in his theory of beauty in
The Theory ofMoral Sentiments. Criticising Mandeville's view, Smith was to state
that workmen tended to work harder when better paid:
In cheap years, it is pretended, workmen are generally more idle, and in dear ones more
industrious than ordinary. A plentiful subsistence, therefore, it has been concluded, relaxes, and
a scanty one quickens their industry. That a little more plenty than ordinary may render some
workmen idle, cannot well be doubted; but that it should have this effect upon the greater part, or
that men in general should work better when they are ill fed than when they are well fed, when
they are disheartened than when they are in good spirits, when they are frequently sick than
when they are generally in good health, seems not very probable. Years of dearth, it is to be
observed, are generally among the common people years of sickness and mortality, which cannot
fail to diminish the produce of their industry.52
Workmen, on the contrary, when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to over-work
themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years.53
The beauty of the talents, which would boost the natural wage of a particular
employment, would work in the same manner:
The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities, is an ancient
evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages. Their absurd presumption in their
own good fortune, has been less taken notice of. It is, however, if possible, still more universal.
There is no man living who, when in tolerable health and spirits, has not some share of it. The
chance of gain is by every man more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by most men
under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, valued more than it
is worth.54
This was a development of his arguments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments of
ambition and delusion in his theory of beauty. This would therefore imply that Smith
thought that the natural rate of wages, which was determined by the natural taste,
among others, was also determined by the propriety and beauty of the profession
concerned.
52 WN, I. viii. 45, pp. 100-1.
53 WN, I. viii. 44, p. 100.
54 WN, I. x. b. 26, pp. 124-5. The temptation to a profession of higher wage was due to 'the respect,
credit, eminence it gives one than the profit of it' {LJ (A), vi. 62, pp. 354-5; LJ (B), 226, p. 495).
Smith was agreeing with Mandeville (FB, II, pp. 342-3): see editors' footnote 32, LJ (A), p. 355. But
these were not pride and vanity, but 'a part of the wages and a share of the reward', that is, a portion
of 'the naturall price of labour' (LJ (A), vi. 62-3, p. 355). In this, natural price was 'that which is
necessary to induce one to apply to a particular business', sufficient to make 'a prospect of
maintaining himself and recompensing the expense of education' {LJ {A), vi. 67, p. 356; LJ {B), 224-
6, pp. 494-5). This idea of natural price of labour in Smith would have partly been a response to
Mandeville by showing labour incentives as not vicious but aesthetic and therefore morally neutral.
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As ambition pursues the beauty of talents and their huge commanding power
of exchangeable value (wages) in the presumptuous hope of success, so it pursues in
the same manner the natural rate of profits, deluding so many adventurers into
hazardous trades.55 The Spanish American colonies were an extraordinary example
in which such 'delusion' successfully worked in their favour thanks to a series of
accidents.56
As he had argued in his account of ambition and delusion in The Theory of
Moral Sentiments, the ambitious would be bound to ruin themselves from overwork
or risky adventure but in the end unintentionally contribute to civilisation. In other
words, the beauty of wealth and power that their success was supposed to bring
about, would delude the ambitious into maximising public benefits while intending
nothing but private interests. This was to show how such ambition and industry is
morally neutral, against Mandeville's claim that they were necessary evils for
prosperity.
Rents as value in exchange were equally derived from taste, demand for the
beauty of situation, or vanity, along with several other factors.
This surplus rent [the ground-rent] is the price which the inhabitant of the house pays for some
real or supposed advantage of the situation. In country houses, at a distance from any great
town, where there is plenty of ground to chuse upon, the ground rent is scarce any thing, or no
more than what the ground which the house stands upon would pay if employed in agriculture.
In country villas in the neighbourhood of some great town, it is sometimes a good deal higher;
and the peculiar conveniency or beauty of situation is there frequently very well paid for.
Ground rents are generally highest in the capital, and in those particular parts of it where there
happens to be the greatest demand for houses, whatever be the reason of that demand, whether
for trade and business, for pleasure and society, or for mere vanity and fashion.57
Together with the natural rates of wages and profits, which were to be partly
determined by taste, now Smith was showing that the natural rate of rents too was
determined, though in a different manner, by taste as well. Smith's argument that
taste arouses the demand for a commodity which in turn determines its price, or
55 WN, I. x. b. 33, pp. 127-8.
56 WN, Book IV: 'Of Systems of political Oeconomy', Chapter VI: 'Of Colonies', Part First: 'Of the
Motives for establishing new Colonies', IV. vii. a. 18-21, pp. 562-4.
57 WN, Book V: 'Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth', Chapter II: 'Of the Sources of
the general or publick Revenue of the Society', Part II: 'Of Taxes', Article I: 'Taxes upon Rent; Taxes
upon the Rent of land', 'Taxes upon the Rent of Houses', V. ii. e. 3, pp. 840-1. See also I. ix. b. 4 for
Smith's discussion of the relationship between land rent and situation. See editors' footnote 2, p. 841.
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exchangeable value, is thus comprehensive, explaining that value in exchange was to
be derived, among other things, from taste equally in each case of three great sources
of revenue in society: wage, profit and rent.
Thus, in developing a language of taste into that of political economy, Smith
developed his account of a commercial polity from the terminology used by Polite
Whigs such as Addison and Hutcheson, who had also been against Court Whigs such
as Mandeville. Phillipson showed that the language Smith used for his conception of
a commercial polity suggests that the values it embodied had some associations with
the culture of politeness.58 As a 'philosophic' Whig, or a variant of Scottish Whig
who used the new polite language of provincial morality in the commercial age,
Smith was a moralist who philosophised about a pattern of sociable relationships and
ideas of virtue deeply embedded in the political language of Scottish Whigs. Smith
employed it to analyse the foundations of commercial civilisation to show that
provincial propriety and taste were embodied in a morality upon which the wealth,
liberty, wisdom and virtue of commercial civilisation might rely.59
How exactly, then, can the augmentation of value in exchange contribute to
that of value in use? Labour value in use would be increased by the increase in
labour value in exchange through delusion or deception, as described above. Labour
value in exchange would then be measured through the 'higgling and bargaining' by
nominal price and increased by the increase in nominal price.60 Thus, delusion and
bargaining together in the market would direct the increase in nominal value into the
real increase in value in use, which must be the actual substance of civilisation and
prosperity. Smith was hence adamant in contending that the actual increase of value
in use had happened:
The real recompence of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries and conveniences of life
which it can procure to the labourer, has, during the course of the present century, increased
perhaps in a still greater proportion than its money price. Not only grain has become somewhat
cheaper, but many other things from which the industrious poor derive an agreeable and
wholesome variety of food, have become a great deal cheaper. ... The common complaint that
luxury extends itself even to the lowest ranks of the people, and that the labouring poor will not
58 Phillipson (1983), p. 194. More in detail, see pp. 195-7 and 199.
59 Phillipson (1983), p. 202.
60 WN, Book I, Chapter V: 'Of the real and nominal Price of Commodities, or of their Price in Labour,
and their Price in Money', I. v. 4-6 and 21, pp. 48-9 and 55.
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now be contented with the same food, clothing and lodging which satisfied them in former times,
may convince us that it is not the money price of labour only, but its real recompence [value in
use], which has augmented.61
The annual produce of the land and labour of England, for example, is certainly much greater
than it was, a little more than a century ago, at the restoration of Charles II. ... The annual
produce of the land and labour of England again, was certainly much greater at the restoration,
than we can suppose it to have been about an hundred years before, at the accession of Elizabeth.
At this point too, we have all reason to believe, the country was much more advanced in
improvement, than it had been about a century before, towards the close of the dissensions
between the houses of York and Lancaster. Even then it was, probably, in a better condition than
it had been at the Norman conquest, and at the Norman conquest, than during the confusion of
the Saxon Heptarchy. Even at this early period, it was certainly a more improved country than at
the invasion of Julius Caesar, when its inhabitants were nearly in the same state with the savages
in North America.62
These are Smith's remarks on how value in use, which must be the substance of
civilisation, has been continuously increasing thanks to the working of taste, delusion
and ambition. These remarks are also in line with some of the sentences in Book III
of The Wealth ofNations having already been quoted in Chapter Two above
Smith's description of sociability in The Wealth ofNations thus shows that a
modern commercial society has incorporated the mechanism of amalgamating
private actions into unintentional public outcomes. In such an aggregation, it has
also the mechanism of converting value in exchange, which is pursued, among other
things, by taste in the first instance and eventually maximised, in the nation as a
whole, into the maximisation of value in use and, therefore, of public benefits.
Commercial sociability was capable enough of properly and effectively fulfilling
both of the mechanisms simultaneously.
Understanding such mechanisms of commercial society and sociability will
make it clearer what Smith supposed should be the tasks of legislators in a modern
commercial society. This understanding would, consequently and naturally,
determine the desirable policies for legislators to manage commercial sociability.
61 WN, I. viii. 35, pp. 95-6.
62 WN, II. iii. 33-4, p. 344. This is the order in which Hume had written his History ofEngland. See
also II. iii. 31, p. 343: 'The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his
condition, the principle from which publick and national, as well as private opulence is originally
derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward
improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of
administration'.
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The science of a legislator that Smith clarified in his account of the duties of
sovereign in the system of natural liberty can be seen as coming from his arguments
that injustice does not pay, and that private interests can be led into public benefits
through taste, delusion and ambition.
The duties of the sovereign, as dealt with in Smith's science of a legislator,
are threefold: defence, justice and public services.63 Regarding the duty of defence,
Smith preferred a standing army to a militia.64 Smith attributed its advantages to the
effects of the division of labour, or of specialisation in military service, in the age of
commerce.65
A well-regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Such an army, as it can best be
maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, so it can alone defend such a nation against the
invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore,
that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preserved for any considerable
time. ... In modern war the great expence of fire-arms gives an evident advantage to the nation
which can best afford that expence; and consequently, to an opulent and civilized, over a poor
and barbarous nation. In antient times the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend
themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous
found it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. The invention of fire¬
arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious, is certainly favourable both to
the permanency and to the extension of civilization.66
In his view, it was therefore necessary for the state to use 'the wisdom of the state'
for their duty of defence in turning the 'so pernicious' invention of fire-arms into 'the
63 WN, IV. ix. 51, pp. 687-8.
64 WN, Book V: 'Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth', Chapter I: 'Of the Expences of
the Sovereign or Commonwealth', Part First: 'Of the Expence of Defence', V. i. a. 23, pp. 699-700.
65 WN, V. i. a. 24-5, p. 700. See also Smith's description of standing army (V. i. a. 18-9, p. 698).
Smith gave some examples in 'the history of all ages' of 'the irresistible superiority which a well-
regulated standing army has over a militia' (V. i. a. 28, p. 701): 1. the superiority of the standing army
of Philip of Macedon over 'the gallant and well exercised militias of the principal republicks of
antient Greece' as well as 'the effeminate and ill-exercised militia of the great Persian empire'; hence
'The fall of the Greek republicks and of the Persian empire' (V. i. a. 29, pp. 701-2; also LJ (A), iv. 86-
7; (B), 41); 2. the superiority of the standing army of 'the great Scipio' over 'The disheartened and
frequently defeated African militia' which 'composed the greater part of the troops of Annibal' at the
battle ofZama; hence 'The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome' (V. i. a. 30-4, pp.
702-3); also the superiority of the standing armies of Rome over 'The militias of all the civilized
nations of the antient world, of Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt' (V. i. a. 35, p. 703); 3. 'the irresistible
superiority which the militia of a barbarous ['the German and Scythian militias'], has over that of a
civilized nation ['a corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined militia' of Rome]; which the militia of a
nation of shepherds, has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers, and manufacturers'. Hence
'The fall of the western empire' (V. i. a. 36, p. 704). See also LJ (A), iv. 99-104; (B), 46-9. See also
the superiority of the militia of the Tartars over that of 'all the civilized countries in Asia' (V. i. a. 39,
p. 705).
66 WN, V. i. a. 39 and 44, pp. 705-6 and 708.
Legislators and free trade in The Wealth ofNations 218
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
permanency' and 'the extension of civilization'. For a legislator in a modern
commercial society, it was particularly necessary to do so because of the
improvement in the art ofwar and its manufacture:
The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so in the progress of
improvement it necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them. The state of the
mechanical, as well as of some other arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines the
degree of perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time. But in order to
carry it to this degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should become the sole or principal
occupation of a particular class of citizens, and the division of labour is as necessary in the
improvement of this, as of every other art. Into other arts the division of labour is naturally
introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote their private interest better
by confining themselves to a particular trade, than by exercising a greater number. But it is the
wisdom of state only which can render the trade of a soldier a particular trade separate and
distinct from all others. A private citizen who, in time of profound peace, and without any
particular encouragement from the publick, should spend the greater part of his time in military
exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himself very much in them, and amuse himself very
well; but he certainly would not promote his own interest. It is the wisdom of the state only
which can render it for his interest to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar
occupation: and states have not always had this wisdom, even when their circumstances had
become such, that the preservation of their existence required that they should have it.67
Smith was here elaborating the language of political economy in Mandeville (that in
Part II of The Fable of the Bees, and A Letter to Dion) for describing the role of
legislators ('the wisdom of the state') in creating a standing army by turning 'private
interest' into the public interest ('the preservation of their existence'). But, unlike
Mandeville, Smith was not necessarily arguing about turning 'private vices' into
public benefits. Smith was attributing the division of labour to the effects of 'the
prudence of individuals', thereby approving their promoting 'their private interest
better'. Smith also presented 'prudence' here as linking the private and the public
interests through 'the wisdom of the state', which was to exploit the advantage of the
division of labour. This was why Smith supported the scheme for a standing army,
rather than a militia, because a standing army enabled legislators to execute 'the
wisdom of the state':
Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army as dangerous to liberty. ...
But where the sovereign is himself the general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the
country the chief officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command of
those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have
themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to
67 WN, V. i. a. 14, p. 697.
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liberty. On the contrary, it may in some cases be favourable to liberty. To a sovereign, ... who
feels himself supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well-
regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances
can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them, and his consciousness of his
own superiority naturally disposes him to do so. That degree of liberty which approaches to
licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well-
regulated standing army. It is in such countries only, that the publick safety does not require,
that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power, for suppressing even the
impertinent wantonness of this licentious liberty.68
A standing army, as a principal duty of the sovereign who was required to defend the
state, was thus the first example of 'the wisdom of the state', necessary in Smith
besides 'the wisdom of nature'. A standing army would allow a certain degree of
'licentious liberty', in place of the Mandevillian idea of statecraft aiming at a
favourable trade balance. Smith's policy proposal here was also his Humean-style
balancing act in addressing Whig ideologies, showing sympathy with the Whig
interpretation of the roles of the nobility in European history while being sceptical
about the civic humanist Country Whig ideas of the virtues of a militia.
The second duty of the sovereign, the administration ofjustice, was also to be
carried out effectively by incentives to private interests to work for public benefits.69
In other words, the administration of justice was, in the same manner as the first duty
of the sovereign (the defence of the state), described in Smith as the second 'wisdom
of the state' exploiting the private interests (of judges in this case) towards the public
interests (of the security ofjustice). In the same manner, public works, the third duty
of the sovereign, would also exploit private interests to achieve public interests.70
But I will here concentrate on Smith's argument about education as a public work for
remedying the conditions of the labouring poor amidst the progress of the division of
68 WN, V. i. a. 41, pp. 706-7.
69 'Publick services are never better performed than when their reward comes only in consequence of
their being performed, and is proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them' (WN, V. i.
b. 20, p. 719). English justice had effectively achieved the result by emulation between different
courts: the courts of king's bench, of exchequer, of chancery, and of law (V. i. b. 21, p. 720). See also
LJ (A), v. 25-6; (B), 69 for the rivalry between the courts. See editors' footnote 30, WN, p. 720.
70 'It seems impossible to imagine a more equitable method of raising a tax' (WN, Book V, Chapter I,
Part Third: 'Of the Expence of publick Works and publick Institutions', Article I: 'Of the publick
Works and Institutions for facilitating the Commerce of the Society' 'And, first, of those which are
necessary for facilitating Commerce in general', V. i. d. 4, pp. 724-5).
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labour in a modern commercial society.71
The state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they
[all the inferior ranks of people] are instructed, the more liable they are to the delusions of
enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most
dreadful disorders. ... They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing through,
the interested complaints of faction and sedition, and they are, upon that account, less apt to be
misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government. In free
countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgement
which the people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance that they
should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.72
Providing public education in the form of reading, writing and accounting for the
labouring poor was in the interests of both the state and the labouring poor. Public
education could enable the labouring poor to control and redirect their private
interests from 'the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition'. This was Smith's
criticism ofMandeville, who had argued that it was the duty of the skilful politicians
to force the labouring poor into industry and thereby more able to contribute to
prosperity.
Finally, when it comes to how to raise the public revenue of the sovereign.
Smith insisted in the same manner on the exploitation of private interests for the sake
of maximising public revenue. For instance, Smith recommended the sale of public
lands, because, apart from the immediate merit of sale for repaying the huge public
debts from mortgage, the sale of public lands would work for the improvement of the
land, the increase of wealth and eventually the increase of public revenue:
In the course of a few years it [the crown] would probably enjoy another revenue. When the
crown lands had become private property, they would, in the course of a few years, become well-
improved and well-cultivated. The increase of their produce would increase the population of
the country, by augmenting the revenue and consumption of the people. But the revenue which
the crown derives from the duties of customs and excise, would necessarily increase with the
revenue and consumption of the people.7'
By the sale of crown lands, the sovereign can raise money as well as exploit the
71 WN, Book I, Chapter I, Article II: 'Of the Expence of the Institutions for the Education of Youth',
V. i. f. 50, pp. 781-2. See also V. i. f. 52-4, pp. 784-5; LJ(B), 329-30.
72 WN, V. i. f. 61, p. 788. See also LJ (B), 328-30, pp. 539-40, which argues for the needs of
education for remedying the bad effects of the division of labour, especially for child labourers.
73 WN, Book V, Chapter II: 'Of the Sources of the general or publick Revenue of the Society', Part I:
'Of the Funds or Sources of Revenue which may particularly belong to the Sovereign or
Commonwealth', V. ii. a. 18, p. 824. See also V. ii. a. 19, p. 824; III. iv. 3; C/(B), 309.
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private interests of the purchasers of the lands in order to raise additional tax
revenue. This was also 'the wisdom of the state' taking advantage of private
interests for public interests.
The attention of the landlord is a particular and minute consideration of what is likely to be the
most advantageous application of every inch of ground upon his estate. The principal attention
of the sovereign ought to be to encourage, by every means in his power, the attention both of the
landlord and the farmer; by allowing both to pursue their own interest in their own way, and
according to their own judgement; by giving to both the most perfect security that they shall
enjoy the full recompense of their own industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive
market for every part of their produce, in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest
communications both by land and by water, through every part of his own dominions, as well as
the most unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of all other princes.74
Smith's legislator thus had to take into account commercial sociability which
would make way for private interests unintentionally working for public benefits. In
making policies for a modern commercial society for exploiting private interests for
public benefits, legislators therefore have to enlarge the role and function of
sociability where sociability does not normally work without 'the wisdom of the
state'.
I have classified Smith's accounts of government and political economy in
his jurisprudence lectures and The Wealth ofNations in terms of three main questions
as his response to Mandeville's Fable of the Bees in what I call the 'private vices,
public benefits' controversy. First, what constitutes injustice, and how injustice is
detrimental to public benefits; second, how private interests contribute to public
benefits; third, what policy the legislators have to take to increase the wealth of
nations. Smith asked the third question in an attempt to set objectives for
government, and this required him to answer a further question: what are opulence
and plenty? In other words, what are 'public benefits'? Once this question is sorted
out, the rest that legislators have to do would be straightforward: first, they have to
get rid of injustice from society, and second, they have to direct sociability into
achieving 'public benefits'. This question concerning 'public benefits' could well
74 WN, Book V, Chapter II, Part II: 'Of Taxes', Article I: 'Taxes upon Rent; Taxes upon the Rent of
land', V. ii. c. 18, p. 833. In this passage, Smith was praising the land tax in the Venetian territory.
See also V. ii. c. 8, p. 830.
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have been the one with which Smith confronted Mandeville's challenge to the moral
legitimacy of a modern commercial society.
I will organise Smith's argument concerning public benefits, or the wealth of
nations, into a further three topics. The first is his argument that wealth, or public
benefits, do not rest on money. The second is that policies aimed at gaining money,
that is, regulations upon domestic trade as well as those aiming at a favourable trade
balance, are consequently wrong, because they are jeopardising the wealth of
nations. Finally, his conclusion is that a policy of free trade should therefore replace
them, so that injustice can be minimised and the wealth of nations can be maximised.
Smith's view that wealth, or public benefits, do not consist of money, was
already reflected in his objectives of government themselves in his jurisprudence
lectures. The purposes of government were to be the security of the people and the
peace of society,75 as well as 'the most proper way of procuring wealth and
abundance', that is, the plenty and cheapness of goods in the country.76 Most laws
and government, therefore, were to be administered for the encouragement of these
policies, by securing property, and ultimately for supplying needs.77 In other words,
opulence would result from high wages combined with low prices for the essentials
and conveniences of life, so that wages can purchase a great quantity of
commodities.78 High wages in themselves did not necessarily bring opulence, unless
they could purchase a great quantity of commodities, which must be produced by
labour. In The Wealth ofNations, Smith argued that wealth comes from labour, or
'the toil and trouble' of the body. Gold and silver, or money, were therefore not the
wealth of nations.
Labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things. It was not
by gold or by silver, but by labour, that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; ...79
The great wheel of circulation is altogether different from the goods which are circulated by
means of it. The revenue of the society consists altogether in those goods, and not in the wheel
which circulates them. In computing either the gross or the neat revenue of any society, we must
75 LJ{A), vi. 6-7, p. 333; LJ (B), 203-5, pp. 486-7.
76 LJ (A), vi. 8, pp. 333-4; LJ (B), 205-6, p. 487.
77 LJ (A), vi. 18-21, pp. 337-8; LJ (B), 210-1, p. 489.
78 LJ (A), vi. 33-4 and 52, pp. 343 and 350; LJ (B), 214-5, pp. 490-1.
79 WN, Book I, Chapter V: 'Of the real and nominal Price of Commodities, or of their Price in Labour,
and their Price in Money', I. v. 2, pp. 47-8.
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always, from their whole annual circulation of money and goods, deduct the whole value of the
money, of which not a single farthing can ever make any part of either.80
Smith's attack on an assumption that wealth consisted of money would give
rise directly to his criticism of policies aimed at keeping and increasing money, that
is, the regulations upon the exportation of metals. The regulations were based on a
misunderstanding of the relationship between cause and effect, or between the
increase of real wealth (value in commodities) and that of circulating money.8' The
misconception of wealth as consisting of money would consequently result in a
hurtful regulation of the prohibition on the exportation of coin and bullion, pushing
prices high and leading the state into poverty, jeopardising the real wealth of
nations.
The above was the starting point of Smith's criticism of Mandeville's
conclusion of a favourable trade balance as a guarantee of the wealth of nations and
the prevention of licentiousness. Smith regarded the systems of Mandeville, Thomas
Mun and others as in the second stage of the development of mercantile systems.
Unlike the first generation of mercantile theorists, they opposed the prohibition of
exporting bullion, but they still advocated a favourable trade balance as a means of
securing the wealth within the nation.83 This would be where Smith confronted
Mandeville's challenge to the moral legitimacy of commercial society. Smith's
80 WN, Book II: 'Of the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock', Chapter II: 'Of Money
considered as a particular Branch of the general Stock of the Society, or of the Expence of
maintaining the National Capital', II. ii. 14, p. 289. See also II. ii. 23, p. 291.
81 WN, II. iii. 22-3, pp. 339-40. See also LJ {A), vi. 169; (B), 266-7. Smith asserted that the policy of
prohibiting the exportation of coin or bullion out of the kingdom was based on a wrong notion of
wealth since Thomas Mun {LJ (A), v. 75-7, pp. 299-300). This is the last section of his account of
justice in LJ, connecting to his account of government.
82 LJ (A), vi. 127-30, 135-6 and 144-55, pp. 377-8, 381 and 384-8; U{B), 244-7 and 252-61, pp. 503-
4 and 506-11. John Law's scheme was another example of policy bringing bad effects, based on the
notion of national opulence as consisting ofmoney {LJ (B), 270-81, pp. 515-9).
83 WN, Book IV: 'Of Systems of political Oeconomy', Chapter I: 'Of the Principle of the commercial,
or mercantile System', IV. i. 7-8, pp. 431-2. In jurisprudence lectures, Smith had stated that 'Mr. Mun
was the first who formed it into a regular system' {LJ {A), vi. 135), and that Mun, Gee, Swift, Locke
and Mandeville were the 'pretended doctors' of the system {LJ {A), vi. 167-8; (B), 261-6). Smith had
also written that the confusion of wealth with money 'has given occasion to the systems of Mun and
Gee; of Mandeville who built upon them; and of Mr Hume who endeavoured to refute them' {ED, 4.
5). See editors' footnotes 14 and 16, WN, pp. 432 and 496. Smith politely omitted his teacher,
Hutcheson. It is also worth noting that Smith thought that Hume had failed 'to refute them'. As I
argue below. Smith might have thought of Hume's policy proposal on increasing the circulating
money in a state in order to stimulate industry.
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Wealth ofNations was to refute Mandeville's conclusion to the Fable of the Bees,
that a favourable trade balance should be the duty of the statecraft in order to
preserve the prosperity of the state.84 His procedure however would have required
Smith to confront Hume regarding his remark that the increase of circulating money
in a state was a stimulus to industry, even though only for an initial period.
The increase of the quantity of gold and silver in Europe, and the increase of its manufactures
and agriculture, are two events which, though they have happened nearly about the same time,
yet have arisen from very different causes, and have scarce any natural connection with one
another. The one has arisen from a mere accident, in which neither prudence nor policy either
had or could have any share: The other from the fall of the feudal system, and from the
establishment of a government which afforded to industry, the only encouragement which it
requires, some tolerable security that it shall enjoy the fruits of its own labour.85
Smith rejected the stimulating effect of the increase of circulating money in a state
upon industry, to further distance himself from the mercantile notion of money as
wealth. Indeed, Smith could have asked whether Hume's policy of increasing the
money supply in order to stimulate industry would require a de facto favourable trade
balance, despite Hume's point in his 'general theory' of money-flow mechanism.
Smith's argument against a favourable trade balance was, then, his direct attack on
Mandevillian notion of statecraft through the skilful management of politicians.
But they were sophistical in supposing, that either to preserve or to augment the quantity of those
metals required more the attention of government, than to preserve or to augment the quantity of
any other useful commodities, which the freedom of trade, without any such attention, never fails
to supply in the proper quantity. They were sophistical too, perhaps, in asserting that the high
price of exchange necessarily increased, what they called, the unfavourable balance of trade, or
occasioned the exportation of a greater quantity of gold and silver. That high price, indeed, was
extremely disadvantageous to the merchants who had any money to pay in foreign countries.86
84 FB, I, p. 116. See my Chapter Three above, p. 154.
85 WN, I. xi. n. 1, pp. 255-6. L.J (B) had referred to Hume's Political Discourses (1752) as an
improvement of the notion of money since Mandeville but not yet completely satisfactory. See also
editors' footnotes 26-8, LJ (B), p. 507. Isaac Rubin however appreciated that Hume's description of
the influence of a growing quantity of money and increased demand upon the motivation and
behaviour of producers 'liberated' the quantity theory ofmoney from the naively mechanical way that
it had been formulated by North and Montesquieu, and paved the way for newer, psychological
variants of the theory. See Rubin, pp. 82-3. Smith's argument, meanwhile, was a development from
James Steuart who had directly criticised Hume and argued that it was the quantity of money in
circulation which was determined by the demands of commodity circulation and the level of
commodity prices. See Sir James Steuart, Principles, Book II, Chapter xxviii, volume II, pp. 241-50,
and Rubin, pp. 84-6.
86 WN, IV. i. 9, pp. 433.
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Smith's attack on the doctrine of a favourable trade balance was presented also as his
criticism of the factional argument by merchants, who had been patronised by and
hugely influenced the Court Whig government policies. This would be where Smith
might have had an ideological implication in his arguments about political economy.
Such as they were, however, those arguments convinced the people to whom they were
addressed. They were addressed by merchants to parliaments, and to the councils of princes, to
nobles and to country gentlemen; by those who were supposed to understand trade, to those who
were conscious to themselves that they knew nothing about the matter. ... The merchants knew
perfectly in what manner it [foreign trade] enriched themselves. It was their business to know it.
But to know in what manner it enriched the country, was no part of their business.87
Mandeville might not necessarily have intended to support those merchants with his
book. But eventually he too reached this 'popular notion' of a favourable trade
balance. This was the theory which had been seized by the Court Whig government
conspicuously in favour of merchants who were among their circles and who they
regarded as by far the most useful members of society with regard to its prosperity.
Smith in this respect was in line with Hume who had criticised the Court Whig
foreign trade policy and advocated a cosmopolitan affection of magistrates. Smith
too argued that the 'popular notion' of a favourable trade balance would result in
national prejudices and animosity regarding foreign trade, 'which ought naturally to
be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has
become the most fertile source of discord and animosity'.88 Smith thought, for
instance, that the policies of colonial trade monopoly adopted as an attempt to
achieve a favourable trade balance would in fact be harmful to Britain by inflicting
the huge military cost on the government, in the form of public debt, in order to
protect the British colonies. Britain's two most expensive recent wars, the Spanish
War of 1739 and the French War of 1755, were both 'a colony quarrel' fought 'in
order to support a monopoly'.89 This mercantile class was among the principal
funders of public debts, from which it also derived an unnaturally high rate of profit.
87 WN, IV. i. 10, pp. 434. Smith described the East India Company as an example (Book IV, Chapter
I: 'Of the Principle of the commercial, or mercantile System', IV. i. 33, p. 449).
88 WN, Book IV, Chapter III: 'Of the extraordinary Restraints upon the Importation of Goods of
almost all Kinds, from those Countries with which the Balance is supposed to be disadvantageous',
Part I: 'Of the Unreasonableness of those Restraints even upon the Principles of the Commercial
System', IV. iii. c. 9, p. 493. See also IV. iii. a. 1, p. 474 and IV. iii. c. 10, p. 494.
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Smith stated that, 'In England, the seat of government being in the greater mercantile
city in the world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to
government'.90 Smith contrasted the interests of London monopolist merchants, who
had been patronised and benefited by the Court Whig government, with those of
country gentlemen.91 Mandeville had argued that, as long as the state kept a
favourable trade balance, even if not the prohibition on the exportation of coin and
bullion, the state would have secured the wealth within the country, and therefore
spending money at home would not diminish wealth at home. This argument had
been in the end in line with the Court Whig policies in favour of their London
monopolist merchants. On the contrary, in favour of the landlords in the country,
Smith argued that the nation would ruin itself if it consumed more than it produced,
as he rejected the notion that money embodied the wealth of nations. Consuming
commodities at home would diminish wealth at home, unless they were employed in
improvement and production,92 while an unfavourable trade balance itself does no
harm to the wealth of nations.
There is no commercial country in Europe of which the approaching ruin has not frequently been
foretold by the pretended doctors of this system, from an unfavourable balance of trade. After
all the anxiety, however, which they have excited about this, after all the vain attempts of almost
all trading nations to turn that balance in their own favour and against their neighbours, it does
not appear that any one nation in Europe has been in any respect impoverished by this cause.
Every town and country, on the contrary, in proportion as they have opened their ports to all
nations; instead of being ruined by this free trade, as the principles of the commercial system
would lead us to expect, have been enriched by it.93
89 WN, IV. vii.c. 64, pp. 614-6.
90 WN, Book V: 'Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth', Chapter III: 'Of publick
Debts', V. iii. 35, p. 918. See also L7 (B), 323-4. See editors' footnote 38, WN, p. 918. This final
chapter of The Wealth of Nations was devoted to his question of public debts as his criticism of
mercantile factional interests, in relation to the monopoly of colonial trade: see IV. ix. 52, p. 688:
'what are the reasons and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage
some part of this revenue, or to contract debts, and what have been the effects of those debts upon the
real wealth, the annual produce of the land and labour of the society'? Like the policy of colonial
trade monopoly, public debt would exert fatal effects upon the national economy (V. iii. 56, p. 928;
also V. iii. 47, p. 924).
91 WN, IV. vii. c. 58, p. 611.
92 LJ(A), vi. 167-70, pp. 392-4; LJ{B), 266-9, pp. 513-4.
93 WN, IV. iii. c. 14, pp. 496-7. Isaac Rubin however argued that the mercantilist concepts of money
as the wealth of a nation and that of foreign trade as its real source were necessary and useful for their
attempt to resolve the basic problem of their age and of their social class. Hence he concluded that the
Physiocrats and Smith failed to grasp that. For, mercantilists' concern lay in the growth of monetary
exchange value, and not in the growth in production for use (or use value). It was an economy where
the development of monetary circulation was still weak and exchange value seemed, therefore, to lay
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On the whole, both Hume and Smith, along with other Scots moral philosophers,
were more or less critics of the Court Whig ideology and interests. After
Mandeville's attack on commercial sociability, Scottish philosophers had to set about
searching for a morality which could recognise virtue in sociability, culture,
conversation, commerce and moral and economic improvement. This would be the
reason the Scottish Enlightenment could be described in terms of the modernisation
of ethics, jurisprudence and political economy, with minimal reference to the need to
overcome a civic criticism of the Whig commercial order. Their foremost targets
were the ideology of Court Whigs, rather than that of civic humanists. It would not
be necessary to view Scottish Whiggism as shaped by confrontation with the Tory
and Jacobite-republican mixture constituting opposition ideology in England.94 It
seemed to have been mainly shaped by confrontation with the Court Whig ideology,
and even adopted Tory elements in order to confront Court Whiggism whenever
necessary and useful. Hume, therefore, as Pocock himself has acknowledged, while
a defender of the Whig commercial aristocracy, expressed Tory fears of the power of
public credit, which might destroy the natural aristocracy of landed families by
rendering property, both real and mobile, valueless.95
In place of a favourable trade balance policy, a free trade policy should
therefore be pursued, so that the wealth of nations could be maximised. Kaye argued
that Mandeville's influence was greatest on Smith's laissez-faire policy.96 The
relationship between private and public was certainly well discussed by both
Mandeville and Smith as an issue of sociability, but in Mandeville it ended up with
his advocacy of statecraft and a favourable trade balance in particular in foreign
economic policy, in line with Court Whig policy. In general, a utilitarian scheme of
ethics or political economy could not result in a laissez-faire economic policy.
not in the products themselves but in money, and where foreign trade was the arena within which the
circulation of money was most extensively developed. Rubin also assessed that, though the
mercantilist interpretation of foreign trade and profit became falacious, their embryonic ideas on the
nature of exchange value and its monetary form proved, on the contrary, capable of theoretical
development by subsequent classical political economists. See Rubin, pp. 53-6.
94 This is Pocock's view. See, for example, Pocock (1985), p. 249.
95 See Pocock (1985), pp. 250 and 253.
96 Kaye, pp. xcviii-ciii and cxxxix-cxlii.
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Smith's criticism of Mandeville was not merely terminological, as Kaye believed,
but also a full-scale attack on utilitarianism as well as the Court Whig interests in
foreign trade. In opposition to Mandeville, who had argued for a favourable trade
balance as a statecraft to preserve a flourishing society, together with his concept of
wealth as embodied in money, Smith concluded that
It is the highest impertinence and presumption, therefore, in kings and ministers, to pretend to
watch over the oeconomy of private people, and to restrain their expence either by sumptuary
laws, or by prohibiting the importation of foreign luxuries. They are themselves always, and
without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts in the society. Let them look well after their
own expence, and they may safely trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance
does not ruin the state, that of their subjects never will.97
So that the best police would be to leave every thing to its naturall course, without any bounty or
any discouragement.98
Among other reasons, Smith followed Hume and argued about the merits of free
commerce for tackling national prejudice and animosity, because, as cited above,
commerce 'ought naturally to be, among nations, as among individuals, a bond of
union and friendship'.99 Free trade was, for instance, the main advantage of the
Union of 1707 for Scotland.100
Smith's advocacy of free trade, therefore, was not to say that, for their part,
legislators had nothing to do. In Smith, legislators were no longer allowed to sit back
and relax at court, facing eastward as recommended by the ancient Chinese sages.
By protecting free trade, legislators had to guard the state against injustices in
commerce such as apprenticeship and slavery. The tasks of the so-called minimal
state, or the minimal government of police, defence and justice, are indeed huge
tasks, if intended to be fully administered. It can reasonably be claimed that no
97 WN, II. iii. 36, p. 346. See also IV. i. 11 and 15, pp. 435 and 437; IV. ii. 11, p. 456; WN, IV. v. b.
43, p. 540; IV. vii. c. 88, p. 630; WN, IV. ix. 50, p. 687.
98 LJ (A), vi. 92-7, pp. 365-6; LJ {B), 235, p. 499.
99 WN, IV. iii. c. 9, p. 493. See also IV. iii. c. 11, p. 494. In the final edition of The Theory ofMoral
Sentiments, Part VI, Section II, Chapter II: 'Of the order in which Societies are by nature
recommended to our Beneficence', Smith was going to refer more explicitly to the national
prejudices, especially that between England and France having been discussed by Hume. See TMS,
VI. ii. 2. 3, pp. 228-9.
100 WN, I. xi. b. 8, p. 165. See also LJ (A), vi. 158-67, pp. 389-92; U (B), 261-6 and 269, pp. 511-3
and 514. Smith had primarily thought that the improvement of land was the advantage of union: see I.
xi. 1. 3, pp. 239-40. See also V. iii. 89 and Letter 50, dated 4 April 1760, for other advantages of the
Union. See editors' footnote 6, WN, p. 240.
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government has ever achieved even this minimal obligation.101 In Smith's view, the
abolition of the corn laws was the British government's most pressing obligation in
his own days, as the laws had institutionalised injustice.
To hinder, besides, the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market, is evidently
to sacrifice the ordinary laws ofjustice to an idea of publick utility, to a sort of reasons of state;
an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can be pardoned only in
cases of the most urgent necessity. The price at which the exportation of corn is prohibited, if it
is ever to be prohibited, ought always to be a very high price.102
Smith had partly been criticising Mandeville's idea of statecraft, which too might
have envisaged 'an idea of publick utility' or 'a sort of reasons of state', but he was
possibly objecting to Hume's argument for public utility as the primary cause of
government and political economy. This would have been due to the difference
between Hume's and Smith's concepts of (the sense of) justice and sociability. For
Smith, justice was established independently from and not primarily for the
consequent economic prosperity and public benefits, as Hume had argued. This was
because, in Smith's view, sociability would ensure that, once justice was established
and property right was secured, the production of wealth and commercial activities
would follow naturally in a just manner even if government did not intervene to
ensure that public benefits were achieved by commerce. Equally, sociability would
ensure that the flourishing of commerce would accompany the virtues of probity and
punctuality as 'the principal virtues of a commercial nation'. These virtues are 'far
more reducible to self interest, that general principle which regulates the actions of
every man, and which leads men to act in a certain manner from views of advantage,
and is as deeply implanted in an Englishman as a Dutchman'.103 Smith's ideas of
justice and sociability were in this respect his criticism of Mandeville, which showed
101 Roy Porter has pointed out that physiocrats, while championing an economic policy of free trade,
recognised that only a determined administration would prove capable of upholding market freedom
against entrenched vested interests, contrary to the ideal of the 'nightwatchman' state so beloved of
English radicals. If Porter means such political economists as David Ricardo by 'later English laissez-
faire liberalism', Smith seems to have shared the physiocratic view of the dirigiste administration,
rather than the English radical ideal of the maximisation of personal freedom and the reciprocal
attenuation of the state. See Porter, p. 29.
102 WN, Book IV, Chapter V: 'Of Bounties', 'Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws',
IV. v. b. 39, p. 539.
103 LJ(B), 326-8, pp. 538-9.
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that prosperity and virtues could go along with each other, especially for Englishmen
and Dutchmen, the two most commercial peoples and Mandeville's compatriots.
The task of legislators was therefore to keep commerce free to let natural
liberty and justice be established 'of their own accord'.
All systems either of preference or of restraints, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the
obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as
long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his
own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those of any other
man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to
perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper
performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of
superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most
suitable to the interest of the society.104
Regarding the policy for colonial trade monopoly, for instance, Smith thought that a
gradual introduction of free trade into Britain's colonial trade would restore all the
different branches of Britain's industry 'to that natural, healthful, and proper
proportion which perfect liberty necessarily establishes, and which perfect liberty can
alone preserve'. It was therefore the legislators' task to restore 'the natural system of
perfect liberty and justice'.105 The independence of the British North American
colonies was Smith's conclusion.106
I have attempted to show that the Wealth ofNations was Smith's attempt to
criticise many ofMandeville's arguments in The Fable ofthe Bees, logically deduced
from his criticism ofMandeville in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments. Compared with
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, The Wealth of Nations looks messy with its
characteristic frequent digressions and observations that were not always relevant to
political economy, just as the original Fable is messy in a similar fashion. Smith's
criticism of Mandeville however was thorough and showed no sympathy with the
system of the Dutch-born doctor. Accordingly and fascinatingly, it resulted in the
'polite' fable of the citizens of a modern commercial polity, showing that vices bring
no wealth but injustice, as well as legitimating that wealth is made out of no vices.
Smith's Wealth ofNations was thus his alternative policy proposal to Mandevillian
104 WN, IV. ix. 51, p. 687. See also IV. v. b. 43, p. 540.
105 WN, Book IV, Chapter VI: 'Of Colonies', IV. vii. c. 44, p. 606.
106 WN, IV. vii. c. 77-8, pp. 624-5.
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statecraft and the favourable trade balance policy. The 'private vices, public
benefits' controversy was finally resolved by his criticism ofMandeville's use of the
languages of vices, of sociability and of benefits. Even though his jurisprudence
lectures had been dealing primarily with a theory of justice, Smith's ideas of justice
and sociability required him not to present his account of justice without his account
of sociability, especially if he had meant it as his 'refutation' of Mandeville in the
'private vices, public benefits' controversy from his Theory ofMoral Sentiments all
the way to The Wealth ofNations. In this sense, his account ofjustice had eventually
to be integrated into an account of government and political economy. In other
words, his Lectures on Jurisprudence could never have been a single book.
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Chapter Five
The Stoics, Cicero and Scottish classical political
economy
This appendix will pay particular attention to the language of Stoic philosophy, and
Cicero in particular.' The debate about sociability in Scottish moral philosophy was
written in a language strongly influenced by Stoic philosophy, in particular its
concept of self-command, as well as Shaftesbury's language of beauty and virtue for
use in their theory of sociability. Shaftesbury's notion of natural human sociability
was unambivalently Stoic, under the specific influence of Epictetus and Marcus
Aurelius. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius were the Stoic philosophers whose works
were reproduced by Shaftesbury in terms of not only their thought but also their
technical languages.2 By using Stoic language and ideas, Shaftesbury distanced
himself from the egoist thinking of his contemporary natural law theorists, whom he
thought were Epicurean.' Shaftesbury once called Epicureanism an 'un-polite
Philosophy', which denied design, order and real beauty in the universe and excluded
aesthetic experiences.4 On the other hand, Mandeville used the egoist thinking of
Epicureanism for his form of the distrust of human reason, which would announce
the weakness of human reason on psychological grounds. It had some relevance to
the sceptics in the sense that, in their attempt to show the elusiveness of truth, they
1 Epictetus, Moral Discourses, translated by E. Carter (London, 1910); Marcus Aurelius, The
Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antonius, translated by Francis Hutcheson, 4th edn.
(Glasgow, 1764); Cicero, 'On Friendship' and 'On Old Age', in Cicero's Three Books of Offices, or
Moral Duties; also his Cato Major, An Essay on Old Age; Laelius, An Essay on Friendship;
Paradoxes; Scipio's Dream; and Letter to Quintus on the Duties of a Magistrate, translated by C. R.
Edmonds (London, 1856).
2 Klein, p. 60. For Shaftesbury's relation to Stoic thinking, see Klein, pp. 70-90; Rand, prefatory
introduction, in Shaftesbury (1900), p. ix.
3 Klein, pp. 67-8.
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considered the ability of man to deceive himself.3 The sensationalist psychology of
Peripatetics and Epicureans, later elaborated by Hobbes, Locke and others, was
useful for Mandeville as the groundwork for his anti-rationalism.6 Especially the
opinion of the Epicureanism of the seventeenth century that man cannot help living
for what seems to be his advantage, made way for Mandeville to argue that man's
reason had no function except that of discovering and furthering what he desires.7
Mandeville seems particularly to have had Hobbes in mind in arguing that human
nature was egoistic, that man was a selfish animal, and society and morality were
consequently artificial.8 On the contrary, for Hutcheson, who was to criticise
Mandeville by following Shaftesbury, the task of modern moralists should be Stoic
in demonstrating the existence and power of an inner faculty, the moral sense, as
forming part of the constitution of the mind. It should be Stoic in showing citizens
that it was prudent and virtuous to submit to its guidance because virtuous and
benevolent actions would serve public benefits and humanity on the whole.9
Hutcheson thought that ancient moralists, most notably the Stoics, had discovered the
distinction between virtue and vice.10 For this reason, Hutcheson was clearly
opposed to Epicureans as much as to Mandeville. He consequently distinguished
two schools of moral philosophers in his Moral Sense (1728): 'The one that of the
old Epicureans, as it is beautifully explained in the first Book of Cicero, De finibus;
which is revived by Mr. Hobbes, and followed by many better Writers'. The other is
the view of moralists such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson himself, 'that we have a
moral Sense or Determination of our Mind, to approve every kind Affection either in
our selves or others'." As professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow, Hutcheson
lectured, always with the above distinction of the two streams of thought in mind, on
natural religion, morals, jurisprudence, government, and Greek and Latin moralists.12
4 Klein, p. 69.
5 Kaye, pp. lxxviii-lxxix.
6 Kaye, p. lxxxiv.
7 Kaye, p. lxxxv.
8
Kaye, pp. lxxxvii-lxxxviii and cix.
9 Phillipson (2000), p. 72.
10 Moore (1994), p. 26.
" MS, pp. 108-9. See Chapter One above, p. 73.
12 Fowler, p. 177.
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His studies ranged over wide interests, including Greek and Latin classics, Hebrew,
theology, natural philosophy, mathematics, civil and ecclesiastical history, the
history of the arts and sciences. Among them, the study of Greek was revived in
Glasgow mainly through his influence,13 which, together with his alliance with Stoic
philosophy, eventually produced his own translation of Marcus Aurelius's The
Meditations in 1742.14 This book is the source of Stoic concepts discussed in this
appendix.
1. Bernard Mandeville
Interestingly, even before Hutcheson, Mandeville had already launched his criticism
ofmodern commercial sociability by satirising Stoic ideas of sociability. Mandeville
clearly had Marcus Aurelius in mind when he wrote The Grumbling Hive in 1705,
and when he later elaborated it into The Fable of the Bees, because Marcus Aurelius
had already written that
What is not the interest of the hive, is not the interest of the bee.'5
Mandeville agreed, but for different reasons. What Marcus Aurelius had thought
was that private interests would match public interests:
Certainly, I may deliberate myself. My deliberation must be about my true interest. Now, that is
the true interest of every one, which is agreeable to the structure of his nature. My natural
constitution is that of a rational being, fitted for civil society. My city and country, as I am
Antonius, is Rome; but, as I am a man, 'tis the universe. That alone, therefore, which is
profitable to those cities, can be good to me.16
13 Fowler, p. 179.
14 Marcus Aurelius, The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antonius, translated by Francis
Hutcheson (4th edn., Glasgow, 1764) (abbreviated as Meditations below). My interpretations of
Marcus Aurelius in this chapter are of this translation.
15 Meditations, Book VI. Article 54, p. 245.
16 Meditations, VI. 44, p. 240.
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Here Marcus Aurelius regarded the universe or the society as an organic whole, not
just a collection of all the individual members.17 His description of the word 'profit'
shows that he had contemplated that private 'interest' which is 'agreeable to the
structure of his nature', is indifferently 'profitable' to both the private person and
society: 'let the word profitable be taken, here, in a more popular sense, to relate to
things indifferent'.18 'Profit', or private interest, is therefore not evil but indifferent,
because any part of the universe, however less important it is, had its own role in it.
Even 'evils' are a part of the universe and allocated their own indispensable roles by
providence. Providence was therefore the design, even exploiting every evil and
delusion.
All which they have fallen into according to that plan, which infinite wisdom originally
concerted for the most excellent purposes; seeing it to be necessary. That there should be very
different orders of being, some more, some less perfect; that many particular evils must be
connected with the necessary means of incomparably superior good; that these imperfections and
evils are prerequisite to the exercise of the most divine virtues, in the more perfect orders of
beings; which must be the ground of then eternal joy: and that many evils are even requisite
means of reclaiming the less perfect beings from their vices and setting them upon the pursuit of
their truest happiness, such thoughts must repress ill-will and all anger against the vicious; but do
not hinder our discerning the misery and deformity of vice. And a Stoic allows the vicious could
refrain from their vices, if they heartily inclined to do so.19
Mandeville himselfwrote The Fable of the Bees as an explicit satire on Stoic
ideas and Shaftesbury's, arguing that, while approving that private interests would
contribute to public interests, such pursuits of private interests were vicious in the
first place, because every business contains vices.20 Furthermore, if the whole thus
contains evils in its parts, such a whole should be nothing other than evil.
Mandeville then seized the opportunity to present the famous Ciceronian example of
evil, that of merchants concealing the true and vital information of commodities from
each other.21 This Ciceronian issue in trading, however, in Mandeville's view, came
from our unfair judgement toward others in which we naturally overestimate
ourselves and underestimate others.22 Mandeville here cited the Ciceronian idea for
17 Meditations, VII. 13, p. 257.
18 Meditations, VI. 45, p. 241.
19 Meditations, V. 17, p. 194. See also VIII. 35, pp. 308-9.
20 FB, I, p. 61.
21 FB, I, pp. 61-3.
22 FB, I, pp. 80-1.
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his criticising Stoic philosophy. Mandeville, for instance, argued that whatever
pleases men is based only on taste, not virtue, by using an Epicurean example as
much as a Stoic.23
... most of the ancient Philosophers and grave Moralists, especially the Stoicks, would not allow
any Thing to be a real Good that was liable to be taken from them by others. ... These among
the Ancients have always bore the greatest Sway; yet others that were no Fools neither, have
exploded those Precepts as impracticable, call'd their Notions Romantick, and endeavour'd to
prove that what these Stoicks asserted of themselves exceeded all human Force and Possibility,
and that therefore the Virtues they boasted of could be nothing but haughty Pretence, full of
Arrogance and Hypocrisy.24
Mandeville was therefore adopting the Epicurean notion of pleasure, but then
criticising it severely from a rigorist, indeed Stoic, standard of virtue, to make his
paradox, 'private vices, public benefits'. Mandeville concluded that real pleasure, or
private interest, was only sensual and worldly, hence evil, in contrast to virtue, or
Stoic self-command. Stoic philosophy would therefore be betrayed by the real
practices of all men.
... the real Pleasures of all Men in Nature are worldly and sensual, if we judge from their
Practice; ... Ask not only the Divines and Moralists of every Nation, but likewise all that are
rich and powerful, about real Pleasure, and they'll tell you, with the Stoicks that there can be no
true Felicity in Things Mundane and Corruptible: but then look upon their Lives, and you will
25
find they take delight in no other."
In the second dialogue of the second volume, Mandeville attempted to demonstrate
that a most beautiful superstructure was based on a rotten and despicable foundation.
Miracles, for instance, were based on pride and vainglory; good offices or duties that
Cicero had argued for, and benevolence, humanity and other social virtues that
Shaftesbury had argued for, were equally based on vainglory.26 Such a contradiction
in Stoic philosophy between the theory of virtue and its actual practice was, in
Mandeville's words, the contradiction in human nature.27 Sociability could not
therefore be described as anything but 'private vices, public benefits'. Mandeville
therefore presented his paradox by demolishing the Stoic system of Shaftesbury.
23 FB, 1, pp. 148-50.
24 FB, I, pp. 150-1.
25 FB, I, p. 166.
26 FB, II, pp. 64-5.
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2. Francis Hutcheson
There had been, therefore, a rationale for Hutcheson to resort to the Stoic language of
morals when he went on to criticise Mandeville and praise Shaftesbury. Regarding
beauty as identical to virtue, Hutcheson was to develop Shaftesbury. Following the
Stoics, Shaftesbury had identified beauty and virtue and argued that the mind was a
'spectator' or 'auditor' of others' minds with its own 'eye' and 'ear' judging of their
behaviour and actions. The mind judged moral virtues in the same manner as it
perceived the shapes, colours and proportions from which beauty and deformity
resulted.28 As a persistent admirer of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson was a Stoic as much as
Shaftesbury, as shown in the introduction of his translation of Marcus Aurelius, The
Meditations,29 The core ofMarcus Aurelius most crucial for Hutcheson's concept of
virtue was the account of beauty, which they both regarded as the modus of virtue.
In it, beauty was described as a thing independent of anything else:
Whatever is beautiful or honourable, is so from itself, and its excellence rests in itself: its being
praised is no part of its excellence. It is neither made better nor worse by being praised. This
holds too in lower beauties, called so by the vulgar; in material forms, and works of art. What is
truly beautiful and honourable, needs not any thing further than its own nature to make it so.
Thus, the law, truth, benevolence, a sense of honour. Are any of these made good by being
praised? Or, would they become bad, if they were censured? Is an emerald made worse than it
was, if it is not praised? Or, is gold, ivory, purple, a dagger, a flower, a shrub, made worse on
this account?30
This was the Stoic language of beauty for Hutcheson who was to criticise Mandeville
for his argument about beauty as relative to circumstances. Virtues such as 'the law,
truth, benevolence, a sense of honour' were to be independent of anything else. This
27 FB, I, pp. 167-8.
28 Shaftesbury, An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit, ed. D. Walford (Manchester, 1977), I. ii. 3, pp.
48-9. As for the Stoic, see Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VII. 58 and 60.
29 Hutcheson praised Stoic philosophy as 'the plainest, and yet most striking considerations' on 'the
noblest emotions of piety, gratitude, and resignation to GOD; contempt of sensual pleasures, wealth,
worldly grandeur, and fame; and a constant inflexible charity, and good-will and compassion toward
our fellows; superior to all the force of anger or envy, or our little interfering worldly interests'
(Meditations, introduction, p. 4).
30 Meditations, IV. 20, pp. 150-1. See also V. 14; VI. 16; XI. 1; XII. 1, 3 and 23.
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is reflected in Marcus Aurelius's statement that 'From my grandfather Verus I
learned to relish the beauty of manners, and to restrain all anger'.31 For, by the
beauty of manners, he meant that 'From my father I learned ... his contentment in
every condition; ... he acted like one who regarded only what was right and
becoming in the things themselves, and not the applause which might follow'.32 The
beauty of manners advocated here was the life away from 'pride', 'vainglory' or
'vanity' and 'any passion'. In other words, life independent of magnificence (as
beauty is independence), or 'the life according to nature'. Only beauty could
therefore bring virtue into life, making it according to nature.33 What is more, only
beauty could make virtue and anything 'profitable' compatible to each other.
Solely intent on his own conduct, and thinking continually on what is appointed to him by the
governor of the universe. Making his own conduct beautiful and honourable; and persuaded that
what providence orders is good. For, each one's lot is brought upon him by providence, and is
advantageous to him.34
As far as man keeps his life independent, 'solely intent on his own conduct', he can
make his conduct 'beautiful and honourable', his life according to nature, and
thereby make them 'advantageous to him'. In this concept of the 'advantageous',
Flutcheson understood, the Stoic view of wealth was reflected, which regarded it as
neither good nor evil but indifferent.
The Stoic called all external advantages [wealth etc.] or disadvantages [poverty etc.], respecting
the body or fortune, things indifferent, neither good, nor evil; but they allowed this difference
among them, that some were according to nature, and preferable; others contrary to nature, and
to be rejected.35
The wealth which is useful to one's own nature would consequently be useful to the
common nature of the whole. The wealth contrary to nature, such as luxury pursued
excessively, should be rejected, as it is not according to nature. This was why 'What
is not the interest of the hive, is not the interest of the bee'.
31 Meditations, I. 1, p. 73.
32 Meditations, I. 13, pp. 85-90.
33 Meditations, II. 1, p. 97. Stoic philosophy would be for making life independent of others and
external materials (Meditations, II. 17, pp. 114-5).
34 Meditations, III. 4, pp. 122-3. See also IV. 18, pp. 148-9; IV. 24, pp. 153-4.
35 Meditations, Hutcheson's footnote, p. 209.
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If wealth adequately pursued could improve human life and bring virtue and
honour, philosophy would have to teach how to refine the way of accomplishing it.
As shown in the preceding chapters, this was the question Hutcheson was concerned
with in his own moral philosophy as a criticism of Mandeville. But Hutcheson's
debt to Stoic philosophy in his dealing with this question could be seen most in his
papers on laughter. Hutcheson's 'Thoughts on Laughter' was published during the
period of his Dublin residence.36 His theory, as a criticism of the insufficiency of
Hobbes's ethical theory, was that laughter arises on the observation of contrast.37
But they were written, though primarily as a criticism of Hobbes, who had argued
about laughter, also as his criticism of Mandeville's account of human nature, by
showing how wealth and virtue could become compatible through laughter, using the
Aristotelian language of Poetics and the Stoic language from Cicero. Hutcheson
criticised Hobbes for his definition of laughter as a joy from some selfish view, in
accordance with Hobbes's grand view of deducing all human actions from self-
love.38
it is this contrast, or opposition of ideas of dignity and meanness, which is the occasion of
laughter. ... Yet even this kind of laughter cannot well be said to arise from our sense of
superiority. This alone may give a sedate joy, but not be a matter of laughter, since we shall find
the same kind of laughter arising in us, where this opinion of superiority does not attend it: for if
the most ingenious person in the world, whom the whole company esteems, should through
inadvertent hearing, or any other mistake, answer quite from the purpose, the whole audience
may laugh heartily, without the least abatement of their good opinion.39
What was important was that such laughter, unlike Hobbesian laughter, could be an
approbation of pursuing wealth:
A truely wise man, who places the dignity of human nature in good affections and suitable
actions, may be apt to laugh at those who employ their most solemn and strong affections about
36 Francis Hutcheson, Reflections Upon Laughter, and the Remarks Upon "The Fable of the Bees",
originally published in The Dublin Journal, 1725; finally collected under the title, Glasgow, 1750; ed.
P. Kivy (The Hague, 1973) (abbreviated as Laughter below).
37 Fowler, pp. 173-7.
38 Hutcheson's view was based on Aristotle's Poetics, chapter V: 'some mistake, or some turpitude,
without grievous pain, and not very pernicious or destructive' (quoted by Hutcheson, a letter in The
Dublin Journal, June 5, 1725, in Laughter, pp. 102-3). Hutcheson quoted Hobbes's view of laughter
from Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature, chapter IX. Hutcheson also pointed out Pufendorf and
Addison {The Spectator, No. 47) as the followers of Hobbes. See Laughter, p. 103.
39 A letter in The Dublin Journal, June 12, 1725, in Laughter, pp. 110-1. See also a letter in The
Dublin Journal, June 5, 1725, in Laughter, p. 104.
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what, to the wise man, appears perhaps very useless or mean. The same solemnity of behaviour
and keenness of passion, about a place or ceremony, which ordinary people only employ about
the absolute necessaries of life, may make them laugh at their betters. When a gentleman of
pleasure, who thinks that good fellowship and gallantry are the only valuable enjoyments of life,
observes men, with great solemnity and earnestness, heaping up money, without using it, or
incumbering themselves with purchases and mortgages, which the gay gentleman, with his
paternal revenues, thinks very silly affairs, he may make himself very merry upon them: and the
frugal man, in his turn, makes the same jest of the man of pleasure.40
Laughter could approve the pursuit of wealth not from a selfish view but from a sort
of sympathy with the person pursuing useless wealth but still thereby contributing to
the public good. In this respect laughter was a sense of beauty in a genuinely
Hutchesonian term. Laughter was, therefore, 'necessarily pleasant to us' and 'easy
and agreeable'.4' By this 'sense of the ridiculous', as by the sense of beauty, the
mean pursuit of wealth could be approved and even imitated to contribute to the
public good.42
The Stoic idea of Providence was undoubtedly behind this supposition. In
Stoic language, 'passions' and 'senses' were independent of interest but still
endowed by Providence as necessary for our interests. Providence was in this sense
the foundation of sociability in Stoic philosophy:
Whatever the Gods ordain, is full of wise providence. What we ascribe to fortune, happens not
without a presiding nature, nor without a connexion and intertexture with the things ordered by
providence. ... Consider, too, the necessity of these events; and their utility to that whole
universe of which you are a part. In every regular structure, that must always be good to a part,
which the nature of the whole requires, and which tends to preserve it.43
Whether all be atoms, or there be [presiding] Natures, let this be laid down as indisputable; that I
am a part of the whole; and the whole must be conducted by its own Nature, be that what it will:
and that I am in some manner socially connected with the parts which are of the same kind with
myself.44
This is beautiful in Plato. "When we consider human life, we should view, as from an high
tower, all things terrestrial; such as herds, armies, men employed in agriculture, in marriages,
divorces; births, deaths, the tumults of courts of Justice, desolate lands, various barbarous
nations, feasts, wailings, markets; a medley of all things, in a system adorned by contrarieties."45
40 Laughter, p. 111.
41 A letter in The Dublin Journal, June 19, 1725, in Laughter, p. 113. Hutcheson wrote that the
purpose of the third letter was to know the proper use of laughter, by considering its effects, and the
ends for which it was implanted in our nature.
42 Laughter, p. 116.
43 Meditations, II. 3, p. 100. See also II. 9, pp. 104-5.
44 Meditations, X. 6, p. 366.
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By using such Stoic terminology, Hutcheson was able to make an argument for the
virtue of benevolence, depicting man as a part of the 'socially connected' whole. In
this, the beautiful system of society (and the division of labour) could be depicted as
a metaphor of music: a 'beautiful' 'system adorned by contrarieties' of both the good
and the evil. This was a Stoic picture first seized by Mandeville for his satire, but
then could be developed by Hutcheson for his counter-argument against
Mandeville.46 What Hutcheson was going to discuss as the sense of beauty and the
moral sense were divine endowments directing men towards beauty and virtue.47
The 'sense' of beauty and the moral 'sense' were endowed by Providence for
motivating men toward actions unintentionally contributing to public benefits,
without intending private interests.
... as in the first Treatise, we resolv'd the Constitution of our present Sense of Beauty into the
divine Goodness, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of
our moral Sense to his Goodness.48
His argument here of beauty and virtue as qualities valued regardless of their
pleasure was from the Stoics described in Cicero's De Finibus.
As, in approving a beautiful form, we refer the beauty to the object; we do not say that it is
beautiful because we reap some little pleasure in viewing it, but we are pleased in viewing it
because it is antecedently beautiful. ... [so] we are pleased in the contemplation [the virtue of
another, the whole excellence] because the object is excellent, and the object is not judged to be
therefore excellent because it gives us pleasure.49
This moral sense from its very nature appears to be designed for regulating and controlling all
our powers. This dignity and commanding nature we are immediately conscious of, as we are
conscious of the power itself. Nor can such matters of immediate feeling be otherways proved
but by appeals to our hearts.50
In Passions and Affections, in addition to the sense of beauty and the moral sense,
several other senses and desires, were also vindicated as useful means of gratifying
45 Meditations, VII. 48, pp. 271-2.
46 See, for instance, Hutcheson's use of Stoic language in his proof of design or intention of the
universe, in opposition to blind force or chance, which he thought was evidenced in wisdom, wit and
prudence in the cause (BOHD, V. XIX, pp. 71-2); of the final causes of the internal senses (VIII. II,
pp. 89-90); Hutcheson's emphasis of it as 'moral necessity' (VIII. II, p. 92).
47 MGE, p. 83.
48 MGE, p. 175.
49 System, I, p. 54. See also pp. 57-8.
50 System, I, p. 61. Footnote, p. 61, approved the Stoics in Cicero's De Finibus, I. iii. c. 10.
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our public desires or serving virtuous purposes.51 These included the external senses,
a public sense, and a sense of honour,52 as well as desires or aversions arising for
these senses.53 Hutcheson followed Cicero's de Finibus and its criticism of
Epicures, who had argued that desires were all selfish.54 Hutcheson's approval of the
harmony between wealth and virtue was thus written in the Stoic language of Cicero
with his idea of benevolent desires of wealth and power for benevolent purposes.
Benevolent or public desires for benevolent or public purposes were then
distinguished from those for excessive ambition in the sense that the former were
based on the Stoic virtue of self-command, which would abate deception,
disappointment from ambition, and finally lead men to the Deity and Providence."
Either the desires are private or benevolent, the evil in each case consists in the want
of their proportion:
The most natural and perfect state which our minds at present seem capable of, is that where all
the natural affections, desires and senses are preserved vigorous, in proportion to the dignity of
the object they pursue; so that the inferior are still kept under the restraint of the superior, and
never allowed to defeat the end for which God intended them; or to control either of the two
grand determinations of our souls toward the happiness and perfection of the individual, and that
of the system.56
This is the typically Stoic idea Shaftesbury had been keen on revitalising in his
writings, emphasising the balance between the various sentiments.
Such proportional sentiments then would be the foundation of natural
sociability, giving rise to private as well as public benefits:
Larger societies have force to execute greater designs of more lasting and extensive advantage.
These considerations abundantly shew the necessity of living in society, and obtaining the aid of
our fellows, for our very subsistence; and the great convenience of larger associations ofmen for
the improvement of life, and the increase of all our enjoyments.57
Regarding proportional sentiments nurturing natural sociability, Hutcheson often
praised Roman law described by Cicero as a useful means of government respecting
51 Passions, pp. 14-5.
52 Passions, pp. 12-3.
53 Passions, pp. 13-4.
54 Passions, pp. 16-7.
55 System, I, pp. 102-4, 106 and 112.
56 System, I, p. 154. See also pp. 150-1 and 154-7.
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'the natural equality of men'.
The natural equality ofmen consists chiefly in this, that these natural rights belong equally to all:
this is the thing intended by the natural equality. ... There is equality in right, how different
soever the objects may be; that jus aequum in which the Romans placed true freedom.58
For example, Hutcheson paid attention to the rights and duties on parentage
described in Roman law, which had supposed the natural equality of rights and duties
between parents and children, which also regarded the latter as equally rational
agents.59 The reverse side of this argument was his dismissal of canon law, for its
failure to bring both justice and equality between sexes.60 Hutcheson's rare historical
account of the origin of canon law shows that he was not sympathetic to Christianity,
and would then have turned his attention to Stoic theology.61 Indeed, while praising
Marcus Aurelius's system as a 'just philosophy',62 what Hutcheson talked of as God
in his account of the duty to God of being virtuous was not the God of Christianity
but of the Stoics. As for jurisprudence, Hutcheson criticised the rigid Christian
adherence to the laws of nature, which he thought had ignored the fact that beauty
and virtue were brought about by senses guided by Providence, not rigidly
commanded by Scripture.63
The conclusion of his System was written in Stoic language, describing how
the private as well as general rights would lead men into both wealth and virtue, by
fulfilling the duties of being both virtuous and prosperous at the same time. This
could be done by controlling selfish passions with the Stoic virtue of self-command:
From these general principles of the publick law of nations, as from those of the private law
respecting individuals, we must discern the wonderful footsteps of Divine Wisdom in the
constitution of our species. Since it is by following the very principles of our nature, the
affections and feelings of our hearts, in that regular subordination of the more limited to the more
extensive, which our inward moral sentiments recommend, and by the delightful exercise of the
powers of reason which we are naturally prone to, that we obtain and secure to ourselves and
57 System, I, pp. 289-90. The footnote acknowledged the second book of Cicero de Officiis. See also
System, II, p. 2.
58 System, I, pp. 299-300. Hutcheson on the other hand criticised primogeniture in the Roman. See I,
pp. 356-7 and II, p. 286.
59 System, II, p. 192.
60 System, II, p. 180.
61 System, II, pp. 182-3.
62 System, II, p. 182.
63 System, II, pp. 128-33.
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others both the noblest internal enjoyments, and the greatest external advantages and pleasures,
which the instable condition of terrestrial affairs will admit.64
Hutcheson had a Stoic faith in Providence and natural sociability bringing even the
transitory external objects and happiness.65 By having his theory of the sense of
beauty and his moral sense theory written in Stoic language, Hutcheson showed how
these senses guaranteed the pursuit of wealth in a virtuous manner. Hutcheson could
then establish his jurisprudence and political economy in order to show the way for
legislators to achieve their duties to the public of both being virtuous and prosperous
through the practice of their moral sense. In this, he modelled civil laws, whose
preservation and practice for the sake of the public good were the duties of
legislators, on Roman Law for its merit as a means of government for achieving
equality. In this way, Stoic language made way for Hutcheson to construct his
system of moral philosophy as a Stoic, after Mandeville had demolished the deist
system of Shaftesbury by his paradox.
Hutcheson however had to develop the way of using Stoic language to fully
combat Mandeville's paradox, after Mandeville had already demolished the Stoic
credentials of Shaftesbury's system. Following Shaftesbury, Hutcheson too
supposed that beauty and virtue alike gave rise to pleasure, but he thought that the
pleasure given by moral virtue was nobler than the pleasure we received from
beautiful objects. For, the former directed our actions only toward the good of others
whereas the latter excited us to the pursuit of knowledge and rewarded us for it.66 In
this, Hutcheson made the distinction between the sense of beauty and the moral sense
by shifting the aesthetic and moral question from the Shaftesburian theory of beauty
and virtue towards that of taste and the sense of morals.67 This is Hutcheson as a
critique, rather than a follower, of Shaftesbury. With his new account of the sense of
64 System, II, pp. 376-7.
65 System, II, p. 377.
66 MGE, p. 83.
67 Pocock suggests that polished taste was a civil virtue associated with an economic, cultural and
moral quality which was an alternative of civic virtue characterised as political and military. See
Pocock (1983), pp. 240-2. Possibly, from the viewpoint of the theory of taste, civic virtue looked like
a fanaticism of virtue without its taste, whereas taste was a reflective sense of that virtue more
crucially demanded in a more moderate modern commercial society rather than in a polis. Klein
offers an interpretation that links the culture of politeness with Shaftesbury.
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beauty and the moral sense, Hutcheson conceived the world as the negative
community and accordingly became sceptical about Shaftesbury's deist dimension to
his account of sociability more suitable for the positive community. Hutcheson's
ideas of the sense of beauty and the moral sense here reflected his Calvinist or
Presbyterian thinking. He thought that men could form the ideas of beauty and virtue
on their own thanks to the sense of beauty and the moral sense which were implanted
equally in every man so as to enable them to survive in the negative community. In
this sense, his Christian thinking enabled Hutcheson to construct his system of moral
philosophy as a Stoic, with his own way of using Stoic language, even after
Mandeville had already demolished the deist system of Shaftesbury by his paradox.
Hutcheson could still use Stoic language, which had been exploited for a satire by
Mandeville, as a powerful weapon to vitiate Mandeville's claims.
3. David Hume
Hume attempted to solve the Mandeville's paradox by discarding the rigorist line of
moral thinking, and by rewriting the theory of sociability, more logically and
credibly, in a way better grounded in experience and observation, or in his own
words, by introducing the experimental method of reasoning into it. This meant for
Hume that the Epicurean or Sceptic line of moral principles, rather than the Stoic,
appeared to be more plausible, and, as a result, to be more useful when he was to
refute Mandeville. As we have seen, Hume thought that we could form our moral
ideas in the light of their usefulness or utility as the standard of morals. And in the
context of 'private vices, public benefits' controversy, Hume sought to solve
Mandeville's paradox by introducing the idea of utility as the measure of morals.
This was Hume's preference for the language of natural jurisprudence written in
Epicurean idioms to the civic humanist language used by Polite Whig deists such as
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.
Hume's differentiation between Epicurean or Sceptic and Stoic languages
however seems more complicated than meets the eye. In his Essays Moral and
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Political published in 1742, Hume offered a sketch of his views on both Stoic and
Epicurean or Sceptic philosophies. Mostly agreeing with Hutcheson, Hume
understood that Stoic philosophy had preached for industry to fulfil both wealth and
virtue by controlling passions. In Hume's view, the Stoics had taught that
You need but taste the sweets of honest labour. Proceed to learn the just value of every pursuit;
long study is not requisite: Compare, though but for once, the mind to the body, virtue to fortune,
and glory to pleasure. You will then perceive the advantages of industry: You will then be
sensible what are the proper objects of your industry.
1 prove to you, that even in the midst of your luxurious pleasures, you are unhappy; and that by
too much indulgence, you are incapable of enjoying what prosperous fortune still allows you to
possess.68
In Hume's understanding, the Stoics would think that happiness lies in prosperous
fortune, or in other words, modest necessaries, as well as in a cultivated mind, or
virtuous spirit, attained only by industry. In other words, industry could achieve both
wealth and virtue, and, as a result, industry could bring happiness to us.
If the contemplation, even of inanimate beauty, is so delightful; if it ravishes the senses, even
when the fair form is foreign to us: What must be the effects of moral beauty? And what
influence must it have, when it embellishes our own mind, and is the result of our own reflection
and industry?69
Hume might have approved Hutcheson's use of Stoic language for arguing that
wealth and virtue were simultaneously attained by the sense of beauty and the moral
sense. As Hume was to argue that value came from industry, he considered the Stoic
idea to be in accordance with his own idea that wealth and virtue came from
industry, whose values would then be reflected in the beauty or utility of both.
But in his subsequent essay on the Sceptic, Hume was to clarify that such
values were not intrinsic, as Hutcheson had argued, but merely relative depending on
the variety of sentiments and taste, as the Sceptics had argued:
If we can depend upon any principle, which we learn from philosophy, this, I think, may be
considered as certain and undoubted, that there is nothing, in itself, valuable or despicable,
desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these attributes arise from the particular
constitution and fabric of human sentiment and affection. ... This is confusedly the case with
regard to all the bodily senses: But if we examine the matter more accurately, we shall find, that
68 Essays, Essay 16: 'The Stoic', p. 150.
69 Essays, p. 153.
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the same observation holds even where the mind concurs with the body, and mingles its
sentiment with the exterior appetite.70
Hume thought that the Sceptics had rightly understood that the relativity of values
stems from the diversity of taste and of sentiments:
... there is a considerable diversity in the sentiments of beauty and worth, and ... education,
custom, prejudice, caprice, and humour, frequently vary our taste of this kind. ... You have not
even any single argument, beyond your own taste, which you can employ in your behalf: And to
your antagonist, his particular taste will always appear a more convincing argument to the
contrary. If you be wise, each of you will allow, that the other may be in the right; and having
many other instances of this diversity of taste, you will both confess, that beauty and worth are
merely of a relative nature, and consist in an agreeable sentiment, produced by an object in a
particular mind, according to the peculiar structure and constitution of that mind.7'
Behind his interpretation of the Sceptics was Hume's own previous argument that
beauty or utility, especially public utility, was a perception, or a moral idea arising
from the association of ideas in the mind.72 Hume appeared to be in favour of
Mandeville's sceptical argument that beauty and virtue were relative, validating it
with his epistemology and his theory of the association of ideas in which he thought
that ideas arose from the sociable passions. But, unlike Mandeville, Hume did not
argue that such taste of beauty and morals were necessarily vicious. Passions and
industry would produce both wealth and virtue, and their values would be reflected
in their beauties. On the other hand, what separated Hume from the Stoics and
Hutcheson was that Hume thought that such passions and natural abilities were
something merely probable, working by chance and fortune, and frequently under the
effect of imagination and delusion. In line with the Epicurean and Sceptical
traditions of morals, Hume accordingly argued differently from Hutcheson's views,
which had been presented in Stoic language.73 First, Hutcheson made no distinction
between justice and the natural virtues, following the Stoics who had argued that the
idea of virtue was always natural, in the sense that it was always amiable and
agreeable to moral sense.74 Second, Hutcheson argued that the rights of men to life,
70 Essays, Essay 18: 'The Sceptic', p. 162.
71 Essays, p. 163.
72 Essays, pp. 166-8. See also p. 165.
73 Moore (1994), pp. 33-4.
74 Moore (1994), p. 34.
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liberty, reputation and property were always natural or instinctive, never artificial or
conventional. He acknowledged no need for conventions, the rules of justice or
artificial restraints to justify those rights.7:1 Finally, Hutcheson thought that human
nature would never fail to approve benevolence or kind affection in characters.
Because the idea ofmoral virtue would come immediately to mind when we perceive
a benevolent character, the utility or agreeableness of such a quality would not
prompt us to approve it.76 In Hume's view, on the contrary, beauty and virtue, good
and value were only relative, and life was governed by fortune, chance or
probability. Hume accordingly argued in line with the Sceptics that, 'In a word,
human life is more governed by fortune than by reason; is to be regarded more as a
dull pastime than as a serious occupation; and is more influenced by particular
humour, than by general principles'.77 Hume was therefore sceptical of the ideas of
virtue and vice found in the writings by the Stoics. In another essay, later
withdrawn, Hume criticised the Stoics for their neglect of the influence of chance,
delusion and probability upon human life, and emphasised the useful biases, instincts
and prejudices, as well as the role of delusion in the sentiments of the heart.
There is another Humour, ... I mean that grave philosophic Endeavour after Perfection, which,
under Pretext of reforming Prejudices and Errors, strikes at all the most endearing Sentiments of
the Heart, and all the most useful Byasses and Instincts, which can govern a human Creature.
The Stoics were remarkable for this Folly among the Antients; and I wish some of more
venerable Characters in latter Times had not copy'd them too faithfully in this Particular. The
virtuous and tender Sentiments, or Prejudices, if you will, have suffer'd mightily by these
Reflections; while a certain sullen Pride or Contempt of Mankind has prevail'd in their Stead,
and has been esteem'd the greatest Wisdom; tho', in Reality, it be the most egregious Folly of all
others.78
Hume instead adopted many of Cicero's arguments, especially those ideas of virtue
and vice which Cicero drew from the Epicureans and the Sceptics. Cicero was an
eclectic, drawing his compositions upon the different streams of ancient moral
philosophy, mostly the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Sceptics. Hutcheson, on the
other hand, had read Cicero as a Stoic, and preferred those of Cicero's works written
75 Moore (1994), p. 34.
76 Moore (1994), pp. 34-5.
77 Essays, p. 180.
78 Essays, Part III: Essays Withdrawn and Unpublished, Essay 2: 'Of Moral Prejudices' (1742), p. 539.
The Stoics, Cicero and Scottish classical political economy 249
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
in favour of Stoic arguments.79 Hume took over the insights of the Epicureans,
revived particularly by the French writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, in his attempt to reduce the insights of the ancient moral philosophers to an
experimental science of morals. For, Hume thought that the ideas of virtue and
happiness conceived by those ancient moralists were merely hypothetical or
fanciful.80 The ancient Epicurean moralists such as Epicures himself, Lucretius and
Horace, had been revived in seventeenth-century Britain by Hobbes, adapted by
Pierre Bayle and Mandeville, and became identified as the morality of the Sceptics or
the Pyrrhonians in the early eighteenth century. This line of Epicurean morals
offered Hume the themes and topics he developed in his Treatise: for instance, the
distinction between justice and the natural virtues; the convention to abstain from the
possessions of others; the moral approbation as derived from utility and pleasure.81
Hume understood and favoured Cicero in his Sceptic aspect, especially his views on
probability and delusion, and his idea of utility as the only criterion of beauty and
virtue. Hume saw these ideas from the Sceptics through Cicero and the Continental
natural jurists as useful to his theory of sociability and worth elaboration in his
Treatise on Human Nature.
In Hume, passions, which would give rise to causation or the association of
ideas, were no more than probable, therefore knowledge derived from such causation
or the association of ideas was accordingly probable. Unlike the Stoics and
Hutcheson, Hume presupposed no Providence in the formation of knowledge, that is,
no senses or reason guided by God towards certain knowledge.82 The necessary
connection of one object with another was therefore but a mere delusion in the
79 Moore (1994), p. 26.
80 Moore (1994), pp. 26-7.
81 Moore (1994), p. 27. See also pp. 28, 36 and 49-50. For Hume's background concerning the
Epicurean tradition at Edinburgh University, see pp. 32-3. James Moore concludes that Hume's moral
philosophy was not at all Hutchesonian, in the sense that Hume wrote in the Epicurean tradition
revived by Hobbes and adopted by Bayle and Mandeville, who had been opposed by Hutcheson in all
the separate expressions of his moral philosophy. It however still has to be shown how Hume's
account of the observance of justice based on fellow-feeling and a regard to public utility was not
Hutchesonian. See Moore (1994), pp. 53-4. For a similar view, see Phillipson (1989), pp. 48-9. Both
Hutcheson and Hume argued against the Court Whig statecraft or government which insisted on
aristocratic patronage as the contrivance of turning private interests into public benefits. Apart from
Fowler's remark on both of them as the 'English Moralists', I strongly agree with Fowler in saying
that Hume was one of Hutcheson's 'successors', rather than a critic (Fowler, p. 224).
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imagination, which could not be determined by reason, aided only by experience.83
The idea of probability in Hume was typically his scepticism of reasoning, passions,
senses and knowledge concerning the association of the ideas of objects.84 Hence
Hume's declaration that carelessness and inattention alone could afford us remedy
for sceptical doubt with respect to reason and senses, and that he would rely entirely
upon them.85 As a Stoic, Hutcheson had emphasised senses, such as the sense of
beauty and the moral sense, as the guiding divine principle for forming the ideas of
beauty and virtue. But Hume, as a Sceptic, shifted the focus back to imagination,
responding to Mandeville's charge of the role of delusive imagination in forming
sociability. Hume was in this respect sticking to his agenda of introducing the
experimental methods into moral sciences. Unlike Hutcheson, Hume validated the
role and influence of experience and habit, which would conspire to operate upon the
imagination, making men form certain ideas, though merely as probable knowledge.
For instance, the memory, senses and understanding were in Hume's view all
founded on the imagination, or in his words, the vividness of our idea.86
Because Hume presupposed no Providence, which would guide men towards
beauty and virtue through senses such as the sense of beauty and the moral sense, he
set utility as the only measure of beauty and virtue. This would also mean for Hume
that self was the only agent which we could rely on for forming ideas of beauty,
virtue and sociability if they should be based on experience and observation. As for
beauty, he argued that beauty or deformity was closely related to self. A form which
would give us delight and satisfaction, or pain, was perceived only as an object of
our pride or humility. This was his typically sceptic view that beauty was derived
only from the ideas of convenience and utility.87 For a similar reason, utility was the
only cause of sociability as well. The satisfaction for utility was perceived only by
82 THN, pp. 62-3.
83 THN, p. 64.
84 See also THN, Book I, Part III: 'OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY', Section XIII: 'Of
unphilosophical probability', p. 104; Part IV: 'Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy',
Section I: 'Of scepticism with regard to reason', pp. 121-3; Section II: 'Of scepticism with regard to
the senses', pp. 125-8. As for the imagination, see also pp. 129, 132 and 139.
85 THN, p. 144.
86 THN, pp. 172-3.
87 THN, Book II: 'OF THE PASSIONS', Part I: 'OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY', Section VIII: 'Of
beauty and deformity', pp. 195-6.
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the imagination, though that would be interfered with by delusion. The cause of
esteem for the rich was, for instance, sympathy, making us partake of the
satisfaction.88 This was because riches would give satisfaction to their possessors,
which would then be conveyed to the beholder by the imagination, producing an idea
resembling the original impression connected with love, an agreeable passion.89 In
other words, because utility was the only cause of sociability, sympathy with others'
utility and satisfaction only would give us an esteem for their power and riches.90
Hume's conception of sympathy in this respect was argued for his criticism
of Mandeville, who had argued that prosperity and virtue were not compatible.
Hume described sympathy as a disinterested and universal principle of the universe,
a basis of friendship and therefore happiness.91 Such sympathy with the utility of
wealth was a sociable sentiment which would both esteem for wealth as well as fulfil
the virtue of friendship.
Hume's conception of sympathy in this sense came from his reading of
Cicero's OfFriendship. Cicero had taught that 'there existed that, wherein consists
the entire strength of friendship, an entire agreement of inclinations, pursuits, and
sentiments'.92 Friendship was exactly what we now call empathy with the sentiments
of a friend: 'Now friendship is nothing else than a complete union of feeling on all
subjects, divine and human, accompanied by kindly feeling and attachment'.93 Hume
then understood that sympathy was the communication of the passions, such as
satisfaction and pleasure from wealth and power, which would form the core of
sociability. Sympathy, therefore, not advantage, was the only motive of friendship.
... we are so formed by nature, that there should be a certain social tie among all; stronger,
however, as each approaches nearer to us. ... in this respect friendship is superior to
relationship, because from relationship benevolence can be withdrawn, and from friendship it
cannot: for with the withdrawal of benevolence the very name of friendship is done away, while
that of relationship remains.94
88 THN, Book II, Part II: 'Of love and hatred', Section V: 'Of our esteem of the rich and powerful', p.
231.
89 THN, p. 234.
90 THN, pp. 232 and 234.
91 THN, pp. 234-5.
92 Cicero, 'On Friendship', in Cicero (1856), Chapter IV, p. 177.
93 'On Friendship', Chapter VI, p. 180. As a disinterested sentiment, the reach of this sympathy
should be extensive and even reach the dead (Chapter VII, pp. 181-2).
94 'On Friendship', Chapter V, pp. 179-80.
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For love (from which friendship takes its name) is the main motive for the union of kind
feelings: for advantages truly are often derived from those who are courted under a pretence of
friendship, and have attention paid them for a temporary purpose. In friendship there is nothing
false, and nothing pretended; and whatever belongs to it is sincere and spontaneous. Wherefore
friendship seems to me to have sprung rather from nature than a sense of want, and more from an
attachment of the mind with a certain feeling of affection, than from a calculation how much
advantage it would afford.95
But although many and great advantages ensued, yet it was not from any hope of these that the
causes of our attachment sprang: for as we are beneficent and liberal, not to exact favour in
return (for we are not usurers in kind actions), but by nature are inclined to liberality, thus I think
that friendship is to be desired, not attracted by the hope of reward, but because the whole of its
profit consists in love only.96
Wherefore friendship has not followed upon advantage, but advantage on friendship.97
... for to love is nothing else than to be attached to the person whom you love, without any sense
of want, without any advantage being sought; and yet advantage springs up of itself from
friendship, even though you may not have pursued it.98
In Cicero's conception of sympathy, Hume saw the possibility of a sociable
sentiment which would both esteem wealth as well as fulfil friendship as a sociable
virtue, capable enough of challenging the Mandevillian paradox. Hume also saw the
possibility of this sociable sentiments and the virtue of friendship in what he called,
in Stoic language, the middle station of life: 'But there is another Virtue, that seems
principally to ly among Equals, and is, for that Reason, chiefly calculated for the
middle Station of Life. This Virtue is FRIENDSHIP'.99 The middle station of life,
characterised by their virtue of friendship, was the only way to both wealth and
virtue. For, in Hume's view, the inferior station of life was more suitable for
attaining wealth than virtue, whereas the superior station of life was more suitable for
practising virtues than attaining wealth.100
Sympathy could esteem wealth as well as fulfil friendship as a sociable virtue
without taking our own interest into account. For, beauty could be derived from
sympathy, or the observation of convenience could give pleasure (because
95 'On Friendship', Chapter VIII, p. 183.
96 'On Friendship', Chapter IX, p. 185.
97 'On Friendship', Chapter XIV, p. 193.
98 'On Friendship', Chapter XXVII, p. 213.
99 Essays, Part III: Essays Withdrawn and Unpublished, Essay 3: 'Of the Middle Station of Life'
(1742), p. 547.
100 Essays, pp. 546-8. Others however would have thought the opposite might be true!
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convenience was a beauty), merely by our sympathising with the proprietor, entering
into his interest by the force of imagination, and feeling the same satisfaction that the
objects would naturally occasion in him.101 This would then tell why utility must be
the only measure of beauty and virtue. A sense of beauty, for instance, depended on
the principle of sympathy, because, by sympathy, all affections readily passed from
one person to another, begetting corresponding movements in every human creature.
So, by the sense of beauty, all pleasure or advantage even of a stranger for whom we
have no friendship, pleases us with his beautiful (or useful) objects.102 Equally,
moral sentiments within all the natural and artificial virtues also depended on the
principle of sympathy, because our approbation of virtues (and their usefulness to
public benefits) extended beyond our own interest towards the most distant countries
and ages.103 Later in his essay 'Of the Standard of Taste', Hume set out a question of
how to seek a reliable standard of taste amidst the relativity of beauty and morals: 'It
is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule, by which the various sentiments
of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment,
and condemning another'.104 This also was to seek a reliable standard of judging
utility as the only measure of beauty and virtue. Hume thought that 'a more accurate
definition of delicacy' was not only possible but also necessary. For, 'Though it be
certain, that beauty and deformity, more than sweet and bitter, are not qualities in
objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed,
that there are certain qualities in objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those
particular feelings'.105 In Hume's view, taste could be a good understanding of the
suitability of the means to the end.
Every work of art has also a certain end or purpose, for which it is calculated; and is to be
deemed more or less perfect, as it is more or less fitted to attain this end. The object of
eloquence is to persuade, of history to instruct, of poetry to please by means of the passions and
the imagination. These ends we must carry constantly in our view, when we peruse any
performance; and we must be able to judge how far the means employed are adapted to their
respective purposes.106
101 THN, p. 235.
102 THN, Book III, Part III, Section I: 'Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices', p. 368.
103 THN, p. 369.
104 Essays, Essay 23: 'Of the Standard of Taste', p. 229.
105 Essays, pp. 234-5.
106 Essays, p. 240.
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A well-refined taste could be, therefore, a good judgement of the suitability of the
'means of the passions and the imagination' to an end, or in other words, utility. A
well-refined taste would control the passions and the imagination as the means
through which the ideas of beauty and morals were formed in the association of
ideas. In Hume, such good taste, or a reliable standard of utility as the only measure
of beauty and virtue, would replace the Stoic-Hutchesonian design of the grace of the
Providence. More importantly, good taste and a reliable judgement of utility would
invite the sociable sentiment of sympathy into a crucial role in forming well-refined
ideas of beauty and morals. In criticising prejudice as a destructive power of sound
judgement and preventing operations of the intellectual faculties, Hume argued that
'a critic of a different age or nation, who should pursue this discourse [on a particular
work of oration and performance], must have all these [particular] circumstances in
his eye, and must place himself in the same situation as the audience [did in that
particular age], in order to form a true judgment of the oration', by forgetting his
individual being and his particular circumstances.107 Hume learned from Cicero that,
rather than Providence, this good taste and sound judgement of utility alone could
guarantee secure ideas of beauty and morals, esteem for wealth and the virtue of
friendship, by involving the sociable sentiment of sympathy. As we have seen.
Hume argued that we could form our moral ideas in the light of their usefulness or
utility as the standard of morals. And in the context of 'private vices, public
benefits' controversy, this was how Hume sought to solve Mandeville's paradox: by
introducing the idea of utility as the measure of morals. Thus Hume demolished the
Stoic system of Hutcheson and presented a Sceptic, and consequently utilitarian,
system of moral philosophy, while showing that it was still possible to argue against
Mandeville without referring to the Stoic deism.
4. Adam Smith
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In comparison with Hutcheson and Hume, Smith appears to have been a more
balanced reader of Stoic philosophy. Smith appreciated the merits that Hutcheson
had found useful for his argument about natural sociability, as well as properly
distancing himself from its demerit of the rigorous treatment ofmorals, as Hume had.
His thinking about sociability was deeply influenced by Hutcheson at Glasgow. The
philosophical education from Hutcheson was an introduction to a Stoic system of
moral philosophy as intended to reactivate the idiom under pressure from the
scepticism and Epicureanism of Hobbes and Mandeville. From Hutcheson, Smith
learned to make the Stoic and Augustinian longing for virtue a fundamental moral
need to be satisfied if men were to be genuinely sociable.108 In his history of moral
philosophy, Smith classified Stoic philosophy as one 'Of those Systems which make
Virtue consist in Propriety', along with Plato and Aristotle.109 This is the point where
Smith approved of them."0 Smith contrasted the Stoics with Epicures, who had
presented one 'Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence'."1 Smith
objected to the doctrine,112 but not because it made virtue consist in prudence, but
because it supposes virtue arise from its utility and 'tendency to prevent pain and to
procure ease and pleasure'. In this respect, Smith acknowledged Plato, Aristotle and
the Stoics as philosophers superior to Epicures in thinking virtue as deserving to be
pursued for its own sake and value, rather than for its utility."' In particular, Smith
appreciated Stoic philosophy for its good understanding of the selfish passions,
teaching 'a certain order, propriety, and grace, to be observed' in pursuing the
objects of original appetite, such as riches, power and authority,"4 and its criticism of
107 Essays, pp. 239-40.
108 Phillipson (2000), p. 72.
109 TMS, Part VI: 'Of Systems of MORAL PHILOSOPHY Consisting of Four Sections', Section II:
'Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue', Chapter I, VII. ii. 1. 1, p.
267.
110 TMS, VII. ii. 1. 15-7, pp. 272-3. See also a paragraph added in 2nd edn. and dropped in 6th edn. on
p. 275. As for Plato and Aristotle, see VII. ii. 1. 11-2, pp. 270-1. Smith's source of the Stoic
philosophy was Cicero's De Finibus. See VII. ii. 1. 15, p. 272.
111 TMS, VII. ii. 2. 1 and 7-8, pp. 294 and 296-7. Smith's source of Epicures was again Cicero's De
Finibus. See VII. ii. 2. 2, p. 295.
112 TMS, VII. ii. 2. 13, p. 298.
113 TMS, VII. ii. 2. 9 and 17, pp. 297 and 299-300.
114 TMS, Part I, Chapter III: 'Of the stoical philosophy', p. 58.
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excessive ambition toward wealth and power.1'5 On the whole, Smith thus approved
and praised Stoic philosophy, but at the same time he pointed out the needs of paying
attention to such matters of fact as the weakness of human nature in our
understanding of morals. Following Hume's criticism of the Stoics, Smith thought
that the 'honourable' demerit of Stoic philosophy was its teaching 'a perfection
altogether beyond the reach of human nature'."6 Smith considered that the Stoics
could have evaluated human passions, and their uncontrollable yet innocent and
useful abilities for contributing to the public good. Smith was to aim at a moral
account of passions and sentiments more suited to a wealthier modern commercial
society."7
Smith decided to do this by altering the Stoic and Hutchesonian fashion for
writing moral accounts. He preferred to write like a critic, following a looser method
and presenting the agreeable and lively pictures of manners, such as done in Cicero's
first book of Offices, and Aristotle's Ethics. Smith thought that such a method would
be more useful and agreeable for a science of morals."8 On the contrary, Smith
considered that the Stoics and Hutcheson had written moral accounts like
grammarians, introducing a sort of accuracy, and endeavouring to provide exact and
precise rules for our behaviour. Such writers included not only casuists such as
Hutcheson but also natural jurists such as Grotius and Pufendorf."9 This method
would have been appropriate for natural jurists, because they had been dealing only
with the rules of justice. But the method would become inappropriate when, for
instance, casuists applied it to many other moral duties. Smith reckoned that the
grammarian writing of morals had rooted in 'the custom of auricular confession,
introduced by the Roman Catholic superstition, in times of barbarism and
ignorance'.120 By this method, casuists 'attempted, to no purpose, to direct by precise
115 TMS, pp. 58-60 and I. iii. 2. 9-12, pp. 58 and 60-1.
115 TMS, p. 60. See also a sentence added in 2nd edn. and dropped in 6th edn. at 111. 3. 8 and 11, pp.
139-41. Hume had similarly thought that the Stoics had departed 'too far from the receiv'd Maxims
ofConduct and Behaviour, by a refin'd Search after Happiness or Perfection' (Hume, Essays, Part III:
Essays Withdrawn and Unpublished, Essay 2: 'OfMoral Prejudices' (1742), p. 542).
117 TMS, III. 4. 5-6, p. 158.
118 TMS, Part VI, Section IV: 'Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical
Rules ofMorality', VII. iv. 2 and 5-6, pp. 327 and 329.
119 TMS, VII. iv. 2 and 7, pp. 327 and 329-30.
120 TMS, VII. iv. 8 and 16, pp. 330 and 333.
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rules what it belongs to feeling and sentiment only to judge of.121 Smith concluded
that 'The two useful parts of moral philosophy, therefore, are Ethics and
Jurisprudence: casuistry ought to be rejected altogether'.122
Smith was therefore going to write about morals as a critic, rather than as a
grammarian. The rule was to be applied equally even to his theory of justice and
government: Cicero's Offices, and Aristotle's Ethics, in Smith's view, 'treat of
justice in the same general manner in which they treat of all the other virtues'. As
for his writing on the laws of government and of political economy, Smith was going
to adopt the style of Cicero's De Legibus and Plato's Laws.m It would be interesting
to see that, in his typically casuistic account of ethics (on gratitude, beneficence, and
so on), Hutcheson had criticised Cicero for his 'too general and inaccurate' account
of 'depositum' in De Officiis.m In Hutcheson's definition, depositum was contracts
'where "the business committed and undertaken is the safe custody of goods'".123
Hutcheson's political economy in his System ofMoral Philosophy was accordingly
going to be a casuistic account of private rights, concerning property (Book II,
Chapters VII and VIII), commerce (Chapter XII) and contracts (Chapters IX, X and
XIII). On the contrary, Smith's political economy was to be a lively description of
the passions, sentiments and sociability in commerce and production. As explained
in his discussion on the regulations of the banking trade, this was because, unlike in
jurisprudence, the perfectionism of morals in the science of a legislator could well
jeopardise the government, or public benefits, in the name of justice, or natural
liberty.
To restrain private people, it may be said, from receiving in payment the promissory notes of a
banker, for any sum whether great or small, when they themselves are willing to receive them;
or, to restrain a banker from issuing such notes, when all his neighbours are willing to accept of
them, is a manifest violation of that natural liberty which it is the proper business of law, not to
infringe, but to support. Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respect a
violation of natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which
might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of
all governments; of the most free, as well as of the most despotical. The obligation of building
party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of natural liberty,
121 TMS, VII. iv. 33, p. 339.
122 TMS, VII. iv. 34, p. 340.
123 TMS, VII. iv. 37, pp. 341-2. See also LJ (B), 1-4, pp. 397-8.
124 De Officiis, I. i. c. 10.
125 System, II, p. 68.
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exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the banking trade which are here proposed.126
Smith's criticism of the French physiocrats was pointed to a similar defect, their too
rigid regimen for political economy, echoing his criticism of the Stoic perfectionism
ofmorals.
Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the human body could be
preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet and exercise, of which every, the smallest,
violation necessarily occasioned some degree of disease or disorder proportioned to the degree of
the violation. Experience, however, would seem to show that the human body frequently
preserves, to all appearance at least, the most perfect state of health under a vast variety of
different regimens; even under some which are generally believed to be very far from being
perfectly wholesome. But the healthful state of the human body, it would seem, contains in itself
some unknown principle of preservation, capable either of preventing or of correcting, in many
respects, the bad effects even of a very faulty regimen. Mr. Quesnai, who was himself a
physician, and a very speculative physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind
concerning the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and prosper only under a
certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty and perfect justice. He seems not to
have considered that in the political body, the natural effort which every man is continually
making to better his own condition, is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and
correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political oeconomy, in some degree, both partial
and oppressive. Such a political oeconomy, though it no doubt retards more or less, is not
always capable of stopping altogether the natural progress of a nation towards wealth and
prosperity, and still less of making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper without the
enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation which could
ever have prospered. In the political body, however, the wisdom of nature has fortunately made
ample provision for remedying many of the bad effects of the folly and injustice of man; in the
same manner as it has done in the natural body, for remedying those of his sloth and
intemperance.127
This statement may remind us of Smith's criticism of Mandeville for his moral
rigorism, his too strict moral standard concerning the vices such as his definition of
luxury: like Quesnay, Mandeville too was a physician himself. In Smith's eyes, the
physiocratic regimen of perfect liberty would have seemed as equally artificial as
126 WN, II. ii. 94, p. 324.
127 WN, Book IV, Chapter IX: 'Of the agricultural System, or of those Systems of political Oeconomy,
which represent the Produce of Land as either the sole or the principal Source of the Revenue and
Wealth of every Country', IV. ix. 28, pp. 673-4. The criticism of moral rigorism was going to be
echoed in his criticism of the spirit of system in the final edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments.
See TMS, VI. ii. 2. 15-8, pp. 232-4. The man of system 'does not consider that the pieces upon the
chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but
that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its
own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to impress upon it' (VI. ii. 2. 17,
p. 234). This is 'the highest degree of arrogance', which 'is to erect his own judgment into the
supreme standard of right and wrong', and 'to fancy himself the only wise and worthy man in the
commonwealth, and that his fellow-citizens should accommodate themselves to him and not he to
them' (VI. ii. 2. 18, p. 234).
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Mandevillian statecraft. It ignored 'the wisdom of nature', or in Smith's words,
'some unknown principle of preservation' contained in the political body itself, or
more precisely, 'the natural effort which every man is continually making to better
his own condition'. These were what had been called 'ambition', 'deception',
'delusion' or 'the contrivance of nature' in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments. These
were the principle of preservation which had been altogether verified and vindicated
as just and endowed by nature, as 'ample provision', in his theory of sympathy, in an
attempt to refute Mandeville's moral arguments. Based on that confident refutation,
the principle was, in The Wealth ofNations, laid as the foundation of the science of a
legislator and ofpolitical economy.
Unlike Hume, Smith however was a more sympathetic reader of Stoic
philosophy and, nevertheless, preferred to develop the language of Stoic philosophy
for his description of natural sociability in a modern commercial society. In a
typically Smithian digression in The Wealth ofNations, he pointed out in passing
three main reasons for his preference for Stoic moral philosophy. The first was the
beauty of the system ofmoral philosophy seen in this ancient account. In this,
The maxims of common life were arranged in some methodical order, and connected together by
a few common principles, in the same manner as they had attempted to arrange and connect the
phenomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting
principles, is what is properly called moral philosophy.128
In his very early essays on 'the History of the Ancient Physics' and 'the History of
the Ancient Logics and Metaphysics', Smith had already developed his argument of
the beauty of philosophical systems and had approved the system of Stoic theology.
Even at this early stage of his academic career, Smith would possibly have planned
to use Stoic language for his future account of sociability because the beauty of Stoic
system seemed to him to be useful for describing the system of a commercial society
as a beautiful system.129 Smith thought that the purpose of the study of Stoic
128 WN, Book V: 'Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth', Chapter I: 'Of the Expences
of the Sovereign or Commonwealth', Part Third: 'Of the Expence of publick Works and publick
Institutions', Article II: 'Of the Expence of the Institutions for the Education of Youth', V. i. f. 25, pp.
768-69.
129 Ancient physics, 11. Smith had primarily considered the professional philosophers' sense of order in
'The principles which lead and direct philosophical enquiries'. Smith's distinctive description of what
The Stoics, Cicero and Scottish classical political economy 260
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
philosophy was to find the invisible hand of Jupiter behind the beauty of nature.
Only in this way could philosophy, with its invisible connecting chain that explained
the operation of nature, counterpoise superstition, which prevailed in the savage state
where philosophy could not be supported or studied.130 In 'the History of the Ancient
Logics and Metaphysics', Smith developed his defence of Stoic philosophy, by
comparing the Stoic notion of 'Idea' with that of Plato.131 Smith regarded the Stoic
concepts of nature and of God without substance as the most useful device for
philosophy in seeking the invisible connecting principles of nature, and in writing
such philosophy in style with its beauty. Such Stoic language would have seemed
useful for Smith who was, along with Hutcheson and Hume, going to argue about
beauty in terms of its effect upon the mind rather than of its own nature like Platonic
philosophy. This systematic arrangement in ancient moral philosophy would have
seemed to Smith to be a good tactic for stimulating public spirit, especially when
philosophy was had been written in terms of philosophers' sense of beauty and order: 'Philosophy is the
science of the connecting principles of nature. ... Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains
which bind together all these disjoined objects, endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of jarring
and discordant appearances, to allay this tumult of the imagination, and to restore it, when it surveys the
great revolutions of the universe, to that tone of tranquillity and composure, which is both most
agreeable in itself, and most suitable to its nature. Philosophy, therefore, may be regarded as one of
those arts which address themselves to the imagination; .... It is the most sublime of all the agreeable
arts, and its revolutions have been the greatest, the most frequent, and the most distinguished of all those
that have happened in the literary world' (Astronomy, II. 12). Smith attempted to show there how
customs and prejudices had intervened reasonable path in the history of scientific discourses, and
thereby to rejuvenate 'the principles which does not always lead and direct philosophical inquiries'; in
other words, the beauty and order of philosophical reasoning. The system of Tycho Brache, for
instance, was accepted, even though it was, 'in any respect, more complex and more incoherent than that
of Copernicus. Such, however, was the difficulty that mankind felt in conceiving the motion of the
Earth, that it long balanced the reputation of that otherwise more beautiful system. It may be said, that
those who considered the heavens only, favoured the system of Copernicus, which connected so happily
all the appearances which presented themselves there. But that those who looked upon the Earth,
adopted the account of Tycho Brache, which, leaving it at rest in the centre of the universe, did less
violence to the usual habits of the imagination' (Astronomy, IV. 43). In this, Smith followed Hutcheson
who thought knowledge was pursued in view of its beauty of theorems, besides its utility (BOND, III.
V). Hutcheson argued that pleasure arose not from any knowledge and utility but from the idea of
beauty, and that utility could only add some pleasure, if any, to beauty (BOHD, I. XII; X. XV). For the
nature of system in general, Smith compared it with a machine, by which it was indicated in Smith that
philosophy was a matter of refining its taste as an artist (Astronomy, IV. 19). As shown, philosophy was
described in Smith in terms of its aesthetic quality, emphasising the standpoint and sentiments of
philosophers and their spectators. Philosophy was, therefore, based on philosophers' good taste of
invisible connecting principles which the imagination could restore pleasant ideas thereby. In Smith,
what mattered in philosophy was a taste, order and method, all of which Galileo possessed (Astronomy,
IV. 50). A discovery of an analogy, for instance, 'no doubt, rendered the system of Kepler more
agreeable to the natural taste of mankind' (Astronomy, IV. 56).
130 See Astronomy, III. 2.
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applied to political economy, as described in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments.
Another reason why Smith preferred ancient (Greek and Roman) moral
philosophy over the modern was that the former had investigated 'Wherein consisted
the happiness and perfection of a man'. They had treated 'the duties of human life'
as subservient to 'the happiness and perfection of human life'. In contrast, modern
moral philosophy had been 'taught only as subservient to theology'. In it, 'the duties
of human life' had therefore been treated as chiefly subservient to 'the happiness of a
life to come'.132 Modern moral philosophy had introduced 'subtlety and sophistry;
the casuistry and the ascetic morality', simply 'for the education of ecclesiasticks'
and for 'a more proper introduction to the study of theology' at European
universities. They had therefore not been 'more proper for the education of
gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely either to improve the understanding,
or to mend the heart'.133 This remark would again echo Smith's assessment of
Mandeville's system and, in particular, of his ascetic morality, which Smith argued
had presented 'the perfection of virtue' 'as almost always inconsistent with any
degree of happiness in this life'. Indeed, Smith could pinpoint the fact that
Mandeville was influenced by the popular Jansenist ascetic morality.
The other reason that Smith preferred ancient moral philosophy, and Roman
philosophy in particular, was that he came to regard Roman Law as a useful remedy
for the factions that had been institutionalised in English Common law. Smith
contrasted Roman moral philosophy with Greek in this respect:
The morals of the Romans, however, both in private and publick life, seem to have been, not
only equal, but upon the whole, a good deal superior to those of the Greeks. ... The good
temper and moderation of contending factions seems to be the most essential circumstance in the
publick morals of a free people. But the factions of the Greeks were almost always violent
sanguinary; whereas, till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been shed in any Roman
faction, and from the time of the Gracchi the Roman republick may be considered as in reality
dissolved.134
Smith attributed the superiority of Roman moral philosophy to the science of Roman
Law, which in his view had succeeded in purging factional interests from legal
131 Ancient Logics and Metaphysics, 9.
132 WN, V. i. f. 30, p. 771. See also TMS, III. 2. 35.
133 WN, V. i. f. 32, p. 772.
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practices.
It is perhaps worth while to remark, that though the laws of the twelve tables were, many of
them, copied from those of some antient Greek republicks, yet law never seems to have grown
up to be a science in any republick of antient Greece. In Rome it became a science very early,
and gave a considerable degree of illustration to those citizens who had the reputation of
understanding it. In the republicks of antient Greece, particularly in Athens, the ordinary courts
of justice consisted of numerous and, therefore, disorderly bodies of people, who frequently
decided almost at random, or as clamour, faction and party spirit happened to determine. The
ignominy of an unjust decision, when it was to be divided among five hundred, a thousand, or
fifteen hundred people (for some of their courts were so very numerous), could not fall very
heavy upon any individual. At Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts of justice consisted
either of a single judge, or of a small number of judges, whose characters, especially as they
deliberated always in publick, could not fail to be very much affected by any rash and unjust
decision. In doubtful cases, such courts, from their anxiety to avoid blame, would naturally
endeavour to shelter themselves under the example, or precedent, of the judges who had sat
before them, either in the same, or in some other court. This attention, to practice and precedent,
necessarily formed the Roman law into that regular and orderly system in which it has been
delivered down to us; and the like attention has had the like effects upon the laws of every other
country where such attention has taken place. The superiority of character in the Romans over
that of the Greeks, ... was probably more owing to the better constitution of their courts of
justice, ....l35
In contrasting Roman moral philosophy with Greek, Smith could well have had
European mercantile policy in mind which was still in practice in his own day.
Smith would have regarded Roman Law, with its attempted impartiality, as useful for
remedying factional defects in the administration of justice and government, which
had inherited and nurtured mercantile factional interests, at one time in favour of
Court Whig interests. For instance, Roman Law could be a remedy for modern laws
obsessed with apprenticeship, especially the regulations on the duration of
apprenticeship.
Apprenticeships were altogether unknown to the antients. The reciprocal duties of master and
apprentice make a considerable article in every modern code. The Roman law is perfectly silent
with regard to them. I know no Greek or Latin word (I might venture, I believe, to assert that
there is none) which expresses the idea we now annex to the word Apprentice, a servant bound
to work at a particular trade for the benefit of a master, during a term of years, upon condition
134 WN, V. i. f. 40, pp. 774-5.
135 WN, V. i. f. 40, pp. 778-9. See that Marcus Aurelius wrote against parties or factions: 'He who had
the charge ofmy education, taught me not to be fondly attached to any of the contending parties in the
chariot-races, or in the combats of the gladiators. ... not to intermeddle with the affairs of others, ....'
{Meditations, I. 2, p. 75). The footnote reads: 'The keenness of these contentions among the Romans
in that age, is abundantly known'.
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that the master shall teach him that trade.136
Roman Law could equally be a remedy for the feudal law of succession. The law of
succession in Roman law had allowed that 'all the children shared equally in the
estate of the father or master of the family'. On the contrary, the law of
primogeniture in European feudal law, which Smith thought was 'contrary to nature,
to reason, and to justice', was occasioned by the nature of feudal government.137 For
instance, entails, 'the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture', 'are
altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither their substitutions nor fideicommisses
bear any resemblance to entails'.138
For these three main reasons, Smith decided to resort to Stoic language and
develop Hutcheson's use of it for his argument concerning sociability, especially for
his criticism of Mandeville and to show that wealth and virtue are compatible. The
old Stoic precept of'following nature' was revived by the neo-Stoics of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries and by natural jurists such as Grotius, and apparently
carried over into the theory of commerce, where nature was supposed to rule as
well.139 Smith valued Stoic ethics for their role in encouraging sociability.140 Marcus
Aurelius had written that
I cannot be angry at my kinsmen, or hate them. We were formed by nature for mutual
assistance, as the two feet, the hands, the eyes lids, the upper and lower rows of teeth.
Opposition to each other is contrary to nature; all anger and aversion is an opposition.141
Go on straight in the way pointed out by your own nature, and the common nature of the whole.
They both direct you to the same road.142
As the regular universe is formed such a complete whole of all the particular bodies, so the
universal destiny or fate of the whole, is made a complete cause out of all the particular
136 WN, Book I, Chapter X: 'OfWages and Profit in the different Employments of Labour and Stock',
Part II: 'Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe', I. x. c. 15, p. 139. For Smith's view on the
defects of apprenticeship, see I. x. c. 13-4, pp. 138-9.
137 LJ (A), i. 115-6. For the law of succession among the Romans, see LJ {A), i. 94-104. See editors'
footnote 6, WN, pp. 382-3.
138 WN, Book III, Chapter II: 'Of the Discouragement of Agriculture in the antient State of Europe
after the Fall of the Roman Empire', III. ii. 5, p. 384. On the other hand, 'even England is not
altogether without them'. Let alone Scotland (III. ii. 6, p. 385).
139 Kaye, p. xcix.
140 TMS, p. 9; Phillipson (2000), p. 80.
141 Meditations, II. 1, p. 98.
142 Meditations, V. 3, p. 176.
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143
causes.
These Stoic ideas could well have inspired Smith's arguments concerning sympathy,
sociability, the division of labour and his criticism of mercantile hostility, especially
that between England and France. From them, Smith would have adopted a language
that could replace Mandeville's in describing how individuals were to be tricked into
contributing to society as a whole through the contrivance of nature such as the sense
of beauty or taste, and the sense of justice. In this language, independent particular
individual causes, 'your own nature' or 'all the particular causes', were to be directed
into the entire design of the universe, 'the common nature of the whole' or 'a
complete cause', by Providence. Stoic ideas of Providence would have given rise to
Smith's ideas of the 'invisible hand' and of delusion fulfilling the needs and utility of
the universe. Hutcheson and Smith developed Stoic language for their criticism of
Mandeville's language of passions, in which beauty and virtue were denoted as
relative to circumstances. In Stoic language, Hutcheson and Smith could describe
beauty and virtue as valuable in themselves, independent of praise or external
circumstances. In Stoic language, Smith could make a distinction between praise
and praise-worthiness: praise was 'lower beauties' 'in material forms, and works of
art', such as 'emerald' or 'gold, ivory, purple, a dagger, a flower, a shrub'.144
On the other hand, however, Smith seems to have read the Stoics in a more
balanced way than Hutcheson and Hume. Smith paid attention to their defects of
moral perfectionism (which Hutcheson had not cared about), as well as to their
argument about delusion or the role of imagination (which Hume had accredited
more to Cicero and the Sceptics than to the Stoics). In Stoic language, Smith
described man as fitted by nature to society, as he needs mutual assistance, with the
sense of remorse, and therewith the ability to check his own conduct, as he is
likewise exposed to mutual injuries.143 This was because the prevalence of injustice
must utterly destroy society, as justice is 'the main pillar' of society. This
consciousness of guilt was therefore implanted by nature into the human breast to
143 Meditations, V. 8, p. 182.
144 Meditations, IV. 20, pp. 150-1, quoted above.
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enforce the observation of justice.146 The conscience was the man within, as distinct
from the man without, or an actual spectator. He was a 'vicegerent' of the author of
nature 'upon earth to superintend the behaviour of his brethren'.147 In Stoic
language, he was 'This inmate of the breast, this abstract man, the representative of
mankind, and substitute of the Deity'.148 In Stoic language, it was also a 'means
adjusted with the nicest artifice to the ends' of the Nature, that is, the support of the
individual and the propagation of the species. It was so in the same manner as the
wheels of the watch adjusted to the correct end, the pointing of the hour.149 It was, in
other words, a contrivance of the means to the end, to which its beauty was ascribed
and man's sense of beauty would be deluded. Such beauty was also the foundation
of sociability by which the selfish passions would be deluded into contributing to
public benefits. This argument was also his challenge to Hume and Hutcheson. It
developed Hume's utilitarian accounts on the passions of remorse and on the sense of
justice and punishment.130 Smith showed that our regard for individuals, concerning
the injustice done to them, would have arisen for its own sake, regardless of our
regard for the multitude, or the needs and utility of justice for the preservation of
society. It also criticised Hutcheson's accounts on justice and on other virtues as
derived from benevolence. Smith stated thai such regard for the individual does not
require love, esteem and affection for particular friends and acquaintances, because
sympathy with the resentment of even an odious person is so universal that it never
fails to check an injustice committed.151 Even man's regard for the general rules of
conduct was built into human nature through a sense of duty, rather than
benevolence, in order to direct man's behaviour.132 Therefore, 'those important rules
of morality are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will finally reward the
145 TMS, Part II, Section II: 'Of Justice and Beneficence', Chapter III: 'Of the utility of this
constitution ofNature', II. ii. 3. 1, p. 85.
146 TMS, II. ii. 3. 3-4, p. 86.
147 TMS, p. 128: added in 2nd edn. and dropped in 6th edn.
148 TMS, p. 130: added in 2nd edn. and dropped in 6th edn.
149 TMS, II. ii. 3. 5, p. 87.
150 See TMS, II. ii. 3. 6-9 and 12, pp. 87-9 and 91.
151 TMS, II. ii. 3. 10, pp. 89-90.
152 TMS, Part III, Chapter III: 'Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that
they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity', III. 5. 1, pp. 161-2.
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obedient, and punish the transgressors of their duty',153 through 'those vicegerents'
within us promulgating those rules. Such general rules are properly called laws
because 'Those vicegerents of God within us, never fail to punish the violation of
them, by the torments of inward shame, and self-condemnation; and on the contrary,
always reward obedience with tranquillity of mind, with contentment, and self-
satisfaction'.154 In Stoic language, unlike Hutcheson, Smith could write that
... by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, we necessarily pursue the most
effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some
sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence.
... What is the reward most proper for encouraging industry, prudence, and circumspection?
Success in every sort of business. And is it possible that in the whole of life these virtues should
fail of attaining it? Wealth and external honours are their proper recompense, and the
recompense which they can seldom fail of acquiring.155
In Stoic language, Smith could describe how wealth could be pursued properly by
selfish passions directed by divine guidance through a sense of remorse and duty,
and achieved as a proper reward from the laws of the Deity. Smith used Stoic
language to respond to Mandeville and to show that human nature is not vicious in
the pursuit of wealth, thanks to the self-checking mechanism of the mind, but neither
is it in terms of the benevolence-based utilitarian account of Hutcheson nor the over-
sceptical utilitarian account of Hume. Smith seems not to have agreed with Hume's
terminology for denoting any motive contributing to public benefits as virtuous.
Smith rather argued that self-love could be virtuous because it controls itself out of
self-interest. Smith was to argue that the passions sought a means to an end for the
sake of the means itself, albeit guided or tricked by the Deity. The Deity has
implanted in man even
the passion properly called ambition; a passion, which when it keeps within the bounds of
prudence and justice, is always admired in the world, and has even sometimes a certain irregular
greatness, which dazzles the imagination, when it passes the limits of both these virtues, and is
not only unjust but extravagant: hence, to be approved to proceed more from the passion itself
[as in a case of a man of enterprise and ambition], than a regard to the general rule [as in a case
of a man of dull regularity].156
153 TMS, III. 5. 3, p. 163.
154 TMS, III. 5. 6, pp. 165-6.
155 TMS, III. 5. 7-8, p. 166.
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The selfish passions such as ambition arise from enterprises and great achievements,
rather than from the regard to public benefits and utility. They always ought to be
within the bounds of propriety and justice, aided by such moral sentiments as
remorse and duty, but even if they happen not to be, they effectively bring about
greater merits for prosperity and public utility than the injustice done by them.
Smith's use of Stoic language would show not only that Smith, even though he
shared with Hutcheson and Hume the essence of their criticism of Mandeville, was
not totally convinced by their strategies and semantics, but also that Smith might
have read, criticised and developed the Stoics differently.
The ancient stoics were of opinion, that as the world was governed by the all-ruling providence
of a wise, powerful, and good God, every single event ought to be regarded, as making a
necessary part of the plan of the universe, and as tending to promote the general order and
happiness of the whole; that the vices and follies ofmankind, therefore, made as necessary a part
of this plan as their wisdom or their virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill,
were made to tend equally to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of nature. No
speculation of this kind, however, how deeply soever it might be rooted in the mind, could
diminish our natural abhorrence for vice, whose immediate effects are so destructive, whose
remote ones are too distant to be traced by the imagination. ... It is the same case with those
passions [luxury and caprice] we have been just now considering. Their immediate effects are
so disagreeable, that even when they are most justly provoked, there is still something about
them which disgusts us. These, therefore, are the only passions of which the expressions, as 1
formerly observed, do not dispose and prepare us to sympathise with them, before we are
informed of the cause which excites them. ... It was, it seems, the intention of Nature, that
those rougher and more unamiable emotions, which drive men from one another, should be less
easily and more rarely communicated.157
His understanding of Stoic language in this manner was going to help Smith
innovate the way the language was used and thereby allowed him to proceed from
natural jurisprudence towards political economy. Smith could use Stoic language so
as to develop a theory of justice per se into a new theory of sociability and such
selfish passions and sentiments as parsimony and ambition, as a science of a
legislator. Smith's reading of the Stoics enabled him, like Hume, to read Cicero as a
quasi-Stoic but a bit more sceptical, immune from the rigorous moral perfectionism
of the Stoics which Smith might have seen in Marcus Aurelius's language typically
deployed by Hutcheson. The introduction of a language from Cicero into his theory
156 TMS, III. 6. 7, pp. 173-4.
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of moral sentiments was a new step by Smith toward a new language of political
economy. Political economy could well have been implausible without stepping
further from a mere account of justice. A new language had to be developed wherein
an account of the sense of beauty in relation to other passions could be elaborated in
order to describe how the essentials of life could be supplied without committing
vices. The new language had to be one in which prudence and frugality could be
depicted as well-controlled sentiments, bringing wealth and virtues without
committing vices.
Below, I present Cicero's language of political economy in his Cato Major,
an Essay on Old Age, as one of the languages to which Smith owed a lot in
developing his language of political economy. In this essay, Cicero was explicit that
the account concerned political economy, whose origin had been Xenophon, praising
agriculture as fulfilling both wealth and virtue at the same time.
For many purposes the books of Xenophon are very useful; which read, I pray you, with
diligence, as you are doing. At what length is agriculture praised by him in that book, which
treats of the management ofprivate property, and which is styled " OEconomicus." 158
Cicero had begun the account with questions concerning old age. Among other
things, he asked whether it is true, 'that it deprives us of almost all pleasures'.159
Cicero insisted that old age rather brought about the pleasure of agriculture. First,
agriculture is as profitable as pleasurable.
I come now to the pleasures of husbandmen, with which I am excessively delighted; which are
not checked by any old age, and appear in my mind to make the nearest approach to the life of a
wise man. For they have relation to the earth, which never refuses command, and never returns
without interest that which it hath received; but sometimes with less, generally with very great
interest. And yet for my part it is not only the product, but the virtue and nature of the earth
itself delight me.160
Second, agriculture will bring us to the pleasure and beauty of nature.
157 TMS, I. ii. 3. 4-5. Griswold argues about Smith's criticism of the Stoics in terms of the difference
between Stoic nature and Smith's new concept of nature as revealed in an impartial spectator. See
Griswold, pp. 317-24.
158 Cicero, 'On Old Age', in Cicero (1856), Chapter XVII, p. 243.
159 'On Old Age', Chapter V, p. 223.
160 'On Old Age', Chapter XV, p. 240.
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Of which not only the advantage, as I said before, but also the cultivation and the nature itself
delights me: the rows of props, the joining of the heads, the tying up and propagation of vines,
and the pruning of some twigs, and the grafting of others, which 1 have mentioned. ... Nor
indeed is rural life delighted by reason of corn-fields only and meadows and vineyards and
groves, but also for its gardens and orchards; also for the feeding of cattle, the swarms of bees,
and the variety of all kinds of flowers. Nor do plantings only give me delight, but also
engraftings; than which agriculture has invented nothing more ingenious.161
Third, agriculture is the best profession for old age.
Was then their old age to be pitied, who amused themselves in the cultivation of land? In my
opinion, indeed, I know not whether any other can be more happy: and not only in the discharge
of duty, because to the whole race of mankind the cultivation of the land is beneficial; but also
from the amusement, which I have mentioned, and that fullness and abundance of all things
which are connected with the food of men, and also with the worship of the gods; so that, since
some have a desire for these things, we may again put ourselves on good terms with pleasure.162
Finally, agriculture, above all, achieves wealth, beauty and virtue at the same time:
Nothing can be either more rich in use, or more elegant in appearance than ground well tilled; to
the enjoyment of which old age is so far from being an obstacle, that it is even an invitation and
allurement. For where can that age be better wanned either by basking in the sun or by the fire,
or again be more healthfully refreshed by shades or waters?163
Marcus Aurelius might have praised an independent life in the country against an
ambitious life in the city, contrasting 'the safety and tranquillity' of the former and
'the danger', 'the consternation and trembling' of the latter.164 But his moral
rigorism had ruled out the possibility that ambition could well contribute to enhance
the spirit of old age, encouraging the retired for agriculture, bringing about both
prosperity and virtue through this most productive as well as beautiful and virtuous
industry. Smith developed the language of Cicero in order to make his case that the
retired life of merchant-landowners engaging in the improvement of land was the
ideal as well as the most important way of increasing the wealth of nations.
In Cicero's language, Smith praised agriculture and country gentlemen
engaging in agriculture for two reasons. One is that country gentlemen were the
most virtuous people in a modern commercial society. And the other is that
161 'On Old Age', Chapter XV, pp. 241-2.
162 'On Old Age', Chapter XVI, pp. 242-3.
163 'On Old Age', Chapter XVI, p. 243. Hume also thought that the beauty of a field lay in its fertility
(THN, p. 235).
164 Meditations, XI. 22, p. 429.
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agriculture was the most productive industry in society, and therefore country
gentlemen were consequently contributing most to public benefits. As for the virtues
of country gentlemen and farmers, Smith, first and foremost, thought that these
people were most immune to factional spirits.
Country gentlemen and farmers are, to their great honour, of all people, the least subject to the
wretched spirit of monopoly. The undertaker of a great manufactory is sometimes alarmed if
another work of the same kind is established within twenty miles of him. ... Farmers and
country gentlemen, on the contrary, are generally disposed rather to promote than to obstruct the
cultivation and improvement of their neighbours farms and estates.165
Apparently Smith's statements such as this were written in Cicero's language
because Smith was quoting Cato's words: that is, from a hero featured in Cicero's Of
OldAge:
it is from the farming class that the bravest men and the sturdiest soldiers come, their calling is
most highly respected, their livelihood is most assured and is looked on with the least hostility,
and those who are engaged in that pursuit are least inclined to be disaffected.166
Smith's use of Cicero's language in his political economy would also reveal the
ideological setting in which Smith wrote. The language criticised the voluntarist
language of Addisonian politeness. This is where Smith affiliated himself more
closely to Country Whig view of the virtue of gentlemen rather than Polite Whig
affection for the virtue of urbanity with which Smith, on most other occasions,
showed more sympathy. Smith seems to have been doubtful whether it was always
the case that polite conversations in 'voluntary associations' such as city taverns and
coffee-houses never ended up with 'the corporation spirit' or party rage.167 In
addition to the innocence of factional spirit, the virtuous character of agriculture
165 WN, Book IV, Chapter 11: 'Of Restraints upon the Importation from foreign Countries of such
Goods as can be produced at Home', IV. ii. 21, pp. 461-2. For their innocence of factional spirit, see
also I. x. c. 23, p. 143; IV. v. b. 4; vii. b. 24; viii. 34. See also editors' footnote 25, WN, p. 143.
166 Cato, De Re Rustica, introduction, translated by H. B. Ash (Loeb Classical Library, 1934), pp. 2-3,
quoted at WN, IV. ii. 21, p. 462. See editors' footnote 35, WN, p. 462.
167 See his language in his contempt for townsmen's factional spirit and passions as contrasted with
the virtues of country gentlemen: 'The inhabitants of a town, being collected into one place, can easily
combine together. The most insignificant trades carried on in towns have accordingly, in some place
or other, been incorporated; and even where they have never been incorporated, yet the corporation
spirit, the jealousy of strangers, the aversion to take apprentices, or to communicate the secret of their
trade, generally prevail in them, and often teach them, by voluntary associations and agreements, to
prevent that free competition which they cannot prohibit by bye-laws' (WN, I. x. c. 22, p. 142).
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praised in Smith was the vast knowledge it requires and the consequent superior
judgement and understanding the husbandmen needed to acquire.
After what are called the fine arts, and the liberal professions, however, there is perhaps no trade
which requires so great a variety of knowledge and experience. ... The common ploughman,
though generally regarded as the pattern of stupidity and ignorance, is seldom defective in this
judgment and discretion. He is less accustomed, indeed, to social intercourse than the mechanick
who lives in a town. His voice and language are more uncouth and more difficult to be
understood by those who are not used to them. His understanding, however, being accustomed
to consider a greater variety of objects, is generally much superior to that of the other, whose
whole attention from morning till night is commonly occupied in performing one or two very
simple operations. How much the lower ranks of people in the country are really superior to
those of the town, is well known to every man whom either business or curiosity has led to
converse much with both.168
This view of agriculture as industry had two implications for Smith. One was that
the effect of the division of labour was less conspicuous in agriculture than in other
industries.
The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not admit of so many subdivisions of labour, nor of so
complete a separation of one business from another, as manufactures. ... This impossibility of
making so complete and entire a separation of all the different branches of labour employed in
agriculture, is perhaps the reason why the improvement of the productive powers of labour in
this art, does not always keep pace with their improvement in manufactures.169
But this was hardly a concern to Smith as evidence of the virtue of this Adam's
profession. Rather, agriculture was the most virtuous profession thanks to its
difficulty in subdividing the operations and the consequent requirement of greater
knowledge on the part of a workman. This virtue would keep husbandmen not so
ignorant as those workers in manufactures amidst the increasing division of labour in
a modern commercial society.170
In Cicero's language, Smith also praised agriculture and country gentlemen
engaging in agriculture because agriculture was the most productive industry in
society, and country gentlemen were consequently contributing most to public
benefits. Productivity was, as in Cicero, attributed to the nature involved in
168 WN, Book I, Chapter X: 'OfWages and Profit in the different Employments of Labour and Stock',
Part II: 'Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe', I. x. c. 23-4, p. 143-4. See also V. i. f. 50;
LJ {B), 328. See editors' footnote 28, WN, p. 144.
169 WN, Book I, Chapter I: 'Of the Division of Labour', I. i. 4, p. 16. See also IV. ix. 35; LJ {A), vi.
30-1; (B), 214.
170 WN, V. i. f. 50.
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No equal capital puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour than that of the farmer.
Not only his labouring servants, but his labouring cattle, are productive labourers. In agriculture
too nature labours along with man; and though her labour costs no expence, its produce has its
value, as well as that of the most expensive workmen. ... The labourers and labouring cattle
therefore, employed in agriculture, not only occasion, like the workmen in manufactures, the
reproduction of a value equal to their own consumption, or to the capital which employs them,
together with its own profit; but of a much greater value. Over and above the capital of the
farmer and all its profits, they regularly occasion the reproduction of the rent of the landlord.
This rent may be considered as the produce of those powers of nature, the use of which the
landlord lends to the farmer. ... It is the work of nature which remains after deducting or
compensating every thing which can be regarded as the work of man. ... No equal quantity of
productive labour employed in manufactures can ever occasion so great a reproduction. In them
nature does nothing; man does all; and the reproduction must always be in proportion to the
strength of the agents that occasion it.171
Manufactures therefore produce no rent, and therefore add less value to the annual
produce of labour in society and to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants.
The capital of the landlord, on the contrary, which is fixed in the improvement of his land, seems
to be as well secured as the nature of human affairs can admit of. The beauty of the country
besides, the pleasures of a country life, the tranquillity of mind which it promises, and wherever
the injustice of human laws does not disturb it, the independency which it really affords, have
charms that more or less attract every body; and as to cultivate the ground was the original
destination of man, so in every stage of his existence he seems to retain a predilection for this
primitive employment.172
In this language, 'independence' was synonymous to 'beauty', as in Hutcheson's
Stoic terminology. Smith ventured that, not only in terms of its own absolute
advantage, but also in terms of the relative advantage of agriculture in relation to the
general interest of the society, agriculture was by far the most advantageous industry
in society. By classifying the revenues of society into three: that is, rent, wages and
profit, Smith concluded that the interest of those who live by rent (the nobility and
country gentlemen) 'is strictly and inseparably connected with the general interest of
the society'.173 On the other hand, the interest of those who live by profit (the
merchants and manufacturers) 'has not the same connection with the general interest
of the society'. For, 'the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the
171 WN, Book II, Chapter V: 'Of the different Employment of Capitals', II. v. 12, pp. 363-4. See also
V. i. a. 9, pp. 694-5.
172 WN, III. i. 3, p. 378.
173 WN, Book I, Chapter XI: 'Of the Rent of Land', I. xi. p. 8, p. 265.
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prosperity, and fall with the declension of the society'.174 Though necessary, trading
and manufacture were, therefore, not the most advantageous professions for public
benefits. What was more, because trading and manufacture were generally prone to
the factional spirit, they were not the most virtuous industry, either.175 On the other
hand, the interest of those who live by wages (the labourers) 'is as strictly connected
with the interest of the society as that of the' nobility and country gentlemen. They
tend however to be ignorant of their own interest, because of their miserable
conditions, poor education and habits unfit for judgement.176 This would jeopardise
the possibility of making their professions the most advantageous to and productive
of public benefits. This was equally the case with the nobility, because of their
indolence and sloth, even though their interest was in line with the general interest of
the public.177 The order of people Smith eventually pinpointed as the most
productive and advantageous, as well as the most virtuous in society, was
consequently the country gentlemen, who engaged in the improvement of their land
in order fully to understand their interest and that of the society.178 This was because
A gentleman who farms a part of his own estate, after paying the expence of cultivation, should
gain both the rent of the landlord and the profit of the farmer. He is apt to denominate, however,
his whole gain, profit, and thus confounds rent with profit, at least in common language. The
greater part of our North American and West Indian planters are in this situation. They farm, the
greater part of them, their own estates, and accordingly we seldom hear of the rent of a
plantation, but frequently of its profit.179
Gentlemen actively engaged in farming were the most advantageous to the increase
of the wealth of nations, because their interest mattered as both landlord and investor
at the same time, unlike that of the nobility indulging and simply collecting their
rents. In particular, those Smith had in mind were the merchants who had turned
country gentlemen and embarked on the improvement of their estates:
174 WN, I.xi. p. 10, p. 266.
175 Their acute understanding of their own interest would eventually be even dangerous to public
benefits: 'The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought
always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been
long carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention'
(WN, I. xi. p. 10, pp. 266-7).
176 WN, I. xi. p. 9, p. 266.
177 WN, I. xi. p. 8, p. 265.
178 On this issue in Smith, see also Phillipson (1983), pp. 191-3 and 197.
179 WN, Book I, Chapter VI: 'Of the component Parts of the Price of Commodities', I. vi. 20, p. 70.
The Stoics, Cicero and Scottish classical political economy 274
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
the wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was frequently employed in purchasing such
lands as were to be sold, of which a great part would frequently be uncultivated. Merchants are
commonly ambitious of becoming country gentlemen, and when they do, they are generally the
best of all improvers. A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable
projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chiefly in expence. ...
Those different habits affect their temper and disposition in every sort of business. A merchant
is commonly a bold; a country gentleman, a timid undertaker. ... The habits, besides, of order,
oeconomy and attention, to which mercantile business naturally forms a merchant, render him
much fitter to execute, with profit and success, any project of improvement.180
These merchant-landowners were consequently the people who had contributed most
to introduce 'order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of
individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a
continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their
superiors'.181 These merchant-landowners provided clear evidence for Smith that
there was at least one profession, agricultural improvement achieved by retired
merchants in their old age, which could well establish a bridge between wealth and
virtue. They seemed to Smith to provide a counter-proof to Mandeville's claim that
it was impossible to achieve both wealth and virtue at the same time. As in
Hutcheson, 'beauty' was the term which linked 'wealth' and 'virtue' and Smith
sought to show how the 'beauty' of the profession pursued by these retired merchants
in their old age produced both wealth and virtue. They could combine the most
productive industry with their attention and application, the virtues most required for
agricultural improvement, that they had formerly acquired as successful merchants.182
180 WN, Book III, Chapter IV: 'How the Commerce of the Towns contributed to the Improvement of
the Country', III. iv. 3, pp. 411-2. R. G. Wilton casts a doubt on Smith's remark, that the merchants
who became landed proprietors 'were the best of all improvers', on the grounds that 'the mercantile
contribution to economic advance during this period' is still an open question. See R. G. Wilton
(1971), p. 146. His paper presents an example of a failure in improvement by merchant-landowners
with the case of the merchant house of Denison in the West Riding of Yorkshire.
181 Smith added that 'Mr. Hume is the only writer who, so far as I know, has hitherto taken notice of
it' (WN, III. iv. 4, p. 412).
182 Smith might well have written about these merchant-landowners as the only alternative in Scotland
to yeomanry in England, who had more secure landownership than farmers in Scotland, as the
yeomanry had not emerged in Scotland. Indeed, eighteenth-century Glasgow, where Smith was a
professor ofmoral philosophy, saw many wealthy colonial merchants, instead of yeoman, who would
go on to purchase land in the country and venture upon improvement. For these examples, see
Graham, pp. 66, 129, 130, 143, 203, 206 and 512-3; Mizuta, pp. 37, 40 and 76; T. M. Devine (1971),
pp. 205-44. Devine concludes that, in the period 1770-1815, 'Merchants were as eager as ever to buy
land and there still appeared to be enough of it to satisfy those who had the necessary financial
sources to acquire it. Quite clearly few commodities could provide, in quite the same way as an estate
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It is worth noting that Hume was rather critical of urban citizens converting
into country gentlemen by the purchase of land, because of its effects on keeping the
already-high rates of the profits of commerce, failing to encourage the circulation of
money and thereby failing to encourage industry.183 Smith on the other hand praised
agriculture as the most productive and virtuous profession and recommended it for
the old age of the town merchants. This may have been due to their different
understandings of Cicero, and their accordingly different ways of introducing
Cicero's language into their writings. Hume may have read Cicero as a more sceptic
moralist, whereas Smith seems to have regarded Cicero as somewhat between a Stoic
and a sceptic, even if not entirely as Stoic as Hutcheson would have liked to believe.
This led Smith into thinking that the most important virtue brought in by
these merchant-landowners was their 'independence', a synonym of'beauty' in Stoic
language, and their capacity to judge and to practice improvement on their own
initiative. Smith illustrated merchant-landowners in the North American colonies as
an example, whose economy he thought was progressing most rapidly.184 Smith
described their prosperity in Stoic language, emphasising that 'Plenty of good land,
and liberty to manage their own affairs their own way, seem to be the two great
causes of the prosperity of all new colonies'.183 On the one hand, certainly, there
would have been circumstantial advantages for landlords in those new colonies, such
as high wages, high growth of population and rapid improvement.186 Also, as
agriculture was the most advantageous industry for increasing wealth, Smith
believed, it would have been the case that 'It has been the principal cause of the rapid
progress of our American colonies towards wealth and greatness, that almost their
whole capitals have hitherto been employed in agriculture'.187 On the other hand,
however, there must have been two factors only therewith all these conditions could
have been met. One was the political institutions of the British colonies that was
could, for the social, aesthetic and financial needs of the eighteenth-century businessman' (Devine
(1971), p. 235).
183 Essays, Essay 9: 'Of Public Credit', p. 354.
184 WN, IV. vii. b. 15, p. 571.
185 WN, Book IV, Chapter VI: 'Of Colonies', Part Second: 'Causes of the Prosperity of new Colonies',
IV. vii. b. 16, p. 572.
186 WN, IV. vii. b. 2-3, pp. 565-6.
m WN, 11. v. 21, p. 366.
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more favourable to the improvement and cultivation of land than those of any other
nation.188 The other was the independence of the merchant-landowners that allowed
them to decide and practice in their own interests. In Ciceronian language, Smith
depicted the British North American colonies as the most rapidly progressing
economy under British political institutions which allowed free trade, and where
independent merchant-landowners naturally and necessarily concentrated their
capital into agriculture, thus following their own interest. This was also to postulate
the Ciceronian imperative that agriculture is the most productive industry and the
most advantageous to an increase in the wealth of nations.
For a legislator, 'the great object of the political oeconomy of every country,
is to encrease the riches and power of that country'. Agriculture was therefore, as the
most productive industry, that sector of the economy where the greatest share of the
country's capital should be invested to achieve the greatest possible value of its
annual produce. For, the annual produce of the state was the fund from which a
legislator must be paid all the taxes. To do so, he had to do nothing more than to let
the share of the capital of the country flow freely into all the sectors of economy for
its own interest, because agriculture would naturally and necessarily attract the
greatest share of capital. In Smith's science of a legislator, it would always be the
case therefore that, as long as all sectors of the economy get capital as much as 'what
would naturally flow into them of its own accord', any country can achieve the
greatest possible value of its annual produce, riches and power.189 The British North
American colonies were the ideal political economy where capital flow was left free
of political interference and merchant-landowners could fully exploit their capital for
their own interest. They could thus act in a way which would consequently but
unintentionally maximise the value of the public annual produce, riches and power.
Smith's 'invisible hand' paragraph in The Wealth ofNations must be read as being
based on this assumption. The 'invisible hand' works only when capital in
agriculture puts into motion a greater quantity of domestic industry and gives
revenue and employment to a greater number of the inhabitants of a country than an
188 WN, IV. vii. b. 17-21, pp. 572-5.
mWN, II. v. 31, p. 372.
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equal capital employed in any other sector of the economy.190 I agree with Phillipson
in arguing that nowhere was Smith's thinking more powerful than in his insight into
the fact that men are apt to value notions of propriety and justice for aesthetic rather
than for functional reasons, and, more generally, all the satisfactions of life in
relation to 'the order, the regular and harmonious movement of the system, the
machine or oeconomy of means of which it is produced', rather than utility.191 But
that 'invisible hand' paragraph in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, and the chapter in
The Wealth ofNations about the unintended consequences of intentional actions, are
not 'quasi-Mandevillian', as Phillipson and others have thought.192 My thesis has
been attempting to show that Smith's insight was neither Mandevillian nor
Hutchesonian nor Humean, but quite peculiarly Smithian, whose equivalent was
found nowhere else in other Enlightenment writers. This was one of very few
passages where Smith claimed originality, quite correctly and, indeed, quite
unusually for him. In this chapter I have tried to show that Smith's insight into the
unintended consequences of intentional actions in the 'invisible hand" paragraph and
elsewhere was written in Stoic language derived from his distinctive reading of the
Stoics. On the one hand, the 'invisible hand' passage and many more in Smith
would have been inspired by Stoic ideas of sociability, of sympathy between fellows
and harmony within the society, of the guiding hand of providence behind individual
causes or the independence of individuals. Smith used the Stoic language of beauty,
such as the phrase, 'of its own accord', unambiguously emphasising the
independence of each sector of the economy and the harmony between the sectors
within the economy. This language was useful for Smith for two reasons. It was
useful therein to present both his praise of agriculture, following Cicero, and his
criticism of factional spirits in foreign trading, thus following Hume. It was as much
useful for Smith therein to do so but without committing himself to what he thought
of as an error by the mercantilists as well as by the physiocrats in advocating or
criticising a particular sector of the economy beyond 'its own accord'. This was
190IV. ii. 5-8, pp. 454-5. The 'invisible hand' paragraph follows at IV. ii. 9, pp. 455-6, quoted above.
See also IV. ii. 3-4, pp. 453-4, and IV. v. a. 3, pp. 505-6.
191 TMS, IV. 1. 10, p. 183, quoted above; Phillipson (2000), pp. 82-3.
192 See Phillipson (2000), p. 82.
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Stoic language describing the sense of beauty in Marcus Aurelius, which Smith
might have had in mind:
The governing part is that which rouses, and turns, and forms itself, such as it chuses to be; and
makes every event appear such to itself, as it inclines.193
What remains as valuable? This one thing, I imagine, to move, or stop yourself, in all desires or
pursuits, according to the proper fabric or structure of your nature: for, this is what all design and
art is tending to; this is all its aim, that the thing formed by art, should be adapted to the work it
is designed for. This, the planter, and the vine-dresser, the horse-rider, and the breeder of the
hound, are in quest of. ... Will you not, then, cease to value other things? If you do not, you
will never attain to freedom, self-contentment, independency, or tranquillity....194
Independent agents and their taste would choose their own professions and
businesses as their interests 'incline', so such a taste should be exploited by
legislators, let free to achieve the maximum value of annual produce, riches and
power of the country. As anything 'valuable' consists in the thing 'adapted to the
work' and 'its aim', or in 'all design and art' fitted to its purpose, taste would, if left
free, lead people into 'freedom, self-contentment, independency, or tranquillity'.
Smith developed Stoic language into his own language of political economy to argue
that taste was the source of industry, guiding people 'in all desires and pursuits,
according to the proper fabric or structure of your nature'. If agriculture were
pursued for its own beauty, without any regard for its advantage, its advantages
(profits) could be maximised. On the other hand, if its advantage is vigorously
intended, the advantage can not be maximised. As expressed in the 'invisible hand'
passage,
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who
affected to trade for the publick good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among
merchants, and very few words need to be employed in dissuading them from it.195
The concept of independence in Stoic language was then refined into Smith's policy
193 Meditations, VI. 8, p. 213. 'The governing part' may have meant 'reason' in Marcus Aurelius, but
Smith would well have interpreted this as 'prudence', which depended on, in Smith's view,
understanding, reason and self-command, as shown below.
194 Meditations, VI. 16, pp. 220-1.
195 WN, IV. ii. 9, pp. 455-6. Equally, Smith thought that restraints invented by country gentlemen and
farmers upon the importation of foreign goods, intending to secure to them the monopoly of the home
market, did them harm (IV. ii. 21, p. 462).
The Stoics, Cicero and Scottish classical political economy 279
The 'private vices, public benefits' controversy
advocacy for free trade, criticising Mandeville's idea of statecraft, which had been
presented as a satire of the Stoic.
Is it not cruel, to restrain men from desiring, or pursuing, what appears to them as their proper
good or advantage? And yet you seem chargeable in a certain manner with this conduct, when
you are angry at the mistakes, and wrong actions ofmen: for, all are carried toward what appears
to them their proper good.196
It would have been of no surprise had a statement such as this been written by Smith
himself. Smith's free market policy proposal might have been a product of his
criticism of London mercantile interests against Scottish merchant-landowners'
agricultural as well as colonial interests, in parallel with his criticism of Mandeville
who had approved of the London merchants' vices as useful for metropolitan
prosperity.
In the 6th and final edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments (1790), Smith
seems to have described the merchant-landowner as the Stoic prudent man, who
would follow the path to both wealth and virtue. In that last edition of his work,
Smith called for a more austere Stoicism to arm the modern citizen against the
rigours of commercial civilisation, as his faith in the civilising powers of commerce
became more muted in the face of what he saw as the corruption of moral
sentiments.197 In a new chapter added in this edition, Smith reflected that the
distinction of ranks and the orders of society, though necessary, were based on the
corruption of our moral sentiments caused by our disposition to admire the rich and
the powerful and to despise the poor and the mean.198 The corruption could be seen,
Smith argued, in the fact that far more attention was paid to wealth than to wisdom.
The objects of ambition and emulation are respect and admiration from mankind, for
which two different roads are presented: the road to virtue by the study of wisdom,
and that to fortune by the acquisition of wealth and power. Our moral sentiments are
corrupt, Smith thought, because the great mob of mankind are most frequently the
196 Meditations, VI. 27, pp. 227-8.
197 Phillipson (2000), pp. 83-4.
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disinterested admirers and worshippers of wealth and greatness, rather than of
wisdom and virtue.199 Still, consolation for Smith was what a prudent man from the
middling and inferior ranks of society could well achieve in terms of both wealth and
virtue.
In the middling and inferior stations of life, the road to virtue and that to fortune, to such fortune,
at least, as men in such stations can reasonably expect to acquire, are, happily in most cases, very
nearly the same. In all the middling and inferior professions, real and solid professional abilities,
joined to prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success. ... In such
situations, therefore, we may generally expect a considerable degree of virtue; and, fortunately
for the good morals of society, these are the situations of by far the greatest part ofmankind.200
This was what Smith had called 'the natural state', and Smith appreciated these Stoic
qualities that could be seen in this 'natural state' of mankind. On the contrary, the
superior stations of life were incapable of the love of praise-worthiness, and
consequently void of happiness, which could not be acquired by wealth alone.201 The
argument then evolved into his evaluation of the Stoic criticism of ambition as well
as his development of the argument of praise-worthiness in the subsequent new
chapters in the final edition of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments.
Smith now developed the distinction between the love of praise and that of
praise-worthiness in Stoic language.202
this desire of the approbation, and this aversion to the disapprobation of his brethren, would not
alone have rendered him fit for that society for which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has
endowed him, not only with a desire of being approved of, but of a desire of being what ought to
be approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in other men. The first desire could
only have made him wish to appear to be fit for society. The second was necessary in order to
render him anxious to be really fit. The first could only have prompted him to the affectation of
virtue, and to the concealment of vice. The second was necessary in order to inspire him with
the real love of virtue, and with the real abhorrence of vice.203
In his argument, Smith was to advance further his criticism of Mandeville with his
198 TMS, Part I, Section III, Chapter III: 'Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is
occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of
poor and mean condition', I. iii. 3. 1, p. 61.
199 TMS, I. iii. 3. 2, p. 62.
200 TMS, I. iii. 3. 5, p. 63.
201 TMS, I. iii. 3. 6-8, pp. 63-6.
202 TMS, Part III, Chapter II: 'Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread
of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness', III. 2. 6-35, pp. 116-34.
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account on sociability written in Stoic language, because if the love of praise resulted
in nothing more than 'the concealment of vice', seeking virtues could still be vicious,
as Mandeville had argued. But his argument of the love of praise-worthiness made
way for Smith to criticise Mandeville:
Some splenetic philosophers, in judging of human nature, have done as peevish individuals are
apt to do in judging of the conduct of one another, and have imputed to the love of praise, or to
what they call vanity, every action which ought to be ascribed to that of praise-worthiness.204
In reply to the charges against human nature, Smith also responded by distinguishing
two groups of people. On the one hand, there is 'the man of correct and modest
virtue', who understands his own praise-worthiness, aims only at the praise due to
him and therefore feels happiness. On the other hand, there is 'the man of excessive
self-estimation', or 'the proud and the vain man', who can never be contented.20' As
pride and vanity had been the two main passions emphasised by Mandeville, Smith
still thought it necessary to criticise Mandeville's moral theory in his last edition of
The Theory ofMoral Sentiments. For this, Smith used Stoic language to defend the
sociability of human nature against the charges made by Mandeville:
in being anxious to avoid the shadow of blame or reproach, there may be no weakness, but
frequently the most praise-worthy prudence. ... The all-wise Author of Nature has, in this
manner, taught man to respect the sentiments and judgments of his brethren; to be more or less
pleased when they approve of his conduct, and to be more or less hurt when they disapprove of
it. He has made man, if I may say so, the immediate judge of mankind; and has, in this respect,
as in many others, created him after his own image, and appointed him his vicegerent upon earth,
to superintend the behaviour of his brethren.206
What, then, if such an impartial spectator failed? What if 'their own consciences',
'the supposed impartial and well-informed spectator', 'the man within the breast, the
great judge and arbiter of their conduct' were 'astonished and confounded by the
vehemence and clamour of the man without'? Smith however asserted that a
humbled and afflicted man could 'appeal to a still higher tribunal, to that of the all-
seeing Judge of the world, whose eye can never be deceived, and whose judgments
203 TMS, III. 2. 6, pp. 116-7. See also VII. iv. 24, p. 336 as an addition in the final edition to the
argument.
204 TMS, III. 2. 27, p. 127.
205 TMS, VI. iii. 31, p. 253, VI. iii. 33-4, p. 255 and VI. iii. 50-1, p. 261.
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can never be perverted'.207 Smith finally resorted to the Stoic doctrine:
Our happiness in this life is thus, upon many occasions, dependent upon the humble hope and
expectation of a life to come: a hope and expectation deeply rooted in human nature; .... That
there is a world to come, where exact justice will be done to every man, ... is a doctrine, in every
respect so venerable, so comfortable to the weakness, so flattering to the grandeur of human
nature, that the virtuous man who has the misfortune to doubt of it, cannot possibly avoid
wishing most earnestly and anxiously to believe it.208
Even at the end of his life, revising his general theory of morals for the final edition
of The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Smith still regarded Stoic philosophy as a useful
means to defend the sociability of human nature and its love of praise-worthiness
against the charges made by Mandeville.
The most extensive addition in the final edition of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments however developed his account of who would be capable of such a
quality as the love of praise-worthiness. This was to be examined in his analysis of
the virtue of prudence. In Smith, prudence was to be defined as the virtue whose
proper business is the care of objects upon which the comfort and happiness of the
individual in this life are supposed principally to depend.209 The first and the
principal object of prudence is security, keeping our health, our fortune, our rank or
reputation away from any sort of hazard. Smith wrote that 'It is rather cautious than
enterprising, and more anxious to preserve the advantages which we already possess,
than forward to prompt us to the acquisition of still greater advantages'. It only
recommends to us 'real knowledge and skill in our trade or profession, assiduity and
industry in the exercise of it, frugality, and even some degree of parsimony, in all our
expences'.210 Smith's description of such a prudent man could well have been a
portrait of a retired merchant-landowner.2" To begin with,
his friendship is not that ardent and passionate, but too often transitory affection, which appears
so delicious to the generosity of youth and inexperience. It is a sedate, but steady and faithful
attachment to a few well-tried and well-chosen companions; in the choice of whom he is not
206 TMS, III. 2. 29 and 31, pp. 128 and 130. As for Cicero, see III. 2. 30, p. 128.
207 TMS, III. 2. 32-3, pp. 130-1.
208 TMS, III. 2. 33, p. 132.
209 TMS, Part VI: 'Of the Character of Virtue', Section I; 'Of the Character of the Individual, so far as
it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence', VI. i. 5, p. 213.
210 TMS, VI. i. 6, p. 213.
211 TMS, VI. i. 7-13, pp. 213-6.
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guided by the giddy admiration of shining accomplishments, but by the sober esteem ofmodesty,
discretion, and good conduct.
This is because the ways of those convivial societies and the jollity and gaiety of
their conversation 'might too often interfere with the regularity of his temperance,
might interrupt the steadiness of his industry, or break in upon the strictness of his
frugality'.212 In the steadiness of his industry and frugality, his proper exertion of
self-command would be approved and even applauded by 'the impartial spectator,
and of the representative of the impartial spectator, the man within the breast'.213
Such friendships among prudent men were described with Ciceronian characteristics,
as 'arising not from a constrained sympathy, not from a sympathy which has been
assumed and rendered habitual for the sake of conveniency and accommodation; but
from a natural sympathy, from an involuntary feeling that the persons to whom we
attach ourselves'. Such friendships were again to be contrasted with relationships
and intimacies among youths which in Smith's view 'can by no means deserve the
sacred and venerable name of friendship'.214 Furthermore, agriculture would be the
profession for the prudent man, because
He has no anxiety to change so comfortable a situation, and does not go in quest of new
enterprise and adventures, which might endanger, but could not well increase, the secure
tranquillity which he actually enjoys. If he enters into any new projects or enterprises, they are
likely to be well concerted and well prepared. He can never be hurried or drove into them by
any necessity, but has always time and leisure to deliberate soberly and coolly concerning what
are likely to be their consequences.215
As agriculture had been eagerly depicted as the most productive, secure, tranquil as
well as virtuous industry in The Wealth ofNations, the prudent man could hardly
embark on anything else. In fact, the prudent man was supposed to be 'not a bustler
in business where he has no concern; is not a meddler on other people's affairs'.
Therefore, 'He is averse to enter into any party dispute, hates faction, and is not
always very forward to listen to the voice even of noble and great ambition'. This
should remind us of a portrait of country gentlemen, free from faction, and can act as
212 TMS, VI. i. 9, p. 214.
213 TMS, VI. i. 11, p. 215.
214 TMS, VI. ii. 1. 18, pp. 224-5.
215 TMS, VI. i. 12, p. 215.
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a counter-portrait to the factional mercantile interests that Smith had so fiercely
attacked. Contrary to such factional merchants, prudent men could contribute most
to public benefits, and therefore would be most sociable. If the care of the
individuals is preserved by everyone, the total care of society would be maximised as
a whole, which would consequently contribute most to the happiness and benefits of
the public. To Smith, this was because
Every man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended to his own care; and
every man is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler to take care of himself than of any other
person. Every man feels his own pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other
people.216
That wisdom which contrived the system of human affections, as well as that of every other part
of nature, seems to have judged that the interest of the great society of mankind would be best
promoted by directing the principal attention of each individual to that particular portion of it,
which was most within the sphere both of his abilities and of his understanding.217
Needless to say, this was a statement, rewritten in Stoic language, of the
presupposition in his free trade policy, whose greatest contributors and benefactors
had been supposed to be country gentlemen. But the statement would now reveal
Smith's distinctive reading of the Stoics. Smith considered that Marcus Aurelius's
The Meditations turned principally upon the highest virtue of universal benevolence
from the divine Being.218 But universal benevolence was, in Smith, not so important
as the virtue of prudence.
The administration of the great system of the universe, however, the care of the universal
happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and not of man. To man is
allotted a much humbler department, but one much more suitable to the weakness of his powers,
and to the narrowness of his comprehension; the care of his own happiness, of that of his family,
his friends, his country.219
In newly-written sentences of Part VII, Smith was critical of Marcus Aurelius
because, in his reading, he was the great apostle of one of the two fundamental
doctrines of the Stoic morality; 'the most entire submission to the order of
216 TMS, Part VI, Section 11: 'Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of
other People', Chapter 1: 'Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our care
and attention', VI. ii. 1. 1, p. 219.
217 TMS, VI. ii. 2. 4, p. 229. See also VI. ii. 2. 10, p. 231.
218 TMS, Part VI, Section II, Chapter III: 'Of universal Benevolence', VI. ii. 3. 5, pp. 236-7.
219 TMS, VI. ii. 3. 6, p. 237.
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Providence; the most complete contentment with every event which the current of
human affairs could possibly cast up'. Marcus Aurelius was 'the mild, the humane,
the benevolent' philosopher who preached natural but a sort of the perfect sociability
of man.220 Rather, Smith preferred to focus his reading of the Stoics on 'what we
may call the practical morality of the Stoics', or 'the doctrine of those imperfect, but
attainable virtues', 'which they supposed them capable of exercising, not rectitudes,
but proprieties, fitnesses, decent and becoming actions, ... what Cicero expresses by
the Latin word officia, and Seneca, I think more exactly, by that of convenientia' ,221
The Stoics seemed to Smith to be much too rigorous in their preaching that the
perfect virtue capable of universal benevolence was the business of men, rather than
of God.222
Finally, Smith sought to evaluate the Stoic virtue of self-command. Self-
command was necessary to support knowledge so as to enable the individual to do
his duty by controlling his own passions.221 Self-command enhances the beauty of
other virtues as well as the calamity of vices,224 and is, above all, important for the
virtue of prudence:
it is from the unremitting steadiness of those gentler exertions of self-command, that the amiable
virtue of chastity, that the respectable virtues of industry and frugality, derive all that sober lustre
which attends them. The conduct of all those who are contented to walk in the humble paths of
private and peaceable life, derives from the same principle the greater part of the beauty and
grace which belong to it; a beauty and grace, which, though much less dazzling, is not always
less pleasing than those which accompany the more splendid actions of the hero, the statesman,
or the legislator.225
In sum, Smith's distinctive understanding of the Stoic virtue of prudence as such was
derived from his distinctive reading of the Stoics. Smith regarded prudence as
linking wealth and virtue, controlling the selfish passion of ambition through the
sense of beauty. This argument was not only a way of criticising Mandeville, but
also a way of developing Hume's utilitarian criticism of Mandeville. Hume had
220 TMS, VII. ii. 1. 35, p. 288. See also VII. ii. 1. 37, pp. 288-9, Meditations, III. II, IX. 3 and editors'
footnote 39, TMS, p. 288.
221 TMS, VII. ii. 1.42, pp. 291-2.
222 TMS, VII. ii. 1. 43-7, pp. 292-3.
223 TMS, Part VI, Section III: 'Of Self-command', VI. iii. 1, p. 237.
224 TMS, VI. iii. 11-2, p. 241.
225 TMS, VI. iii. 13, p. 242.
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considered that our approbation of virtue was derived from a perception of beauty
which resulted from the appearance of the utility of characters and actions to be
judged of.226 Smith thought of our approbation of virtue as derived from 'a sense of
propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility'.227 The virtue of prudence
consists of superior reason and understanding and self-command, and is admired not
primarily for its utility but for its propriety. For, those qualities of reason and
understanding are approved not merely as useful or advantageous but as just, right
and accurate,228 and that of self-command is admired just as much under the aspect of
propriety as under that of utility. When the practice of prudence is proper, the
eminent esteem arises 'in the practice of frugality, industry and application, though
directed to no other purpose than the acquisition of fortune'.229 In other words, self-
command is the virtue which supported other virtues such as prudence, and has its
own beauty.
The command of... passions, independent of the beauty which it derives from its utility; from its
enabling us upon all occasions to act according to the dictates of prudence, of justice, and of
proper benevolence; has a beauty of its own, and seems to deserve for its own sake a certain
degree of esteem and admiration.230
Smith's strategy for criticising Mandeville was therefore not Humean: as seen in his
conclusion of Part VI, Smith thought that reason, understanding and self-command,
which constitute the virtue of prudence, should be exerted by the sense of propriety,
rather than by the sense of utility as Hume had thought:
Those passions which are restrained by the sense of propriety, are all in some degree moderated
and subdued by it. But those which are restrained only by prudential considerations of any kind,
are, on the contrary, frequently inflamed by the restraint, and sometimes (long after the
provocation given, and when nobody is thinking about it) burst out absurdly and unexpectedly,
and with tenfold fury and violence.231
Smith, along with Hutcheson and Hume, was criticising Mandeville's argument
about the contradiction between wealth and virtue, but only with his own
226 TMS, IV. 2. 2-3, pp. 187-8.
227 TMS, IV. 2. 5, p. 188.
228 TMS, IV. 2. 7, p. 189.
229 TMS, IV. 2. 8, pp. 189-90.
230 TMS, VI. iii. 4, p. 238. VI. iii. 5-13, pp. 238-42 describes the beauty of self-command.
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understanding of the Stoic virtue, and in his own particular use of Stoic language, as
distinct from Hutcheson's and Hume's use of that language. This was the strategy
which made way for Smith to destroy Mandeville's paradox, 'private vices, public
benefits', for the first time in a non-utilitarian way. This was also the strategy which
allowed Smith to reconstruct a neo-Stoic system of moral philosophy in the post-
Humean age after Hume had already demolished Hutcheson's Stoic system of moral
philosophy.
231 TMS, VI. concl. 3-4, p. 263.
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Conclusion
My dissertation has tried to show that eighteenth-century Scottish moral philosophy
was partly a response to Mandeville's theory of passions, sentiments and sociability
in what I have called the 'private vices, public benefits' controversy. In other words,
I have tried to write 'the Mandevillian Moment' in the Scottish Enlightenment in
place of 'the Machiavellian Moment' as Pocock has presented. Scottish moral
philosophy throughout the eighteenth century was more or less influenced by
Mandeville with his graphic paradox that such 'private vices' as pride, vanity and
ambition alone could contribute to 'public benefits'. It revolved around the question
of how to direct the acquisitive passions driving men into commercial relations into
supplying their need so as to establish sustainable sociability in the newly-emerging
commercial society in Britain.
John Pocock has argued that, since the civic humanist framework presents the
ideal of republican virtue as a weapon that could be used to attack the Whig regime,
it presents Scottish social theory as the latter's philosophical defence. He concludes
that their delineation of commercial society was therefore not a criticism of
aristocracy but a vindication of it in its Whig shape.' This suggestion presumes that
Scottish social theory was identical to the ideological basis of Whig policies. My
dissertation has tried to disprove the case, by showing that Scottish social theory was
primarily and fundamentally formulated against modern Court Whiggism. It
presumes that Polite Whiggism, from which Scottish social theory seems to have
evolved, should be distinguished from modern Court Whiggism.
My thesis will consequently cast new light on Pocock's further question
following his presupposition: whether commercial ideology can be thought of as
having at any period triumphed over the republican ideology of civic patriotism and
' Pocock (1983), p. 243. See my Introduction, pp. 3-4.
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virtue, or even driven it from the field. Pocock suggests that civic and commercial
ideologies were struggling with one another at least down to the era of Smith and
Millar, and that it is doubtful whether there had been a time when the former may be
said to have been disappeared entirely.2 He argued that in the era of Smith and
Millar the effects of the division of labour on the labourer were beginning to arouse
concern, presuming that this concern might have been about the civic capacity and
virtue which employer and labourer were thought by Smith and Millar to be in
danger of losing.3 My thesis suggests that the question itself does not necessarily
lead to a crucial interpretation of Scottish social theory. For, Scottish social theory
seems to have evolved from Polite Whig ideology which already contained some
elements from Country Whiggism, and the Scots version of polite ideology also
made use of Country elements whenever it was necessary and useful for their
refutation of Court Whig ideology and policy.
With his theoretical differentiation between civic humanism and natural
jurisprudence, Pocock has summed up his subject as follows: if there were a specific
vocabulary and language of civic humanism, together with others derived from it,
existing side-by-side with the language of natural jurisprudence, the relationship
between them is to be determined.4 What Pocock has suggested as a possible
strategy to use in confronting the problem is to assume that the civic humanist and
jurisprudential languages entailed distinct and opposing sets of ideological values,
and that the relation between them therefore existed in a state of ideological tension."
My thesis would indicate that this seems not to be the case: Polite Whiggism and
Scottish social theory were constructed primarily against Court Whiggism, by
extracting ideas useful and effective for their purpose from both civic humanist or
Country Whiggism and the natural law tradition. In his argument as early as 1983,
Pocock seems not yet to have reached a clear distinction between Polite Whigs and
Court Whigs. For instance, he stated that 'The individual who found his rights in the
possession and conveyance of property was easier to depict as the inhabitant of a
2 Pocock (1983), p. 244. See my Introduction, p. 4.
3 Pocock (1983), p. 245.
4 Pocock (1983), pp. 249-50. See my Introduction, p. 3.
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commercial and polite society, held together by the exchange of goods and
sympathies, than the individual who affirmed his virtue in the austere equalities of
purely civic action' [my italics].6
Pocock's other possible solution to his problem looks more promising, based
on Quentin Skinner's argument of Ciceronian and Senecan modes of humanism of
the sixteenth century. Skinner argues that the tension between virtue and commerce
had already been a great deal reduced by then. Pocock assumes that it is highly
possible that these or their successors figured in eighteenth-century ideologies of
sociability, sensibility and politeness, serving to reduce the stark opposition between
citizenship and culture.7 In this respect, my thesis certainly agrees with Pocock in
saying that 'In the age of the Anglo-Scottish Union, when the reaction against the
Whig regime in its various forms led to many dramatic restatements of the virtue-
commerce tension, there is plenty of evidence for the persistence of the civic
humanist paradigm. ... It is certainly not the case that the Scottish theorists in
general regarded republican and jurisprudential language as distinct and ideologically
opposite rhetorics'.8 The non-existence of an antithesis between civic humanism and
natural jurisprudence however does not necessarily guarantee the putative existence
of a synthesis of them: there would be the possibility of a mere juxtaposition of them
in a vast area in-between those two extreme cases.
It seems more likely to be the case that Scottish social theorists made use of
both civic and jurisprudential idioms primarily for their criticism and refutation of
Court Whig ideology and policy, most notably expressed in Mandeville, who had
been neither Stoic nor Ciceronian unlike those Polite and Scots Whigs. My thesis
would agree neither with James Moore's view (that Hutcheson failed to synthesise
the civic and natural jurisprudential systems) nor with Haakonssen's view (that
Hutcheson succeeded in doing so), because their question, whether Hutcheson could
manage it or not, seems to be rather off the point. As a Shaftesburian Polite Whig,
5 Pocock (1983), p. 250. See my Introduction, p. 4.
6 Pocock (1983), p. 250.
7 Quentin Skinner (1978), Vol. I, Chapters 8 and 9; Pocock (1983), pp. 250-1. See my Introduction, p.
4.
8 Pocock (1983), p. 251.
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Hutcheson had used, but not necessarily intending to synthesise, both natural law
doctrines from Locke and the Continental natural jurists, together with a neo-
Harringtonian treatment of the forms of government, whenever useful for his
criticism ofMandeville.9 My thesis would not see 'us confronting a problem which
is not unlike the old "Adam Smith problem" in a more complex historical form':
that is, 'How did the complex synthesis of "moral sentiment" with "the wealth of
nations" evolve or degenerate into the science of classical economics'?10 My thesis
rather understands that Smith's theory of 'moral sentiments' was his assault on
Mandeville's ethical theory, and 'the wealth of nations' (Mandeville's term) was his
consequent alternative policy proposal and conclusion in place of Mandeville's,
following his own refutation of the ethical foundation ofMandeville's system.11
In view of this new 'Adam Smith problem',12 Pocock has suggested that 'A
9 Winch (1983), pp. 264-5. Caroline Robbins focused on the Country Whig influence on Hutcheson
and Smith, but her account of Hutcheson and Smith is inevitably far from systematic. See Caroline
Robbins (1959), pp. 185-96 for Hutcheson and pp. 196-9 for Smith.
10 Pocock (1983), p. 251.
11 Michael Ignatieff (1983), argues that 'Millar's contradictions' resulted from his being trapped
between those two languages of civic humanist moralism and of political economy, and concluded
that 'only one of them [could have] had the resolution to force his way to an internally consistent
discourse', assuming Smith's The Wealth ofNations was successful, unlike Millar's Historical View,
due to Smith's preference for the new language of economics over that of civic humanism in writing
his market analysis (pp. 341-2). My thesis regards that, in his political economy, Smith too used both
languages, in addition to many others possibly without what Ignatieff regards as 'tensions which
Smith was able to hold under control'. If something had 'broke Millar's work into irreconcilable
layers' (p. 342), it still might not have been 'the tensions' between the languages of civic humanism
and political economy, but could have been something else. But the topic is out of place in this
dissertation.
12 It would be of note that the 'Adam Smith problem' has sometimes been progressed one way or
another in an attempt to associate Smith with Marx, especially in nineteenth-century Germany, in mid
twentieth-century Japan and in 1970s King's College Cambridge. In Germany, those inventors of the
problem like Onken and others were Marxists of the first generation. Marxism has been one of the
dominant intellectual forces in Japan since 1920s, and consequently Smith studies in Japan, especially
in post-war years, have been effectively hijacked by Marxists. The collection of essays in Wealth and
Virtue originated from 1970s' series of seminars at Cambridge, and Marx is quoted right at the top of
the first page of the volume, referred to frequently in subsequent chapters by Pocock, Winch and
Ignatieff. One of the editors, Michael Ignatieff, later in another book made it clear that his intention
was to link Smith and Marx, or the ideals of natural liberty and of classical republican citizenship.
See Michael Ignatieff (1984), Chapter IV, pp. 105-31. The other editor, Istvan Hont, on the other
hand, attempted to link Smith and Marx by finding a connection between the Continental natural
jurisprudence tradition and socialism, particularly in their stadial theories of history: see Istvan Hont
(1987), pp. 253-76. It however would have made it difficult for them to capture Smith's philosophic
attitude as a Whig towards any ideological form of thinking. More 'tensions' seem to exist rather
between Smith himself and any ideological understanding of sociability, particularly against that of
Court Whiggism and Mandeville, than between civic humanism and natural jurisprudence in Smith.
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common strategy is to invoke Mandeville and suppose that this vindication of
egotism and greed somehow unmasks commercial society and prefigures its
reductionism. Yet this hardly seems convincing in the light of Hume's, Smith's and
Robertson's labours to demonstrate the proliferation and diversification of
personality under the conditions of commercial growth, an enterprise in which they
incorporated all that Mandeville had had to say'.13 Were this to be the case, my
thesis would collapse: but it should cause no surprise if we notice that, as early as
1983, Pocock seems not yet to have identified a clear distinction between
Mandevillian Court Whig commercial ideology and Polite and Scottish Whig
ideology including both Hume's sceptical and Smith's philosophic versions,14 even
though he could point out that 'it seems unlikely that the history of thought in this
period can be organized with the clash of [civic] virtue and commerce at its centre'.15
13 Pocock (1983), p. 252.
14 Pocock still seems to have no such clear distinction in 1985 when he argued that Polite Whigs could
not have been called Whigs, but later formed an ideological buttress of the 'Whig supremacy', that
they advocated a rational religion aimed at repressing moderating or replacing the 'enthusiasm' now
regarded as the central characteristic of Puritans, and that this was the Whig ideology which took a
decisive turn toward social, cultural and commercial virtues. See Pocock (1985), pp. 219 and 235.
Klein similarly thought that Scottish Whigs offered an alternative to civic humanism, in the form of
manners and politeness, as the response to their social, political and economic circumstances in
eighteenth-century Scotland, conceptualising the exigencies of commercial society, and that the
natural law tradition was important for their elaboration of a legitimist ideology for Whiggism, which
was accordingly individualistic, commercial and therefore liberal. See Klein, pp. 130-1.
15 Pocock (1983), p. 252.
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